



CIA FILE ON
REINHARD GEHLEN
VOL. U



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1. ON 23 JUNE FRENCH COMMUNIST DAILY QUOTE L'HUMANITE UNQUOTE
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3. TO HQS: DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS SOV REACTION TO REF
ARTICLE. ALTHOUGH FIRST ARTICLE IS BASICALLY HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
ON GEHLEN, IT CONTAINS CHARGES BOTH U.S. DOLLAR AND FEDERAL DEUTSCH
MARKS ARE NOW BEING USED TO CONTINUE FORMER NAZI SUVERSIVE EFFORT
AGAINST SOV UNION. IMPLICATION IS U.S. AND GERM GOVT ARE PERPETUATING
NAZI GAME.

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English translation of L'Humanite' series on Reinhard GEHLEN
filed C November 1966.

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File:
Reinhard GEHLEN 201
June 1966

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DATE: _____

FROM SHERMAN KENT

TO: [] []

One of the lovelies from your
Office that I met at
your house the other
evening told me that she
had not heard of this
series. Here it is in
English. *Sherman*

Washington Representative
November 1966

A SERIES OF ARTICLES ON REINHARD GELLEN

Following is a translation of three articles by Alain Guerin and Jean Hansi on Reinhard Gellen entitled, "When the Shadow General Was Going to School," "A Chalet in the Alps and a Plane to Washington," and "This Man is Dangerous," in the French-language newspaper L'Humanité (Humanity), Paris, 22 June 1950, p. 3, 24 June, 1950, p. 2, and June 26, p. 2.

When the Shadow General Was Going to School.

Let us first turn the pages of some newspapers. For the Zeitungs of Zurich it is "a man without face," for Frankfurter it is "an invincible general;" for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Essen it is "the man with a thousand faces;" for Le Monde it is "the most enigmatic and best-concealed man in history;" for the Wendische Tagesblatt of Dortmund it is "the Shadow General;" for Aux Echos it is "the king of espionage;" for Christ und Welt of Stuttgart it is "the man of whom nothing is known;" for the London Telegraph it is "the secret phoenix of Germany;" for Time of New York it is "the doctor;" for the Allgemeine Zeitung of Leipzig it is "the most dangerous man of the West;" for the Stockholm Tidningen it is "a strange chief of spies;" for the Daily Express of London it is "a Hitler general who now spies for dollars," etc.

Does this journalistic honors list define a man or is it proceed from a legend? To answer this question is one of the goals of this inquiry. A question among others which one, moreover, could pose in a different manner. Like this, for example: Has Reinhard Gellen, the present President of the BND, known for the past 25 years an exceptional fate and is he now one of the last and most insignificant proselytes of the "cold war", one of the most dangerous revengers of Bonn, a man who can raise a grave provocation in this still explosive land of Germany? It is a question which requires its full sense, its full range when one knows that the BND is the Bundesnachrichtendienst, that is to say the Federal News Service of West Germany, the heritage organism which Jacques Bloch-Morhange called the "new of German spies".

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manufacturers." (1)

An inquiry on Gehlen, therefore.

To be appraised in the ordinary practice of our times, this type of inquiry does not present many difficulties if one wants to avoid all effability. The man of the secret likes to practice intoxication, even indirect, and it is often difficult to distinguish the border between the lie and the truth. For that reason we propose to stick to the facts.

The first fact in the life of a man is his birth. Reinhard Gehlen was born in Erfurt in Thuringia on 3 April 1894 in the apartment occupied by his father at No. 63 Lieberstrasse. Who was this father? He was an Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) in the army of the Kaiser, Walter Gehlen, himself the son of a governmental counselor of the Prussian monarchy. And his mother? Katharina Margarete van Vaerenwyck belonged to a family of Flemish origin. Reinhard was the first son of the household. He was three years old when his younger brother Walter was born, a future Jurist.

The Gehlen family remained only a few years in Erfurt. In 1908, in fact, the Oberleutnant left the army and moved to and installed himself on the banks of the Oder, in Breslau, (the present Polish Wrocław). In partnership with his uncle, his brother Max, a doctor of jurisprudence at the University of Leipzig, the Oberleutnant had purchased the Breslau University Publishing House Ferdinand Hirt at Königsplatz No. 1.

At the Breslau Gymnasium, Reinhard Gehlen received in 1918 the diploma equivalent to our Baccalaureat. He is sixteen and a half years old. He spends his adolescence in a Germany militarily defeated and economically ruined. For other sons of the nobility and bourgeoisie, the war of 1914 - 1918 and its tragic results had been the occasion to open the eyes and to range themselves at the side of the working class. The young Reinhard did the opposite. He applauded with his family the bloody crushing of the Spartakist episode, and, faithful to the Prussian tradition of his ancestors, he chose the army profession in a Germany officially without an army.

His destiny is from now on outlined: As soon as he can,

(1) "The War Manufacturers -- German Spies -- 1918 - 1960." -- Paris, 1960.

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he becomes Fahnenjunker (student officer) in the renaissance Reichswehr, where he is admitted on 20 April 1920, hardly 18 years old.

Embrace of the National Socialist Idea.

These endowments as man of war and a mind dedicated to the cult of revenge assure the young Gehlen a rapid and brilliant career, so much more remarkable as despite the repeated violations of the Versailles Treaty, openings were rare in the German army. Thus, on 1 December 1923, he is appointed Leutnant (second lieutenant) and sent to the second battery of the Third Artillery Regiment in Schweidnitz (the present Polish city of Swidnica). The Third Artillery is an Ausbildungsgeschwader (training regiment). This appointment illustrates the concern that now seems primordial for Heinrich Gehlen: to acquire the maximum military knowledge. He goes to Schweidnitz in 1926 to spend two years at the cavalry school in Hannover. He left there as Oberleutnant (first lieutenant).

From then on his rise continues. He is promoted (captain) at 33, and in 1935 he is chosen as one of 30 officers who receive the title of Generalstabler (officer of the General Staff).

Who chose these fifty officers? The Nazis, to be sure, who were in power for the past two years and who, by the Law of 16 March 1935, constituted a Wehrmacht already 33 divisions strong. It are still the Nazis who admit Heinrich Gehlen to the Kriegsakademie (war academy) they just have opened, violating once more the Versailles Treaty.

It is true, as Julius Mader so excellently remarked (1), that the entire family Gehlen got on excellently with the Hitlerites from the beginning. The Ferdinand Hirt Publishing House had received the title "model Nationalist Socialist enterprise." The president of the "control committee for the protection of international Socialist writings" had written in the "National Socialist bibliography," the principal work of Heinrich's father. And when the young brother Walter Gehlen had supported a doctoral dissertation in jurisprudence at the University of Frankfurt, it had been on the question whether a deputy should feel responsible to his voters or whether, on the contrary, he should be

(2) In his book "Die graue Hand" (The Gray Hand) -- Berlin 1931.

concerned only about reasons of State.

Politically sure in the eyes of the Nazis, the young officer Reinhard Gehlen was it not less in those of the Prussian Junkers. When he married on 10 September 1931 at Glogow (the present Polish Glogow), he had taken as wife Maria (later Lotte Agnes Helene von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, the daughter of Junkers whose properties even then bordered on Polish soil.

The Colonel Is Forty Years Old.

Now that he is wearing the reverce sash which distinguishes the officers of the general staff in the Third Reich, the run of honors for the son of the Breslau editor is accelerated.

He spends his eighteenth and nineteenth years on his estate in Liegnitz (the present Polish city of Legnica), is then commander of the 18th Artillery Regiment, and he serves as major at the general staff of the 213th Division of the 8th Military Region in the invasion of Poland.

In 1940, flying upon France, Reinhard Gehlen pursues in the "lightning war" the career as specialist of the "first bureau" (Army Intelligence officer), which he has undertaken under the protection of General Von Manstein. In several pleasures of invading our country as a liaison officer. His missions he circulates between the headquarters of Hermann von Brauchitsch, the army of von Bunch and the "Panzer" of the Generals von Roth and Guderian.

Already, however, Hitler prepared the war in the East. Successively Adjutant (aide-de-camp) of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army, Halder, then head of the "Eastern group" of the operational group, under orders of an officer who achieved later a certain celebrity, Hansinger, Reinhard Gehlen participates in the preparation of the aggression against the USSR, the Barbarossa Plan. He distinguishes himself in the spring a decoration and a promotion. In June he is decorated with the Kriegsverdienstkreuz Erster Klasse mit Brillanten (Distinguished War Service Cross First Class with Diamonds) and on 1 July 1941 he is promoted to Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant colonel).

During the first months of the "Russian campaign," Oberstleutnant Gehlen continues to be an "Army Intelligence" officer, that is to say, in charge of operational questions (in France the First Bureau of the general staff), but his position

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will change very soon. In fact, General Franz Halder, who has been his patron since October 1940, has encouraged with "Service 12" of his General Staff: the "Freunde Heere Ost" (Foreign Armies East). Commanded by an elderly colonel, Kinnel, "Service 12" did not furnish the detailed information which of the general staff of the land armies has the right to obtain of his intelligence service. This dearth of "secrets" is particularly annoying when the Wehrmacht, first victorious, experiences in the East its first reverses.

In the spring of 1942, General Halder therefore discharges Kinnel from the direction of "Freunde Heere Ost." To replace him he chooses an officer of his general staff who just for that forty: Reinhard Gehlen, and promotes him on this occasion to the rank of Oberst (colonel).

Until now an "I A" officer (operations), the son of the German publisher becomes therefore an "I C" officer (intelligence) (the equivalent of the 2nd Bureau in the French intelligence staffs). And at once, with a higher rank, he becomes the head of a service including several hundred officers whose training extends from Scandinavia to the south of the Balkans, and who ask all the questions relating to the enemy No. 1 of the Third Reich: the Soviet Union.

The Enemy-bag Thieves.

Reinhard Gehlen understands at once the importance and interest of his new situation. Between the "Abwehr" (3) of Admiral Canaris, who gets winded and gets himself in the way of his intrigues with some British and American agents and the S.D. (4) of Schellenberg, whose Machievellianism is sometimes impeded by the fanatical instincts of some Nazi leaders, the new chief of "Freunde Heere Ost" feels that here is a place to be. At once he conceives the project of a service uniquely dedicated to intelligence and anti-Soviet action. Anti-communism must be the sole rule of this service. It is logical that he therefore

(3) Accurately "Abwehr Ausland" (counter-espionage abroad of the OKW) (General Staff of the Land, Sea and Air Forces). Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was its head since 1939.

(4) Accurately SD fur das Ausland (security service abroad, or Amt VI (Sixth Bureau) of the RSHA (Central Security Bureau of the Reich). Under the authority of the supreme chief of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, the SS chiefs Heydrich -- before his execution by the resistance in Prague -- and Kaltenbrunner have successively directed the RSHA. One gets an idea of the importance of the RSHA when one knows that its Amt IV (Fourth Bureau) was the Gestapo itself (Secret State Police).

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will obey the best anti-Communist of the time: Adolf Hitler, but he will nevertheless not let himself be restrained by the rules regarding the Hitlerian camarilla, nor, furthermore, by the intrigues of the various general staffs of the Wehrmacht.

In the Prussian tradition, he will seek his own organization, in the "new order" of the Nazi Reich, his own agency, and from both he will get their contempt and their desire for supremacy.

Modernism mixed with the absence of scruples will lead him to practice in a "total war" (total intelligence, and military, scientific and economic, etc.) and in his for subversion and provocation not to take into account the rules of espionage that requires that action and intelligence be fully concealed.

Such will be the service -- essentially counter-revolutionary, this war machine must not disappear with the Hitler birth: the Hitler Reichsmark, the dollar, the Reichsmark, and the Reichsmark of Federal Germany, and, on the other, be the fuel.

But let us not anticipate. We are still in 1941.

The manner in which Reinhard Gehlen profoundly reformed and totally reorganized the service whose head he had been comes into view in the comparison made by Julius and Ethel between the French Secret (st and its homologues for the front: French Secret West. Whereas the first will be the effectives multiplied by ten and foreboding in its action, the American CIA, the second will remain a service of the general staff, concerned especially with military operations and operations and very comparable with the French Deuxieme Bureau during the two wars. Gehlen "took new roads," leader concludes. And that is all.

The new chief of French Secret East received similar orders from his superiors "special powers" and the transfer of dozens and then of hundreds of young non-commissioned officers of secret to his service. Young non-commissioned officers and soldiers of other professions: chemists and geographers, economists and physicists, linguists and policemen, forgers and physicians, printers and parachutists, etc.

Pretending friendship for Canaris, when in April 1941 he let him be executed without having a finger, Gehlen obtained from the chief of Abwehr the "cession" of a large part of his Ostabteilung (Eastern Section), this organism of chief.

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G. Colvin has written (6): "the incomparable Russian department of counter-espionage that Canaris had prepared." At the same time he creates and organizes a new corps, the Frontaufklarungstruppen (front reconnaissance troops) subdivided in regiments and companies, placed under the orders of specially-chosen "I C" officers. One of the first directives which he gave his new troops when he sent them behind the Soviet lines -- by infiltration or by parachute -- was to assassinate a maximum of Red Army officers in order to steel their wallets.

The chief of Fremde Heere Ost ordered these wallets there even at a time when he worked out new missions for Gruppe II and Gruppe III of his service. While the 3d section is now on is to devote itself to the "liquidation of the prisoners," the 2nd is to devote all its efforts to the interrogation of the prisoners of war. A center is organized for this purpose, the fort of Boyen, near Lotzen.

To this fort are brought officers and soldiers of the Red Army, "raided" by Gehlen's men from the various Soviet prisoner of war camps. The Oberst also gave his instructions for these "raids": Leaders of the Communist Party, engineers, scientists and artists must be specially searched for.

A Chalet in the Alps and a Plane to Washington

Hundreds of Soviet war prisoners were interrogated each day at the Prussian fort of Boyen by the men of Canaris's Gruppe II. (1)

-- Mix violence with sweetness! the chief of Fremde Heere Ost told his officers.

It would have been more correct to say: enticement and torture. A certain enticement was, in fact, the great concern of Reinhard Gehlen.

-- The instructions of the Führer for the conquest by force of the Russian land and its total exploitation as a German colony can only lead us to our destruction, he pointedly

(6) In his book "Admiral Canaris, Chef des Geheimdienstes" (Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Secret Service), Vienna, Munich, Zurich, 1955.

(1) See in yesterday's 1. Universal the article of this inquiry "When the Shadow General went to the School."

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told his young officers. We can conquer the Soviet system only if we succeed in making the mass of the Soviet population our ally"

Certainly, this reflection of Gehlen might cause quite some remarks. To report it after the Hitlerian defeat was evidently aimed at nourishing the veritable campaign waged by Gehlen himself, tending to present him as an "opponent" of Hitler, a silent ally, but not thinking less of the loss of the "twentieth July," which he was not. Such a reflection justifies, moreover, by its unreality ... but what we want to point out here is a preoccupation that often carries the reader-spy Gehlen over to espionage: subversion.

From 1942 on, the chief of Brande Heere Oct wants the members of his service to be constantly concerned "with recruitment... To recruit the Soviets is easy to order but difficult to execute. That is why Gehlen is not so particular about the quality of his recruits: "The political adversaries of the Soviet regime" will be especially those sentenced by eastern law, liberated by the German advance, white Russian refugees, and up all over Europe and some deserters.

As neither this sort of recruitment nor recruitment proves very successful, Gehlen also used "psychological warfare" to the letter. He tried to reawaken nationalism and chauvinism in the territories occupied by the Nazis. He tried to arouse the Ukrainians, the Belts and the Ukrainians against the Germans. But were the results of these attempts, on which we have already here because they were retained by Gehlen later than the "cold war" in Germany for the account of the Americans?

They contributed in an important way to the making up of the "Weiss Army" and the utilization of the "collaborators" of the O.U.N. (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). If the Brande Heere Oct was able to outfit a few thousand soldiers with the German uniform, the millions of pamphlets it had printed and distributed in Russia did not have the anticipated result. Torture and assassination remained more successful.

"Cold Realism."

The prompt development of the espionage service which had been entrusted to him, certainly won Reinhard Gehlen a title.

(2) As Jurgen Thorwald did in Die Zeit on November of 30 November 1950.

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more rapid advancement than he had had until then. The reason in which he experienced this advancement confirms, moreover, what we have said earlier about the attempted poisoning that constitutes the campaign leading to make the chief of the Foreign Office appear as an ally of the officers who on 20 July 1944 tried to kill Hitler and who after their failure were savagely executed. Gehenis suffered the counterattack on 20 July, not earlier. On the contrary. It was at the time when the members of the Wehrmacht had been purged and each promotion was submitted to the approval of a political committee. It was on the SS that the master of the espionage network, who had been successively promoted to Generalmajor (brigadier general) and then to Generalleutnant (general of a division), promotions took place on 1 December 1944 and the 1st January 1945. (3)

The committee we spoke about had expressed the opinion that Reinhard Gehenis was "without reproach and of complete confidence." On 9 January 1945 he was personally promoted by Hitler.

It will be understood that under these conditions the recreating of the Nazi special services undertaken by Gehenis or defect, when Schellenberg had to double his forces, was not "Ant VI" and take over the rest of the dissolved service, did not affect Gehenis. (4)

On the contrary, some Lucjan Wolnowski (3), the Polish intelligence on the East European countries for analysis and synthesis. And at the end of March 1946, the same source with social-democratic tendencies, Freie inner Schweiz, published in Lucerne, wrote:

"SS Reichsführer Hitler and the chief of the service 'Fremde Heere Ost' had during the war the supreme control over all the East European offices of Germany."

(5) The last of these two promotions, the one to Generalleutnant, is often hushed up or even concealed in Western Germany. The reason is easy to understand. However, the proofs are numerous, including the edition of 28 July 1950 of the Münzinger Archiv, devoted to Gehenis's biography (p. 288).

(4) As we explained in our preceding work, Ant VI was the 20 für Gehenis (Security Service) of the RSHA (Central Security Office of the Reich), of which Ant IV was the well-known Gestapo.

(5) In the book "Gehenis" (p. 100).

Worms, 1955.

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However, in 1944, Reinhard Gehlen is very much in doubt about the German victory, and, as Jürgen Thorwald notes (6): "At the latest in mid-1944, Gehlen began to collect reports, documents, studies and archives on Russia in view of the success of the Bavarian Alpine Division. Thus -- and I have learned it from numerous sources -- it was impossible for the archives of 'Freudenhof' to have been destroyed."

While thus taking the precautions, Gehlen, by preparing his transit to the American side. He was, however, a lieutenant, who always prided himself on being a "dangerous dreamer of power," continue to act with the one must not compromise one's future in case of a victory to Hitler. For that reason he prepared, and carried out, his "American operation" his "operation Reichsflucht."

The "Reichsflucht" plan for the "desertion."

It will be recalled that under the name of "Reichsflucht" and "desertion," acting in small groups, there had been actions in Germany following the Hitlerian defeat on the Western Front. While these factions pulled about here and there, the "Reichsflucht" was received with open arms by the Americans. It was he who had conceived the action plan of the "Reichsflucht" plan conceived by Himmler and put into operation by the "Reichsflucht" (General of an SS Army Corps) from 1944 on.

To provide for this clandestine "Reichsflucht" operation, Gehlen had drawn his inspiration from the Polish "Reichsflucht" movement. The British officers of the Intelligence Service, in the "Reichsflucht" movement, who interviewed Walter Scheller, a German officer following his capture by the Allies, reported (7): "Scheller told us that during the days close to Germany's defeat, Major General von Gehlen, who had worked for a long time in organizing the Polish clandestine movement, had worked out a plan of German resistance on the same basis."

It is not far-fetched to believe that Gehlen, on his promotion to the rank of Generalleutnant to his old division. However, with things developing as they did, Gehlen obviously devoted himself essentially to his "American operation," while the allied troops in the East and the West occupied him.

(6) In Die Welt am Sonntag of 27 November 1944. This publication is the Sunday edition of the largest paper in the right in western Germany, Die Welt, published in Hamburg.

(7) In his book "The Last Days of Hitler," London 1947.

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successive offensives the ruins of the Third Reich.

Another eminent member of the Intelligence Service, Heister-Beckmann wrote (2): "When the Hitlerian system collapsed in 1945, General Gehlen was able to flee to the West with the most important documents of his service. He had in his possession the most secret lists of German agents in the USSR and in the neighboring countries to the East (...). He had a plan for the espionage net created by Goebbels, Himmler and Heinrich Heide." (3)

This "key," one may say, was voluminous. In fact, it concerned not simply to furnish the American services with intelligence and archives, but to continue with the operation of his espionage and subversion apparatus, Gehlen had in his dispositions so that his principal collaborators could escape the consequences of defeat as he had done.

-- Go quietly and have the Americans take you prisoners, the chief of Fremde Heere Ost said to his officers and to his trusted men. Do not say anything, once you are taken. To speak, wait for our orders, for mine or those of my principal collaborators.

At the same time, those who remained of the German military post transmitted to many families of Gehlen's friends the advice to die "for the Führer, the people and the Fatherland." Was "death" not the best cover? Especially accompanied by forged papers ...

Disappearing with ... Cigarettes.

At first Gehlen and his staff sought refuge in a place where bombs were stored, the "Geybach I," not far from Berlin. From there, when all the records had been "taken" (the records were in triplicate and classified in hermetically sealed containers), they went to a Bavarian Alpine area, where a vast chalet was waiting for them. According to General Gehlen, (4) this Alpine place is called Blonds-Alpe; Julius and Ethel it (Blondstein (5) ...

In his Alpine chalet, Heinrich Gehlen experienced a short time of inactivity -- not more than a few weeks -- the only one of his career, and then he came down to Munich. In this small Bavarian town he met American officers. He planned

(2) In the Briefing Memoirs of 17 March 1945.

(3) In his book "Die Graue Hand" (The Gray Hand),

Berlin 1961.

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himself into their hands as a prisoner, declined to give his rank, and asked to see as quickly as possible a high official of the intelligence. Thereupon, "prisoner Gehlen" was sent to the Intelligence Center of the Seventh US Army in Wiesbaden.

The contact thus established with the 1st and 2nd of the C.I.C. (10) soon bore fruit. In June 1945, Red Cross officers were already no longer a captive but an interlocutor. The records of the Brenda Moore had lost their lock, and the offices of the American headquarters at Wiesbaden, the principal collaborators of the services came out of the caves of the prison camps to join their chief. He was then left for Washington ...

Thus, less than three months after the fall of the head of the principal espionage service and the subversion of Hitler was received by American officers at the seat of the C.I.C. (11) in the (12) negotiations began between Reinhard Gehlen on the one hand, Professor Sherman Kent and Brigadier General ... other.

Feeling that his interlocutors were loyal, the chief (but still alive) of Brenda Moore got hold of the conditions. The main ones were: To be employed as a contributing force in the US Services, but not to be mixed with them; to have a budget in dollars, but to be paid only with American top officials; to receive the assurance that whenever an autonomous German Government would be established, it would be subordinated to it and would be free to demand on the American; to have to furnish intelligence only on the Communists and the countries of the East, with the exception of any information susceptible to embarrass the American Government; finally, to be assured that all his past would escape prosecution for war crimes and "denazification" investigation that was in progress at that time.

-- O. H., answered the Americans, and especially Bill Donovan, the chief of the O.S.S.; Allen D. Dulles, the future head of the CIA, and General George V. Loring, the head of "G-2." (13)

- (10) Counter Intelligence Corps.
- (11) Office of Strategic Services, the American Intelligence Service during the war and the predecessor of the present CIA.
- (12) The American "G-2" is the equivalent of the German "I C" and of the French "Deuxieme Bureau, i.e. the equivalent of the various general staffs charged with intelligence.

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Reinhard Gehlen was even presented to Edgar G. Hoover, the head of the FBI (13), another gourmet in anti-Communist matters. The effective preparation of the Gehlen network within its new American setting was entrusted to a Jewish specialist in intelligence, a future CIA person like, I think, Becker (14). Financing began immediately in the year 1947 with 2,500,000 dollars from the very beginning, especially by Gordon Belzer (8), and indirectly with thousands of pounds of cigarettes, which the agents of the network sold at high prices on the black market.

Was this going to lead to the establishment of the *Süddeutsche Industrieüberwachung* (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany)?

III. This can be answered.

Sometimes "Doctor," sometimes no. 30," sometimes "Dr. Lohrer Schneider," etc. Reinhard Gehlen likes cover for himself, and also for his service. Thus, before the "Industrial" cover: "Süddeutsche Industrieüberwachung" (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany), he had a "Doctor" (15). In fact, he returned from Washington under the name of a member of the Historical Division of the US Army and installed himself in his network in Wiesbaden. He remained there until 1947. A trial period? A testing period? Did the Americans want to verify the efficiency of a service that already cost them more than two billion former Marks annually?

Yes and no. In fact, on the one hand there was an entire year for Gehlen only a waiting period, long as the newspaper *Die Zeit* (8) of Munich says: He "had already in 1946 and 1947 the possibility to extend his secret service network to the East;" but, on the other hand, it is evident that in

(13) Federal Bureau of Investigation: Director of Federal Police, an important part of which follows nationalization of the same order as the FBI in France, but with a more pronounced McCarthyist orientation.

(14) Loftus Becker did not hesitate to take part in the Nuremberg trials, but without appearing among the American audience.

(15) See in yesterday's *Washington Post* the article of this inquiry: "A check in the files and a look at Washington."

(8) In its edition of 2 February 1948.

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recuperation of the organism *Freude Meere Ost* and its de facto insertion in the US special services system had not taken place without causing some disturbance in the leading circles of the United States.

The liberals formed in the Roosevelt school, a criticism for whom Nazism remained a historic villainy, men who sincerely believed in peace and friendship among the people determined to oppose this internal re-employment of a gang of chivalrous and criminals and of their thousands of agents for ends of an odious character did not cease to them. But the future Trotskyists carried the day. "In the end," noted *Jour. de l'Europe*, (1) "Eichsen's choice sanctioned a veering of American policy. It was the choice of the cold war."

With this first preliminary crossed, Reinhard could not could incontestably develop his organization in a more systematic manner. The move so no Washington was then making the director of a master of his dominions -- master but also pupil -- Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John A. Dulles and placed by Truman at the head of the CIA, when this instrument of war preparation was born. (4)

From its *Hauptverwaltung* (General Management) at the *Kellmannstrasse* in Pfullen, in the Munich suburbs, the so-called "*Süddeutsche Industrieverwaltung*" (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany) therefore achieved from its establishment in 1948 a rapid progress.

Systematically using the commercial cover, Reinhard organized his network under the appearance of a vast commercial firm, with branches called *Gesamtervertretungen* (general representations), *Bereichsvertretungen* (district representations), *Unterververtretungen* (subrepresentations), and *Filialen* (local branches). This took place in Germany, while *Residenzen* (residences) were established abroad.

It should be mentioned that even when the *Adlon* service

(3) In *Die Welt am Sonntag* of 27 November 1968.

(4) The "Central Intelligence Agency," of which it is known that it could be called the "invisible government" of the US and which, from the overthrow of Mussolini (in Italy) and of Arbenz (in Guatemala) to the recent resurgence in Indochina and the incessant provocations against Cuba has shown that no war-daring activity is unknown to it.

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ceased to be the clandestine Süddeutsche Industriewerk, going to become the official IWD, the "commercial" side having remained in existence and the type of organization was not modified. Geographically, even if the "Filialen" and "Untervertretungen" often changed their seats, the "Hauptvertretungen" (installed in Stocking near Munich, in Lohr itself, in Hamburg, Darmstadt, Düsseldorf, Karlsruhe, etc.) were relatively fixed and the "Untervertretungen" were stable. Abroad, the "Auslandsturen" were generally in the capitals and the networks-- according to the importance of the country -- spread almost everywhere.

The "Dissolving of the Chancellor."

We have seen that one of the conditions laid down by Goehlen in 1940 to the Americans for his re-employment had been the necessity de facto for all the Nazis to remain in his organization he wished to continue. This was the reason for the public notoriety that former Nazis were abundant in Pullach. It is estimated that of the 12,000 collaborators and the 12,000 agents of the organization, 57 % have come from the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the SS, the "IC" Bureau of the General Staff, the Wehrmacht (GKW), while 25 % or more than 2,000 men, the former members of Bureau IV (Gestapo) and VI (Schellenberg) of RSHA (G).

Some "former" names should be cited which will be or figured still recently among the members of the German Service. These include the names of Franz-Alfred Sitt, SS Brigadeführer (SS Brigadier General); Emil Langemann, SS Sturmbannführer (SS Commander); Fritz Schmidt, alias Friedrich Schütte, of the Leitstelle (directing office) of the G. I. in Kiel; of Franz Cüring, alias Wilhelm Thierold, alias Wilhelm Tobias, SS Hauptsturmführer (SS Captain); Hans Hütli, alias Walter Hagen, SS Sturmbannführer; Ernst Languet, SS Sturmbannführer (SS Colonel); Ernst Languet, alias Berthold Kastner, alias Krause, SS Officer.

The can throw light on some of these names by pointing out that Wilhelm Hütli was under Hitler the collaborator of Adolf Eichmann; that Ernst Krause was the collaborator of Otto Skorzeny, and that Franz Schmidt distinguished himself during the massacre of the "Foreign workers camp" at Mauthausen.

(5) The relations between the various German services of the Hitlerian Germany were recalled in the third article of this investigation.

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Ott near Kiel, where 2,000 captives were killed by a bullet in the nape of the neck, and also during the extermination of 6,000 deported persons on the vessel "Cap-sabons."

One would have to cite still dozens of other cases just as exemplary ... But that is not all. For it should also be noted that, by protecting them and by paying them not to lose their lives, Reinhard Gehlen has contributed between 1945 and the creation of the Bundeswehr a masterpiece, a breeding-ground of militarism. Adolf Heusinger, for example, by working first at Pullach before experiencing the nice career that is known. And General Ernst Terbohn, chief of the NATO "standing group" in Washington until his death... etc.

Moreover, on 21 August 1945, Georges Pompidou could write in Le Monde about Gehlen and his men: "Even before the first noise of the boots has resounded, even before the first hissing of a jet motor, the Federal Republic will owe thanks to the Americans, of an intelligence or counter-intelligence service whose ramifications are extended all over Eastern Europe and perhaps even the West."

Paris-Presso said the same one year later, on 22 August 1946: "The Federal Republic of Bonn inherits today a service polished by 13 years of uninterrupted labor, which merits consideration as the most dynamic anti-Communist intelligence network."

In fact, the transition of Reinhard Gehlen from the American leg to the official control of Bonn, his elevation to the rank of Ministerialdirektor and the new title of Nachrichtenendienst (Federal Intelligence Service), or BND, that has been given to his network were one of the first steps to German rearmament and took on the quality of a signal. Konrad Adenauer, moreover, knew to appreciate Gehlen's value and often received him privately -- this Gehlen whom the Soviet writer V. Chernov (6) baptized "the darling of the Chancellor."

The "Konzanne" Paid.

The transition of Reinhard Gehlen from the Americans to the Bonn authorities took officially place in 1946. The word "transition" should be correctly understood. It is certain, in fact, that the BND continued to be associated with the CIA and to serve the designs of the warmongering American circle in

(6) The title of a book published in Moscow in 1962.

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Europe and elsewhere. However, Gehlen gained by this transfer greater liberty and vaster means.

Since 1948, the head of the Fremde Heere Ost service had joined a "syndicate" section to his network. This section permits the principal Konzerns, the big trusts of the "economic miracle" in Germany to use espionage and provocation as means to fight labor claims. For that reason, excellent relations developed between Reinhard Gehlen and men like Hermann A. Abs, Robert Pfordmenges, Wilhelm Sungen, Hermann von Siemens, Axel Ilgner, etc. Abs was the biggest German banker of the West, a member of some thirty administrative councils, etc. etc., another powerful banker, twenty administrative councils, a financial counselor of Adenauer, Sungen, director of the Hoescht trust; von Siemens, director of the Siemens trust, one billion marks of capital; Ilgner, the man with a reputation of trust at I.G. Farben.

When he wanted to profit from his transfer to the West, Reinhard Gehlen did not in vain count on the good heart and the gratitude of these associates. The German industry has turned over ten billion marks for the transition of Gehlen," wrote the Gesamtdeutsche Zeitung on 20 January 1956.

And since then, the Minna has not stopped coming down the coffers at Pullach, nor the domicile of Gehlen, 11111 in Berg near Sternberg from being open to the representatives of the Konzerns. Direct subventions and very remunerative cover money offered to the numerous collaborators of the GMD arrived in this manner and furnished 50 % of his budget for organization at Pullach. The other half is made up of official financing which, by official accounts, reached 20,100,000 marks in 1956, 45,000,000 in 1959, and 55,100,000 in 1960.

Such increases during the years of his human, financial and technical means led Gehlen to give more credence to the GMD. While continuing the lance head of the "Cold War" in Berlin and the Federal Republic (2), the former chief of the Fremde Heere Ost service (7) has been concerned during the

(2) Activities of provocation and aggression against the German Democratic Republic are and remain a constant concern of Gehlen. Statistics covering the period between 13 August 1961 and 31 July 1962 give a good indication: 458 attacks and 236 cases of aggression against the borders of the GDR; 136 tear-gas bombs dropped; 100 cases of border violations and 2,715 of sabotage against the railway lines of the G-Drahn.

(7) Service of Foreign Armies East. See the preceding two articles.

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ten years with giving some sort of universal competence to his instrument of subversion and espionage.

Let us throw a rapid glance on some of these activities. The countries of the People's Democracies and the USSR are, of course, the main subjects. But not only they, but from it, have to suffer from Gehlen's activities. Sweden, Great Britain, Italy, numerous countries in Africa, Austria, the East Islands, France and Egypt have during the past few years been reached by the enterprises of the RMD.

Terror in Tyrol and Explosives at the IJsselmeer.

Who, as was revealed by a document found by the French services at NATO in July 1952, had ordered his agents to find the localities where explosives could be most efficiently placed in the dikes of the Zuiderzee to inundate a part of Holland?

Who, as we said at that time, has actively aided in Germany itself the terrorists of the "Red Hand" against the Algerian patriots?

Who supports in Austria and Northern Italy the terror actions of the members of the Cultural Work of Southern Tyrol, of the Edelweiss League, and of the Liberation Committee of Southern Tyrol (LAF)?

Who established contacts with former General Gehlen, the head of CIA and gave him some aid against promises of privileges in case the subversion would have removed him to France?

Who uses systematically, as formerly the "Vlasov Army," all emigrant organizations to recruit agents and stir up trouble in the countries of origin?

Who has sent armed groups to Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine?

The answer to all these questions, to be sure, is: Reinhard Gehlen.

And this answer, coming after we have told about him since the beginning of this investigation, shows how dangerous this man is. Spy merchant, manufacturer of provocations, master of subversion, he is one of those who in Bonn continue to dream of war.

Reinhard Gehlen is the U-Fall, the case of emergency and all agents of the RMD, under all circumstances, have received instructions concerning this subject. Very precise instructions.

It will be necessary to speak of this again.

I. - Quand "le général de l'ombre" allait à l'école...

FEUILLETONS d'abord quelques journaux... Pour le Weltwoche de Zurich, c'est « un homme sans visage » ; pour Paris-Presse, c'est « un général invisible » ; pour la Westdeutsche Allgemeine d'Essen, c'est « l'homme aux mille oreilles » ; pour Combat, c'est « le personnage le plus énigmatique et le mieux dissimulé de l'histoire » ; pour la Westdeutsche Tageblatt de Dortmund, c'est « le général de l'ombre » ; pour Aux Ecoutés, c'est « le roi de l'espionnage » ; pour le Christ und Welt de Stuttgart, c'est « l'homme dont on ne sait rien » ; pour le Sunday Telegraph de Londres, c'est « le Phénix secret de l'Allemagne » ; pour Time de New York, c'est « le docteur » ; pour l'Allgemeine Zeitung de Mayence, c'est « l'homme le plus dangereux de l'Occident » ; pour le quotidien suédois Stockholm Tidningen, c'est « un étrange chef d'espions » ; pour le Daily Express de Londres, c'est « un général de Hitler qui maintenant espionne pour des dollars », etc.

l'école...



M. Gehlen aime le mystère : sa signature (notre cliché) est aussi rare que son visage

— l'Humour —

23 June 1966



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Ce palmarès journalistique définit-il un homme ou précède-t-il d'une légende ? Répondre à cette question est un jeu de hasard. Une question parmi d'autres et que l'on pourrait d'ailleurs autrement poser. Comme cela, par exemple : Reinhard Gehlen, l'actuel président du BND, a-t-il connu depuis 25 ans un destin exceptionnel et est-il actuellement l'un des derniers et des plus forcés prosélytes de la « guerre froide », l'un des plus dangereux revanchards de Bonn, un homme qui peut monter une grave provocation sur cette terre explosive qu'est encore l'Allemagne ? Question qui prend tout son sens, toute sa portée, quand on sait que le BND est le Bundesnachrichtendienst, c'est-à-dire le Service fédéral de renseignements d'Allemagne de l'Ouest, l'organisme héritier de ces espions allemands que Jacques Bloch-Moisan a pu appeler « les fabricants de guerre ». (1)

Une enquête sur Gehlen, donc.

Pour être très prisé en l'ordinaire de nos jours, ce genre d'enquête n'en présente pas moins bien des difficultés si l'on veut éviter toute affabulation. Les gens du secret pratiquent volontiers l'intoxication, même indirecte et c'est un snobisme de l'ombre que d'affecter de ne plus distinguer la frontière entre le mensonge et la vérité. Aussi bien notre propos sera-t-il de nous en tenir aux faits...

Le premier fait de la vie d'un homme, c'est sa naissance... Reinhard Gehlen naquit à Erfurt, en Thuringe, le 3 avril 1902, dans l'appartement qu'occupait son père, au No 63 de la Loberstrasse. Qui était ce père ? C'était un oberleutnant (lieutenant) de l'armée du kaiser. Walther Gehlen, lui-même fils d'un conseiller gouvernemental de la monarchie prussienne. Et sa mère ? Katharina Margarete van Vaerenwyck appartenait à une famille noble d'origine flamande. Reinhard fut le premier fils du ménage. Il avait trois ans quand naquit son frère cadet, Walter, futur juriste.

La famille Gehlen ne resta que quelques années à Erfurt. En 1908, en effet, l'oberleutnant quittait l'armée et la Thuringe pour s'installer sur les rives de l'Oder, à Breslau (l'actuelle Wrocław polonaise). En association avec l'oncle de Reinhard, son frère Max, docteur en droit de l'Université de Leipzig, l'oberleutnant avait acheté les Editions Universitaires Royales Ferdinand Hirt, au No 1 de la Königsplatz.

C'est donc au gymnase (lycée) de Breslau que Reinhard Gehlen passe en 1918 le diplôme équivalent à notre baccalauréat. Il a 16 ans et demi. Il vit son adolescence dans une Allemagne militairement défaite et économiquement ruinée. Pour d'autres fils de la noblesse et de la bourgeoisie, la guerre de 1914-1918 et ses suites tragiques auront été l'occasion d'ouvrir les yeux et de se ranger aux côtés de la classe ouvrière. C'est le contraire que fera le jeune Reinhard. Il applaudira avec sa famille au sanglant écrasement de l'épopée spartakiste et fidèle à la tradition prussienne de ses ancêtres, c'est le métier des armes qu'il choisira dans l'Allemagne officiellement sans armée.

Son destin est désormais tracé : dès qu'il le peut, il devient fahnenjunker (élève officier) dans la Reichswehr rennaisante, ou il est admis le 20 avril 1920, à peine âgé de 18 ans.

Qui a choisi ces cinquante officiers ? Les nazis bien sûr, au pouvoir depuis deux ans et qui, par la loi du 16 mars 1935, viennent de constituer une Wehrmacht déjà forte de 36 divisions. Ce sont toujours les nazis qui admettent Reinhard Gehlen à la Kriegsakademie (Académie de guerre) qu'ils viennent de rouvrir en violant une nouvelle fois le traité de Versailles.

Il est vrai que, comme le fait excellemment remarquer Julius Mader (2), toute la famille

Gehlen fut, dès le début, au mieux avec les hitlériens. Les Editions Ferdinand Hirt avaient reçu le titre d'« entreprise modèle national-socialiste ». Le président de la « commission de contrôle du parti pour la protection des écrits nationaux-socialistes » avait inscrit dans la « bibliographie national-socialiste » le principal ouvrage du père de Reinhard. Et quand son jeune frère Walter Gehlen avait soutenu une thèse de doctorat en droit à l'université de Breslau, c'était sur le point de savoir si un député devait se sentir responsable devant ses électeurs ou si, au contraire, il ne devait se soucier que de la raison d'Etat.

Politiquement sûr aux yeux des nazis, le jeune officier Reinhard Gehlen ne l'était pas moins à ceux des hobereaux prussiens. En effet, quand il s'était marié, le 10 septembre 1931, à Glogau (l'actuelle Glogow polonaise), il avait pris pour femme Herta Charlotte Agnès Hélène von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, fille de junkers dont les propriétés débordaient même alors sur le sol de Pologne.

Entreprise modèle national-socialiste

Des dons d'homme de guerre et un esprit voué au culte de la revanche assurent au jeune Gehlen une rapide et brillante carrière, d'autant plus remarquable que malgré les violations répétées du traité de Versailles, les places sont alors rares dans l'armée allemande. Ainsi, le 1er décembre 1923 est-il nommé lieutenant (sous-lieutenant) et affecté à la 2^e batterie du III^e d'artillerie à Schweidnitz (l'actuelle ville polonaise de Swidnica). Le 3^e d'artillerie est un ausbildungsbataillon (régiment de formation). Cette affectation illustre le souci qui semble alors primordial pour Reinhard Gehlen : celui d'acquérir le maximum de connaissances militaires. D'ailleurs, quand il quitte Schweidnitz c'est, en 1926, pour aller passer deux ans à l'école de cavalerie de Hannover. Il en sortira oberleutnant (lieutenant).

Dès lors, l'ascension est continue. Hauptmann (capitaine) à 33 ans, il est à la même époque, en 1935, choisi pour être un des cinquante gradés qui accèdent au titre de generalstabier (breveté d'état-major).

Le colonel vient d'avoir 40 ans...

Maintenant qu'il porte le revers amaranthe qui distingue les officiers d'état-major sous le III^e Reich, la course aux nonneurs du fils de l'éditeur de Breslau va s'accélérer.

Ses dix-huitième et dix-neuvième années, sous les armes, il les passe à Liegnitz (l'actuelle ville polonaise de Legnica) comme chef de batterie au 18^e régiment d'artillerie, et c'est comme major (commandant) à l'état-major de la 21^e division de la 8^e Région militaire qu'il participe à l'invasion de la Pologne.

1940, rucé sur la France... Reinhard Gehlen poursuit dans la « guerre-éclair » la carrière de spécialiste du « bureau opérationnel » (officier « I A ») qu'il a entreprise sous la protection du général Von Manstein. C'est, comme officier d'état-major, qu'il savoure le plaisir d'envahir notre pays. Ses missions le font circuler entre le quartier général du maréchal von Brauchitsch, l'armée de von Busch et les « panzer » des généraux von Hoth et Guderian.

Déjà, pourtant, Hitler prépare la guerre à l'Est. Successivement adjudant (aide de camp) du chef d'état-major de l'armée de terre Halder, puis chef du « groupe Est » du bureau opérationnel, sous les ordres d'un officier qui connaîtra plus tard une certaine célébrité, Heusinger, Reinhard Gehlen participe à la mise au point du dispositif d'agression contre l'URSS, le Plan Barbarousse. Il s'y distingue et connaît, ce printemps, une décoration et une promotion.

En juin, il est en effet décoré de la Kriegsverdienstkreuz I. Klasse mit Schwertern (Croix de Guerre pour le Mérite de 1^{re} classe avec Epée), tandis que, le 1er juillet 1941, il est promu oberstleutnant (lieutenant-colonel).

Durant les premiers mois de la campagne de Russie, l'oberstleutnant Gehlen continue d'être un officier « I A », c'est-à-dire chargé des questions opérationnelles. (En France, le 1^{er} Bureau de l'état-major), mais sa spécialité va bientôt changer. En effet, le général Franz Halder, qui est son patron depuis octobre 1940, a des ennuis avec le « Service 12 » de son état-major : le « Fremde Heere Ost » (Armées Etrangères Est). Dirigé par un colonel vicieux, Kinzel, le « Service 12 » ne fournit pas sur les « ouïes » les informations détaillées qu'un chef d'état-major des armées de terre (O.K.H.) comme Halder est en droit d'attendre de son service de renseignement. Cette pénurie de « secrets » est particulièrement fâcheuse quand la Wehrmacht, d'abord victorieuse, connaît en URSS ses premiers revers.

Au printemps 1942, le général Halder congédie donc Kinzel de la direction du « Fremde Heere Ost ». Pour le remplacer, il choisit un officier de son état-major qui vient d'avoir quarante ans : Reinhard Gehlen et qu'il fait, à cette occasion nommer Oberst (colonel).

Jusqu'à maintenant officier « I A » (opérations), le fils de l'éditeur de Breslau devient donc officier « I C » (renseignements — l'équivalent du 2^e Bureau dans les états-majors français). Et d'emblée à un rang élevé : chef d'un service groupant plusieurs centaines de gradés et dont la compétence s'étend de la Scandinavie au sud des Balkans, en englobant toutes les questions relatives à l'ennemi No 1 du III^e Reich : l'Union Soviétique.

Les voleurs de sacoches

De sa nouvelle situation, Reinhard Gehlen comprend d'emblée l'ampleur et l'importance. Entre l'Abwehr (3) d'un amiral Canaris, qui s'essouffie et se prend lui-même au piège de ses intrigues avec certains agents anglais ou américains, et le S.D. (4) de Schellenberg dont le machiavélisme est parfois gâté par la folle fanatique et bornée de certains dirigeants nazis, le nouveau chef du Fremde Heere Ost sent qu'il y a une place à prendre. D'emblée, il conçoit le projet d'un service, uniquement voué au renseignement et à l'action antissoviétique. L'anticommunisme doit être la seule règle de ce service — logiquement, il obéira donc au meilleur anticommuniste de l'époque : Adolf Hitler, mais il ne se laissera pas pour autant freiner par les règlements de comptes de la camarilla hitlérienne, pas plus d'ailleurs que par les intrigues des divers états-majors de la Wehrmacht.

A la tradition prussienne, il demandera son sens de l'organisation : à l'« ordre nouveau » des nazis, son efficacité sanglante : à l'un et à l'autre, leur mépris de l'homme et leur volonté d'hégémonie.

Le modernisme mêlé à l'absence de scrupules lui permettront de pratiquer dans une « guerre totale » le « renseignement total » (politique et militaire, scientifique et économique, etc.) et dans son désir

de subversion et de provocation, de ne pas tenir compte de la règle de l'espionnage qui veut que soient soigneusement réparés l'action et le renseignement.

Tel sera le service — essentiellement contrerévolutionnaire, cette machine de guerre ne cessera pas de disparaître avec celui qui en permit la naissance : les reichsmark d'Hitler, les dollars des Etats-Unis et les deutschemarks d'Allemagne fédérale pourront aussi, tour à tour, en être le carburant...

Mais n'anticipons pas... Nous sommes encore en 1942...

La manière dont Reinhard Gehlen a profondément modifié et totalement remodelé le service dont il venait de prendre la tête apparaît très clairement quand on se réfère à la comparaison faite par Julius Mader (2) entre le Fremde Heere Ost et son homologue pour le front de l'ouest : le Fremde Heere West. Alors que le premier va voir ses effectifs multipliés par dix et va présager par ses méthodes la CIA américaine (5) actuelle, le second va demeurer un service de l'état-major surtout soucieux d'exploitation militaire et de synthèse et très comparable au 2^e Bureau français de l'entre-deux guerres. Gehlen « prit de nouvelles voies », conclut Mader. C'est tout dire.

Simultanément, le nouveau chef du Fremde Heere Ost obtient de ses chefs des « pouvoirs spéciaux » et la mutation de dizaines, puis de centaines de jeunes gradés dont il a besoin dans son service. Des jeunes gradés et des cadres de toutes sortes : chimistes et géographes, économistes et physiciens, linguistes et policiers, faussaires et médecins, imprimeurs et parachutistes, etc.

Peignant l'amitié pour Canaris, alors qu'en avril 1945 il le laissera exécuter sans lever le petit doigt, l'oberst Gehlen obtient du chef de l'Abwehr qu'il lui « cède » une grande partie de son Ostabteilung (section Est), cet organisme dont Ian G. Colvin a pu écrire (6) : « L'incomparable département russe du contre-espionnage que Canaris avait mis au point ». Simultanément, il crée et organise un nouveau corps : les Frontaufklärungsgruppen (troupes de renseignements sur le front), subdivisées en régiments et en compagnies, placées sous les ordres d'officiers « I C » spécialement choisis. Une des premières directives que donnera Gehlen à ces nouvelles troupes lorsqu'il les enverra derrière les lignes soviétiques — par infiltration ou par parachutage — sera d'assassiner le maximum d'officiers de l'Armée Rouge afin de leur voler leurs sacoches.

Ces vols de sacoches, le chef du Fremde Heere Ost les ordonne au moment même où il affecte de nouvelles missions au Groupe II et au Groupe III de son service. Tandis que la 3^e section doit se consacrer « normalement » à la « liquidation des partisans », la 2^e doit porter tous ses efforts sur l'interrogatoire des prisonniers de guerre. Un centre est d'ailleurs organisé à cet effet : le fort de Boven, près de Lötzen.

Dans ce fort sont amenés des officiers et soldats de l'Armée Rouge « razzies » par les gens de Gehlen dans les divers camps de prisonniers soviétiques. Pour ces « razzias » aussi l'oberst a donné ses instructions : les responsables du Parti Communiste, les fonctionnaires, les scientifiques et les artistes doivent être spécialement recherchés...

(A suivre.)

12 - Espions allemands - 1918-1950 - Paris, 1950.

2) Dans son livre « Die graue Hand » (La main grise) - Berlin, 1961.

(3) Exactement Abwehr Ausland (contre - espionnage à l'étranger) de l'OKW (état-major général des armées de terre, de l'air et de mer). L'amiral Wilhelm Canaris en était le chef depuis 1939.

(4) Exactement SD für Ausland (service de sécurité à l'étranger), soit l'AMT VI (sixième bureau) du RSHA (Bureau central de Sécurité du Reich). Sous l'autorité du chef suprême des SS Heinrich Himmler, les chefs SS Heydrich - avant d'être exécuté par la Résistance à Prague - et Kaltenbrunner ont successivement dirigé le RSHA. On a une idée de l'importance du RSHA dans le monde nazi quand on sait que son AMT IV (quatrième bureau) n'était autre que la Gestapo (Police secrète d'Etat).

(5) Central Intelligence Agency.

(6) Dans son livre « Admiral Canaris, chef des Geheimdienste » (L'amiral Canaris, chef du service secret). Vienne, Munich, Zurich, 1955.



Le colonel Reinhard Gehlen venait d'avoir 40 ans...



Le S.D. (Service nazi de Sécurité à l'étranger) était placé sous l'autorité suprême de Himmler, le chef supérieur des S.S., que l'on voit ici haranguant ses troupes à Linz (en Autriche)

II. - UN CHALET DANS LES ALPES ET UN AVION

DES centaines et des centaines de prisonniers de guerre soviétiques étaient interrogés chaque jour au fort prussien de Boyen (1) par les hommes du Gruppe II de Gehlen.

— Mêlez la violence et la douceur ! avait ordonné à ses officiers le chef du Fremde Heere Ost.

Il eût été plus juste de dire : la séduction et la torture. Une certaine séduction était en effet le grand souci de Reinhard Gehlen.

— Les instructions du führer pour la conquête par la force de la terre russe et son exploitation totale en tant que colonie allemande ne peuvent que nous mener à notre perte, disait-il volontiers à de jeunes officiers. Nous ne pouvons vaincre le système soviétique que si nous parvenons à ce que la masse de la population soviétique devienne notre alliée... »

**pour
Washington...**



Certes, cette réflexion de Gehlen pourrait appeler bien des remarques. La rapporter après la défaite hitlérienne (2) avait évidemment pour but d'alimenter la véritable campagne suscitée par Gehlen lui-même et tendant à le présenter comme un « opposant » à Hitler, un allié silencieux mais n'en pensant pas moins des hommes du « 20 juillet » — ce qu'il ne fut pas. Une telle réflexion stupéfiée en outre par son irréalisme... Mais ce que nous voulons en retenir ici c'est une préoccupation qui, chez le maître-espion Gehlen, l'emporte même souvent sur l'espionnage : la subversion.

Dès 1942, le chef du Fremde Heere Ost veut que les membres de son service aient pour souci constant de recruter... Recruter des Soviétiques, c'est facile à ordonner mais plus difficile à faire. Aussi bien Gehlen ne sera-t-il pas regardant sur la qualité de ses recrues : les « adversaires politiques du régime soviétique » seront surtout des condamnés de droit commun libérés par l'avance allemande, des aventuriers russes blancs ramassés un peu partout en Europe, et quelques déserteurs.

Cette sorte de recrutement ni la corruption ne se révélant assez rentables, Gehlen usera aussi de la « guerre psychologique » avant la lettre. Il cherchera notamment à révéler le nationalisme, le chauvinisme dans les territoires occupés par les nazis. Il tentera de dresser les Géorgiens, les Baltes et les Ukrainiens contre les Russes : quels seront les résultats de ces tentatives, sur lesquelles nous insistons surtout ici parce qu'elles furent reprises par Gehlen plus tard lorsqu'il mena la « guerre froide » en Allemagne pour le compte des Américains ?

Elles contribuèrent pour une part importante à la mise sur pied de l'« armée Vlassov » et à l'utilisation des « collabos » de l'O.U.N. (organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens). Toutefois, si le Fremde Heere Ost parvint à faire endosser l'uniforme allemand à quelques milliers de traîtres, les millions de tracts qu'il fit imprimer et lancer en U.R.S.S. n'eurent pas le résultat escompté : la torture et l'assassinat restèrent plus rentables.

Le « réalisme froid »...

Le prompt développement du service d'espionnage qu'on lui avait confié valut, bien sûr, à Reinhard Gehlen un avancement encore plus rapide que celui qu'il avait eu jusqu'ici. La manière dont il connut cet avancement confirme d'ailleurs ce que nous avons dit plus haut sur la tentative d'intoxication que constitue la campagne tendant à faire passer le chef du Fremde Heere Ost pour un allié des officiers qu'il le 20 juillet 1944, tentèrent d'abattre Hitler et furent, après leur échec, sauvagement exécutés. Canaris subit le contre-coup du 20 juillet, pas Gehlen. Au contraire. C'est à l'époque où les cadres de la Wehrmacht venaient d'être épurés et où chaque promotion était soumise à l'approbation d'une commission politique dépendant en fait des SS, que le maître du réseau d'espionnage à l'Est fut successivement promu général-major (général de brigade) puis général-lieutenant (général de division). Ces nominations datent respectivement du 1er décembre 1944 et du début de l'année 1945 (3).

La commission dont nous venons de parler avait émis l'avis que Reinhard Gehlen était « sans reproche et absolument digne de confiance ». Le 9 janvier 1945, il était personnellement reçu par Hitler.

On comprend que, dans ces conditions, la refonte des services spéciaux nazis entreprise à la veille de la défaite et qui vit Schellenberg doubler son Amt VI d'un Amt « Mil » et y prendre en main les restes de l'Abwehr dissoute n'ait pas affecté Gehlen (4).

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avec la collaboration de Jean HANSI

Au contraire, comme le remarque Lucjan Wolanowski (5), le R.S.H.A. avait pris l'habitude de transmettre au Fremde Heere Ost les informations sur les pays de l'Est européen pour analyse et synthèse. Et, fin mars 1955, c'est le Journal suisse de tendance social-démocrate, « Freie Inner-Schweiz », paraissant à Lucerne, qui écrivait :

« Le Reichsführer SS Himmler et le chef du service « Fremde Heere Ost », le général-lieutenant Gehlen, avaient lors de la guerre le contrôle suprême sur tous les alliés est-européens de l'Allemagne. »

Toutefois, en 1944, Reinhard Gehlen doute beaucoup de la victoire allemande et, comme le note Jürgen Thorwald (6) : « Au plus tard à la mi-1944, Gehlen a commencé à rassembler les rapports, documents, études et archives sur l'U.R.S.S. dans divers endroits du réduit des Alpes Bavaïses. C'est ainsi — et je l'ai appris de très nombreuses sources — qu'il était impossible que les archives du « Fremde Heere Ost » n'aient été détruites. »

En prenant ainsi ses précautions, c'est évidemment son passage du côté américain que prépare Gehlen. Cependant le général-lieutenant qui fait toujours l'éloge du « réalisme froid » opposé aux « dangereux rêves de puissance », tient à agir avec prudence. Il ne faut pas compromettre son avenir au cas où un miracle viendrait donner la victoire à Hitler. Aussi bien va-t-il, parallèlement à son « opération américaine », préparer son « opération Werwolf ».

Le « plan Loupgarou » pour les « desperados ».

On se souvient que, sous ce nom de Werwolf (Loupgarou), quelques desperados nazis, agissant par petits groupes, menèrent, en Allemagne, des actions terroristes au lendemain de la défaite hitlérienne du 8 mai 1945. Tandis que tiraillaient, ici et là, ces fanatiques, Gehlen, nous allons le voir, était reçu à bras ouverts par les Américains ; mais c'était lui qui avait conçu le plan d'action des Werwolf, plan approuvé par Himmler et mis en application par le SS Obergruppenführer (général de corps d'armée SS) Hans Prützmann.

Pour prévoir cette organisation clandestine du Werwolf, Gehlen s'était inspiré des structures du mouvement polonais de Bor-Komorowski. L'officier de l'Intelligence Service anglaise H. R. Trevor Roper, qui interrogea Walter Schellenberg au lendemain de sa capture par les alliés, a rapporté (7) : « Schellenberg nous a raconté qu'en ces jours proches de la défaite, un certain major-général von Gehlen, qui avait longtemps travaillé à l'étude du mouvement clandestin polonais, avait dressé un plan précis de résistance allemande sur les mêmes bases. »

Il n'est pas interdit de penser que c'est à son plan Werwolf que Gehlen dut sa promotion au rang de général-lieutenant. Pourtant, les choses évoluant comme elles évoluaient, c'est évidemment à son « opération américaine » que Gehlen se consacra essentiellement tandis qu'à l'Est et à l'Ouest les troupes alliées occupaient, par offensives successives, les ruines du III^e Reich.

Un autre membre éminent de l'Intelligence Service, Seton Delmer, a écrit (8) : « Quand les armées hitlériennes ont été détruites en 1945, le général Gehlen a réussi à s'enfuir en direction de l'Ouest avec les documents les plus importants de son service. Il avait gardé les listes les plus secrètes des agents allemands en U.R.S.S. et dans les pays voisins à l'Est... Il avait la clef du réseau d'espionnage créé par Canaris, Himmler et Schellenberg... »

Cette « clef » était, si l'on peut dire, volumineuse. En effet, soucieux non pas de simplement fournir aux services américains des renseignements et des archives, mais bien de continuer à faire fonctionner son appareil d'espionnage et de subversion, Gehlen avait pris ses dispositions pour que ses principaux collaborateurs échappent comme lui aux ennuis de la défaite.

— Allez tranquillement vous faire faire prisonniers par les Américains, dit ainsi le chef du Fremde Heere Ost à ses officiers et V-mann (hommes de confiance). Une fois là-bas, ne dites rien. Pour parler, attendez nos ordres, les miens ou ceux de mes collaborateurs directs...

Simultanément, ce qui restait de la poste militaire allemande était transmis à beaucoup de familles de membres du réseau. Gehlen des avis de décès « pour les familles » — qu'il le Führer, le peuple et la patrie... La mort n'était-elle pas la plus merveilleuse des « couvertures » ? Surtout accompagnée de faux nauiers...

Le financement par... cigarettes

Dans un premier temps, Gehlen et son état-major se réfugièrent dans un camp où étaient entreposées des bombes, le « Maybach I », non loin de Zossen. De là, lorsque toutes les archives eurent été « planquées » (microfilmées en triple exemplaire et classées dans des récipients hermétiques) ils gagnèrent un alpage bavarois très retiré, où un vaste chalet les attendait. Pour Jürgen Thorwald (9), cet alpage porte le nom de Elends-Alm : pour Julius Maeder (9), celui de Oelandsalm...

En son chalet alpin, Reinhard Gehlen connut un bref chômage — pas plus de quelques semaines — le seul de sa carrière, puis il descendit vers Miesbach. Dans cette bourgade bavaroise, il rencontra des officiers américains. Il se constitua prisonnier entre leurs mains, déclina ses titres et demanda à voir le plus vite possible un responsable du renseignement. C'est alors que le « prisonnier Gehlen » fut dirigé vers l'Intelligence Center de la VII^e Armée U.S., à Wiesbaden.

Le contact ainsi établi avec des dirigeants du C.I.C. (10) fut vite fructueux. En juin 1945, Reinhard Gehlen n'était déjà plus un captif, mais un interlocuteur. Les archives du Fremde Heere Ost quittaient leurs cachettes pour les bureaux du quartier général américain de Wiesbaden. Les principaux collaborateurs du service sortaient de l'ombre où des camps de prisonniers pour aller rejoindre leur chef. En juillet, un avion partait pour Washington...

Ainsi, moins de trois mois après la défaite hitlérienne, le chef du principal service d'espionnage et de subversion anti-soviétique de Hitler était reçu par des généraux et officiers américains au siège de l'O.S.A. Entre Reinhard Gehlen, d'une part, et d'autre part le professeur Sherman Kent et le général de brigade John Magruder, une négociation s'engageait.

Sentant ses interlocuteurs appâtés, le chef de l'ancien (mais toujours vivant) Fremde Heere Ost posa ses conditions. Les principales étaient : être employé comme « force d'appoint allemande » aux services U.S., mais ne pas être intégré dans ceux-ci ; avoir un budget en dollars mais n'avoir avec les

Américains que des rapports à la tête ; recevoir l'assurance que dès qu'il existerait un gouvernement allemand autonome, il lui serait subordonné et ne dépendrait plus des Américains ; n'avoir à fournir des renseignements que sur le communisme et les pays de l'Est à l'exception de toute information susceptible de gêner le futur gouvernement allemand ; enfin être assuré que tous ses agents échapperaient aussi bien aux poursuites pour crimes de guerre qu'aux recherches de « dénazification » alors en cours.

— O. K., répondirent les Américains et plus spécialement le général Bill Donovan, chef de l'O.S.S. ; Allan W. Dulles, le futur chef de la C.I.A. et le général George V. Strong, chef du « G 2 » (12).

Reinhard Gehlen fut même présenté à Edgar J. Hoover, le chef du FBI (13), un autre gourmet en matière d'anticommunisme. La mise en place effective du réseau Gehlen dans son nouveau cadre américain fut confiée à un juriste spécialiste du renseignement et « star personnelle » de la C.I.A., Loftus Becker (14). Le financement commença immédiatement de deux façons : directe, 3.500.000 dollars dès le début selon Seton Delmer (8), et indirecte, des dizaines de milliers de paquets de cigarettes que les agents du réseau revendaient à prix d'or au marché noir...

Et ainsi allait bientôt naître la Sueddeutsche Industrie-Verwertung, c'est-à-dire l'Office pour la Mise en valeur Industrielle de l'Allemagne du Sud (sic)...

(A suivre.)

(1) Voir, dans l'Humanité d'hier, le premier article de cette enquête : « Quand le général de l'ombre » allait à l'école ».

(2) Comme le fit Jürgen Thorwald dans Die Welt am Sonntag du 30 novembre 1955.

(3) La dernière de ces deux promotions, celle au grade de général-lieutenant est souvent passée sous silence, sinon contestée, en Allemagne de l'Ouest. On comprend pourquoi. Toutefois les preuves en sont nombreuses, dont le numéro du 28 juillet 1956 des Münzinger-Archiv consacré à la biographie de Gehlen (page 5.823).

(4) Ainsi que nous l'avons expliqué dans notre précédent article, l'Amt VI était le SD für Auslands (service de sécurité à l'étranger) du RSHA (Bureau Central de Sécurité du Reich) dont l'Amt IV n'était autre que la Gestapo.

(5) Dans son livre « Gichy Front » (Front secret), Varsovie 1955.

(6) Dans Die Welt am Sonntag du 27 novembre 1955. Cette publication est l'édition dominicale du plus grand journal de droite d'Allemagne de l'Ouest : Die Welt, paraissant à Hambourg.

(7) Dans son livre « The last days of Hitler » (Les derniers jours de Hitler), Londres 1947.

(8) Dans le Daily Express du 17 mars 1952.

(9) Dans son livre « Die graue Hand » (La Main grise), Berlin 1951.

(10) Counter Intelligence Corps : service militaire de contre-espionnage américain.

(11) Office of Strategic Services : service de renseignements américain pendant la guerre, ancêtre de l'actuelle CIA.


(12) Le « G 2 » américain est l'équivalent de « le 2 » allemand et du « 2e Bureau » français — c'est-à-dire la section des divers état-majors chargée du renseignement.

(13) Federal Bureau of Investigation : police fédérale américaine dont une partie importante a des activités du même ordre que la DST en France mais avec une orientation « macarthyste » très nette.

(14) Loftus Becker n'allait pas tarder à faire partie, mais sans apparaître aux audiences du Parquet américain au Tribunal International de Nuremberg. Comme on le voit, l'immunité des nazis de Gehlen était volontairement assurée.



Un chalet dans les Alpes... et un stock de microfilms.



Une des très rares photos de Reinhard Gehlen : au bain. A l'arrière-plan, en barque, deux gardes du corps.

III. - Cet homme est dangereux...

TANTOT le « Doktor », tantôt le « n° 30 », tantôt le « Herr Doktor Schneider », etc... Reinhard Gehlen a le goût des couvertures. Pour lui. Et aussi pour son service. Ainsi avant la couverture « industrielle » : « Süddeutsche Industrieverwertung (Office pour la Mise en valeur industrielle de l'Allemagne du Sud) avait-il eu une couverture historique. En effet, au retour de Washington (1), c'est sous le couvert de l'Historical Division de l'U.S. Army qu'il installa le centre de son réseau à Wiesbaden. Il y demeura jusqu'en 1948. Période d'essai ? Période d'épreuve ? Les Américains tenaient-ils à vérifier l'efficacité d'un service qui leur coûtait déjà plus de deux milliards d'anciens francs par an ?

l'Humanité



Kellmannstrasse à Pullach, dans la banlieue de Munich : le siège du B.N.D. — En haut : l'entrée. En bas : une allée parmi les autres dans le dédale du secret.



Une enquête d'Alain GUERIN avec la collaboration de Jean HANSI

(1) Voir, dans « l'Humanité » d'hier, le deuxième article de cette enquête : « Un chalet dans les Alpes et un avion pour Washington ».

(2) Dans son numéro du 2 février 1953.

(3) Dans « Die Welt am Sonntag » du 27 novembre 1955.

(4) La « Central Intelligence Agency » dont on sait qu'elle a pu être appelée le « gouvernement invisible » des U.S.A. et du renversement de Mossadegh (en Iran) ou d'Arbenz (au Guatemala), jusqu'aux récentes massacres d'Indonésie, en passant par les incessantes provocations contre Cuba rien de ce qui est belliciste ne lui est étranger.

(5) Les rapports entre ces différents services secrets de l'Allemagne hitlérienne ont été rapportés dans le premier article de cette enquête.

(6) Comme titre d'un livre paru à Moscou en 1952.

(7) Service des « Armées étrangères de l'Est » : voir les deux articles précédents.

(8) Les activités de provocation et d'agression contre la République Démocratique Allemande sont et restent un souci permanent de Gehlen. Une statistique portant sur la période du 1^{er} août 1961 au 31 juillet 1962 prend ainsi toute sa valeur. Pendant cette période de 236 cas d'agressions armées : 483 cas de jets de bombes lacrymogènes ; 200 cas de violation de frontière et 2.746 de sabotage des lignes ferroviaires du G.D.R.

Oui et non... En effet, d'une part, ces deux ou trois ans ne furent pas pour Gehlen une période d'attente-pulsque comme le notait le Journal Die Tat (2) de Zurich : il eut déjà au cours des années 46-47 la possibilité d'étendre son réseau de service secret vers l'Est ; mais, d'autre part, il est évident que la récupération de l'organisme Fremde Heere Ost et son insertion de fait

A partir de sa Hauptverwaltung (direction générale) de la Kellmannstrasse, à Pullach, dans la banlieue de Munich, la prétendue « Süddeutsche Industrieverwaltung » (Office pour la mise en valeur de l'Allemagne du Sud) prit donc, dès sa naissance, en 1948, un rapide essor.

Utilisant systématiquement la couverture commerciale, Gehlen organisa son réseau sous les apparences d'une vaste firme commerciale avec pour échelons les Generalvertretungen (représentations générales), les Bezirksvertretungen (représentations régionales), les Vertretungen (représentations), les Unterververtretungen (sous-représentations) et les Filiale (filiales). Ceci pour l'Allemagne même tandis qu'à l'étranger s'installaient des Residenturen (résidences).

Notons que même lorsque le service Gehlen cessa d'être la clandestine Süddeutsche Industrieverwaltung pour devenir l'officiel B.N.D., le vocabulaire « commercial » resta en honneur et le type d'organisation ne fut pas modifié. Géographiquement, si les « filiales » et « sous-représentations » changent souvent de siège, les « représentations générales » (installées notamment à Stockholm, près de Munich, à Munich même, à Hambourg, à Darmstadt, à Düsseldorf, à Karlsruhe, etc.) sont relativement fixes et les « représentations régionales » plus stables. A l'étranger, les « résidences » sont en général dans les capitales ou dans les réseaux casernes un peu partout.

Le « chéri du Chancelier »...

Nous l'avons vu, une des conditions posées par Gehlen, dès juillet 1945, aux Américains pour son réemploi avait été l'amnistie de fait pour tous les nazis qu'il comptait continuer d'employer dans son organisation. Aussi bien est-il de notoriété publique que les ex-nazis régnent à Pullach. Sur vain les 5.000 collaborateurs et 12.000 agents de l'organisation, on estime que 57 % viennent du service Fremde Heere Ost, de l'Abwehr-Ausland de Canaris et du bureau « Ic » du quartier général de la Wehrmacht (O. K.W.) tandis que 25 %, donc plus de 4.000 hommes, sont d'anciens membres des bureaux IV (Gestapo) et VI (SD-Ausland de Schellenberg) du RS HA (5)...

Quelques noms d'« anciens » valent ainsi d'être cités qui tous figurent ou figuraient encore récemment parmi les cadres du service Gehlen. Notamment ceux de Franz-Alfred Six, SS-Brigadeführer (général de brigade des SS) ; de Emil Augsburg, SS-Sturmabführer (commandant de SS) ; de Fritz Schmidt, alias Friedrich Schütte, Leitstelle (dirigeant) de la Gestapo à Kiel ; de Franz Göring, alias Wilhelm Tobias, SS-Hauptsturmführer (capitaine des SS), de Wilhelm Hottel, alias Walter Hagen, SS-Sturmabführer ; de Franz Wimmer-Lamquet, SS-Standartenführer (colonel de SS) ; de Bruno Kauschen, alias Berthold Kautner, alias Krause, officier de SS.

On peut illustrer ces quelques noms en précisant que Wilhelm Hottel fut sous Hitler le collaborateur d'Adolf Eichmann ; que Bruno Kauschen fut celui d'Otto Skorzeny et que Fritz Schmidt se distingua lors du massacre du « camp de travailleurs étrangers » de Friedrichs-Ott, près de Kiel, où 2.000 captifs furent tués d'une balle dans la nuque et ainsi lors de l'extermination de 6.000

déportés sur le navire « Cap Arcona ».

Il faudrait citer encore des dizaines d'autres cas, tout aussi exemplaires... Mais ce n'est pas tout. Car il convient aussi de noter que, en les mettant à l'abri et en leur permettant de ne pas perdre la main, Reinhard Gehlen a constitué entre 1945 et la création de la Bundeswehr un réservoir, un vivier de militaristes. Adolf Heusinger donna l'exemple en travaillant d'abord à Pullach avant de connaître la belle carrière que l'on sait. Et le général Ernst Ferber, chef jusqu'à sa suppression du « standing group » de l'OTAN à Washington..., etc.

D'ailleurs, dès le 21 août 1945 Georges Penchenier pouvait écrire dans Le Monde à propos de Gehlen et de ses hommes : « Avant même qu'ait retenti le premier bruit de botte, avant même qu'ait sifflé le premier moteur à réaction, la République fédérale disposera, grâce aux Américains, d'un service de renseignements et de contre-espionnage dont les ramifications s'étendent sur toute l'Europe orientale et peut-être même en Occident. »

De même l'aria-Tresse, un an plus tard, le 13 août 1956 : « La République Fédérale de Bonn hérite aujourd'hui un service rodé par treize ans de travail ininterrompu et que ses adversaires mêmes considèrent comme le plus dynamique des réseaux de renseignements anticomunistes. »

En effet, le passage de Reinhard Gehlen du giron américain au contrôle officiel de Bonn, son élévation au rang de Ministerialdirektor et le nouveau titre de Bundesnachrichtendienst (Service fédéral de renseignements), ou BND donné à son réseau marquèrent un des premiers jalons du réarmement allemand et prirent valeur de symbole. Konrad Adenauer sut d'ailleurs l'apprécier à sa valeur, qui recevait très souvent Gehlen en tête à tête — ce Gehlen que l'écriturier soviétique V. Tchertnev (6) a pu ainsi baptiser « le chéri du Chancelier ».

Les « Konzerns » ont payé

Le passage de Reinhard Gehlen des Américains aux autorités de Bonn fut officiel en 1956. Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le mot passage. Il est sûr en effet que le BND a continué d'être associé à la CIA et de servir les desseins les plus bellicistes américains en Europe et ailleurs. Toutefois, Gehlen gagna à la faveur de ce transfert une plus grande liberté et de plus vastes moyens.

Dès 1948, l'ancien chef du service Fremde Heere Ost avait adjoint à son réseau une section « syndicats ». Cette section permit aux principaux Konzerns, aux grands trusts du « miracle économique » allemand d'employer l'espionnage et la provocation comme moyens de lutte contre les revendications ouvrières. Aussi bien, d'excellentes relations se développèrent-elles entre Reinhard Gehlen et des hommes tels que Hermann J. Abs, Robert Pferdmenges, Wilhelm Zangen, Hermann von Siemens, Max Ignier, etc. Abs, c'était le plus gros banquier d'Allemagne de l'Ouest, membre d'une trentaine de conseils d'administration ; Pferdmenges, autre puissant banquier, vingt conseils d'administration, conseiller financier d'Adenauer ; Zangen, directeur général du trust Mannesman ; von Siemens, dirigeant du trust du même nom, un milliard de marks de capital ; Ignier, l'homme de confiance de l'IG-Farben.

Quand il voulut profiter de sa mutation en BND pour croître et multiplier, Reinhard Gehlen ne fit pas en vain ap-

pel au bon cœur et à la reconnaissance de ces magnats, « L'industrie lourde allemande a versé dix millions de marks pour le passage de Gehlen... » pouvait ainsi écrire la Gesamtdeutsche Rundschau du 20 janvier 1956.

Et, depuis, la manne n'a cessé de tomber dans les coffres de Pullach ni le domicile de Gehlen, immeuble 68, à Berg, près de Sternberg d'être ouvert aux envoies des Konzerns. Subventions directes et emplois de couverture très rémunérateurs offerts à de nombreux collaborateurs du B.N.D. arrivent ainsi à fournir 50 % de son budget à l'organisation de Pullach. L'autre moitié est constituée par le financement officiel qui, à titre définitif, est passé de 23.100.000 marks, en 1956, à 43.000.000, en 1959, et à 58.100.000, en 1963...

Facile augmentation, au fil des années, de ses moyens humains, financiers et techniques, a amené Gehlen à vouloir donner plus d'ampleur au B.N.D. Tout en restant le fer de lance de la « guerre froide » à Berlin-Ouest et en République Fédérale (8), l'ancien chef du service Fremde Heere Ost (7) est, depuis dix ans, soucieux de donner en quelque sorte une compétence universelle à son appareil de subversion et d'espionnage.

Jetons un rapide coup d'œil sur certaines de ces activités. Les pays de démocratie populaire et l'U.R.S.S. viennent, bien sûr, au premier plan. Mais il n'y a pas qu'eux. Jön de là, qui aient à souffrir des activités de Gehlen, La Suède, l'Angleterre, l'Italie, de très nombreux pays d'Afrique, l'Australie, les Pays-Bas, la France et l'Egypte, notamment, ont été ces dernières années atteints par les entreprises du B.N.D.

Terreur au Tyrol et explosifs au Zuyderzee

Qui, comme en fait fut un document découvert à l'O.T.A.N. par les services français en juillet 1958, avait ordonné à ses agents de relever les endroits où pourraient être le plus efficacement placés des explosifs dans les digues du Zuyderzee afin d'inonder en partie la Hollande ?

Qui, comme nous l'avons dit à l'époque, a activement aidé, en Allemagne même, les terroristes de la « Main Rouge » contre les patriotes algériens ?

Qui soutient en Autriche et en Italie du Nord les actions de terreur des membres de l'Œuvre Culturelle du Tyrol du Sud, de la ligue Edelweiss et du Comité de Libération du Tyrol du Sud (B.A.S.) ?

Qui a pris des contacts avec l'ex-général Salan, chef de l'O.A.S., et lui a apporté quelque aide contre des promesses de privilèges au cas où la subversion l'aurait emporté en France ?

Qui utilise systématiquement, comme jadis l'« armée Vlasov », toutes les associations d'émigrés pour y recruter des agents et susciter des troubles dans les pays d'origine ?


Qui a envoyé des groupes armés en Pologne, Hongrie, Yougoslavie et Ukraine notamment ?

A toutes ces questions, c'est, bien sûr : Reinhard Gehlen qu'il faut répondre.

Et cette réponse, venant après tout ce que nous avons dit de lui depuis le début de cette enquête, achève de démontrer combien cet homme est dangereux. Marchand d'espions, entrepreneur en provocations, maniaque de la subversion, il est un de ceux qui, à Bonn, continuent de rêver à la guerre.

La guerre, pour Gehlen, c'est le fait, le cas d'urgence, et tous les agents du B.N.D., en toutes circonstances, ont des instructions précises à ce sujet. Des instructions très précises.

Il faudra bien en reparler...



Un certain sourire... Celui du maître et de l'élève. Mais qui fut le maître ? Et qui l'élève ?

En haut : Reinhard Gehlen. En bas : Allen W. Dulles.



dans le système des services spéciaux U.S. n'avait pas été sans susciter quelques troubles dans les milieux dirigeants des Etats-Unis.

Les libéraux formés à l'école de Roosevelt, des Américains pour qui le nazisme restait une scélératesse historique, des hommes qui croyaient sincèrement à la paix et à l'amitié entre les peuples tentèrent de s'opposer à cet immoral réemploi d'une bande de criminels de guerre blanchis et de leurs milliers d'agents à des fins dont le caractère odieux ne leur échappait pas. Mais ce furent les futurs macarthystes qui l'emportèrent. « En définitive, a pu noter Jürgen Thorwald (3), le choix de Gehlen sanctionnait un revirement de la politique américaine. » C'était le choix de la guerre froide.

Ce premier cap franchi, Reinhard Gehlen put incontestablement développer son organisation de façon plus systématique. D'autant plus qu'à Washington montait alors l'étoile d'un maître et sa mesure — maître mais aussi élève — Allen W. Dulles, frère du secrétaire d'Etat Foster Dulles et placé par Truman à la tête de la C.I.A. (4) dès la naissance de cet instrument de préparation à la guerre.

2/CS

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION																																									
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ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES																																													
ACTION - ROUTE TO [] FOR INFO AND RESPONSE AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.																																													
1. THE TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM UTILITY TO [] /ORIGINAL BEING POWHED UNDER SEPARATE COVER/ FOLLOWS -																																													
2. 1124 JUNE 66																																													
MY DEAR []																																													
I WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU VERY WARMLY ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS THE NEW DIRECTOR OF /KUBARK/. IT IS A SPECIAL JOY TO US THAT A SO- DISTINGUISHED PROFESSIONAL AS YOURSELF HAS BEEN NAMED TO THIS POST. PLEASE KNOW THAT BECAUSE OF THE LONG HISTORY OF OUR DIRECT AND IN- DIRECT COOPERATION, WE PLACE A VERY SPECIAL TRUST IN YOU, NOT ONLY PROFESSIONALLY, BUT ALSO PERSONALLY. ONE THING IS CERTAIN--THAT IN YOU IS PERSONIFIED THE LONG YEARS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN INTELLIGENCE WORK BETWEEN PBPRIME AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.																																													
I WISH YOU MUCH GOOD FORTUNE AND SUCCESS IN YOUR VERY RE- SPONSIBLE OFFICE. MY SENIOR COLLEAGUES AT CATIDE JOIN ME IN THESE WISHES.																																													
WITH WARMEST GREETINGS																																													
AS EVER YOURS																																													
//UTILITY//																																													
3. I AM SURE THAT A REPLY TO THE ABOVE WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH APPRECIATION BY UTILITY AND CERTAINLY WOULD BE A HELP TO THE LIAISON BASE. UTILITY FEELS HIMSELF A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF KNIGHTS, AND ANY PERSONAL TONE IN A RESPONSE WOULD BE GOOD.																																													
<div style="text-align: center;">[]</div>																																													
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CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMT - 13846		DATE 24 JUNE 66																																									
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<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>END OF TT/3 - 203/DIR, 552/BONN DISPATCH EGMT-13846</div> <div>ORIGINATING</div> </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>OFFICE</td> <td>OFFICER</td> <td>TYPIST</td> <td>EXT.</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">COORDINATING</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OFFICE SYMBOL</td> <td>DATE</td> <td colspan="2">OFFICER'S NAME</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td colspan="2"> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td colspan="2"> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td colspan="2"> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td colspan="2"> </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4">RELEASING</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OFFICE SYMBOL</td> <td>DATE</td> <td colspan="2">OFFICER'S SIGNATURE</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td colspan="2"> </td> </tr> </table>						OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.	COORDINATING				OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME																		RELEASING				OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE					
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BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EGMT-13846

24. Juni 1966

Sehr geehrter, lieber Mr. Helms!

Ich möchte Ihnen recht herzlich zu Ihrer Ernennung zum neuen Direktor des CIA gratulieren. Für uns ist es besonders erfreulich, daß ein so hervorragender Fachmann wie Sie in diese Stelle kommt. Sie wissen, daß wir durch die langjährige direkte und indirekte Zusammenarbeit nicht nur sachlich und fachlich sondern auch persönlich ganz besonderes Vertrauen zu Ihnen haben. Ist doch Ihre Person über lange Jahre hinaus mit der Entwicklung der nachrichtendienstlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik verbunden.

Ich wünsche Ihnen viel Glück und Erfolg für das schwere Amt, und die leitenden Mitarbeiter des BND schließen sich diesen Wünschen an.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen

stets Ihr

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

24 JUN 1966

SECRET

4/CE

CONTACT REPORT

[] with UTILITY, @Holm, @Rose
24 June 1966, 1000 hours
UTILITY's Office

1. In the main this meeting was ceremonial. [] brought [] to visit UTILITY on the occasion of []'s posting to Headquarters and []'s assumption of the duties of COS. Expressions of gratitude for past cooperation and hopes for more of the same in the future were expressed on various sides. UTILITY again made the comment that we are such good friends we can even differ with each other. [] picked this up and said that out of a resolution of differences comes better understanding.

2. UTILITY presented [] with a formidable and touchingly inscribed silver platter bearing UTILITY's family coat of arms and his own signature.

3. @Holm then asked [] if he would tell UTILITY what he had told Ambassador McGhee's dinner guests the evening before about the change in administration at Headquarters. This [] did. Other topics discussed were press difficulties in both countries, the fact that UTILITY must be the dean of the world's corps of intelligence directors, books which have damaged intelligence operations, etc.

4. UTILITY spoke about his job as head of CATIDE and of his forthcoming 65th birthday, when he should normally be expected to retire. He said he had been asked to stay on. He did not give any date when he did intend to retire, but he said he did not intend to stay too long. He said that the organization would need younger and more vigorous strength in its top leadership. (My recollection is that this came up in the discussion of the appointment of [] a professional from inside the house--taking over as head of KUBARK. This may be a reflection of UTILITY's thinking on the matter. He once told me that @Holm "naturally" would take over the vice-president spot, vacated by @Wagner, who is now out on rather permanent sick leave. He may also expect @Holm to take the presidency.)

32W-2-29/1.1 [] [] [] [] [] 24 June 66
(CATIDE/West German Govt) UTILITY, @Holm, @Rose

5. UTILITY said that relations with Chancellor Erhard were improving. He even hoped to get the Chancellor to visit CATIDE during the course of one of his visits to his summer home near Tegernsee.

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

SECRET

Page 2

6. The meeting ended with further expressions of good will and reminders that the [] and [] families were expected at tea at UTILITY's later in the day.

Distribution:

Orig - UTILITY file

- 1 -
- 1 -
- 3 - 801 for forwarding
- 1 - 801 chrono
- 1 - extract
- 1 - 847 info

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: ☐
 UNIT: L/CE
 EXT: 25
 DATE: 27 June 1966

SECRET

ROUTING			
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	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO: INFO. DIRECTOR GERMANY BONN
 FROM: MUNICH 6470
 CONF: L/CE 155/GEHL 100/27
 INFO: L/OPS 11:31

CITE MUNICH 6470

TO: INFO CITE

☐ INFO. DIRECTOR GERMANY BONN
 CATIDE
 REF. ☐ 8343

PLEASE PROVIDE CLIPS REFERENCE SERIES AND MAIL TO
 MISTER ☐ 8 MUNICH 90, HANS BARTHS STRASSE 1.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MUNICH 6470

L/CE
L/ORS

ROUTINE

27 JUN 66

IN-2133 G

SECRET 271345Z CITE BONN 3663

[] INFO DIRECTOR, GERMANY, MUNICH

CATIDE

REF [] 8343

APPRECIATE OFFER BUT BONN BASE AND COS NOT INTERESTED
RECEIVING ARTICLES. DEFER TO MUNICH.

SECRET

TOR: 27/1417Z

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

ACTIVITY
BONN 3663



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ADVISOR
FRANKFURT, a/M, GERMANY

Address Official Communications To

OCA, AMCONGEN
APO 757, U.S. FORCES

29 June 1966

Dear General Gehlen:

On the occasion of our departure from Europe let me thank you again for the warm and cordial reception afforded to Peggy and me during our last visit to Munich. Tea at your home and then the opportunity to meet with members of your staff Friday evening will remain in our memory as the happiest of many visits since 1949.

We are particularly grateful to have the engraved silver dish as a permanent memento of our association with you and your splendid staff.

Please convey our kindest regards to Mrs. Gehlen.

Faithfully,

Gordon M. Stewart

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: E.O. 13526 EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

File: V7tily

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: ☐
UNIT: L/OCS
EXT: 55
DATE: 11 JULY 1964

TO: GERMANY
FROM: MORRICH
CONF: L/OCS
INFO: L/C

6580

1055 JUL 11

09:15

1055/9/Dehler, R

D

ROUTING			
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	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS
CITE: MORRICH: 6580			

TO: GERMANY INFO CITE (MORRICH ACTING)

1. IN RESPONSE YOUR 30 JUNE PERSONAL LETTER (WHICH ARRIVED AFTER ☐ DEPARTURE ON LEAVE) WROTE TOGETHER WITH FLOWERS ALREADY DELIVERED UTILITY'S WIFE. AM SURE ☐ WOULD CONCUR YOUR DECISION NOT WRITE PERSONALLY TO UTILITY THIS JUNCTURE AS WELL REASONING THEREFOR.

2. NEW EYE SUBJ: (REF: GERMANY 7806) CONCUR PARA 2 REF. NO SPECIAL PLAN ON CATIDE REQUIRED.
END OF MESSAGE.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 382E
NAZIS CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

N/O/NB

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

L/CE

10 August 1966

Dear Dr. Schneider:

On return from my recent leave, I found your very kind birthday letter to me. It was very thoughtful of you to remember that day.

I spent it with my mother and younger daughter on the Isle of Skye in Northern Scotland among cousins from my mother's side of the family. Happily we enjoyed unusual sunny weather, which I guess is more than one could have said about Bavaria at the same time.

I hope you are enjoying your leave and getting some good sailing in.

With thanks again and kindest wishes,

Sincerely,

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Giblin
201-file

ORIG: ☐
UNIT: L/OPS
EXT: 55
DATE: 10 AUGUST 1966

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR (INFO: GERMANY, BERLIN, FRANKFURT)

FROM: MUNICH

CONF: L/OPS

INFO: L/CS, C/MB, DC/MB

6855
1966 AUG 10 14:41

155/GERLEN/12

ROUTING			
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		OPERATIONAL	INITIALS
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE		IMMEDIATE	
CITE MUNICH:			
6855			

TO

INFO

CITE

DIRECTOR INFO: GERMANY, BERLIN, FRANKFURT

REWAY: CATIDE

REF: DIRECTOR-26362

☐ FROM ☐

1. UTILITY, DEGENHARDT, AND HOLM WILL BE AWAY MUNICH ON
OCCASION YOUR VISIT AND REGRETTABLY UNABLE MEET WITH YOU. KUEHNE
AND REIDHILIN WILL BE AVAILABLE AND LOOKING FORWARD SEE YOU MOR-
ING 2 SEPT. KUEHNE WILL HOST LUNCH AT CATIDE.

2. ☐ NOT YET ABLE CONTACT ☐ BUT EXPECTS
INFORM YOU SEPARATELY CONCERNING AVAILABILITY FOR YOUR PROPOSED
VISIT EVENING 1 SEPT.

END OF MESSAGE.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/MB
RELEASING OFFICER

L/OPS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

MUN 1 6855

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]/SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	CHIEF, EUR CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	[REDACTED]/CATIDE ALIAS DEGENHARDT/ COMMENTS ON SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S AIR LIFT REMARKS		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
ACTION - HQS AND GERMANY DECISIONS AS TO USE OF FOLLOWING INFORMATION EITHER AT HOME OR WITH EMBASSY			
REF - CSHB-F-1-1 CHAPTER 1, PARA 12			
<p>1. AS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION \subset \supset RECEIVED FROM ALIAS DEGENHARDT ON 10 AUG 66 MAY BE CONSIDERED TYPE WHICH FALLS UNDER REF PARAGRAPH CONCERNING INFORMATION CRITICAL OF A U.S. OFFICIAL, WE ARE FORWARDING IT IN OVERALL DISPATCH FORM, RETAINING, HOWEVER, THE REPORT FORM AS BELOW, IN CASE SOME DISSEM USE CAN BE MADE OF IT. SOURCE DESCRIPTION HAS BEEN TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND CONTEXT OF DELZNHARDT'S REMARKS. DEGENHARDT CHANGED THE SUBJECT OF WHAT WE HAD BEEN HAVING SO ABRUPTLY AND WITH SUCH LITTLE FINESSE, IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT HE WISHED TO GRASP OPPORTUNITY OF MY VISIT TO CONVEY HIS MESSAGE TO US. VISIT, HOWEVER, WAS AT MY INSTANCE. HE DID NOT COME TO US.</p> <p>2. REPORT IS AS FOLLOWS -</p> <p>COUNTRY - WEST GERMANY/UNITED STATES SUBJECT - SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S "AIR LIFT" REMARKS DOI - EARLY AUGUST 1966 ACQ - GERMANY, MUNICH /10 AUGUST 1966/ REPORT NO - EGO-153 SOURCE - A POLICY-MAKING OFFICER OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE /BND/, WHO HAS MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON PRACTICALLY A WEEKLY BASIS. HIS COMMENTS ARE DOUBTLESS BASED ON CONVERSATIONS HE HAS HAD WITH GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN, HEAD OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, AND OTHER SENIOR BND COLLEAGUES, AS WELL AS HIGH-RANKING FIGURES IN THE GOVERNMENT IN BONN. HE TALKS FREELY WITH AMERICANS WITH WHOM HE HAS PROFESSIONAL CONTACT AND DOUBTLESS INTENDED HIS REMARKS TO REACH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICERS.</p> <p>DIST - BY TAPE /CONT/ C/EUR COS/G</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METH 4006 EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p> <p>UTILITY 201</p> <p>GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	EGMA 68986	10 AUGUST 66	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER	
	[REDACTED]/SECRET	32W-2-39/5	

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EGMA-68986

~~SECRET~~/SECRET

EGMA-68986 PAGE TWO

1. SECRETARY McNAMARA'S COMMENT ABOUT AMERICA'S ABILITY TO AIR LIFT TROOPS TO EUROPE TO MEET THE THREAT OF ATTACK IS BEING RECEIVED BY HIGH GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WITH GREAT SKEPTICISM. THE STATEMENT HAS ALREADY TENDED TO DEVALUE IN ADVANCE REMARKS THE SECRETARY MAY MAKE IN THE FUTURE. THIS IS THE VIEW OF A HIGH GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OFFICER WHO SAID ON 10 AUGUST HE WAS REFLECTING NOT ONLY THE ATTITUDE IN THE SENIOR CIRCLES OF HIS OWN ORGANIZATION, BUT ALSO THE STANDPOINT OF HIS CONTACTS IN BONN.

2. THE INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS - "THE THING THAT IS CONCERNING US THESE DAYS--AND BY 'US' I MEAN THE VERY SENIOR PEOPLE IN BONN, AS WELL AS OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE--IS SECRETARY McNAMARA. HE RECENTLY SAID THAT IF THERE WERE ANY THREAT OF A SURPRISE ATTACK FROM THE EAST AGAINST GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE 14 DAYS WARNING OF THIS AND BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN ARMY'S AIR LIFT CAPABILITY, A COUPLE OF DIVISIONS COULD BE FLOWN OVER TO EUROPE IN TIME TO SAVE THE SITUATION.

3. "FRANKLY, THIS HAS UNLEASHED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF SKEPTICISM IN GERMAN GOVT CIRCLES. ONE HEARS SUCH REMARKS AS - IF THE UNITED STATES BECOMES MORE DEEPLY COMMITTED IN VIETNAM THAN IT IS NOW, WILL THERE BE ENOUGH AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO MAKE SUCH A LIFT? WILL THERE BE SKILLED PILOTS ENOUGH AVAILABLE? FURTHER, THE COMMENT IS HEARD THAT THE SOVIETS CAN VERY WELL SAY, 'IF YOU DON'T STOP BOMBING HANOI, WE'LL SNATCH BERLIN.' AT THIS POINT, TWO AMERICAN DIVISIONS ARE FLOWN TO EUROPE. NOTHING HAPPENS. THE SOVIETS GO QUIET DOWN. THE DIVISIONS ARE SHIPPED OUT AGAIN. AND THEN THE SOVIETS MAKE THEIR MOVE. IN SHORT, THE GERMAN OFFICIALS SIMPLY DON'T BELIEVE THE AIR LIFT THESIS.

4. "THAT IS NOT TO SAY, THAT THIS IS ANY REFLECTION ON SECRETARY McNAMARA'S GOOD WILL OR HONORABLE INTENTIONS OR READINESS TO DEFEND US. THE AIR LIFT COMMENT WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT DESIGNED FOR AMERICAN PUBLIC CONSUMPTION--IT WAS DESIGNED FOR THE GERMANS. BUT PSYCHOLOGICALLY, IT WAS THE WRONG WAY, SEEN FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW, OF HANDLING THE SITUATION. IT WILL BE READILY ADMITTED THAT IN THE PAST EVERY TIME CORPORAL JONES OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN GERMANY WENT ON FURLOUGH, SOME GERMAN OFFICIAL WOULD CRY OUT THAT AMERICA WAS LEAVING GERMANY IN THE LURCH. THIS MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN THE REASON FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA TO MAKE THE SUPPOSEDLY REASSURING AIR LIFT STATEMENT. BUT IT SIMPLY ISN'T BELIEVED AND THE BAD THING ABOUT IT ALL IS THAT THE FUTURE COMMENTS OF THIS HIGHLY QUALIFIED PUBLIC SERVANT ARE BEING UNDERMINED IN ADVANCE BECAUSE OF THE DISBELIEF IN THE AIR LIFT 'REASSURANCE.'

5. "THERE ARE ENOUGH DOWN-TO-EARTH, TRUSTFUL, AND BELIEVING OFFICIALS IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO WHOM ONE CAN SAY 'NOW LOOK HERE, FRIENDS, WE ARE HAVING A TOUGH TIME IN VIETNAM. WE NEED 75,000 TROOPS, AND WE PROPOSE TO REMOVE THEM FROM GERMANY NOW. WHEN WE ARE OVER THE HUMP--BECAUSE A SEMI-MOBILIZATION AT HOME TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER WOULD UPSET THE WORLD'S SITUATION EVEN MORE--WE'LL RETURN THESE CHAPS. IN THE MEANTIME, DON'T WORRY. WE'LL HONOR OUR COMMITMENTS EITHER BY CONVENTIONAL OR ATOMIC MEANS. THE FACT THAT WE ARE BLEEDING AND DYING IN VIETNAM FOR A MUTUAL CAUSE IS ONLY FURTHER PROOF THAT WE WOULD ALSO DO IT IN EUROPE A LOT CLOSER HOME AND A LOT CLOSER TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.' TO BE UTTERLY FRANK, THAT IS THE WAY WE WISH THE TROOP QUESTION HAD BEEN HANDLED, RATHER THAN WITH REASSURANCES OF A FOURTEEN-DAY EARLY WARNING AND AN AIR LIFT OF A COUPLE OF DIVISIONS."

6. FIELD DISSEM - NONE.

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

TO

Chief, Munich Liaison Base

MARKED FOR INDEXING

INFO.

Chief of Station, Germany

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

FROM

Chief, EUR

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

SUBJECT

CATIDE

Letter to UTILITY

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: EGMT-13846, 24 June 1966

Forwarded under separate cover is a letter from E
to UTILITY in response to the congratulations transmitted
via Reference.

Distribution:

2 - C/MLB w/att u/s/c
1 - COS/Germany w/o/att

Attachment:

U/S/C

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

EGMS-6783

DATE

19 August 1966

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

EGMS-6783

SECRET

26 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General Gehlen's Foreign Travels

1. General Gehlen's last official visit to the United States was in April 1961. He made a one-day visit for discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence on 24-25 September 1961. This was, of course, immediately after the erection of the Berlin Wall and just prior to the arrest of Heinz Felfe, an RIS penetration of the BND.

2. General Gehlen was formally invited to visit CIA in the Spring and in the Autumn of 1963. General Gehlen found it inconvenient to accept either of these invitations. In June of 1964 [] , then Chief of the Eastern Europe Division, was in Munich and invited General Gehlen to visit CIA. Once again, General Gehlen found it inconvenient to accept the invitation.

3. We know that General Gehlen visited London in early 1964 and Paris in the Fall of 1965 for discussions with the British and French services. We have no further information about his foreign travels.

4. Attached is a biographic sketch on General Gehlen prepared in 1964 as well as several letters written to General Gehlen in the past two years.

[]
C/E/G/CE

Attachment:
Biographic Sketch

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005
SECRET

1 September 1966

Dear General Gehlen:

I have always attached a special importance to the close relationship between our two services and I believe strongly that this relationship has contributed significantly to the development of the alliance between the Federal Republic and the United States. Today after two decades the common requirement for a strong bond between our two countries is greater than ever. Thus, in embarking upon my new responsibilities I feel obligated to do all I can to preserve and strengthen the concept of a special relationship between our two organizations. In terms of my personal interest and involvement dating back to the early years of our liaison, this is a task that I take up with pleasure.

Because I am mindful that your long experience in guiding the German intelligence effort throughout the period of the Cold War is unique in the Free World and because I would welcome an opportunity to talk personally with you regarding certain aspects of our work, I have considered making a short visit to Europe and particularly to Germany. Unfortunately, two circumstances beyond my control -- the pressures of the war in Vietnam and my present lack of an experienced Deputy -- dictate that I not absent myself from Washington in the immediate future. Still, however, I feel that it has been too long since we have discussed our many mutual interests. As a consequence, I would like to suggest the possibility that you visit us here in Washington in the near future, possibly in November which, from my point of view, would be a favorable time.

As you know, [] is planning to visit Germany in October and he is very much looking forward to meeting you. He will be accompanied by [], who is heading up our recently constituted European Division. I commend both officers to you.

In closing, I earnestly hope that you will find it possible to arrange for a November visit. Because of the long and close association of our organizations, I believe that they have an unusual ability and thus a special obligation to contribute to the mutual understanding and cooperation of our Governments and our countries.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD 3 EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

cc: C/EUR ✓

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

ORIG: ☐ ☒ MV ☐ FILE NO. ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INIT: DC/E/G
EXT: 7858
DATE: 3 September 66

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY: 1 PER #

FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: YN FILE DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, ADDP

CONF: EUR P ☐ RID COPY

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

MAB

CSIRF CI, C/OPS, FI, F/INT, CSID (PICA)

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 3 17 17Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 32925

TO IMMEDIATE MUNICH INFO PRIORITY GERMANY

CATIDE

(POUCHED 1 SEPT)

A LETTER FROM ☐ EN ROUTE MUNICH INVITING
2 UTILITY VISIT WOFAC HQS. PLEASE DO NOT REPEAT NOT DELIVER
2 TO UTILITY PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQS.

(OR MENTION)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED END OF MESSAGE
CENTR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

EUR/COPS

DC/E/G

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DIR 32925

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

ORIG: ☒ ☐ ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: O/CEUR ☒ INDEX
EXT: 5881 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 6 September 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
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DISSEM BY 3 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/CEUR 4 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE DCI, N/SCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE AND TIME FILLED

(CLIFE)

(PICA)

18 21 53Z CITE DIRECTOR 33095

TO GERMANY

RYBAT

☒ FROM ☒

CS Comment: *Advised of ☒ s letter to General Gehlen inviting him to visit Hqs.

RE DIRECTOR 32925 *

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MCGHEE FROM ME:

"I MENTIONED TO SECRETARY RUSK THE OTHER DAY THAT I PLANNED TO INVITE GENERAL GEHLEN TO VISIT US SOMETIME THIS FALL. GEHLEN HAS NOT BEEN IN THE U.S. FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND THUS THIS INVITATION SEEMED TO ME DESIRABLE. THE SECRETARY AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE CHANCELLOR ERHARD ADVISED OF THESE PLANS IN ADVANCE, IN CASE HE MIGHT WISH TO EXPRESS SOME PREFERENCE REGARDING THEM. I WOULD THUS APPRECIATE YOUR MENTIONING TO THE CHANCELLOR IN LOW KEY OUR INTENTION TO INVITE GENERAL GEHLEN AND YOUR LETTING ME KNOW HIS REACTION, WHICH I WILL OF COURSE SHARE WITH SECRETARY RUSK. REGARDS."

END OF MESSAGE

DCI

AC/EUR
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DDP

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 25X2
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

COPY NO.

DIR 33095

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION		
TO			MARKED FOR INDEXING		
INFO.	CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY CHIEF, BONN OPERATIONS BASE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
FROM	CHIEF, EUR		MICROFILM		
SUBJECT	CATIDE ① LETTER TO UTILITY FROM				
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>1. POUCHING AS SEPARATE COVER ENCLOSURE PERSONAL LETTER FROM <input type="checkbox"/> EXTENDING INVITATION FOR UTILITY VISIT WOLADY IN NOVEMBER. REQUEST <input type="checkbox"/> PASS LETTER PERSONALLY AND CABLE WHEN LETTER PASSED SO WE CAN ADVISE ALIAS DESSAU.</p> <p>2. GIST AS FOLLOWS - OWING LONG AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTH SERVICES AND <input type="checkbox"/> EARLY PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT ESTABLISHING CATIDE, FEEL DISCUSSION MUTUAL INTERESTS IN ORDER. PRESSURES VIET NAM AND LACK DEPUTY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE <input type="checkbox"/> LEAVE WOLADY IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND THEREFORE <input type="checkbox"/> INVITES UTILITY VISIT WOLADY. ALSO MENTIONS UPCOMING VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> AND <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>3. COPIES LETTER FOR ADDRESSEES BEING POUCHED.</p>					
<p>ATTACHMENT -</p> <p>1. PERSONAL LETTER TO UTILITY</p> <p>2. 2 COPIES OF LETTER FOR ADDRESSEES</p> <p>DISTRIBUTION -</p> <p>BY TAPE</p> <p>2-C/MLB W/ATT 1 U/S/C</p> <p>1-COS/GERMANY W/ATT 2 U/S/C</p> <p>1-C/BONN OPS BASE W/ATT 2 U/S/C</p> <p>ATTACHMENTS U/S/C BY POUCH</p>					
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE		
		EGMS-6840	6 SEPTEMBER 1966		
		CLASSIFICATION	HQ'S FILE NUMBER		
		S E C R E T			
<p>HQ'S DISTRIBUTION -</p> <p>2-E/G/CE</p> <p>1-E/G/IS</p> <p>1-RI</p>		ORIGINATING			
		OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPYST	EXT.
		E/G/CE	MARY ANN BROWNING:BAF		6028
		COORDINATING			
		OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
	C/E/G	2 Sept 66	[Signature]		
<p>20-1 3 PM 11:00</p>		RELEASING			
		OFFICE SYMBOL			
		DATE			
		C/EUR	2 Sept 66	[Signature]	

DISPATCH

EGMS-6840

INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B	TOTAL COPIES 21
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	SECRET	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
X-REF TO FILE NO.		
FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/>	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1
DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.		2 676
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ACTION EXP 2	ADVANCE COPY	UNIT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY	<input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBES	TIME 1625Z BY S
INFO	FILE VR, DOI, DIOCI, DDP, BDDP, CS/RE, CI, CILOPS, FI, FILIST 2,	

SECRET 071547Z CITE MUNICH 7088

DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY

REF A DIRECTOR 32925

B EGMS-6783

SO THAT THERE IS NO SLIP AT THIS END, PLEASE CONFIRM
THAT LETTER WHICH ARRIVED HERE SEPT 7 FROM **C** TO
UTILITY, DATED 12 AUGUST 66, THANKING UTILITY FOR HIS KIND
WISHES, MAY BE GIVEN TO UTILITY WITHOUT FURTHER ADO.

SECRET

BT

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

ACTION 7 SEP 1966 0931
G/S Comment: Station requested not
deliver letter inviting UTILITY (1) visit
WOFAC Hqs.

1) DC/E/G

LETTER POUCHED ~~EGMS~~ EGMS 6783
~~SHOULD~~ SHOULD BE PASSED UTILITY AT
EARLIEST CONVENIENCE

GEHLEN 701

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

MUNI 7088

ROUTING			
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☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO el/ce BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: EUR ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR . FILE DCI D/DCI DDP ADDP CS/RF

(DATE AND TIME FILED)

CITE AIR (REFERENCE NUMBER)
01R 33366

CITE DIRECTOR

TO  MUNICH INFO GERMANY

REF MUNICH 7088 (IN 90931)*

LETTER POUCHED EGMS 6783 SHOULD BE PASSED UTILITY AT EARLIEST
 CONVENIENCE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS. Comment: *Asked Hqs. to confirm that the letter from L 7 to UTILITY (1) dated 12 August 66, thanking UTILITY (1) for his kind wishes, may be given to UTILITY (1) without further ado.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

7 Sept 66

DC/EUR/G ☐

RELEASING OFFICE

ORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/G/CE

**AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER**

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COFT NO

DIR 33366

SECRET

To be filed in ☐ Visit
@ DEGENHARDT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE: RECORD:


SUBJECT: Alias DEGENHARDT's Visit

1. On the afternoon of 9 September 1966 I received a telephone call from ☐ of the DDI's office who stated that he had had further discussions with ☐ concerning the ☐ Visit. ☐ said that ☐ is of the opinion that the invitation had already been sent to General Gehlen and ☐'s view that the ☐ visit was now held in abeyance until a precise date for the Gehlen visit has been determined. I explained to ☐ that while an invitation had indeed been pouched to Munich Base, it had not been actually issued to General Gehlen and would not be until we have heard from the Chancellor. ☐ said that the basic reason for his call was to suggest that we send a cable to Munich explaining our delay in providing them with an agenda. I expressed a willingness to send such a cable but I said that we would like to have an indication that ☐ approved the taking place of the ☐ Visit. ☐ said that ☐'s view is that he does not now know whether ☐ will be coming or not. ☐ said that once the question of the timing of General Gehlen's visit has been decided upon, the question of the ☐ visit will have to be raised at one of the Director's morning meetings. Final approval for the ☐ visit will thus have to be given by the Director.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

GEHLEN

SECRET



SECRET

File in Washington Rep.

12 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cocktails at alias DESSAU's Home on 31 August 1966

1. The party turned out to be more relaxed than is usual with parties at @ DESSAU's. Alias DESSAU himself appeared somewhat less tense than usual, although, when the air conditioning proved to be inadequate to the number of guests, he insisted on rushing about making personal apologies to each and every guest. He seems to be genuinely proud of daughter Sybilla and discussed at length her activities at the University of Marquette where she apparently earned top scholastic honors. Perhaps she offers a form of substitution for the son he lost.

2. Sybilla struck me as a rather plain girl who is wrapped up in her children and husband. She was obviously somewhat tired from her recent travels and, apparently, conditions in the DESSAU household are rather crowded what with her three children and Baerbel now living at home. I should judge that she is quite intelligent, but like any young mother with young and active children she probably has little opportunity to pursue anything other than the children. I did not have a great deal of opportunity to talk with her husband. He is an extremely nice looking, quite young in appearance, rather soft spoken and appeared to have a smile for everyone. I must admit that he probably felt himself something of a stranger in that crowd but he seemed to handle himself quite well. He speaks German with a Viennese accent but appears equally at home in either English or German.

3. I spent a good part of the evening talking with Count zu RANTZAU. His family apparently has sizable holdings in the neighborhood of Eckenernförde but he indicated that he has not been home for almost six years. He was stationed in Singapore for three years prior to his assignment here in Washington. He described his position here as that of personal assistant to the Ambassador. He seems to enjoy his work immensely and he finds Washington a most pleasant post. The Count is a bachelor but he complained that Washington really doesn't live up to its reputation as a bachelor's paradise. He seemed to be treated with a good deal of deference by all the Germans but this is probably basically due to his family and position. He does have a certain amount of charm. He presents an almost ludicrous figure, being somewhat short and combing his rather limp hair down in all directions from the crown. On the other hand, he is a lively and engaging conversationalist and probably does his job quite well. At a later time in the evening, I watched him in action as he arranged a meeting for the next morning between General WESSEL and Minister von STACKELBERG to smooth out some misunderstanding which had arisen between these two gentlemen. He certainly held his own with both of these worthies and appeared to have gotten the matter back on the right track.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

4. Alias DESSAU made a special point of introducing me to Admiral CRABB of the Australian Embassy. I found the Admiral and his wife to be a most charming couple. They both originally came from England but they appear to be Australian to the core. They said this was their first visit to the DESSAU's home and they appear to have been invited because Sybilla and her husband are Australians. The diplomatic list has the following entry:

Rear Admiral G. John B. CRABB, D.S.C., Attache (Defense Adviser).

5. I spoke briefly to General WESSEL and recalled to him our earlier meeting in Bonn in 1958. We reminisced for a time and he then stated that he expected to be reassigned to Germany next March. I asked to which job he would be assigned and indicated that the pyramid begins to get quite narrow when one reaches his rank. He agreed with this but said that he really didn't know to which job he would be assigned. I asked whether his reassignment might have anything to do with the current "revolt of the Generals" but he denied this, saying that as he understood it, it was simply a matter of tours being limited to three years and his time would unfortunately be up. I can't help but recall General WESSEL's secretary's statement to [] that she still expects to return to Munich with WESSEL one of these days. Couple this with the fact that GEHLEN's birthday is in April and you have a rather provocative idea.

6. In addition to the rather sizable group of the DESSAU family, the following were there as best I recall. Undoubtedly, I've missed a couple:

CIA

Non CIA

Mr. and Mrs. Critchfield	Leo SAAL and wife
Mr. and Mrs. []	Admiral and Mrs. CRABB (Australia)
Mr. and Mrs. []	Mr. and Mrs. Peter BAZOWSKI (Canada RCM)
Mr. and Mrs. []	Berndt von STADDEN and wife (German Embassy)
Mr. and Mrs. []	Baron von STACKELBERG and wife
[]	Count Detlev zu RANTZAU
Mr. and Mrs. []	General WESSEL (Military Liaison Mission)
Mr. John Comstock	Christa WESSEL
[] State; now private business)	Frl. von HAGEN (National Geographic)
	General FERDER and wife (Mil. Liaison Mission)

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____

X-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. _____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ☒ TOTAL COPIES ☒

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY

☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT _____ TIME _____ BY _____

ACTION **D.C. 1**

INFO FILE, IR, CLEAR-4, D/DCI, DD/P, ADDP, CS/RP C/CI - G/F-1-2

CS/DO

13 SEP 66 94922

SECRET 131410Z CITE GERMANY 4677

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

FROM _____

REF DIRECTOR 33095

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1. YOUR MESSAGE DELIVERED TO AMBASSADOR MCGHEE WHO DECIDED THE PROPER "LOW KEY" PROCEDURE WAS TO ADVISE MINISTER WESTRICK OF YOUR INTENTION TO INVITE GENERAL GEHLEN AND TO ASK WESTRICK TO CONSULT CHANCELLOR ERHARD IF HE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY. WESTRICK SAID HE WAS SURE THE CHANCELLOR WOULD HAVE NO SPECIAL PREFERENCES IN THE MATTER AND NO OBJECTION. WE HAVE NOW WAITED ABOUT 72 HOURS SINCE DELIVERING THE MESSAGE TO SEE IF WESTRICK MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED A DIFFERENT REACTION FROM ERHARD THAN HE EXPECTED AND HAVE NOT HEARD ANYTHING AT ALL. AMBASSADOR MCGHEE HAS THEREFORE ASKED ME TO ADVISE YOU AND SECRETARY RUSK THAT HE CONSIDERS THE INVITATION TO GENERAL GEHLEN TO HAVE BEEN CLEARED WITH THE CHANCELLOR.

2. SINCE I AM SCHEDULED TO SEE GENERAL GEHLEN THIS FRIDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER, I WOULD LIKE YOUR PERMISSION TO CONVEY YOUR LETTER TO HIM IF IT HAS ARRIVED IN MUNICH OR TO ADVISE HIM ORALLY THAT IT IS COMING. THIS WILL BE MY FIRST REAL BUSINESS MEETING WITH

SECRET

GEHLEN 201

GERMANY 4677

PAGE 2 GERMANY 4677 S E C R E T

SECRET

THE GENERAL AND IT WILL BE MOST HELPFUL IN TRYING TO GET OUR
RELATIONS WITH HIS GROUP ONTO A HIGHER AND MORE CORDIAL PLANE
IF I CAN BEGIN WITH THIS PROPITIOUS GESTURE. I WOULD ALSO WELCOME
MORE DETAILS ON YOUR THINKING ABOUT THE VISIT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

C/S Comment: *L 1 requested Ambassador mention to the Chancellor
in low key his intention to invite General Gehlen to U.S. sometime this fall.

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: E
UNIT: C/EUR
EXT: 5881
DATE: 15 Sept 1966

(LE RID
☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

2- SECRET

ROUTING			
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DISSEM BY 22 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/EUR ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE DCI D/PC DD CS/RF CS/DO

(CLASSIFICATION)

C/EAZ C/CI C/FLZ
(DATE AND TIME FILLED)

(REFERENCE NUMBER)

(PAGE)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

35433

TO IMMEDIATE GERMANY MUNICH

RYBAT

FROM

REF: A. GERMANY 4677*

B. DIRECTOR 23095**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

MAB

1. BY ALL MEANS TAKE ADVANTAGE YOUR 16 SEPT MEETING TO ACCOMPLISH DELIVERY LETTER INVITATION WHICH ALREADY IN HANDS MUNICH BASE.

2. PURPOSE INVITATION IS LARGELY POLITICAL, IN THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GEHLEN HAS NOT ALWAYS PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY, AND WITH HIM NEARING RETIREMENT, THERE APPEARS BE OPPORTUNITY USE MY LONG PERSONAL ASSOCIATION TO BRING PRESENT ERA TO CLOSE IN FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE. INEVITABLY GEHLEN'S FRAME OF MIND AT TIME OF CHANGEOVER TO NEW REGIME WILL HAVE IMPORTANT BEARING ON HOW NEW RELATIONSHIPS ARE LAUNCHED.

3. SPECIFICALLY DURING VISIT WOULD PLAN DISCUSS NEED FOR INCREASED VIGILANCE AND THEREFOR INCREASED COVERAGE IN EAST GERMAN AREA.

GEHLEN 201

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM

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DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

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Page 2

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR . FILE

S E C R E T

(DATE AND TIME FILED)

CITE DIRECTOR

35433

4. FYI: INVITATION SUGGESTED BY GENERAL WESSEL WHILE LUNCHING WITH ME. WESSEL, AS YOU KNOW, HAS LONG BEEN THE HEIR APPARENT TO GEHLEN, ALTHOUGH THIS STATUS MAY NOW BE SOMEWHAT OBSCURED BY HIS LONG ABSENCE FROM THE BND AND BY THE EMINENCE HE HAS ACHIEVED IN THE WEST GERMAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE ROLE PLAYED BY WESSEL REGARDING THE INVITATION BE REVEALED TO ANY GERMAN.

END OF MESSAGE

(IN 74322) Requested permission to convey [] a letter to Gen. Gehlen on 16 September. Message from [] to Amb. McGhee concerning a possible visit of Gen. Gehlen to Washington.

DCI

C/EUX

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FIELD MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

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DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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ACTION

ADVANCE COPY

UNIT

TIME

BY

☐ RID COPY

☐ ISSUED

☐ SLOTTED

☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE VR, DDCT, DD, ADP, CS/CF, CS/DO, C/AL, C/CT, C/FE, C/EUR

SECRET 161327Z CITE MUNICH 7175

16 SEP 66 07378

DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY

(Station should take advantage of 16 Sept. meeting to accomplish delivery of invitation to UTILITY(2).)

FROM: ☐ ☐

REF DIRECTOR 35433*

1. ☐ DELIVERED YOUR INVITATION TO UTILITY² FORENOON OF 16 SEPTEMBER, AND UTILITY² ACCEPTED WITH OBVIOUS PLEASURE AT ONCE.

2. IN ACCEPTING, UTILITY² MADE REFERENCE TO HIS LONG-STANDING PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH YOU. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT THE FACT YOUR APPOINTMENT MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO MEET WITH "A PROFESSIONAL LEADER WITH WHOM ONE CAN TALK BUSINESS FRANKLY".

3. HE WILL BE LOOKING AT HIS NOVEMBER SCHEDULE MORE CLOSELY, AND WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED SO MEETING DATE CAN BE SET.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

GEHLEN 201

MUN 7175

L/CE

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

[] with UTILITY & @Holm
16 September 1966, 1000 Hours
UTILITY's Office

32W-2-29/1 [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

1. Before we got to the meeting, which was [] first official business one with UTILITY, we accidentally ran into alias Degenhardt. He gave us a few groups on the resignation of Minister Westrick. This was in response to a query by [] On going upstairs to talk with UTILITY, we got into a further discussion of Westrick. UTILITY reported what Westrick had told him a few days ago, namely, that he was tired of being attacked when he really wasn't the target. All of this is combined in a teletape information report EGO-157.

2. There was some waffling around about the possible successor to Westrick. The names of Karl Hohmann and Secretary Gumble came up. UTILITY said that there was a feeling in the parliament that Hohmann was probably coming up the ladder too fast. Furthermore, for a job like that, he was possibly not suited as being an official rather than a political person.

32W-2-41/1 [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

3. We got into a discussion of UTILITY's views on staff organization. One of his interesting comments in front of alias Holm was that he really didn't think an awful lot of the Deputy system, but preferred the Chief of Staff system. Holm is a little bit of both, actually, although he is designated Chief of Staff. UTILITY spoke of the impossible situation which might arise if a deputy were appointed to a job by the political powers and the Chief and the Deputy didn't get along.

- continued -

Distribution:

Orig - UTILITY file
1 - [] file
3 - 801
1 - 801 chrono
1 - extract
1 - 829/847

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SOURCE METHOD 3 EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

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Page 2

32W-2-28/13 [] , [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

4. The above subjects were not the opening topics of the conversation, however. The invitation by [] to UTILITY was. UTILITY reacted in an astonishing way, as I view it. I say astonishing because he has heretofore been dragging his feet and shoving the recent invitations to visit WOFAC under the rug. When this invitation was made, he almost acted as if it were a command performance. He seemed as if he were going to be very apologetic about not being able to come in September; having to push it off to October. When he found out the suggestion was November, he almost seemed relieved that he could carry out his orders, as it were, at a later date. He said he could not get off in October because of, I gather, the somewhat political unsettled situation. He said in a job such as his you had to be always scouting out ahead of the troops to see where the mine fields were. I gather that a lot of them are being laid by CATUSK un-friends.

801 Visits [] , [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

5. Then we turned to the matter of the visit by [] and []. Very interestingly, UTILITY murmured something to alias Holm about the possibility of having the two gentlemen and their wives out to his home for tea. We should try to take advantage of this, and I should get off a reminder to the Chief of Station to strike a blow for us in this matter. (See EGMA-69362) Still outstanding is precise information about their arrival dates. This was requested in MUNICH-7203.

137-5-27 (VETNAM) [] , [] & UTILITY, 16 Sept 66
@Holm

6. In advance, we had tipped off UTILITY as to [] interest in getting advice from UTILITY about how the German Government could be convinced of the virtue of making clear to the German people our situation and role in Vietnam. UTILITY and Holm both explained to us that they had gone through this problem with alias Winterstein. They had come to the conclusion that chats or conferences or talks or pleas to anyone would not be the ticket. What needed to be done was to mount an operation in the German press. This should not appear to be WOFAC's but should appear to be CATUSK's. This line had been telegraphed a couple of days earlier in alias Winterstein's unexpected interest in Vietnam background material. This information was forwarded in teletape EGMA-69248.

SECRET

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Page 3

32W-2-29/1 [] [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

7. This led UTILITY into a discussion of a matter he has brought up with me previously. He thinks that there is a cultural penetration going on in Germany carried out by the Soviet Bloc. He spoke again of the Humanistic Union. This is an outfit which UTILITY avers has sucked in a lot of intelligent and well-meaning people with various reasonable mottos. But the effort is a softening of the German position vis-a-vis the East. This UTILITY sees as sinister and something against which we should guard ourselves.

8. In earlier days he said he had suggested in high government quarters that some sort of an effort should be made to fight this Eastern Bloc action. He said that there were various meetings and it was agreed that ministries and organs of the government which were to deal with this danger should submit plans. The committee met. CATUSK was the only one that had a plan ready. This led to further discussions which never got off the ground. UTILITY said, "finally I left the committee and let myself be represented by Holm." At this Holm laughingly blushed and said, "Oh I'm sorry, I forgot to report, I have left the committee and turned it over to (alias) Goslar." Goslar is the psychological situation man who works for alias Degenhardt.

9. UTILITY said that it was CATUSK's estimate that some two hundred to three hundred million West German marks were spent a year in a propaganda and cultural penetration program aimed at West Germany. He said this involved penetration of magazines, newspapers, etc. He did not back up this figure with any further data; however, as an estimate it might be useful in an information report. (See EGO-158) UTILITY said that this estimate of 200 to 300 million DM's did not include normal intelligence work.

CALLIKAK [] [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

10. Alias Holm said that inside the German Government the appropriate organizations have got together on the emergency law and the procedures to be followed. It is all agreed that CATUSK will take over the CALLIKAK job. [] asked whether this had been written into the draft law. The reply was yes. The estimate is that the emergency law will be passed this year.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 4

11. Interestingly enough, UTILITY said that it might be useful for [] to mention in any contacts he has in Bonn how much the U.S. Government depends upon the CALLIKAK service for strategic intelligence. UTILITY was telling us in effect that there was a lot of brouhaha about the law, and the more Bonn people were convinced that Allies had a lot to gain from it, the easier the path would be.

32W-2-29/1 [] [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

12. Alias Holm came up with an interesting comment near the close of our meeting. He asked whether we were aware--it seemed to be sort of a reminder--that questions involving intelligence outside Germany were the province of CATUSK and those involving matters inside Germany were the province of CAVATA. I immediately asked Holm whether something had gone adrift or whether there was any specific case in mind. He said that no, he just wanted to make the comment.

155/[] [] [] & 16 Sept 66
UTILITY, @Holm

13. UTILITY asked us whether we could look into the matter of []'s visa application. She is a girl in the CATUSK Translation Unit who hopes to go to the United States to work for a few months and visit her sister. Apparently, her visa is very slow in coming through and UTILITY thought it might be in connection with her using the CATUSK cover story, which might have become unbuttoned somewhere. This is a matter to be turned over to C/MOB. He can most easily see what the problem is. Miss [] was born 7.3.36 in Munich, and she has German citizenship, and her residence is []

[] [] [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

14. UTILITY said that []'s prison term was coming to an end and wondered whether we could look into the possibility of safehaven in the U.S. We said we certainly would look into that.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 5

[] [] [] [] [] & UTILITY, 16 Sept 66
@Holm

15. In the course of the conversations, we were told that in connection with the [] (dprob: 17 October 1935, Frankfurt am Main), a German girl who was arrested in Tashkent, the Soviets had indicated that they would be interested in a swap for Felfe. UTILITY said that naturally they were not going to rise to this bait. On return to the office we found out that this had been surfaced to us through the CE channel and was reported to Headquarters in MUNICH-7173. UTILITY said that [] is "not ours." He said that he had not yet asked if she was ours.

32W-2-29/1 [] [] [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

16. Referring back to his earlier comments about the psychological softening of Western Germany, UTILITY sent for a book which he said had been put out as part of CATUSK's efforts in the Psych field. It is called "East-West Confrontation in Question and Answer (Ost-West-Begegnung in Frage und Antwort)." The publisher is the Deutsche Arbeitsgruppe für West-Ost Beziehungen e.V., 8 Munich 13, Hapsburgerplatz 1/1. Copyright is 1966 by the Ilmgau Verlag Paffenhofen/Ilm. It is a bunch of questions and answers on the East-West politics. The foreword is signed by Dr. Nicolaus von Grote. CE should note the names and cover organizations used in this 299-page paperback book. There are a lot of questions; just to open the book at one page, the question is: What is the difference between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat? Another question is: What is the difference between parties in the East and West? The answer follows immediately. There are two for that question.

L/SP SECURITY [] [] [] & UTILITY, @Holm 16 Sept 66

17. At one point in the conversations, UTILITY made the comment that Special Intelligence cannot be given to the Foreign Office or the Chancellor's office because of security considerations. He did say it could be given, however, to the Ministry of Defense. This is the first time I've heard him say this, although it has been generally known to me. He did not say, however, that they hid some of their Special Intelligence in their regular material.

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICIAL DOCUMENT EXTRACT

DOCUMENT: EGMA-69362

DATE: 19 Sept 66

TO: COS/6 ; C/MEB

FROM: C/MEB

SUBJECT: Clean-up Items Following your Visit

REFERENCE: _____

HQS FILE: COS TRAFFIC

*EXTRACT FILE: C = Utility

3. CONCERNING UTILITY VISIT TO HQS - LAST TIME THIS HAPPENED, CHIEF OF BASE ACCOMPANIED UTILITY PARTY. I ASSURE THIS WOULD BE THE DRILL THIS TIME AS WELL. I WOULD HOPE THAT AS MUCH BENEFIT FROM THIS TRIP WOULD RUB OFF ON US LOCALLY AS IS POSSIBLE AND TRUST YOU AGREE AND WILL SO RECOMMEND.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: ☒ ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: C/E/G/CE
EXT: R1172
DATE: 19 Sept 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: 98 PER: #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: clear ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE DDP, ADDP, class, class

ROUTING

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2	6
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4	8

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 19 22 56 Z (REFERENCE NUMBER) 36355 (PIC)

SECRET

TO: MUNICH INFO GERMANY

RYBAT CATUSK

REFS: DIRECTOR 23461

MUNICH 7175 (IN 97378)

PLEASE CONFIRM SOONEST ☒ ☐ APPOINTMENT
(IN ACCORDANCE THEIR TRAVEL SCHEDULE.)

WITH UTILITY EITHER IN BONN OR MUNICH

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

GEHLEN 701

[] 3
/DC/EUR

[]
C/E/G/CE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

36355

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO. _____
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. _____

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DECLASSIFICATION

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ACTION DISSEM 4/2
C/EUR 4
INFO

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ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FILE, VR, JDP, RDP, C/OS 3, C/OS 5, C/CT, C/EL 2, C/ET/SP 3, C/ET/INT 2

20 SEP 66 099462

SECRET 201038Z CITE MUNICH 7203

DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY

RYBAT CATUSK

REF DIRECTOR 36355

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1. OUTLINE PROGRAM FOR L, D, F MUNICH VISIT
FOLLOWS:

A. MEETING WITH UTILITY 11 OCT FOLLOWED BY
BRIEFING PRIMARILY ON CATUSK-BONN RELATIONSHIPS.

B. MEETING WITH THREE SENIOR CATUSK OFFICERS AND
WIVES AT SMALL INFORMAL-DRESS OPERA-SUPPER PARTY EVENING
11 OCT.

C. BRIEFING BY MUNICH BASES AND MEETING WITH STAFF
AND/OR LIAISON CONTACTS DURING COURSE OF 12 OCT. A COURTESY
CALL ON CONGEN MAY BE IN ORDER.

D. LUNCH FOR LADIES WITH 3 OR 4 SENIOR CATUSK
WIVES 12 OCT.

E. INVITATION TO TEA AT HOME OF UTILITY IN SUBURBAN
BERG ON STARNBERG LAKE WITH LADIES AFTERNOON OF 12 OCT.

SECRET

MUN: 7203

PAGE 2 MUNICH 7203 S E C R E T

SECRET

CONTACT WITH UTILITY AND WIFE IN THIS RELAXED ATMOSPHERE
EMINENTLY WORTHWILE.

F. EVENING 12 OCT AND FORENOON 13 OCT FREE.

2. AS IS HIS USUAL PRACTICE, UTILITY SAID THAT
SCHEDULE WITH HIM CONTINGENT UPON HIS NOT BEING SUMMONED
TO BONN FOR CONSULTATION. IF SUCH WERE CASE, HE WOULD BE
IN TOUCH WITH US TO MAKE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET

C 3 AND C 71.

3. UTILITY MEETING AND TEA INVITATION ARE PRETTY WELL
FIXED. OTHER ITEMS OPTIONAL OR CAN BE SHIFTED SOMEWHAT,
BUT ARE RECOMMENDED. APPRECITE O.K. ON PROGRAM AND FLIGHT
TIMES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

ORIG: E ☐ FILE ☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

UNIT: C/EUR

EXT: 5881

DATE: 21 Sept 66

TOTAL COPIES: 13

SECRET

ROUTING			
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DISSEM BY 3317 PER _____ # _____

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/EUR 4 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2

(CLASSIFICATION) **SECRET** (DATE AND TIME FILED) 22.21 02Z (REFERENCE NUMBER) 37359 (ELITE) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR

MUNICH INFO GERMANY

RYBAT CATUSK

RE MUNICH 7203 (IN 99462)

1. CONCUR PARA ONE A REF MEETING AND PARA ONE B AND ONE E OPERA PARTY EVENING 11 OCTOBER AND VISIT TO UTILITY HOME AFTERNOON 12 OCTOBER.

2. IN ORDER HOWEVER PRESERVE TIME FOR PARA ONE C BRIEFINGS AND MEETINGS WITH STAFF PLUS DISCUSSIONS WITH COS, VIENNA AND C, WHO WILL COME MUNICH, PREFER REMAIN AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE BY AVOIDING ADDITIONAL LIAISON INVOLVEMENTS FOR EITHER SELVES OR WIVES SUCH AS PARA ONE D LUNCH. SUGGEST EVENING 12 OCT AND FORENOON 13 OCT BE KEPT FREE PER PARA ONE F UNTIL WE ARRIVE AND CAN REVIEW PROGRAM TOGETHER.

END OF MESSAGE

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DATE 2005

DDP
C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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C/EUR
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COPY NO.

DIR 37359

Pertinent extracts:

EGBA-82760, 22 Sep 66

C/R @REICHLIN & []
meeting 11 Sep 66 in Munich

Attach. @REICHLIN

5. I asked how things were going in CATUSK and REICHLIN said pretty well. He added that I doubtlessly knew by now that UTILITY was being extended in office for two more years. I said I had indeed heard this and was glad that UTILITY was able to continue. I added that UTILITY always made a very healthy, lively appearance and this was doubtlessly due to the fact that he took good care of himself and got lots of rest and took lengthy vacations. REICHLIN said this was where I was completely wrong: UTILITY still worked as hard as he ever did and didn't take care of himself at all. Frequently UTILITY said he was going on vacation only so that he would have an excuse to get caught up on his back work without being disturbed. REICHLIN added that UTILITY still knew every detail that was going on in CATUSK and kept track of matters of even minor importance. This made it difficult for a subordinate to try to deceive him.

6. Continuing, REICHLIN said that UTILITY had only one major failing as a boss: he did not like to say no to people or get tough to them face-to-face. If UTILITY saw that one of his senior officers was carrying out his duties in a way which displeased him, he would not simply call the officer to his office and tell him to change his way of doing things. Instead, UTILITY made his displeasure known in many little ways, hoping that the officer would get the point without a direct confrontation. If the officer did not get the point over a prolonged period, UTILITY suspected willful disobedience and finally flew up. REICHLIN said that anyone working for UTILITY had to be alert to the smallest nuances and spend a good deal of time guessing at what UTILITY really wanted.

7. I suspect REICHLIN's description is a pretty accurate one. I have previously heard from several CATUSKers how reluctant UTILITY is to say no to anyone.

9. REICHLIN said Bundeswehr is in a terrible mess. Morale in officer corps is low and everyone is demoralized. @R said UTILITY and @HOLM had been in Bonn all preceding week for conferences on Bundeswehr problems. The various schemes being put forward for reorganizing Bundeswehr do not directly affect CATUSK but a large number of CATUSK officers are on detached service from the Bundeswehr and UTILITY wanted to make very sure that decisions about them are not made without his being consulted.

C/R @WINTERSTEIN & []
meeting 11 Sep 66 in Munich

23. [] asked if there had been any changes of consequence in CATUSK or the position of UTILITY. @W said no; as he had already told us, the political parties had asked UTILITY to stay on for two more years and UTILITY had agreed. What will happen in two years is anybody's guess. @WESSEL is no longer being talked of as a possible replacement for UTILITY, but @HOLM is still in the running. It remains a good possibility that a smart young politician will end up with the job...

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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e/g/ca

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ACTION

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BY

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☐ TUBED

EUR 8
INFO

FILE VR, JCT, JECT, JMS, RMB, CS/RE, CS/DO, CS, CS/OS, FI, FI/SP, FI/INT, Z,

JMT, Z, OCT 4

S E C R E T 221351Z CITE MUNICH 7230

DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY BONN

REF DIRECTOR-36234 *

(*Headquarters desires no conflict between
UTILITY(1) and Degenhardt visits.)

1. BEEN GENTEELLY PUSHING ALIAS HOLM FOR EARLIEST
INDICATION OF UTILITY'S PROPOSED ACCEPTANCE DATES FOR
C J'S INVITATION TO HQS. ON 22 SEPT ²HOLM SAID UNFOR-
TUNATELY UTILITY NOT ABLE TO CLARIFY THIS FOR US YET. IN
ANY EVENT HE WANTED TO REPLY TO C J'S LETTER. I HOPE
WE WILL BE GETTING REPLY THROUGH MLB INCLUDING COURTESY
CARBON WHICH WE ^{CAN} CABLE.

2. INDICATED TO HOLM OUR HOPES OF GETTING EARLY
ANSWER AND SKETCHED OUT PART OF THE PROBLEM AS INDICATED
IN REF.

3. WITH RESPECT TO DEGENHARDT VISIT, WE UNDERSTAND HQS
PROBLEM. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW MOST SINCERELY HOPE THAT
SITUATION WILL NOT ARISE WHICH FORCES DEGENHARDT TO DELAY.
HE HAS ALREADY HAD TO POSTPONE ONCE WHAT WE KNOW HE FEELS

22, SEPT

2201354

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

22 Sept 66

MUN 7230

RECEIVED
RID/MIS

RID/MIS

OCT 3 9 51 AM '66

PAGE 2 MUNICH 7230 SE 6 5 5 T 2 25 PM '66

IS AN IMPORTANT CONTACT WITH WORDOMP FOR QUITE A NUMBER OF
MONTHS. FOR SAME PERIOD HAS ~~BEEN~~ ^{BFEW} HOLDING PERIOD BETWEEN
28 OCTOBER TO THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER OPEN FROM ALL OTHER
ENGAGEMENTS SO HE COULD IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT DATES IN THAT
PERIOD WE SUGGEST.

4. AGENDA NOW WOULD BE USEFUL. ~~SECRET~~

BT
SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. E

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 24

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. E

2/9/82

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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2	6
3	7
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ACTION

By 15

ADVANCE COPY

UNIT

TIME

BY

EUR 8

☒ RID COPY

☐ ISSUED

☐ SLOTTED

☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE, VP, DCL, D/DCL, DDP, ADDP, CS/RE, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, FI,

EI/SPG, E/INT 2

SECRET 231700Z CITE MUNICH 7245

23 SEP 66 02500

DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY

C/S

Comment:

REF MUNICH 7230

(1001354)

*

Station pushing for earliest indication of
UTILITY's (1) proposed acceptance dates
for E 's invitation to Hqs.

UTILITY'S REPLY TO E SAID THAT HE THANKS

FOR KIND INVITATIONS, LOOKING FORWARD TO VISIT IN NOVEMBER.

ADDED THAT THERE IS A "LABILE" POLITICAL SITUATION IN
GERMANY, AND POSSIBLY CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT COULD KEEP

TIED DOWN FOR WHILE. HOWEVER, HOPES BY MID OCTOBER TO

SUGGEST APPROXIMATE NOVEMBER DATE. TELETAPING TEXT OF

LETTER SHORTLY.

SECRET

BT

copy to DD/OC/EUR

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

AM B2	EX	FI/6/CE
EX	DE	4244
ABSTRACT	Y	

NNNN

23 Sep 66

MUNI 7245

SECRET

26 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with @DESSAU for Lunch on 23 September 1966

1. The purpose of the lunch was to allow @DESSAU to introduce @Dr. RASP. @Dr. RASP seems a most pleasant, young man, quite excited about his first visit to the United States and looking forward to being permanently assigned. It appears, however, that the final decision as to whether or not he will actually even come permanently to the United States has not yet been made. In addition to influencing the office he might be assigned to, his report of this TDY trip will also help decide whether he is to come PCS at all.
2. @DESSAU had with him Kreide envelopes for me and Mr. [redacted]. He took one document from my envelope and asked that I pass it directly to [redacted] on the Board of National Estimates. He said that this was in specific reply to a query made during the discussions with @GRAU and company. He also gave me a personal letter addressed to [redacted] and asked if I could send it direct through the pouch. (We later opened this letter and photographed it. A copy is attached herewith since it refers to @DESSAU's plans to visit the [redacted] at Christmas time. @DESSAU has, of course, mentioned this trip to me previously, but the letter indicates that his plans are apparently contingent upon the willingness of the [redacted] to entertain @DESSAU and his wife.)
3. I informed @DESSAU that the Director has invited General Gehlen to the United States in November and stated that General Gehlen has accepted. @DESSAU immediately indicated his great pleasure with this development and said that he had always pushed the "Doktor" to come to the United States. He referred to his earlier statements that the visit of @EGENHARDT would provide good opportunities for General Gehlen to come. I said that I knew nothing further about the visit and indicated that General Gehlen might well not want the two of them to be absent from Munich at the same time. @DESSAU merely shrugged this off, but made no further direct comment to this point. He did say he was pleased to know of the forthcoming visit and indicated that it fitted perfectly into his own schedule. He said too he would arrange to have his guest room in order, noting that General Gehlen does not like to sleep in hotels.

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4. I queried @DESSAU on the statements he had made to [] during the previous evening's cocktail party concerning the BND report about Viet Nam from French sources. I indicated the vital importance which we attached to running down the origin of all such reports and asked that he give me as much detail as he possibly could. He told me that the information had come to him in a form not to be considered a report and that he was given permission to discuss it with us if he so desired. He then repeated in somewhat greater detail the same report which he had given to [] the night before. I have subsequently passed this information to C/E/G/R.

5. I indicated to @DESSAU and @Dr. RASP that the first discussion with our S and T has been arranged for Tuesday afternoon at 1330 hours. @DESSAU indicated that he planned to attend the first session and indicated that he would decide thereafter whether to come to any further sessions. I told them I would meet them in the lobby of our building shortly before 1330 hours on next Tuesday (27 September 1955).

6. I paid the check.

7. @DESSAU exhibits a rather odd sense of security at times. In extracting the report for [] from the Kreide envelope, he excused himself from the table and went outside after unsuccessfully trying to find the particular report while sitting at the table. He attributed this action to security and apparently had no difficulty in finding the report once outside. At another point in the conversation when he was relating to me the report from Paris he paused whenever the waitress was near saying that he felt she did speak German. (Earlier, because of @Dr. RASP's difficulty with the menu, we had asked this particular waitress if she spoke German and she said that she did not.)

8. Later on in the afternoon, @DESSAU called me to indicate that he had just received the concluding report of the Moldau series. It was rather late in the afternoon and he said that he no longer had any method of getting the report to us. He said, however, that two sentences sum up the report quite nicely and he asked if I would take them down. I said that I would and I would see that they were passed on to the proper parties. After having read the two sentences to me, he indicated that they were particularly aimed at those who believed that the trend of the Soviet Bloc Armed Forces is not as great as it once was. I passed the report as he dictated it to C/E/G/R.

[]
C/E/G/CE

SECRET

TT/3 - 396/DIR, 704/BONN DISPATCH EGMT-14534 FOLLOWS

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION	
				MARKED FOR INDEXING	
TO CHIEF, WOFAC				NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO. CHIEF, EUR COS, GERMANY				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
FROM CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE				MICROFILM	
SUBJECT LETTER TO MR. HELMS FROM GENERAL GEHLEN					
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
REF - MUNICH-7245					
TEXT OF GENERAL GEHLEN'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE LETTER TO MR. HELMS FOLLOWS -					
<p>REINHARD GEHLEN 8131 BERG BEI STARNBERG, DEN 22ND SEPTEMBER, NR.68 1966</p> <p>DEAR MR. HELMS,</p> <p>I WISH TO THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR KIND LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 1ST. I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR FRIENDLY REMARKS ABOUT OUR SERVICE. BUT IN RESPONSE I SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ALL ARE EXTREMELY HAPPY ABOUT THE CHOICE YOUR PRESIDENT MADE IN APPOINTING YOU HEAD OF THE CIA.</p> <p>I THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND INVITATION, AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEE YOU IN NOVEMBER, IF NOTHING HAPPENS WHICH MAY MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR ME TO STAY HERE. AS YOU KNOW THE SITUATION FROM THE GERMAN DOMES- TIC POLICY POINT OF VIEW IS AT PRESENT A BIT LABILE. EVENTUAL CHANGES WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD KEEP ME HERE FOR A WHILE AS I EXPL- AINED MORE DETAILEDLY TO MR. CLINE. AFTER ALL, I HOPE I WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE THE TRIP IN NOVEMBER, AND I MAY SUGGEST AN APPROXIMATE DATE DURING THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER.</p> <p>ALL GOOD WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR HEAVY TASK AND MANY REGARDS TO ALL OUR FRIENDS IN YOUR ORGANIZATION.</p> <p>WITH CORDIAL REGARDS,</p> <p>SINCERELY YOURS,</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p> <p>R. GEHLEN SEP 1966</p>					
DIST - BY TAPE C/WOFACT C/EUR COS/G					
CROSS REFERENCE TO 32W-2-28/13		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMT - 14534		DATE 26 SEPT 66	
		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		HQ'S FILE NUMBER 71	
END OF TT/3 - 396/DIR 704/BONN DISPATCH EGMT-14534		ORIGINATING			
		OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
		COORDINATING			
OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE		OFFICER'S NAME	

EGMT 14534

REINHARD GEHLEN

6131 BERG DEI STARNBERG, DEN
NR. 68

22nd September,
1966

Executive Registry
66-2218

Dear Mr. Helms,

I wish to thank you very much for your kind letter of September 1st. I appreciate very much your friendly remarks about our service. But in response I should stress that we all are extremely happy about the choice your President made in appointing you head of the CIA.

I thank you for your kind invitation, and I am looking forward to see you in November, if nothing happens which may make it necessary for me to stay here. As you know the situation from the German domestic policy point of view is at present a bit labile. Eventual changes within the German Government would keep me here for a while as I explained more detailedly to Mr. Cline. After all, I hope I will be able to make the trip in November, and I may suggest an approximate date during the middle of October.

All good wishes for success in your heavy task and many regards to all our friends in your organization.

With cordial regards,

Sincerely yours,

R. Gehlen

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

C/MLB

54

28 SEPT 66

DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY

MUNICH

7270

1000 SEP 28

03:43

C/MLB

L/NT

L/PLANS 32W-2-28/13

(L/CE) files: ; Gehlen

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CITE MUNICH
7270

INFO

CITE

DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY

REF: MUNICH-7230

IN-04960

1. HAVE SPOKEN TO ALIAS HOLM QUIETLY AND INFORMALLY CONCERNING TIMING UTILITY AND DEGENHARDT TRIPS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GET HARD AND FAST DATES, HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT IS REASONABLE TO PASS WORD TO HQS THAT UTILITY AIMING AT DATE DURING LATTER HALF OF NOVEMBER. TO AVOID CONFLICT HOLM IS WORKING WITH ALIAS DEGENHARDT TOWARD A 7-12 NOVEMBER DATE FOR THAT GROUP.

2. ON BASIS OF ABOVE FEEL WE HAVE THE CONFLICT PROBLEM PRETTY WELL IN HAND AND HOPE THIS WILL PERMIT US TO MOVE FORWARD PROMPTLY WITH DEGENHARDT VISIT PLANS. WOULD APPRECIATE ESPECIALLY LONG-HOPED-FOR AGENDA.

END OF MESSAGE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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RELEASING OFFICER

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MUNICH 7270

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

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NIT: DDI
XT: R9374
ATE: 29 Sept 1966
☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

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FROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: DDI 2 ☐ RID COPY

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30 15 13 Z CITE DIRECTOR

39472

TO: MUNICH INFO GERMANY

MUNI 7270 (M04960) *

C/S Comment: * Field believed that UTILITY(1) aiming at date during latter half of November for U.S. visit.

1. IN EXPECTATION THAT UTILITY NOT LIKELY TO ARRIVE HERE BEFORE LATE NOVEMBER, HQS APPROVES ALIAS DEGENHARDT VISIT FOR WEEK OF 7 NOVEMBER. DO NOT DESIRE INVOLVE SENIOR WOFAC OFFICERS IN TWO VISITS TIMED TOO CLOSELY TOGETHER.

2. IN ORDER MINIMIZE COST IN BOTH TIME AND MONEY WE HAVE TRIMMED AGENDA PROPOSAL FOR DEGENHARDT VISIT, BEING TAPED. WE PROPOSING SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AT HQS FROM 7-9 NOVEMBER, 10 NOVEMBER AT LNSHOE, AND SHORT FIELD TRIP FROM 13-16 NOVEMBER IF DEGENHARDT SCHEDULE PERMITS.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

AC/EUR

DDP

DIRECTOR

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DIR 39472

SECRET

B I O G R A P H I C S K E T C H

Oct 66

GEHLEN, Reinhard (@Dr. Schneider)

Born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt, Reinhard GEHLEN has been head of the END since it began. While he will be due for retirement in April 1967, Bonn apparently has asked him to stay on for one or two years thereafter.

Now a Lieutenant General in the Reserve, GEHLEN entered military service during 1920, was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1923, and was assigned to the German General Staff in 1937. He rose to brigadier general during World War II, ending up as the top intelligence authority on the Russian front. He was dismissed by Hitler ("get rid of the man; he's crazy") for a factual briefing of the Russian Order of Battle in February, 1945.

Having preserved his Russian OB files, he interested the U.S. Army in his intelligence capabilities. After spending nearly a year as a POW in Washington, he returned to Germany in 1946 and activated his intelligence organization under U.S. Army sponsorship. Custody was transferred to WOFAC during 1949 and continued until the BND was legalized in 1956.

Mr. Jim Critchfield, who knows him well, commented after a 1963 visit: "Gehlen's highly personalized domination of

SECRET

German intelligence extends without interruption back into the late years of the war; he has survived all his counterparts in NATO; he is in this sense the dean of the Western intelligence world. In the past few years his own relationships with the Europeans has grown; his personal ties with America have declined. The passing of the Dulles family, Adenauer's final desire to consummate rapprochement of France and Germany in his own lifetime, and the early indifference of the Kennedy administration to Germany further contributed to the erosion of his orientation. He apparently foresees a growing diminution of the U.S. presence in Europe, is reinforcing his European ties and is initiating a subtle disengagement from the 'special arrangements' with us."

Concerning this "subtle disengagement," I think it is in part, at least, to be explained as a growing-up and away from the old tutelage position held by us vis-a-vis BND and as well known by Jim Critchfield. GEHLEN has told me, in effect, that he does not like to appear in the eyes of Bonn as a puppet of the Americans. This may account in part for the fact that, after years of hesitation, GEHLEN has now picked up ties with MI-6. One of his most trusted officers was sent there as Chief of Station.

I do not think that this broadening of contacts means that GEHLEN has weighed all factors in the balance and decided systematically to distance himself from us. He often refers to the fact we are good and old friends, adding that

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SECRET

we can afford the luxury of frankness one with the other. He does not hesitate in his frankness when he feels he has been wronged; and when under fire, he attacks.

Our relations with him were troubled when we refused to accept his son-in-law as his Chief of Station, Washington. He took this as a personal affront.

The discovery of a Soviet agent in a senior post on his staff was a traumatic experience for his organization.

Although he is a friendly social companion, he eschews representational life.

His penetrating and steadfast gaze while concentrating on his conversational partner has earned him, among the Americans who know him, the name "blue eyes."

SECRET

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SECRET 041126Z CITE MUNICH 7337

DIRECTOR INFO BONN, OPS BASE/MUNICH

RYBAT CATUSK

REF A DIRECTOR 37359

B MUNICH 7275

DUE ABSENCE UTILITY'S WIFE CATUSK REGRETS MUST
 CANCEL TEA ON AFTERNOON 12 OCT. THIS WILL AFFORD LOOSER
 TIME SCHEDULE FOR MEETING ☐ AND ☐ CHIEFS
 AS WELL AS CHIEFS OF STATION FROM VIENNA AND ☐

SECRET

BT * CONCUR IN MEETINGS WITH COS, VIENNA AND COS, ☐

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

Declassification unnecessary

e/g/ce

MUN 7337

LICE

SECRET

[] (GEHLEN, Reinhard)

[] : @Moeller

4 Oct 66

3. Moeller said that UTILITY has wanted to get him out of the headquarters for some time. UTILITY has told Moeller that he is too active, that he has too many contacts, that he stirs up too many things. (We had several exchanges about making omelets without breaking eggs, etc., when he made this comment. I also reached in my pocket, saying, "Where's that contract; we look for that kind of officer!") Furthermore, apparently Moeller had some run-ins with UTILITY concerning UTILITY's brother Guisseppi in Rome. Guisseppi operates outside the Foreign Liaison Division directly under UTILITY. Although he is a brilliant man and had a wonderful career ahead of him in science or mathematics or something as an assistant to Professor Heisberg, he has instead become a dilettante and a Roman lounge-lizard. The lack of discipline in this matter has upset Moeller considerably. This confirms

what [] has been eliciting from @Wilden for some time. Moeller said that another thing was annoying to UTILITY. Apparently, Moeller (while I was away on home leave) was trying to knit together the threads of contact between WOFAC and CATUSK following the [] case. This seemed to annoy UTILITY, who was looking for a "high-level political resolution" to the problem, rather than just having the working-level boys get together and smooth the thing out.

[] (GEHLEN)

[] : @Moeller

4 Oct 66

4. Particularly griping to Moeller was the matter of the recent promotion of alias Seidel. Moeller's slot was previously occupied by General @Mertens. Moeller had every anticipation, then, of being able to make General in this slot. After being retired recently for disability, Mertens' General's slot was transferred to another part of CATUSK. Surprise--it was to the Como Division, so that UTILITY's brother-in-law, alias Seidel, could get a promotion to General. This outrageous bit of nepotism was something with which CATUSKERS apparently have had to live for a long time. The foregoing information is forwarded in EGMA-69372.

(GEHLEN) & OHola 4 Oct 66

3. Alias Holm reiterated that the outlook for the
UTILITY visit to U.S. still seemed stable at the second
half of November.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005 6 October 1966

Memorandum to: Chief, Support Branch
From : Chief, Munich Liaison Base
SUBJECT : Exchange of Receipts as an Accommodation
for UTILITY

1. As reflected in my contact report for 4 October 1966 with alias Holm, I performed an accommodation for UTILITY, President of CATUSK, which apparently has been performed by my predecessors as well. He had asked me to oblige him in this affair when I visited him to introduce ~~C~~ ~~DA~~.

2. Attached you will find two receipts, each in the amount of DM 400, signed "Schneider." This is the alias used by UTILITY. One receipt is dated 23 July 1965; the other one is dated 27 June 1966.

3. ~~I got these receipts for~~ signing two other receipts of DM 400 each with my CATUSK Compound alias "Turm."

4. This exchange of receipts is apparently something done by UTILITY in order to protect himself against the Federal Accounting Office. I gather that he makes a contribution to the annual picnic or company party for his employees. He must use company funds for them, and apparently we have been obliging him in this respect for a number of years. No actual money changed hands.

5. The receipts I received from Schneider are attached.

P. S. This maybe should go into
Frian records? No Wolfart funds in-
volved, however. Then maybe ops file?

CONFIDENTIAL

CE/C

(GEHLEN, R.)

SECRET

4. Additionally, [] said that one capping injury had been done him by UTILITY. [] explained that his predecessor as Chief of Foreign Liaison, alias Mertens, was a general officer. [] said that normally, then, he might have expected to be a general officer himself. (Although he admitted his slot did not carry a star; Mertens' came from elsewhere in CATUSK.) But when Mertens was retired from active duty on grounds of health, the slot which Mertens had was transferred to the Commo Division of CATUSK. UTILITY's brother-in-law, alias Seidel, went into it and was promptly promoted from Colonel to Brigadier General. [] admitted that Seidel deserved the promotion, but he said this blatant piece of nepotism could not help but embitter him. He said now his chances for making one star were gone.

5. [] commented philosophically that he was use to this sort of upset in his life. In 1950 he had been hastily called by UTILITY to stand by; he was needed urgently in Paris. He was sent, however, only in 1960. And then, [] concluded, when WOFAC would not accept UTILITY's son-in-law as Washington representative, UTILITY's daughter came crying to UTILITY, saying, "Daddy, you promised us a post abroad," to which UTILITY replied, "Yes, I know, what do you want?" The answer was Paris, and [] found himself back at the old headquarters grind.

1
SECRET

4/CE

CONTACT REPORT

[] with UTILITY and []
10 October 1966, 1030 Hours
UTILITY's Office

[] & UTILITY, @Holm 10 Oct 66

1. This meeting was at my instance to convey to UTILITY the fact that Headquarters was not in a position to take [] into safehaven. This was conveyed to him in the form of Blue Memo No. 35129, in addition to an oral presentation. His response was a reiteration of the problem as CATUSK saw it. The main fear was that he might be assassinated despite the Germans' best efforts and this would discourage further defections. This went out to Hqs in MUNICH-7375.

32W-2-29/1(WEST GERM GOVT) [] & UTILITY, @Holm 10 Oct 66

2. Then we got into a long discussion of world affairs. UTILITY was in one of his plain truths for plain people moods and let off his feelings about Secretary McNamara, President Johnson, Chancellor Erhard, and a few other assorted people. I have attempted to bring these together in the form of an information report, No. EGO-163.

Distribution:

Orig - UTILITY (GEHLEN)
1 - [] file
2 - 801 for forwarding
1 - 801 chrono
1 - extract
1 - 829/847/831

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
1 JUL 2005

SECRET

SECRET

4/CE

CONTACT REPORT

[] [] [] with UTILITY and @Holm
11 October 1966, 1500 Hours
UTILITY's Office

1. This was primarily a hello-and-get-acquainted meeting for [] and [] with UTILITY. Holm had met [] before; they had greeted each other cordially before the meeting.

2. [] opened up by indicating to UTILITY that he heard about him for years and years, but he unfortunately had never had the opportunity of meeting him. Reference was also made to UTILITY's forthcoming visit to see []

[] UTILITY was not forthcoming, as I had hoped, in giving any hard dates for his proposed visits to the States. He did comment on his feeling of closeness to []

[], because the fact that [] had always had some tie-in with the German scene.

76-5-33 [] [] [] 11 Oct 66
(YUGOSLAVIA) [] & UTILITY, @Holm

3. In the course of the conversation, the subject got around to Yugoslavia. [] said that we had increased our interest in Yugoslavia and were, in fact, preparing a study of field grade and lower Yugoslav Army officers. He floated the question as to whether CATUSK had any information about this category of persons. He added that we would be grateful for anything that CATUSK could offer us. UTILITY said he didn't think there was anything at hand but would be glad to be helpful if he could. This should be the subject of further conversations here at the Base. The discussion brought from UTILITY the comment that: "Perhaps we should be looking a little more closely at Yugoslavia," (i.e. if you are.).

- continued -

Distribution:

- Orig - UTILITY file
- 1 - [] file
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- 1 - extract
- 1 - 801 chrono
- 1 - 829/847

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

SECRET

Page 2

137-5-27
(VIETNAM)

L J, L J, L 1,
L & UTILITY, @Holm

11 Oct 66

4. The discussion turned to Vietnam. L J briefly touched on a WOFACT development in the scientific field to which it could be determined that a man has recently touched or rubbed his clothing against metal such as in a gun or a light machine gun. This was proving very useful to the Armed Forces in Vietnam. This obviously intrigued UTILITY, a certified gadget-man. The discussion of Vietnam went on a little further, especially UTILITY's offer (after a L J presentation of the problem as seen in our eyes) to plant some Vietnamese material in the German press. From a Base point of view, the interesting thing was that @Holm commented that the material could not be simply spread broadcast in, for example, a handout form but had to be given personally to each newspaperman ~~as~~ as an "exclusive." This solves one of our problems here in that if we can send over smaller bundles of specific story material, CATUSK can use its modus operandi of reporting to give an "exclusive" to one newspaperman after another.

5. In a turn of the conversation concerning Vietnam, L J (based on previous briefing material) commented that "I understand that McNamara is not the most popular man in Germany." This brought an appreciative chuckle from UTILITY, who had been particularly harsh on McNamara to me the day before. L J, however, developed the theme a little to say that the fact that the American Army was for the first time prepared for the war it was fighting could be attributed to McNamara's insistence that troops be prepared to fight as our Special Forces are prepared. This was easily understood by UTILITY, who knows that we have Special Forces troops down here in Bad Toelz. In fact, they do some training for the CATUSKERS. The conversation veered around to the Sino-Soviet situation and UTILITY got an opportunity to comment, as he and his organization do, about his contention that the Soviet attitude vis-a-vis Europe is "offensive." The day before, he had been speaking to me about the great American error in believing that the Soviets wanted a detente.

6. L J briefly mentioned one of the peculiarities of the American political scene today, being the far-out "new left" who regard normal Communists as something of sticks-in-the-mud. UTILITY was reassured that these people were not a political factor of any importance.

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ORIG: ☐
UNIT: C/MLB
EXT: 54
DATE: 14 OCT 1966

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

4/CE file

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ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS
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CITE MUNICH
7426

TO: GERMANY

FROM: MUNICH

CONF: C/MLB

INFO: DC/MLB

7426
FILE ~~SECRET~~ (GEHLEN)
1966 OCT 14 14:43
32W-2-28/13

TO: INFO: CITE:

GERMANY

INTRA

☐ FROM ☐

IN TALK WITH ALIAS HOLM IT CLEAR THAT AS ON LAST TRIP
UTILITY WILL BE TAKING AN A.D.C. WITH HIM. ALSO WOULD
"VERY MUCH WELCOME" YOUR AND MY ACCOMPANIMENT (OR MY
ACCOMPANIMENT AND YOUR APPEARANCE AT THE SCENE OR ANY
VARIATION). THIS LEFT VAGUE TO BE FLEXIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MESSAGE FORM

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 EXT: 1172
 DATE: 19 October

☐ FILE RID☐ INDEX☐ NO INDEX☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 301-19358

SECRET

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: EUR 8 ☐ RID COPY

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(CLASSIFICATION)

(DATE AND TIME FILED)

(REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

10 22 10:21

DIR
CITE DIRECTOR

44921

TO: MUNICH INFO BONN

CATUSK

REFS: MUNICH 7245 (IN 02500)

MUNICH 7270 (IN 04960)

COULD YOU ATTEMPT APPLY DISCREET PRESSURE ON UTILITY FOR DATES
 HE PROPOSES VISIT HEADQUARTERS.

~~IN ORDER INSURE AMPLE TIME FOR MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS~~
 HQS

PTA WE NEED START ON PLANNING ~~SOONEST.~~

END OF MESSAGE

AC/E/G E.C/E/CR ☐C/E/G/CE ☐

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 SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET 281435Z CITE MUNICH

7554

28 Oct 66 27803

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

ANPS	PT	E/G/CE
PS	TEST	
ABSTRACT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	INDEX

1. ONE DAY AFTER CABINET-COALITION CRISIS IN BONN, ALIAS HOLM CALLED ME OVER TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM UTILITY TO ☐. HOLM SAID IN IT UTILITY ASKED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF HIS SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF POLITICAL EVENTS. HE HOPED THAT ☐ WOULD UNDERSTAND HE CANNOT NOW SAY WITH ANY CERTAINTY WHEN HE CAN VISIT HQS. HOLM SAID THAT A GOOD GUESS WOULD BE EARLY IN 1967.

2. HOLM WAS VERY INSISTENT THAT ☐ AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO OTHER REASON FOR UTILITY'S REQUEST THAN INTERNAL GERMAN SITUATION, AND UTILITY DEFINITELY WANTS TO ACCEPT ☐ INVITATION AS SOON AS THINGS SETTLE DOWN. I

REASSURED HOLM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING WHATSOEVER, SAYING THAT I WAS SURE THE MINUTE THE CABINET NEWS HIT WASHINGTON, OUR OFFICERS WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD IMMEDIATELY THE DELICATE SITUATION IN WHICH UTILITY FOUND HIMSELF.

3. LETTER TO ☐ IS SEALED. CAN EITHER POUCH OR OPEN, TELETAPE CONTENTS, AND POUCH. PLEASE SAY.

SECRET

BT

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

28 Oct 66

MUNICH 7554

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: ☒ EJK FILE RID
UNIT: C/E/G/CE ☐ INDEX
EXT: X1172 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 28 October 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: EURO ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE

ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/ICZ,

(CLASSIFICATION)

(DATE AND TIME FILED)

(REFERENCE NUMBER)

(PICA)

SECRET

20 22 11Z CITE DIRECTOR 47938

TO: MUNICH INFO BONN

CATUSK

REF: MUNICH 7554 (IN 27803)

PLEASE POUCH LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

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DATE 2005

GEHLEN 201

DC/E/G

C/E/CRK

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/G/CE

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

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COPY NO.

28 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Lunch with @DESSAU on 28 October 1966

1. I arranged to have lunch with @DESSAU at the Marriott Restaurant at 12 o'clock on 28 October 1966. This was the first opportunity I had had to see @DESSAU since his return from Bermuda. He looks brown and fit and indicated that he enjoyed Bermuda very much.

2. Our first topic of conversation was the resignation of the four FDP Ministers from the Erhardt Cabinet. @DESSAU expressed dismay at this turn of events and we briefly discussed the legal ramifications which now face the German government. @DESSAU indicated that no one in the German Embassy had any great amount of insight into the situation in Germany. He commented that the latest information referred that the Bundesrat had unanimously rejected Erhardt's budget proposals. @DESSAU referred to earlier contentions that the SPD should be admitted into the government immediately following the Nordrhein westfalen election debacle. He stated his view that the SPD was in a position in that they could insist upon greater concessions than heretofore. He stated that in his personal view a SPD government was preferable to any situation which would allow the view of Franz Josef Strauss to be heard in the government.

3. @DESSAU took from his pocket a cable from @HOLM which he allowed me to read. @HOLM wrote that he had passed to [] a letter from UTILITY to the Director indicating that because of the internal political situation, UTILITY requested a postponement of the November date of his visit to the United States. The cable continued with the note that @HOLM and [] would get together in order to propose a new date. I thanked @DESSAU for this information and asked whether he felt the situation might have any effect upon the @DEGENHARDT visit. @DESSAU said that he did not believe it would.

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L. Olsen

Der Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes

28. Oktober 1966

Executive Registry

66-4789

Geheim

mt

Lieber Mr. Helms!

Wir haben hier infolge der Finanzlage der Bundesregierung eine schleichende Regierungskrise, die jetzt zum Austritt der FDP-Minister geführt hat. Sie wissen sicher aus eigener Erfahrung, wie sehr die Stellung des Dienstes durch eine etwaige Regierungsumbildung und damit verbundenen personellen Veränderungen im Kanzleramt berührt werden kann. Ich möchte Sie daher um Verständnis bitten, wenn ich meinen Besuch noch etwas verschiebe, bis wirklich wieder ganz klare Verhältnisse entstanden sind. Ich werde mich dann mit Ihnen wegen eines Termins für meinen Besuch erneut in Verbindung setzen. Abgesehen davon, daß ich mich freuen würde, Sie und unsere anderen amerikanischen Freunde drüben wiederzusehen, bin ich doch sehr an einem auf weite Sicht gerichteten Gespräch mit Ihnen interessiert.

Wenn mir auch gesagt worden ist, daß ich voraussichtlich noch zwei bis drei Jahre im Amt bleiben müsse, so will ich doch rechtzeitig meine spätere Nachfolgeschaft so regeln, daß ein über mindestens 10 bis 15 Jahre nachrichtendienstlich erfahrener Beamter oder Offizier des Dienstes die Leitung übernimmt. Letzteres nur vertraulich persönlich für Sie

Mit herzlichen Grüßen bin ich in Verbundenheit

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Ihr

Helms

Geheim

ROUTINE

29 OCT 66

IN 4833 B

S E C R E T 282241Z CITE DIRECTOR 47938

MUNICH INFO BONN

CATUSK

REF: MUNICH 7554

PLEASE POUCH LETTER.

S E C R E T

EX TOR: 29/0642Z

pouched 31 Oct 66

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Gehlen

DIR 47938

1 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Contact with GDESSAU on 31 October 1966

1. GDESSAU called and said that GDr. RASP had obtained the answers he was seeking. He indicated that GDr. RASP had called [] on Sunday, 30 October and had allegedly learned from [] that the DDSAT would be most happy to enter into a formal relationship with GDr. RASP and that they were prepared to do so as soon as GDr. RASP returned PCS to the United States. (He used the words "Begrueessen" and "Bereit") GDESSAU said that he and GDr. RASP were pleased with this decision but GDESSAU asked that it be communicated to him in some kind of formal manner. This took me somewhat by surprise as it seemed to be diametrically opposed to the information which I had received from [] of the DDSAT on Friday, 28 October. I said to GDESSAU that it was my understanding that no formal decision had been reached and I indicated that it would be necessary to get Munich into the act before a formal decision could be made. GDESSAU said that he understood this completely and said further that he was even at that moment dictating a letter which GDr. RASP would carry back with him for presentation to our base in Munich. I understood that this letter was to be the formal notification from the BND to CIA that they are sending GDr. RASP here as their representative. I told GDESSAU that we could hardly fully react to a proposal until such time as a formal request is made and I indicated that his answer would have to await receipt of the letter from the BND.

2. GDESSAU said that he was also writing a letter to the "Doktor" urging him not to delay too long in naming a new date for his visit to the United States. GDESSAU expressed some concern that CIA representatives fully understand the reason for Gehlen's desire to postpone his visit and he asked whether I had any indication that there might be some misunderstanding. I replied that insofar as I had heard anything at all, it had reflected a complete understanding of Gehlen's desire to postpone the visit because of the internal political situation in Germany. GDESSAU said that in his letter to the "Doktor" he had suggested the month of February as the most suitable time to re-schedule the visit. He said that he had picked February feeling that it was too close to Christmas to try to re-schedule

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Gehlen's 201

the visit for this year. He stressed, however, his conviction that the visit should not be delayed unduly.

3. @DESSAU noted that he had been extremely busy over the weekend in that he had two house guests, @Dr. RASP and [] He noted that [] left for Calgary on Sunday afternoon and that @Dr. RASP was leaving on Monday evening.

4. We spoke briefly about the @DEGENHARDT visit but only to rehash matters which we had previously discussed. @DESSAU said that he would not be available on Tuesday (1 November) since it is a German holiday. He indicated that he planned to spend it at home doing some work which had been neglected, i.e. relaying a carpet runner on his stairway, cleaning rugs, and generally helping to straighten up the house. He said that he would be in our building on Wednesday for his usual briefing and as planned to see each other then.

[]
C/E/G/CE

TT/3 - 486/DIR - 903/BRN - 795/BONN - DISPATCH EGMA 68310 FOLLOWS

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
				MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	C/EUROPEAN DIVISION			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	C/SOV BLOC DIV - CGS/GERMANY - COD/BERLIN			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	C/MUNICH LIAISON BASE			MICROFILM
SUBJECT	CATUSK			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

BONN - 5055

1. DURING THREE RECENT MEETINGS WITH ALIAS REICHLIN, CHIEF OF CATUSK'S TACTICAL COLLECTION DIVISION, ADDITIONAL LIGHT WAS GAINED INTO ALIAS REICHLIN'S CURRENT DRIVE TO DEVELOP A CLOSER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH WOFAC. ONE OF THESE MEETINGS WAS MAINLY DEVOTED TO ALIAS REICHLIN'S PROPOSAL TO SEND ECONOMIC OFFICERS, ALIAS STURM AND ALIAS HAHN, TO VISIT WOFAC HEADQUARTERS AND IT WAS REPORTED IN EGMA - 68317. THE OTHER TWO MEETINGS WERE SOCIAL AFFAIRS WITH TIME FOR PRIVATE TALK.
2. ALIAS REICHLIN WAS, AS USUAL, QUOTE FRANK IN STATING HIS OBJECTIVE OF A CLOSER WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIS DIVISION AND WOFAC. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE THOSE IN HIS ORGANIZATION WHO SAY THAT HE IS WASTING HIS TIME TRYING TO DO OPERATIONAL BUSINESS JOINTLY WITH WOFAC - THEY TELL HIM THAT IT HAS BEEN DONE BEFORE AND HAS NEVER GONE VERY FAR BECAUSE WOFAC WON'T COOPERATE OR IF IT DOES COOPERATE IT ALWAYS ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL EVERYTHING AND, QUOTE SINCE IT IS THE BIGGEST CAT IT WILL USUALLY ALWAYS GET THE MOUSE END QUOTE. ALIAS REICHLIN DEPLORES THE ATTITUDE OF THE DOUBTERS (NOT NAMED), SAYING THAT GENUINE COOPERATION BETWEEN PARTNERS WHO CAN HELP ONE ANOTHER IS THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY TO CONDUCT THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS NOWADAYS.
3. ALIAS REICHLIN FEELS THAT A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP IMPLIES THAT A PARTNER CAN SAY FLATLY QUOTE NO END QUOTE TO THE OTHER AND NOT THEREBY CREATE HARD FEELINGS ON EITHER SIDE BUT THAT OUTSIDE OF CERTAIN HIGHLY SENSITIVE AREAS OF THE BUSINESS THERE SHOULD BE A POSITIVE AND FRANK EXCHANGE OF WORTHWHILE

/CONTINUED/
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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Int Dist:

f. UTILITY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

32W-5-25/1 (1/00) Ppl Ops/Tact
Ops
1 - 829 Chrono: [unclear] B [unclear]
1 - 801/847

EGMA-68310

8 NOV 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

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EGMA-68310

INFORMATION THAT WOULD BENEFIT BOTH PARTIES. HE SAYS HE IS OPTIMISTIC THAT SUCH A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP CAN BE WORKED OUT WITH WOFAC.

4. DESPITE HIS OPTIMISM ON THE PROSPECTS FOR WORKING TOGETHER, ALIAS REICHLIN IS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT COULD HAPPEN TO HIS STATUS IF THIS ATTEMPT BACKFIRES I.E. IS UNSUCCESSFUL, BECAUSE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS IN CATUSK ARE EVER READY TO SAY QUOTE I TOLD YOU SO END QUOTE. REICHLIN SAYS HE WOULD MUCH RATHER BE TOLD THE PLAIN TRUTH ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION THAN TO GET FROM WOFAC A SERIES OF OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS WHICH INDICATE THAT EVERYTHING IS ROSY AND THE SETTLEMENT OF ALL LIAISON PROBLEMS IS JUST AROUND THE CORNER. HE FEELS THAT THE UNVARNISHED TRUTH WILL PROVIDE HEADROOM FOR GOOD PROGRESS AND IT WILL PUT HIM IN A SOLID POSITION WITHIN HIS OWN ORGANIZATION.

5. ACCORDING TO ALIAS REICHLIN, A STATE OF MIND EXISTS WITHIN PARTS OF CATUSK THAT TENDS TO NEGATE ITS EFFORTS. ONE REFLECTION OF THIS STATE OF MIND IS A RIGID COMPARTMENTATION BETWEEN THE ELEMENTS OF CATUSK. HE SAYS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ALIAS MINTERSTEIN IS DOING, AND THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE - THEY SELDOM TALK BUSINESS TO ONE ANOTHER AND WHEN THEY DO IT IS ONLY ON ISOLATED CASES. ALIAS REICHLIN IS VERY MUCH AGAINST THIS RIGID COMPARTMENTATION FOR HE FEELS THAT CATUSK IS TOO SMALL TO AFFORD THE LUXURY OF MANY UNRELATED, DIVIDED EFFORTS WHEN IT IS BEING CONFRONTED BY GIANT, EFFICIENT OPPOSITION SERVICES SUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION'S.

6. REICHLIN SAID THAT THE UNHEALTHY COMPARTMENTATION IN CATUSK IS LARGELY DUE TO UTILITY'S REACTION TO QUOTE THE DREADFUL UNDEROSY CASE END QUOTE AND HIS QUOTE ABSOLUTE OBSESSION WITH A DETERMINATION THAT IF IT HAPPENS AGAIN NOT EVERYTHING WILL BE LOST END QUOTE. ALIAS REICHLIN DOES NOT AGREE WITH UTILITY ON THIS QUOTE EXTREME POSITION END QUOTE AND HE SAYS THAT ALIAS HOLM, UTILITY'S DEPUTY, DOES NOT AGREE WITH UTILITY ON IT EITHER BUT ALMOST EVERYBODY IN CATUSK IS RESIGNED TO IT AND CONVINCED THAT AS LONG AS UTILITY IS AROUND THINGS WON'T CHANGE MUCH IN THIS REGARD. ALIAS REICHLIN FEELS THAT IF ALIAS HOLM WERE IN CHARGE HE WOULD TRY TO GET THE CATUSK DEPARTMENTS TO WORK MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER, IN HARMONY WITH ONE ANOTHER, RATHER THAN TO KEEP THEM QUOTE VOLUNTARILY SEPARATED END QUOTE.

7. ALIAS REICHLIN REPEATED MANY OF HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS REGARDING HIS TRIP TO WOFAC HEADQUARTERS IN THE SUMMER OF 60 AND NOW IT CONVINCED HIM THAT HE SHOULD ADVOCATE COOPERATION WITH WOFAC AS THE KEY TO CATUSK INTELLIGENCE SUCCESS IN THIS DAY AND AGE.

8. ALIAS REICHLIN SUGGESTED THAT ☐ MEET AGAIN WITH ALIAS MAURER TO DISCUSS SOME ASPECTS OF ALIAS MAURER'S OPERATIONAL PROGRAM. THAT WAS DONE AND THE RESULTS ARE BEING FORWARDED. THEY INDICATE THAT ALIAS MAURER'S OPERATIONAL RESOURCES ARE ALMOST UNIFORMLY LEGAL TRAVELLERS. ALIAS MAURER FEELS THAT THEY DID AN EXCELLENT JOB REPORTING THE RECENT VETAVA MANEUVER, BUT IT WAS A SUPREME EFFORT.

END OF TT/3 486/DIR - 906/DRLN - 755/DONN - DISPATCH EGMA 00310

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9 NOV 1966

SUBJECT: Conversation with Lieut. General Wonsel
German Federal Republic Representative
on the NATO Military Standing Group

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET EYES ONLY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

had not changed. Since Gehlen has consistently for many years spoken of Wessel as his probable successor, this would seem to indicate that Gehlen is also aware of recent activity in this matter.

6. Wessel has taken no actions in recent years to support his own candidacy for the top END post. His wife is strongly opposed to his return to the END; she has been a highly successful hostess in Washington and obviously enjoys an existence unburdened by the demands of life in the END with which she is quite familiar.

7. Wessel assumes that Gehlen will stay on until at least early 1968; his own assignment to the END in 1967 as deputy is an obvious possibility. Also, he does not rule out the possibility that General Wendland (@ Wandt, @ Holm) might be named to the number 1 post of the END if Gehlen retires. It is my impression that Wessel is entirely relaxed and quite flexible regarding his own future.

8. I place Wessel among the two or three most intelligent, balanced and sophisticated senior German officials known to me. His years in Paris with Speidel, his experience in Bonn as J-2 and later a Division Commander, and, finally, his years in Washington on the NATO Standing Group have brought him a long way from his not undistinguished beginning as the youthful chief of "Foreign Armies East" during the closing months of WW II.

9. I have no evidence that Wessel has remained in close touch with the END; specifically, there have been no indications of his conversations with me having been reported to Gehlen. While his relations with the local END representative, [redacted], have been cordial, it is quite clear that he does not report to him. For example, Wessel's conversation with the Director leading to the invitation to Gehlen to visit Washington was not communicated by Wessel to either [redacted] or to Gehlen.

10. Were Wessel to emerge as head of the German Service, I would have quite a lot to say regarding the consequences of this appointment to CIA and to the USG and the manner in which CIA's relations with the END, under his leadership, should be conducted.

SECRET EYES ONLY

11. On the whole, the current crisis in Germany's political leadership would not seem to be damaging to the prospects of either Gehlen or Wessel. I would guess that Wessel, at this point, enjoys respects in many German government and political circles--quite independent of, and in some instances in spite of, his long association with Gehlen.

/s/ James H. Critchfield

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
Chief, Near East and
South Asia Division

cc: DBP
C/EUR
C/CI
C/SB

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3
SECRET EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY SECRET

10 NOV
1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Conversation with []
of the RND

1. In a private conversation 9 November 1966 [] conveyed to me a message from Gehlen. The thrust of the message was that Gehlen wanted to assure the Director that his postponement of his visit on this occasion was solely due to the political crisis in Germany. Gehlen said that he was aware that his failure to be responsive to a series of invitations from various Agency officers over the past few years had been read within CIA as having political connotations. Also, Gehlen was aware that he had been labelled a "Gaullist" by individuals who were not directly and fully aware of his political views. Gehlen told [] that he wanted us to know that his basic convictions concerning the importance of a politically unified Western Europe within an integrated Atlantic Community remained unchanged. He thought that much that De Gaulle had attempted to do was entirely consistent with this concept; not all that De Gaulle had said and done was, however, acceptable to Gehlen.

2. I told [] that many of us, specifically including myself, had attributed--accurately I thought-- political considerations to Gehlen's reluctance to visit the US in recent years; however, in the instant case I thought that everyone--and most certainly the Director--harbored no doubts at all about the necessity for Gehlen's presence in Germany in these critical days.

3. [] said that Gehlen anticipated that things would shake down by early in 1967; he thought that February might be a suitable time for rescheduling the visit if this proved to be convenient to the Director. (Comment: It was not my impression that this was an official proposal requiring a response from us at this time.)

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EYES ONLY

4. After conversing on other matters, [] returned to the subject of the postponed visit to observe that there had been one curious aspect of the exchange which had mystified Gehlen. [] said that Gehlen had neither instructed nor authorized him to bring up this point; therefore it was not, he emphasized, part of Gehlen's message. Gehlen had, however, asked [] for judgment on the significance of the use of the official USG-Bonn channel to extend and obtain approval of the visit. Gehlen had been advised that the first word of the Director's invitation came from the American Ambassador in Bonn to Westrick in the Chancellor's office.

5. I laughed and brushed this lightly aside as of no significance. I said that I did, by coincidence, know something of the circumstances which had accidentally led to some activity in official channels concerning the Director's notation. It had been a pure accident and no significance at all should be attached to it. [] said that he had assumed this and had told Gehlen that in his five years in Washington he had never gotten the impression that the Director consulted with the Secretary of State on top level CIA liaison contacts.

/s/ James H. Critchfield

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
Chief, Near East and
South Asia Division

cc: DDCI
DDP
C/EUR

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

PERTINENT EXTRACT

OIRA-46156
14 November 1966
filed: 43-5-7

[] was invited to UTILITY's brother's home on
11 November 1966, on which occasion

para. 1.c. "UTILITY's brother said that he had just returned
from a visit to his brother, whom he found to be particularly
enigmatic. UTILITY had introduced his successor (a general whose
name the brother did not volunteer), but according to our host in
Rome, it does not appear likely that UTILITY will retire on schedule..."

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CONTACT REPORT

[] with UTILITY
17 November 1966; 1430 Hours
House 37, CATUSK Compound

32W-2-36/1 (CA) [] & UTILITY 17 Nov 66

1. This meeting was for the purpose of passing our Yellow Memo No. 35537 on the CATUSK PSYCH book Ost-West Begegnung in Frage und Antwort. UTILITY was obviously pleased that we had been so interested in his propaganda work and brought out a book about the Russian Army on the Silesian Front in 1945. It is a documentation of the excesses on the civil population. This also led to a discussion of CATUSK's little paper called Die Orientierung. A full discussion of this little paper and the possibility of what it may offer to us is dealt with in EGMA-69580.

[] [] & UTILITY 17 Nov 66

2. I mentioned to UTILITY that I had just come from a meeting with Ackermann. I said that we were discussing his automatic data processing trip to the United States, and figuring out how by continued consultation we could set up a system whereby the CATUSK operations did not go down any paths we had already found out were not worthwhile. UTILITY said he had sent me a message on the matter. This is dealt with in EGMA-69648.

32W-2-29/1 (WEST GERM GOVT) [] & UTILITY 17 Nov 66

3. We then got into a discussion of the situation in Bonn. This was covered in a rather long cable to Chief of Station for background reading. (See MUNICH-7732) UTILITY does not seem to be such an enemy of Franz Josef Strauss anymore. He prefaced remarks about him, however, with the phrase that he was no special friend of Strauss', but went on to speak well of him for his undoubted capabilities. He also spoke of having seen Wehner of the Socialists recently. This was in connection with a book we were discussing, Ost-West Begegnung. UTILITY also had some comments to make about McNamara again. These were forwarded in an EYES ONLY cable to Chief of Station. (MUNICH-7731)

Distribution:

Orig - GEHLEN 201
1 - 801 chrono
2 - 801 for forwarding
1 - extract
1 - 829/847

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DATE 2005

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: 1
 UNIT: O/MLB
 EXT: 54
 DATE: 17 NOV 66

TO: BONN
 FROM: MUNICH 1966 NOV 17 17:11
 CONF: O/MLB
 INFO: DE/MLB 1/RS
 7731
 UTILITY F 2
 82W-2-29/1

ROUTING

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CITE MUNICH

7731

TO

INFO

BONN

RWBAT INTRA

EYES ONLY

REF: MUNICH-

1. WHEN UTILITY WAS SPEAKING ABOUT THE DEFENSE SECRETARY

AND HIS ALLEGED REPUTATION AS A LOGICAL, COMPUTOR-TYPE THINKER, HE GOT A BIT CARRIED AWAY WITH HIMSELF AND SAID, "YES, BUT YOU NOTICE THAT MACHINE-LIKE LOGICAL THINKING (I.E., WITHOUT HUMAN FEELING BEHIND IT) IS A CHARACTERISTIC FOUND IN THOSE WHO ARE CARRIED AWAY TO THE ASYLUM." HE IMMEDIATELY REALIZED HE HAD SAID SOMETHING A LITTLE BIT BEYOND THE BOND OF PROPRIETY AND HAD THE GOOD GRACE TO LOOK A LITTLE FLUSTERED AND SAY THAT OF COURSE HE DIDN'T REALLY MEAN THAT THE WAY IT SOUNDED. BUT THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT FOR SOME REASON HE REALLY IS THUMBS DOWN ON THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. (IN THIS CONNECTION, I RECALLED TO HIM THE COMMENTS OF [] THAT THANKS TO THE SECRETARY

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-CONT-

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

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PRIORITY	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

7731

PAGE TWO MUNICH SECRET

TO INFO CITE

AND HIS INSISTANCE ON GREEN BERET TRAINING THAT WE HAVE A FORCE IN VIETNAM ABLE TO FIGHT THE KIND OF WAR WE ARE CONDUCTING THERE). HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT "EVEN YOU PEOPLE IN WOFAC HAVE SUFFERED A LITTLE FROM HIM." I TOOK JOCLAR STAND SAYING, "WHO AM I TO HAVE A VIEW ON SUCH MATTER?"

2. THE IMPORT OF THIS ~~ISSUE~~ IS, ~~AS~~ AS ~~STATED~~ ~~DATE~~ I'VE HINTED BEFORE, THAT UTILITY ~~WAS~~, WOULD NOT NECESSARILY PICK UP THIS TYPE OF ATTITUDE ON HIS OWN (UNLESS AS THE RESULT OF ALLEGED "INSIDE POOP" FED TO HIM BY DESSAU IN WASHINGTON). I'M MUCH MORE CONVINCED THAT THIS VIEW IS A REFLECTION OF ATTITUDES HE PICKS UP AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN BONN--OR MAYBE FOREIGN OFFICE--BUT AT ANY RATE BONN.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, Germany; ☐ ☐ X
Chief, Munich Liaison Base

Chief of Base, Berlin
~~SECRET~~/CALL/CATUSE
Meeting with ~~SECRET~~BROCK in Holland

1. Forwarded herewith is a Contact Report on a meeting I had with ~~SECRET~~BROCK in The Hague on 8 November 1966. The meeting was cleared in advance with ☐ ☐ and ☐ ☐
2. By chance ~~SECRET~~CASTROP was in Berlin the day before I went to Holland and I advised him that I planned to call ~~SECRET~~BROCK. ~~SECRET~~CASTROP made no comment and assumedly advised UTILITY of my intentions.
3. When I spoke to ~~SECRET~~BROCK I told him of my conversation with ~~SECRET~~CASTROP and suggested that he report our meeting to ~~SECRET~~CATUSE Headquarters through his own channels. ~~SECRET~~BROCK said he would do so.

Attachment: HEREWITH
Contact Report

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

f. UTILITY

~~SECRET~~

EGBA-63, 179

SECRET

17 November 1966

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EGBA-83179

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10. By this time BROCK was running out of new things to say about his situation and work in Holland, so I asked how things were getting along at CATUSK Headquarters. BROCK said there was essentially no change; the organization was as bankrupt as ever and would certainly remain so as long as UTILITY stayed in office. BROCK said he now sees UTILITY only every three months or so when he makes his periodic visits to Munich. The last time he saw UTILITY he was struck by the fact that UTILITY seemed to be aging very rapidly. During this meeting [redacted] was also present and the conversation touched on the necessity of services like CATUSK and [redacted] to maintain excellent relations with WOFAC. UTILITY said he certainly agreed and for this reason had once selected the best man he could find in his service (an obvious reference to [redacted] to act as Liaison officer to WOFAC. However, UTILITY added with some bitterness, WOFAC had decided that the officer he selected was not good enough for them. No more was said, but BROCK is sure from UTILITY's attitude that his feelings toward WOFAC have not changed for the better.

11. BROCK next commented on UTILITY's sensitivity to being called an American stooge and the postures he occasionally cuts to prove he isn't. BROCK said that a good rule of thumb in judging UTILITY's actions is the size of his audience. If he takes out after WOFAC in a loud voice before an audience he is doing it to demonstrate to other Germans that he is not a WOFAC puppet. If he calls in the WOFAC Chief of Station for a private conference and complains about something then he really means it.

12. I asked if BROCK had heard any recent rumors about who would replace UTILITY. BROCK said that UTILITY was still determined to remain in office as long as there was a breath in his body. He had even kept SWAGNER, sick as he was, in office as vice-president in order to keep the question of new leadership for CATUSK from coming up. However, there continues to be a lot of speculation about his eventual successor, and most of this continued to revolve around General Gerhard WESSEL and HOHM. WESSEL seems to fear he is not going to get Graf von KIEHLMEISEGG's position and is actively campaigning for the job. However, HOHM has won a great deal of recognition for his ability to handle both WAGNER's job and his own and his chances are improving. The final choice between these two men and probably other candidates will depend on the political situation and new government in Bonn.

13. BROCK said UTILITY continues to wheel-and-deal with Bonn politicians in an effort to save his own job and protect CATUSK from criticism. Through HOHTEN, UTILITY recently established good relations with both KIESINGER and Dr. BERGER, the former German Ambassador in The Hague and now chief of the Presidential Staff. BERGER was formerly BROCK's chief in Holland and BROCK introduced him to HOHTEN. Via HOHTEN UTILITY has also succeeded in establishing contact with his old enemy, Franz Josef STRAUSS. UTILITY's good relations with KRONE deteriorated sharply during the last few months of the Erhard government. The cause of the trouble was KRONE's proselytizing a number of CATUSK officers to work for him. BROCK said he believed UTILITY had been glad to have trouble with KRONE and had deliberately exaggerated their quarrel. KRONE's

15. We talked next about a number of CATUSK officers known to both of us. BROCK said MOELLER is going to Spain. MOELLER voiced his hatred of UTILITY so loudly in CATUSK Headquarters that even the Putzhaus became aware of it and UTILITY had to ship him out. DESSAU is still deluging CATUSK with the information he picks up in

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S E C R E T

ORIG: C/MLB
 UNIT: 54
 EXT: 17 NOVEMBER 66
 DATE:

TO: BONN
 FROM: MUNICH
 CONF: C/MLB
 INFO: L/CE
 L/RE

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UTILITY 201; 32W-2-29/1

1966 NOV 17

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TO INFO

BONN

INTRA CATUSK INTEL

1. THE FOLLOWING IS OFFERED AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO CHIEF OF STATION AND OTHER BONN OFFICERS. HAD OCCASION TO TALK WITH UTILITY ON 17 NOV, ANTE-PENULTIMATE EVE BEFORE ELECTION IN BAVARIA. HIS OPINIONS AND COMMENTS ON NUMBER OF ITEMS MAY BE OF BACKGROUND INTEREST.

2. UTILITY SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE FPD WAS GOING TO LOSE IN BAVARIAN ELECTIONS. HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF BOTH THE SPD AND THE CSU, BUT HE COULD NOT NATURALLY TELL TO WHAT DEGREE. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH HE DID NOT FORECAST ANY RISE IN THE NPD'S FORTUNES IN THE BAVARIAN ELECTIONS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, HE DID NOT EVEN MENTION THEM. I TRIED TO JOG SOME COMMENT OUT OF HIM WITHOUT LUCK.

3. HE SAID THAT IF THE FPD LOST APPRECIABLY IN BAVARIA, THEY WOULD NOT SHOW THEMSELVES TO BE SUITABLE COALITION

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5. THIS DISCUSSION LED TO THE NAME OF STRAUSS. AS UTILITY PUT IT, "YOU KNOW, I AM NOT ESPECIALLY A GREAT FRIEND OF STRAUSS", BUT WE MUST LOOK AT THE MAN AS HE IS."

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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PAGE THREE MUNICH

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TO

INFO

CITE

UTILITY SAID THAT FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS, STRAUSS HAS BEEN QUIETLY STUDYING ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. ~~WITH HIS QUALITIES~~ HE IS NOW AT THE POINT ~~WHERE HE~~ HAS A HEIGHTENED UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMICS. HE HAS, THEREFORE, BUILT UP THAT WHICH WAS MISSING IN HIS MAKEUP. IN ADDITION, HE KNOWS ABOUT DEFENSE AFFAIRS AND FINANCE, AND OF COURSE, AS FOR POLITICS, HE HAS IT IN EVERY VEIN. STRAUSS HAS MATURED, HE HAS RIPENED; HE HAS CHANGED FOR THE BETTER.

6. IT IS AN ERROR TO BRAND HIM PARTICULARLY AS A DE-GAULLEIST. HE IS NOT. HE MERELY TAKES THE STAND THAT FRANCE AND GERMANY MUST WORK TOGETHER. ⁶AND THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN FRANCE'S AND GERMANY'S WORKING TOGETHER AND BEING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. NO SUCH DECISION IS NECESSARY. WE WOULD WORK TOGETHER IN THE MOST CAREFUL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES," UTILITY SAID.

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7. ~~WALK~~ BUT GOING ON ABOUT FRANCE AND DEGAULLE, UTILITY CONTINUED, ONE OF THE RESULTS OF DEGAULLIST POLICIES IS TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT NATO DOESN'T WORK. IT'S NOT THE IDEA THAT NATO IS NO GOOD. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS. BUT IT SIMPLY DOES NOT FUNCTION CORRECTLY.

8. UTILITY COMMENTED THAT "ALL THE MILITARY MEN IN EUROPE (AND HE MENTIONED LEMNITZER BY NAME) TAKE THE EUROPEAN VIEW" ON NATO'S FAULTS, IT IS ONLY THOUSANDS OF MILES AWAY IN WASHINGTON WHERE THEY DO NOT HAVE THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITY THAT MILITARY MEN HERE IN EUROPE BEAR THAT THEY SEE THE SITUATION SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY. IN THIS RESPECT HE AGAIN BROUGHT UP HIS VIEWS ABOUT SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND HIS REFERENCES TO HIM AS A LOGICAL "THINKING MACHINE."

9. IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER MATTER I HAD RAISED WITH HIM, UTILITY SAID HE HAD BEEN SPEAKING RECENTLY WITH

-CONT-

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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 PAGE FIVE MUNICH 7732 SECRET

TO INFO CITE

WEHNER HAD TOLD HIM ("AND WHO KNOWS THE COMMUNISTS BETTER THAN
 WEHNER?") THAT THERE WAS NO POINT TO TALKING WITH THE SOVIET
 UNION (ABOUT GERMAN PROBLEMS). THE SOVIET UNION, WEHNER SAID,
 IS GOING TO TALK TO GERMANY ~~WHEN~~ WHEN THE SOVIET UNION WANTS
 TO. THAT WILL BE AFTER THE SOVIET UNION HAS ISOLATED WEST
 GERMANY FROM EVERYONE ELSE AND PUT IT IN AN AWKWARD POSITION
 AND THEN IS GOING TO COME IN WITH ITS ENTICING OFFERS OF THIS,
 THAT, AND THE OTHER. AND THEN UNDERNEATH THE SOVIET SKIRT
 "ONE WILL SEE THE CLOVEN HOOF OF THE DEVIL," SAID UTILITY.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION	
				MARKED FOR INDEXING	
TO	Chief, EUR			XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief, Munich Liaison Base, Chief of Station, Germany				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief []				MICROFILM
SUBJECT CATUSK/Comments by and on UTILITY's Brother []					
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
REFERENCE: EGMT-14105, 1 June 1966					
<p>1. The writer has seen UTILITY's brother on infrequent occasions, having entertained him at dinner some months ago, and most recently, was invited to the brother's home on 11 November 1966.</p> <p>2. In the course of a long and relaxed evening, during which no other guests were present, UTILITY's brother made a number of comments which may be of some passing interest. A summation of his observations follows:</p> <p>a. Asked about the political situation in Germany, UTILITY's brother said he found the twin developments of the <u>Nationaldemokratische Partei</u> vote in the Hesse state elections and the elevation of Kurt Georg KIESINGER (with his acknowledged NSDAP membership dating from 1933) to the position of heir apparent to Chancellor Ludwig ERHARD to be distressing in the extreme. His reasoning is based not so much on any serious concern about a resurgence of Nazism in the Federal Republic, which he dismisses out-of-hand, but rather with the unfortunate impression these two events will create abroad, particularly in England and the USSR, where Kiesinger's NSDAP membership will add fuel to the flames and render any accommodation with the Soviet Bloc infinitely more problematical. UTILITY's brother expressed a personal preference for Eugen GERSTENMAIER, and said he was not at all sure why GERSTENMAIER had withdrawn his candidacy, unless he had been persuaded by Franz Josef STRAUSS that it was wiser to withdraw in view of the hopelessness of his situation, rather than suffer an embarrassing defeat within the CDU/CSU Party caucus. UTILITY's brother in any case believes that the power behind the throne is Franz Josef Strauss, whose political ambitions have never waned, and who may have exacted a substantial price in return for throwing his CSU block behind Kiesinger.</p> <p>b. On the subject of Erhard, UTILITY's brother indicated that it had been CATUSK (and others') experience that ERHARD of late has been preoccupied and apparently unable to make decisions on even relatively simple matters. CATUSK officers have made presentations to ERHARD in</p>					
DISTRIBUTION: 3 -EUR; 2 - Munich Liaison Base; 2- COS, Germany					
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		DATE		
CE/MAB	OIRA-146156		NOV 16 1966 14 November 1966		
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		[]		

search of decisions, only to find that Erhard would sit quietly by, puffing on a long cigar, and declining to make a decision. UTILITY's brother says that the story is going around that ERHARD's physical condition has deteriorated substantially over the last twelve to eighteen months, the accepted diagnosis being rapidly worsening arteriosclerosis.

c. UTILITY's brother said that he had just returned from a visit to his brother, whom he found to be particularly enigmatic. UTILITY had introduced his successor (a general whose name the brother did not volunteer), but according to our host in Rome, it does not appear likely that UTILITY will retire on schedule and will be extended by special legislation (viz. reference). UTILITY's brother also commented that all other things being equal, he may himself remain on duty for some additional unspecified period of time.

d. In response to a query on the extent and nature of his local contacts with Soviet Bloc personalities, UTILITY's brother pointed out that he has no official or diplomatic standing, being widely known as the "unofficial CATUSK representative" or the "personal representative of his brother in Rome." By virtue of this anomalous situation, UTILITY's brother is able to avoid the diplomatic social whirl, which he said he abhors, and select only those occasions, usually of a semi-official nature, in which he participates. He indicated he was close to, and had considerable respect for, the West German ambassador in Rome. His other major range of contacts is to be found in the Vatican, where he is a prominent member of various unofficial study groups and the like, although he did not expound at any length on this subject.

e. UTILITY's brother also proudly displayed his orders and decorations, along with a series of autographed photos of a range of dignitaries, including Umberto, former King of Italy, Adenauer, the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, Prince Ferdinand of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and (which he indicated various French officials have asked him to intercede on their behalf for the award of this prized decoration), a Savoy order presented to him by Umberto, and the Italian Commander of the Italian Republic.

f. UTILITY's brother said that his relations with [] were excellent, and he enjoyed thoroughly the confidence and support of his hosts. He dropped one or two mildly derogatory comments about some of the lower-level [] officials (notably [], but said that the normal exchange of paper proceeds smoothly. Among the military, he numbers [] as a close, personal friend, and expressed some lack of enthusiasm for [], whom he considers to be the less effective of the two.

3. The undersigned accepted UTILITY's brother's offer to inspect the impressive, top-floor apartment which he purchased in 1957; he showed his bookcase-lined study, which also contains two large metal safes (key locks), and then displayed the adjacent room in which his long-time secretary works. This room contained a teletype machine (which he said connects directly to his brother's office), and next to it what he referred to as an "off-line cipher machine", which was, however, covered and could not be more closely inspected. In this connection, he showed the writer a deciphered message he had received on 7 November from the outgoing chief of the Verbindungsdienst (cryptonym: "Viktor") thanking his colleagues for their support. The message was addressed personally to "Gustav" (clearly the cryptonym for UTILITY's brother), and was also signed by "Roerendorf", the incoming Chief of the Verbindungsdienst. UTILITY's brother asked that the writer not indicate he had seen the cipher equipment nor a deciphered message, and said that it was not necessary to bother with the cryptonyms involved, since they were not pertinent to the body of the message, a tortuous and labored German military text which he said impressed him more and more with the inflexibility and stereotyped mentality of the typical German military officer, since both "Viktor" and "Roerendorf" are full colonels of the German General Staff.

4. In describing his functions, UTILITY's brother said that he is first and foremost a mailman ("Brieftraeger"), which he vastly prefers, since this role does not require him to engage in the minutiae of intelligence operations. He does not enjoy reading files, and has little interest in CE/CS operations. He primarily passed reports to [] from CATUSK and receives material in the opposite direction; he maintains on his staff, in addition to the secretary, a full-time translator for German to Italian and vice-versa, an elderly man who has apparently been employed by UTILITY's brother for a number of years. Working out of the German Embassy, UTILITY's brother also has under his supervision a Lt. Col. or Col. VON SELDTE, son of Franz VON SELDTE, author of the World War I trilogy and one of the founders of the Stahlhelm. It is not entirely clear what the relationship, in the command sense, is between UTILITY's brother and Col. VON SELDTE, although the latter is clearly to some extent at his beck and call.

5. On the subject of mail, UTILITY's brother said that he relies heavily on couriers between Rome and Munich who travel twice a week (once each way) by air. He also travels himself (usually by train) to Germany, and has a German chauffeur, apparently connected with the local Embassy, although the name was not mentioned.

6. UTILITY's brother's wife is a delightful Swedish woman in her middle 60's, and they have one daughter (at least), who is on the verge of marrying an ne'er-do-well, which is causing them both considerable anguish. UTILITY's brother has threatened to disown his daughter, and the mother is very much upset over this familial crisis, the outcome of which is not currently known.

7. UTILITY's brother maintains a very large apartment, decorated with many valuable antiques, which he picks up on regular visits to antique shows in Germany and Austria. He displayed with great pride his 18th century clocks and various items of Biedermeier furniture, complete with detailed accounts of where and how he found them, accompanied by the display of numerous catalogues of antique shows. He also appears to be a real connoisseur of 18th and 19th century German painters, and has several fine originals on his walls.

8. The foregoing conveys nothing new or startling, but is reported for the record only, to convey some impressions of the nature and scope of the activities of UTILITY's brother in Rome. Such other information as may be developed in the future will be recorded; on the substantive side, it might be added only that meaningful dealings on a professional basis with UTILITY's brother do not appear warranted, although it is recognized that there may be an exceptional case where local discussion might be useful.

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TRANSLATION

TO : []
FROM: UTILITY

Mr. ACKERMANN, my representative for ADP questions, has reported to me in detail on his trip to (WOLADY) from 8 October to 24 October 1966.

The very carefully prepared lectures and demonstrations which were given to him underlined on the one hand against the very complicated problems involved in ADP, but on the other hand gave him also an understanding of the great progress which you have made in solving these problems and gave him valuable leads for the solution of our own problems.

We are most particularly interested in a continuation of this dialogue because the subject under discussion does not lend itself to open discussion with the manufacturers' representatives due to its classification.

I want to express my special appreciation for the generous hospitality with which you received Mr. ACKERMANN as well as for the thorough preparation which you made for the trip.

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DATE 2005

21 Nov 66

Received 24 66

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SECRET 221415Z CITE MUNICH 7775

22 NOV 66 11:44182

FRANKFURT INFO DIRECTOR

CATUSK

CATUSK REQUEST NAME AND TRACES ON OWNER OF USAREUR
REGISTERED CAR AM 3965, FORD TAUNUS 20M, WHICH NOTED AS
HALTING EXCESSIVELY IN VICINITY UTILITY RESIDENCE NIGHT
20 TO 21 OCTOBER 1966.

FY21 UTILITY IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO POTENTIAL
SURVEILLANCE, USUALLY MAKES SUCH INQUIRIES WHEN CARS
PARK EXTENSIVELY VICINITY HIS RESIDENCE.

ADDRESSEES MAY RECALL THAT DURING CASE UTILITY
TOLD ME, APPARENTLY MORE IN SORROW THAN ANGER, THAT HE KNEW
WOFAC HAD ONCE SURVEILLED HIM.

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DATE 2005

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324-2.33/1

A. Lehman

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO	Chief, EUR; Chief, WOMACE Systems Group	RECEIVED FOR RECORDS
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany	NO RECORDS REQUIRED
FROM	Chief, Munich Liaison Base	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> UJDRACO ZUBER's Visit	INDEXED

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Note suggestions re UTILITY and ☐ ☐ (para 2 and 5).

1. The recent visit of Subject to various ADP installations seems to have been an outstanding success of a professional as well as of a personal nature. Since his return, we have had a large number of echoes from his various associates such as Alias ROSE and Alias MULTHAUP of the Liaison Staff, Alias BERNHARDT, Alias CASTROP, Alias PETERS, and others indicating that he has pictured his visit in the most glowing colors to all who would hear. Under separate cover we are forwarding Subject's own letters of thanks to ☐ ☐ and to ☐ ☐ as well as a translation of a teletype from UTILITY to ☐ ☐ expressing his thanks to us.

2. In a recent recapitulation of his experience, Subject went into considerable detail as to the great value of the trip to him personally as well as to the entire ADP project at CATUSK. The greatest value for him had been to see an ADP unit in operation, to be briefed on the organization of such a unit, and to see how it fitted into the organization as a whole. He stated that he regretted greatly that some of his assistants had not been able to see what he had seen and hinted grossly that he would like to have some of his assistants have a chance at a trip to our Headquarters. He also suggested that UTILITY be given a walk-through briefing on the ADP set-up at Headquarters upon his next trip there. He felt that his would be most useful for UTILITY's appreciation of his, Subject's, problems.

ATTACHMENT - Letters - USC

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5 DEC 1966

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DATE 2005

GROUP I

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EGMA-69648	28 November 1966
	SECRET	32W-5-3840 25/8
OFFICE	ORIGINATING	
	COORDINATING	
OFFICE SYMBOL	NAME	OFFICER'S NAME

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201-

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3. He pointed out several great differences between WOFAC's and CATUSK's problem. The first being that the ADP unit he had seen at Headquarters, and the entire RID unit which it serves, was responsible solely for the WOMACE part of the Organization, whereas CATUSK's ADP unit will have to serve the entire organization with the exception of the ELINT-COMMINT sections. (In that connection, it is interesting to note that the ELINT-COMMINT computer, an IBM 360/30 has been delivered some time ago and is not being used at all because the sections responsible for its use had no program worked out by the time the machine arrived. Subject had spoken of this ridiculous situation several times on our trip.)

4. The second big difference between the WOFAC and the CATUSK computer problem, he pointed out, was the fact that WOFAC could clear and bring IBM employees into their Headquarters and there work with them in very close cooperation, that WOFAC could afford to farm out some of its programming, and many other labor consuming projects in connection with the ADP program, whereas CATUSK, being so to speak, right on the front line, could not afford to take such a leisurely attitude towards the persons who became witting of its program. Subject stated that in a divided country such as theirs, where almost everyone had fairly close relatives behind the Iron Curtain, where traffic to and from the Iron Curtain countries was an everyday affair and included millions of people every year, it was just not good security practice to have as many persons even partially witting to what CATUSK had in their files or how they used their machines. He pointed out that CATUSK cover was so loose and so poorly backstopped that even the attendance at an overt IBM school caused difficulties. All this in addition to UTILITY's known sensitivity to the security problem made it impossible for Subject to copy some of the methods WOFAC had used successfully in the establishment of their ADP section.

5. Another very important difference he pointed out, was the difference in handling files within the organization. As he saw it, WOFAC, or at least WOMACE, had a well-established central repository or at least centrally responsible division which had been given authority and responsibility for the control and maintenance of files before automation. There remained only the task to automate an existing unit with existing responsibility and authority. CATUSK not only lacks such a centralized unit, but it also lacks a policy which would permit the effective functioning of such a system. In order to make ADP useful, the policy will have to be established first, then it will have to be implemented, the personnel will have to be trained in the new methods, and finally, the central control unit will have to be established. All this will presumably take place simultaneously with the establishment of the ADP program. Realizing all these problems and the tremendous difficulties which they present, Subject said that he needed still a lot of help and that he hoped that the dialogue between him and the WOFAC ADP section could be maintained. He hoped very much that [] would again visit CATUSK some time in the second half of 1967 when they had had their first experiences with the machines and would need some additional aid. In this connection, he reiterated again the tremendous help which he had received from the 1965 seminar. He pointed out again that, but for the seminar, CATUSK would have established procedures and followed a policy which would have cost them millions in time and labor and would have set them back years in the development of their program. He said he felt it absolutely necessary for the good of his program to have WOFAC experts look over their shoulder now and then to keep them, so to speak, on the straight and narrow path of reasonable procedures.

APPROVED: *DATA*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: ☐
 UNIT: C/MLB
 EXT: 54
 DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 66

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		9	
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X	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS
CITE MUNICH 7854			

TO : BONN
 FROM: MUNICH 7854 1966 NOV 29 11:32
 CONF: C/MLB
 INFO: L/INT
 L/PLANS 32W-2-28/13
 L/CE ☐ (GEHLEN)

TO INFO CITE

BONN

INTRA CATUSK

ATTENTION ☐ FROM ☐

AT MEETING WITH ALIAS KUEHNE 29 NOV, HE SPOKE OF
 TRIP TO HQS, SAYING AS DISCUSSED AT MEETING AMONG ☐ ☐
☐ ☐, YOUR SUCCESSOR, ALIASES DEGENHARDT AND KUEHNE,
 UTILITY VISIT TO HQS NOW FORESEEN FOR FEBRUARY. DEGENHARDT
 HAD BEEN GIVEN THIS MESSAGE TO CARRY BY UTILITY AS TRIPPERS
 TOOK OFF. HAD YOU HEARD OF THIS DATE OR THE HQS DISCUSSION?

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

Attachment to
 66MA-69648

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
 Excluded from automatic
 downgrading and
 declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

C/MLB

CE

L/INT

L/PLANS

L/CE

ROUTINE

30 NOV 66

IN-5541 G

S E C R E T 301154Z CITE BONN 5961

MUNICH

INTRA CATUSK

ATTENTION ☐ FROM ☐ ☐

RE MUNICH 7854

HAVE HEARD NOTHING OF THIS DISCUSSION, BUT THE TIME SOUNDS
REASONABLE AND PRESUME UTILITY WILL MAKE SOME MORE FORMAL
APPROACH AS THE TIME DRAWS NEAR.

S E C R E T

TOR: 30/1434Z

1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

32W-2-28/13

Gehler 201-

BONN 5961

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO	Chief []	
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany Chief, European Division	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief, Munich Liaison Base	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK UTILITY's Brother []	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OIRA-46156

We are very grateful for the reference dispatch and your interest in keeping us all apprised of your contact with UTILITY's brother. There were a number of items concerning his office that this Base didn't know. If the chance ever rises again, we would certainly be interested in hearing the name of UTILITY's successor. If the introduction was made right in the office, the successor apparently is the man once indicated to me by UTILITY, namely, Major General Horst Wendland (alias Wendt, aka alias Holm). Under separate cover please find the Italy pages in our CATUSK handbook. Any comments, additions, corrections you may have and are able to make in spare time would be appreciated. We are attaching also a list of the Consular Corps in Munich. Do any of the names check out in your card file as being possible liaison officers from the Italian Service to CATUSK here in Munich?

Distribution:

2- [] w/att 1 u/s/c; w/att 2 h/w
 2-COS, Germany w/o atts
 1-C/EUR w/o atts

Attachments:

U/S/C 1 - Italian pages from CATUSK Handbook
 H/W 2 - Xerox of Italian Consular Corps in Munich

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 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
43-5-7	EGMA - 69584	30 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	DCS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	[] []
1-chrono 1-board 2-files 1-829/847	ORIGINATING	
	OFFICE	OFFICER - TYPIST
	COORDINATING	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
	OFFICER'S NAME	

EGMA-69584

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ROUTINE

1 DEC 66

IN 5585 B

SECRET 011024Z CITE BERLIN 6592

MUNICH INFO BONN

INTRA CATSK

FROM

REF MUNICH 7828

SORRY. NEITHER WIFE NOR I CAN RECALL
GIFT TO UTILITY LAST YEAR. BEST WE CAN SUGGEST FOR GIFT
THIS YEAR IS SOME SORT EXPENSIVE BOOK OR PHONOGRAPH RECORDS.
REALIZE THIS NOT VERY IMAGINATIVE, HOWEVER.

SECRET

TOR: 01/1104Z

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BRN 6592

32W-2-28/1.1

(GEHLEN 201)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

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5		13	
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8		16	
X	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : C/MLB
 EXT : 54
 DATE: 8 DECEMBER 66

TO : BONN 1966 DEZ 5 15:54
 FROM: MUNICH 7920
 COMP: C/MLB 801 Visits; 801 Social

INFO: C/SE
 L/CE file: GEHLEN, Reinhard

CITE MUNICH

7920

TO

INFO

CITE

BONN

ATTENTION ☐ FROM

INTRA

MY ANNUAL CHRISTMAS BLACK TIE DINNER FOR UTILITY SET
 FOR 7:30 P.M., 21 DECEMBER AT MY HOUSE. AS USUAL, GUEST
 LIST WILL BE SMALL: UTILITY, HOLM, DEGENHARDT, HOLTON
 (WHOM YOU HAVE NOT MET) AND THE LADIES. TALKED TO YOUR
 DAUGHTER. SHE WILL BE THROUGH WITH SCHOOL ON THE 21ST AND
 LOOKS FORWARD TO MAKING NIGHT TRAIN TO BONN WITH YOU THAT
 EVENING. WE WILL ARRANGE FOR DOUBLE BEDROOM AND HAVE
 TICKETS HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy 113.

mun/1. 7920

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ☐

X-REF TO FILE NO. 32W-2-29/1

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. E

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

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DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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FROM
Dissem by ref

ACTION

EUR-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

☐ ISSUED

☐ SLOTTED

☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/EC-2, FI, FI/INT-2

SECRET 061740Z CITE BONN 6103

ACTING) 6 DEC 65 53875

DIRECTOR INFO MUNICH

CART CATUSK

AN	W/PI	E/G
PS	BBBT	
SUBTRACT		INDEX

☐ ADVISES THAT HE HAS HEARD FROM AN
THAT A DISAFFECTED CATUSK STAFFER HAS CONTACTED AN SPD MEMBER
OF THE BUNDESTAG INTERIOR COMMITTEE AND COMPLAINED ABOUT
CONDITIONS WITHIN CATUSK. HE IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT
UTILITY'S PRACTICE OF NEPOTISM AND STATED THAT HE COULD NAME
THIRTY-TWO UTILITY RELATIVES ON THE CATUSK PAYROLL.
ACCORDING TO ☐ THE CATUSK STAFFER HAS VOLUNTEERED TO
TESTIFY TO THE INTERIOR COMMITTEE BUT APPARENTLY THE SPD
HAS DECIDED NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION, AT LEAST DURING THE
CURRENT POLITICAL REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT. ☐ DOES
NOT KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THE CATUSK STAFFER.

SECRET

BT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2005

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.
DEC 1966

SECRET

D 32W-2-29/1

6 DEC '66

BONN 6103

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
		SECRET	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, Munich Liaison Base		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: Chief of Station, Germany			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, WORMACE Systems Group			MICROFILM
SUBJECT: CATUSEK [] ZUBER's Visit []			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>EGMA-69648, 28 November 1966 (para 2) ZUBER suggested UTILITY be given work-through briefing on Hqs ADP set-up on his next trip here) L/CE C/MLB</p> <p>1. Forwarded under separate cover is a courtesy reply from the undersigned to Zuber's letter.</p> <p>2. We will be glad to take UTILITY through the ADP shop. It would be useful if you could indicate how much time he might wish to spend on this.</p> <p>3. Another visit in 1967 by [] and/or others to review CATUSEK progress is possible but subject to the need. We will let the initiative come from CATUSEK.</p>			
Attachment: USC True Name Pouch			
Distribution: 2-C/MLB w/att USC 1-COS/G w/o att			
<p>BEST AVAILABLE COPY</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p> <p>ZUBER, Ebrult UTILITY</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	EGMS-7048	20 December 1966	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER	
	SECRET		

EGMS-7048

SECRET

Contact Report

2P
[] , [] , [] , [] , [] and CATUSKers
1930 hours 21 December 1966
[] 's home (Christmas Party Attended by UTILITY)

1. During the course of his little speech at [] 's party UTILITY acknowledged the sentiments and comments previously offered by [] in a gracious and apparently quite sincere manner. UTILITY spoke in German rather than English ... which surprised me, particularly since his remarks were, to a considerable extent, directed to [] seated directly across the table. Besides the usual thanks for the support and cooperation provided by [] , his staff, [] , and WOPACT in general, during the year just past, UTILITY made a few points which in my view are worth recording and which I am, to the best of my ability, reproducing below for the record.

MICROFILMED
JAN 25 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

a. In expressing thanks for close support, cooperation, etc., UTILITY dwelt on the traditions of close association and friendship between CATUSK and WOPACT developed over twenty years. He stressed that this has enabled the two services to have disagreements from time to time and in some cases even a serious one (I got the impression he was alluding to the [] affair), but that the friendship between the two services will go on and that the partners in the long run will be closer for having been able to disagree.

b. UTILITY had a few words to say about the latest political developments in the Federal Republic, stressing the point that he has always been convinced that the "grosse Koalition" would be the only solution over the long run for the accumulation of serious problems with which the West Germans find themselves confronted. He ended on a strong note of optimism concerning the new Chancellor's prospects as he begins his term of office.

c. On a distinctly personal note, UTILITY expressed his thanks in behalf of not only himself but also his wife (according to my recollection this is the first in many years that UTILITY's wife has attended one of these Christmas parties) to [] and [] . He stated that his attendance at these affairs has always afforded him considerable pleasure and that he hoped, and expected, to be around to attend a few more of them.

2. During the course of the evening I had only a few short separate conversation with UTILITY beyond the usual social amenities. I had the impression that he seemed generally to be enjoying himself to the hilt.

/continued/

Distribution:

Orig - UTILITY file
2 - 801 to forward
1 - 848 info
1 - 829/847a Chrono
1 - 847 Work file

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CS COPY

It was impossible not to notice that, as midnight was approaching, @HOLM, @DEGENHARDT, and @ROENDORF and their wives seemed to be eyeing each other in a sense of some dismay that the party was still carrying on and that UTILITY apparently had no intention of calling it an evening. It was my personal impression, and this is shared by [] , that the air was almost thick with apprehension as HOLM, DEGENHART, and ROENDORF were becoming increasingly itchy to hit the road for home but obviously couldn't jar themselves loose until UTILITY started making some signs of leaving. It is my understanding that DEGENHARDT's driver was available at 2230 hours for the homeward trip. If my recollection is correct UTILITY and his wife did not depart until approximately 0130 hours.

SECRET

320 2-29/1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG:
 UNIT: C/MLB
 EXT: 54
 DATE: 22 Dec 1988

SECRET

ROUTING			
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DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
		OPERATIONAL	INITIALS
ROUTINE		IMMEDIATE	

TO: BONN
 FROM: MUNICH 8088
 CONF: C/MLB
 INFO: L/CE
 L/RE
 L/INT

8088

1988 DEC 22

15:03

FILE 32W-2-29/1

CITE MUNICH

8088

TO

INFO

CITE

BONN

INTRA CATUSK INTEL

HAS IT BEEN REPORTED (OR IS IT OF INTEREST) THAT WEHNER,
 ACCORDING TO UTILITY, WAS ONE WHO INSISTED THAT STRAUSS BE
 MEMBER OF GOVT? PLS SAY IF AND HOW YOU WANT THIS PUT OUT.

END OF MESSAGE


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 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

C/MLB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER



AUTHORITY: 100-104.2

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MUNICH 8088

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	19
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5	23
6	24
7	25
8	26

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

CITE MUNICH
3089

RIG: L
UNIT: C/MLB
EXT: 54
DATE: 22 Dec 1966

TO: BONN INFO BERLIN 100 LEE 22 15:03
FROM: MUNICH 8039
CONF: C/MLB
INFO: L/ CE File UTILITY 201

TO INFO CITE

BONN INFO BERLIN

INTRA CATUSK

ATTENTION [] AND []

1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR APPEARANCE LAST NIGHT. KNOW IT WAS HARD TO WORK INTO YOUR SCHEDULE BUT CONVINCED IT WORTHWHILE. THIS IS FIRST TIME IN AT LEAST THREE YEARS THAT ¹⁹⁷⁵ WIFE HAS TURNED UP. WILL TRY TO PUT TOGETHER SHORT "STIMMUNGS BERICHT" DISPATCH.

2. []: HIS NIBS CHATTERED ON UNTIL 1:20 A.M. HAPPY AS A CLAM THEREBY (UNLESS YOU TOPPED IT LAST YEAR) SETTING NEW WORLD'S RECORD. BY ACTUAL STOPWATCH REMAINDER OF 2.5 SECONDS CATUSK GROUP LEFT LATER.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MUNI 3089

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outside the German Branch without
Branch Chief's approval.

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January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

During a conversation on 21 November 1966 between General Gehlen and a Source considered to be reliable, the following points were mentioned by General Gehlen:

a. General Gehlen had received from Mrs. Albert Thomas (Member of Congress) a large colored photograph taken from an oil portrait of her late husband, Congressman Albert Thomas. He inquired about her status and especially her standing and influence in the various committees of the House of Representatives. He was unaware of the death of Mr. Thomas and confided that out of friendship and loyalty to Mrs. Thomas he feels obliged to maintain these ties not only with Mrs. Thomas but the immediate family. He said he would extend an invitation to Mrs. Thomas in his thank you note to visit him during her stay in Germany and asked the Source to arrange such a meeting after Mrs. Thomas arrives in Munich.*

b. Gehlen very strongly condemned the rebirth of neo-Nazism in the NPD and its support especially by the younger generation. He explained that for the past several years his organization has been meticulously maintaining files on the organizers and key supporters of the NPD, and that detailed investigations revealed that some NPD key supporters were exposed to Soviet ideologies - and thus may be used by the Soviets for penetration purposes. He named three or four NPD key supporters in Bavaria and their affiliation with the Soviets. In this connection, he also revealed evidence on hand to indicate the disturbances and chaos in So. Tirol are fomented and inspired by the Soviets and pointed out the clever Soviet tactics in the establishment of Soviet influence in the Middle East.

*IN APRIL 1966, MRS. THOMAS SENT A THANK YOU LETTER TO ADMIRAL

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Gehlen 201

DE-0016002
AWC-002522

SECRET

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HELLMUTH HEYE FOR HIS EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY ON THE OCCASION OF HER HUSBAND'S DEATH. SHE ADDED "I HOPE TO COME TO GERMANY AFTER CONGRESS ADJOURNS AND WOULD LIKE TO COME BY AND PAY MY RESPECTS." A CHECK WITH LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL IN JUNE 1966 REVEALED THAT MRS. THOMAS WAS NOT A MEMBER OF ANY COMMITTEE, AND AT THAT TIME THERE WERE NO PLANS KNOWN OF A PROPOSED TRIP BY HER TO GERMANY.

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SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	5
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3	7
4	8

ACTION

B-1 7

ADVANCE COPY

☒ **RID COPY**

☐ ISSUED

☐ SLOTTED

☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE

VR C/5B5 C/C1 C/FL2 C/FL/INT2

SECRET 061544Z CITE

7568

6 JAN 67 72824

DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP

REF: DIRECTOR 46744 *

[] HAS INFORMED [] THAT THE SUBJECT HAS
NOT BEEN RAISED IN GERMANY AS [] HAS FOUND THAT AS RECENTLY
AS 6 JUNE 1964, CHIEF, CATUSK TOLD [] BONN REPRESENTATIVE
THAT CHIEF, CATUSK KNEW [] PERSONALLY
AND HAD A HIGH REGARD FOR HIM.

SECRET

*A CONCERNED RIS SOURCE
WHO ~~WAS~~ WAS A DOUBTFUL SOURCE*

BT

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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7 JAN 1967

Gehlen 201.

[] 7568

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	CHIEF, EUR		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK/CI/CE CATUSK BUDGET - UTILITY'S TRIP?		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
ACTION - FOR INFORMATION			
REF - EGMA-69876			
<p>1. FROM ALIAS BERNHARDT [] I HAS ELICITED THAT THE BUDGET CUT MENTIONED IN THE REFERENCE IS A TEMPORARY GOVT-WIDE MEASURE. [] HAS LEARNED FROM ALIAS KUEHNE THAT CONSEQUENTLY CATUSK TRAVEL IS TO BE STOPPED FOR THREE MONTHS. THIS MAY MEAN THAT UTILITY MAY FEEL HE CANNOT VISIT WOFAC.</p> <p>2. BERNHARDT SAID EXPENDITURES MAY CONTINUE ON A SOMEWHAT SIMILAR SCHEME TO THE MONTHLY ONE WE USE WHEN FUNDS HAVE NOT YET BEEN APPROPRIATED, WITH THE ADDED PROVISIO THAT THE MONTHLY SPENDING TAKE PLACE AT 25 PERCENT LESS THAN THE YEAR BEFORE. FIXED COSTS ARE TO BE PAID, BUT OTHER EXPENDITURES ARE TO BE SCRUTINIZED VERY CAREFULLY. IN THIS CATEGORY FALL SUCH THINGS AS TRAVEL AND ESPECIALLY OVERSEAS EXPENDITURES. WE WILL TRY TO SEE IF THERE IS ANY FURTHER INFORMATION TO BE ELICITED ON THIS MATTER INSOFAR AS IT APPLIES TO CATUSK.</p>			
<p>DIST - BY TAPE</p> <p>COS/G C/EUR</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>			
<p><i>Letter 11 201</i></p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
32W-2-28/13	EGMA - 69880	11 JANUARY 67	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQ'S FILE NUMBER	
	S E C R E T	32W-2-26/3	

EGMA 69880

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RTD ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE *F*

TOTAL COPIES *17*

SECRET

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DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION

EUR 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

☐ ISSUED

☐ SLOTTED

☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 121530Z CITE L

1 6216

12 JAN 76 751

BONN INFO DIRECTOR MUNICH

KEYWAY L CATUSK

FOR YOUR INFORMATION L

ADVISES THAT HE WILL BE

VISITED BY CHIEF CATUSK ON 31 JANUARY AND 1 FEBRUARY. L

ADVISES HE HAS SEEN VERY LITTLE OF CHIEF CATUSK'S REPRESENTATIVE
SINCE HIS POSTING

S E C R E T

BT

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

No foreign travel ??

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TO	Chief, European Division	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief of Station, Germany	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, Munich Liaison Base	MICROFILM

SUBJECT CATUSK
UTILITY At Annual Christmas Dinner

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCES: A. EGO-169
B. EGN-3152

1. A report on the appearance of UTILITY at the Chief of Base's traditional annual black tie Christmas dinner might be in order.

2. The most interesting comment made by UTILITY was in his response to my toast. He said that he didn't like to appear egotistic, but he hoped to be able to appear "a few more times" at such Christmas affairs.

3. During the course of the evening, he made no spectacularly reportable remarks, although after querying Bonn, we did put out Reference A more or less for the record. His views on his tenure may not necessarily clash with Reference B, which reported that Hohman is a front-runner for UTILITY's post when UTILITY retires. I have heard a number of remarks to the effect that CATUSK and Hohman get along very well.

4. During the course of the evening, UTILITY said that Chancellor Kiesinger was not just a handsome diplomatic-type looking gentleman with two vigorous strong men to cope with--Strauss and Brandt. (This was a proposition I had thrown at him.) Kiesinger, said UTILITY, is a man who knows what he wants and is not necessarily going to be pushed around by the two more dramatic figures of Brandt and Strauss. However, the proof of his leadership will be his ability to direct these two

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H/W Attachment: contact report

Lehler

CROSS REFERENCE TO 32W-2-28/1.1	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA - 69882	DATE 12 January 1967
C]	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	NO. FILE NUMBER 32W-2-28/1

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

ORIGINATING		EXT.
OFFICER	TYPE	
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OFFICER'S NAME	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
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EGMA-69882		
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men. As he has to go in the morning, post. UTILITY of the mentioned situation's intelligence, and particularly, his apparently noteworthy victory. Again he continued to say that that he was presently self-satisfied in economic affairs.

5. At the dinner table UTILITY expressed himself along lines he has laid out previously. He referred to his approval of the idea of a grand coalition. He spoke of CATUSK's and WOFAC's long and friendly work together. He mentioned a recurring theme: that we are such close friends we can be frank with each other. His remarks on this subject had curious overtones. I really had the impression that when he referred to difficulties that might arise between us, he was in some way apologizing for what appeared to many of us to be an emotional over-reaction in the [] case. For the second year running, he has made references which could be considered in this light. (I am attaching [] contact report covering the evening, which may be of possible interest to the addressees.)

6. During the rest of the course of the evening, which was spent on social conversation (with the exception of a brief post-prandial chat between [] and UTILITY), the CATUSK chief dealt with a number of lighter subjects. My official gift to him of a history of deep sea sailing led him off into a long discussion of his favorite sport. A casual reference turned his interest back to World War II. He tied this in with the remark he has made to me before about over-staffing of the present German Army. He said that he and a staff of two or three assistants worked an unbroken twenty-four hours one time during World War II. This tiny group turned a staff plan for a peaceful German Army truck trip into Southeast Europe into a fighting campaign. The unanticipated resistance in Southeast Europe called for his abrupt change in the German Army plans. Somewhat grimly UTILITY said "and General Heusinger always teased me because of this 24-hour stint of general staff work, that the Yugoslavian war was my war."

7. I am still somewhat astonished to report that UTILITY broke all records known to the memory of man in these parts by staying at the affair until 1:20 in the morning. It was also something of a surprise, and a pleasant one, I must say, to find the CATUSK chief accompanied to our affair by his wife. She has not appeared at these social events for some years, I believe. Although UTILITY was going at a great rate on old war stories, I fear the rest of the party, which included alias Holm, alias Degenhardt, and the Chief of Foreign Liaison, alias Roendorf, were getting somewhat restless. Alias Roendorf came over and sat in on the conversation (or I should say monologue held by UTILITY), in an attempt to break it up. This was not exactly successful, as UTILITY was flying at a great height and enjoying it. But finally he did realize what time it was and took his leave. The other guests, needless to say, shot out behind him with record-breaking speed. Indicative of the fact that other guests had not anticipated UTILITY's stayability was the fact that Degenhardt's poor chauffeur had been ordered to pick him up at 10:00.

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		2. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
<p>14.</p> <div><p>GEHLEN. REINHARD /GEN/ [] 7</p><p>SEX M DUB ?</p><p>CIT ?</p><p>OCC BND CHIEF HAS DEFINIETELY. BEEN GIVEN ANOTHER YEAR OF DUTY TO HAEAD THE WEST GERM INTELL SERVICE /BND/, BECAUSE THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON A SUCCESSOR. HOW MUCH DONGER GEHLEN WILL STAY ON DEPENDS. ENTIRELY ON HOW SOON THE LDRS OF COALITION AGREE ON SUCCESSOR~</p><p>EGFEGBEGGEGM</p><p>32W-005-000 EGN -03193 25 JAN 67 PI</p><p>R 6702080953</p><p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p><p>FILE IN [] 7</p></div>					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		➔			

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T
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COUNTRY West Germany REPORT NO. CS DB-312/00199-67
SUBJECT Postponement of Decision to DATE DISTR. 25 JAN 1967
Transfer Karl Hohmann to the NO. PAGES 1
West German Intelligence Service REFERENCES VIA TAPE

DATE OF INFO. 11 January 1967
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Germany, Bonn (12 January 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A West German professional man well versed in German domestic and foreign affairs. He has numerous contacts, some of them of long standing, among senior West German government officials and leading politicians of the Christian Democratic and Social Union Parties (CDU/CSU), who discuss current issues with him. Some of those contacts may be aware that his acquaintances include Americans. His past reporting, while colorful and at times controversial, has on many occasions proved reliable. He obtained the information. ☒ The information is probably true.

- ☒ on 11 January 1967, Ministerialdirektor Karl Hohmann of the Federal Chancellery said that the decision to transfer him to the West German Intelligence Service (BND) has been postponed until next summer. At that time the decision will depend upon other personnel developments in the government.
- Hohmann said that he will become a special advisor to the West German Government on the German image abroad and ways to improve it.

1Field Comment: According to "Die Welt" of 17 January, Hohmann has been given a position in the Federal Press Office, where he will be concerned with matters pertaining to public opinion and electronic data.

2Field Comment: ☒ was told earlier by Hohmann that he was a serious candidate to head the BND when General Gehlen retires from that position - see CSDB-312/00190-67. It was subsequently reported by a ranking BND official that Gehlen had received a one year extension past his 65th birthday, which is in April 1967.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE #	DIA	ARMY #	NAVY	AIR #	NSA	DOJ	OCR

(Notes: Field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

FI/D/E	1	E/SAS	1					EGN-3166
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E/CR/R	1							
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E/G/R/W	1							
TOTALS	5	CI 2, FI 4, EUR 6, DO/H 1.				NO LIAISON	COORDINATING	RELEASING
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FORM NO. 1

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Gehlen

(30)

CSDB-312/00199-6

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
<i>Outland Adventure - Newly Identified Employees, Organizers and Personnel Changes - 1966</i>		2. RI FILE NO.	<i>32W</i>	<i>2</i>
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
		<i>EGMA-20440</i>		<i>3/18/67</i>
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

(1) GUTTENT's [] term of service as President of the Organization has been extended until at least April 1968, one year past his 66th birthday (3 Apr 67). (EGO-17) WINTERSTEIN has advised during Apr 66 that all the political parties in the parliament had promised GUTTENT to stay on the and he had consented to do so for another two years. (EGMA-684) This request may have been made through the All-Party Parliamentary Group which serves as a watchdog over the Organization's operations. (EGMA-69585). GUTTENT's Ministerialdisposition would HOHMANN of the Federal Chancellor is one of the latest likely candidates to replace GUTTENT when he does retire. (EGMA-6166). Also, one Organization official stated that possibly Stefan THOMAS head of the Ost Bureau, might well have been offered GUTTENT's position if the SPD had formed a small coalition government during the recent Bonn crisis. (EGO-167 and EGO-171).

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3 Feb 67

TALKING PAPER FOR USE WITH GENERAL GEHLEN

1. Our Headquarters has asked me to release Mr. [] for another appointment. The prospective assignment is such a unique career opportunity for Mr. [] that it would not be fair for me to interpose any objection; nevertheless, we are going to be able to keep Mr. [] until summer. We have already started looking for another senior officer to replace him. This is not an easy post to fill, and we have always been selective. I hope, however, to have a suitable man to represent me here.

2. While we are talking about personnel, I thought I'd like to talk to you about my impressions of our liaison. I mentioned this at Mr. []'s Christmas dinner. I have been here long enough now to have got a good sense of our service relationships, both in the past and present, as well as a feeling for the future.

3. I am at ease and of good cheer about our relationship. Your comments to me and to others about the deep nature of our ties and the quality of these relationships have been confirmed by my own observation. Your phrase about knowing each other so well that we can be frank with

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each other reflects my thinking, too.

4. As I look to the future in our relationships, I see a continued close contact. Although your independence has long been established--over ten years now--this has not affected the closeness and cordiality of our services. We continue to operate together on a broad basis, in strategic terms, you might say. Although for years now we have not concerned ourselves with small operational matters--particular cases, for example--our ties have continued to bring us together for mutual consideration of the broadest problems in our profession. That is why I have not felt uneasy when it became obvious that Vietnam and China, as well as the accompanying budget problems, were going to cost us some people here in the German Station.

5. This reflects itself in Munich, too, and I don't want you, therefore, to misunderstand if in the next six to eight months we should fail to replace one or another of our officers. This willingness to cut back here is based on our confidence in our relationship with your organization. We are simply going to have to sacrifice men in Munich to be able to man our positions on the front lines. I want to tell you this to yourself first so that there will be no misinterpretation as our consolidation takes effect.

6. To come back to the matter of Mr. []'s transfer for a moment, it is not connected with the manpower problems to which I have just been referring. (I would not want it to get any farther than yourself, but I can say for your ears only that our mutual friend Jim is the thief in the matter of Mr. [] .)

7. But to go back to our manpower problem: We may even have to go so far in the course of the next year or so as to take our liaison base chief and add to his duties those of my local []

[] " which functions in the [] I may have to move the base chief over to the [] to do this. The rest of the personnel, however, would probably stay for the moment where they are. One thing that we are

pretty well assured of, however, that is, in the field of broad exchange on a strategic level between my old directorate, the DDI, and []'s office, there would certainly be no break in the close contact. We also hope that the continued and increasing closeness in the field of SIGINT can go on without any sacrifice in manpower. (The military representatives, of course, are not affected, either.)

8. Speaking of DDI, one of the interesting things I've heard reflected from the November meeting of General

and his men with our people in Washington was the high praise of your younger generation. I certainly hope that as time goes on during my tenure here in Germany, you will continue to bring your younger people into contact with us, so that they too will absorb the history and tradition of our special relationship. I would hate to see this unique comradeship wither away simply because the older generation didn't bring the younger generation into the tradition, not that this is the case! I hope that on both our sides, as time goes on, we can continue to get our second generation people in the picture.

9. To summarize, I wanted to be able to tell you of our personnel problems of the next six or eight months so that there would be no misunderstanding about our motives or what was impelling us to appear, at any rate, to be withdrawing somewhat. We are not withdrawing in anything but a few selected positions, and we are reducing only because we feel secure in our relationship with you. We are certainly not withdrawing in spirit as I hope will become evident to you as time goes on.

D. A. M.

3 Feb 67

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - EGMA 69925
FILE NO - 32W-2-28/1 AND 62-5-23
DATE - 6 FEBRUARY 1967
INDEXING - NONE
MICROFILM - NO
TO - CHIEF/SUR
INFO - CDS/GERMANY
FROM - CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE
SUBJECT - CATUSK/OPERATIONS
1-UTILITY MEETING
ACTION - FOR INFORMATION
REF - NONE

1. ON 3 FEB [] I MET WITH UTILITY. OTHERS PRESENT WERE ALIAS ROENDORF, HEAD OF CATUSK'S FOREIGN LIAISON, AND []. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO NOTIFY UTILITY OF OUR PLAN TO REDUCE THE MUNICH LIAISON BASE IN SIZE. AS SUCH A REDUCTION WILL BECOME APPARENT AS IT TAKES PLACE, THE THOUGHT WAS TO EXPLAIN TO UTILITY WHAT WAS BEHIND IT SO THERE WOULD BE NO FALSE INTERPRETATION OF IT.

2. UTILITY OPENED OUR BUSINESS CONVERSATION HIMSELF WITH A DISCUSSION OF AN OPERATIONAL MATTER. THIS WILL BE DEALT WITH BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE FROM BONN.

3. [] THEN SAID THAT HE WAS SORRY TO TELL UTILITY THAT [] WAS BEING CALLED TO ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT FOR WHICH HIS BACKGROUND UNIQUELY QUALIFIED HIM. THE ASSIGNMENT WAS NOT PINPOINTED. [] CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE OCCASION FOR INFORMING UTILITY OF THIS PERSONNEL CHANGE GAVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING UP ANOTHER MATTER NOT CONNECTED WITH []'S MOVE. THAT,

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CONTINUED, WAS THE MATTER OF THE OVERALL PERSONNEL SITUATION. C SAID THAT DEMANDS FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD SIMPLY MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP UP TO FORMER STRENGTH. C ADDED THAT BECAUSE OF THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN CATUSK AND WOFAC, HE FELT HE COULD WITHOUT ANY FEAR OF HARMING THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SERVICES DO SOME RETRENCHING IN MUNICH.

UTILITY AGREED THAT WHATEVER DEGREE OF CONTACT WAS DROPPED. THE BROAD AREA OF EXCHANGE OF STUDIES AND REPORTS AND THE AREA OF SIGINT WERE TWO FIELDS IN WHICH WE BOTH WOULD WANT TO STAY AS CLOSE IN TOUCH AS HITHERTO. UTILITY ALSO AGREED THAT HE VIEWED THE LIAISON CHANNEL AS ONE SUITED TO AN EXCHANGE OF BACKGROUND THINKING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TWO SERVICES INVOLVED.

4. ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF TELLING UTILITY THAT WE THOUGHT OF MOVING THE CHIEF OF THE LIAISON BASE OVER TO THE C WHERE HE COULD AT THE SAME TIME ASSUME WIDER RESPONSIBILITIES, THIS WAS NOT ACTUALLY BROUGHT UP AT THE MEETING. AS OUR PLANS FOR CONSOLIDATING COM AND MLR JELL, WE WILL DECIDE NOT TO CONVEY THIS TO UTILITY.

5. THE DISCUSSION WITH UTILITY LASTED ABOUT AN HOUR, DURING WHICH HE EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, ONE WHICH WAS /AFTER C HAD PUT THE QUESTION/ THAT HE

ANTICIPATED BEING ABLE TO TAKE UP C INVITATION TO VISIT WOFAC SOMETIME IN APRIL OR MAY. C SUGGESTED THAT WE BE GIVEN A FOUR TO SIX-WEEK LEAD TIME TO ALLOW SOME FLEXIBILITY TO FIT IN WITH C S SCHEDULE. UTILITY READILY AGREED, ADDING THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE VISIT.

HE CONTINUED BY SAYING SOMETHING WHICH WE HAVE NEVER HEARD HIM SAY BEFORE, NAMELY, THAT HE "COULDN'T" LEAVE FOR A

TRIP TO VISIT WOFAC DURING THE ERHARDT ADMINISTRATION.

HE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THIS, BUT FROM ALL THAT HE HAS SAID BEFORE, ONE WOULD CONCLUDE THAT HE FELT HE HAD TO BE ON THE SPOT AT ALL TIMES TO PROTECT CATUSK FROM THE ERHARDT GOVERNMENT'S INDIFFERENCE, IF NOTHING ELSE/.

6. IN DISCUSSING POLITICAL MATTERS, UTILITY SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE RUMANIAN MOVE TO OPEN RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY WAS TRULY INDEPENDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE HEDGED SOMEWHAT AS TO WHETHER THIS WOULD NOW BE THE TIME TO TAKE UP INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS IN AND WITH RUMANIA. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF NEITHER BEING IN A POSITION TO OPEN UP INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS THERE NOR OF BEING ABLE TO MOUNT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. HE COMMENTED THAT CATUSK WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CONTINUE TO GET INFORMATION ON RUMANIA FROM OTHER PLACES. HE DIDN'T APPEAR TO WANT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER ANY FURTHER. /A QUICK LOOK AT OUR MLB/CE FILES ^{DOES} NOT INDICATE OUR KNOWLEDGE, AT LEAST, OF ANY CATUSK ASSETS IN RUMANIA./

7. TOUCHING ON RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES, UTILITY SAID HE HAD LONG HELD THE VIEW THAT IN A CLOSELY COORDINATED WAY, THE UNITED STATES MIGHT "SYMBOLICALLY" WITHDRAW A CERTAIN NUMBER OF MILITARY UNITS FROM GERMANY. THE COORDINATION WOULD CONSIST OF APPROPRIATE TIMING SO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT COULD MUSTER UNITS TO FILL THE GAP LEFT BY THE AMERICANS. HE ALSO SPOKE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF INCREASING THE GERMAN FORCES' FIRE POWER.

8. TOUCHING LIGHTLY ON THE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO THE EAST, UTILITY SAID THAT THE BONN GOVT WAS VERY REALISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION, NOT NECESSARILY EXPECTING SUCCESSES. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HAD JUST RIPENED TO THE

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SECRET DISPATCH EGMA 69925 PAGE 4

POINT WHERE THE PUBLIC THOUGHT THAT THE MOVE TO OPEN UP
TOWARD THE EAST SHOULD AT LEAST BE ATTEMPTED.

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SECRET DISPATCH EGMA 69925 PAGE 4

DISPATCH

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S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, European Division	INDEXED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief, Munich Liaison Base	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK/CI/CE Horst Wendland <input type="checkbox"/> Alias Holm	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

There have been intimations within recent weeks that @Holm, the Chief of Staff and de facto vice-president of CATUSK, was ailing. We had heard stories of possible heart trouble, etc. At a meeting with UTILITY a few days ago, @Roendorf, Chief of CATUSK Foreign Liaison, was present. As he was escorting ☐ and me out of the building, he mentioned alias Holm: Doctors who have thoroughly examined alias Holm have found nothing organically wrong with him. However, they did find that he was simply worn out. He is now taking a rest cure and will shortly be back at work. We record this for your information because of the mentions of alias Holm in the question of the succession of UTILITY.

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMA - 69926	DATE 7 February 1967
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OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST
COORDINATING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

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FILE, NR, DDP		9
		10

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DIRECTOR

KMBALL

FROM

IT NOW APPEARS UTILITY WILL NOT MAKE HIS SCHEDULED TRIP TO WASHINGTON FOR TWO OR THREE MORE MONTHS. I HAVE BEEN HOPING TO KILL TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE DURING HIS VISIT BUT IT NOW SEEMS PREFERABLE TO MAKE A SHORT TDY TRIP OF MY OWN TO DISCUSS KEY PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS AND FUTURE STATION STRUCTURAL AS WELL AS PROGRAM PROBLEMS. WHO IS HERE SAYS 19 MARCH ARRIVAL WOULD BE GOOD TIME FROM DIVISION STANDPOINT. THEREFORE REQUEST APPROVAL FOR 7 TO 10 DAY TDY FOR CONSULTATION BEGINNING MORNING 20 MARCH.

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GEHLEN 201

BONN 7238

DISPATCH

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MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO

Chief, Munich Liaison Base

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INFO.

Chief, EUR Division

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FROM

Chief of Station, Germany

MICROFILM

SUBJECT

CATUSEC Proposed Transfer of CATUSEC Military Evaluation
Section to Ministry of Defense

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: EGNA-33071, 2 December 1966

C/E/JD/HAB
CIR

32W-2-29/1

Lt. Col. Cacciato, the local USAREUR Liaison Officer, has learned from his Ministry of Defense contacts that the reference proposal to transfer the CATUSEC Military Evaluations Staff to the Ministry of Defense has been tabled for the time being. It has been decided to postpone further action on this proposal until after the retirement of UTILITY.

MICROFILMED

FEB 27 1967

DOC. MICRO. SER.

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2 - C/EUR

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See EGNA-33071
32W-2-29/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

D 32W-9-15

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

EGNA-33684

DATE

20 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

FF: CATUSEC
32W-2-29/1

EGNA-33684

23 February 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Lunch with General Gerhard Wessel
Tuesday, 21 February 1967

The Non-Proliferation Treaty

1. Wessel believes that the Western Alliance is for the first time directly and seriously endangered by the political problem related to the NPT. Summary of his views:

a. A serious communications problem between Bonn and Washington is developing. The style of USG-GFR negotiations, aside from substantive problems in the Treaty draft, is contributing to the political problems.

b. All of the deprecators of Bonn's pro-U.S. foreign policy orientation -- the extreme nationalists, the pro-French and the pro-Soviets -- find grist for their mill in this situation.

c. Senior German officials find it difficult to estimate what the real U.S. estimate on the viability and potential of the NPT, as a disarmament measure, really is. Because of the way it is being handled, they feel the motives are a mixture of obscure politics and genuine disarmament efforts.

d. The majority of the German military leaders do not want control of atomic weapons; basically the concept of the U.S. President's having the decision is, soberly examined, a desirable solution. Wessel, unlike some of the German military, sees no hope in a

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
FATE 2005

national German command which would be militarily ineffectual and politically an invitation to disaster.

e. Because the U.S. is taking the initiative in making the plea for the USSR to cooperate, the dialogue is regarded as in the pattern that gives the Soviets the opportunity to politically exploit the dissensions in the West without the USSR making any significant concession in the power balance.

f. It is questionable whether the NPT is a realistic disarmament measure; it has some characteristics of simply political maneuvering. If it is the latter, the West is likely to pay a very high price. (Wessel has several times quoted an off-the-record expression of opinion by Secretary McNamara that it is inevitable that a number of nations will in the next fifteen years become possessors of atomic weapons regardless of USG and Soviet interests in maintaining the status quo.)

Wessel's Future

2. He will remain here until late summer. The Defense Ministry is actively considering the problem of his replacement. General Ferber, who is leaving Washington this week for a troop assignment at Marburg, is the most likely candidate. Ferber has been alerted that he may be asked to take the post after the NATO Military Standing Group moves to Belgium later in 1967. (Ferber, like Wessel, is a Gehlen man.)

3. There is nothing new on Wessel's next assignment. He expects that the decision on Gehlen's replacement will be made in the next six months. Wessel is taking no action at this time to influence a decision. His wife remains unreconciled to the prospect of his assuming the demands of the BND position.

James H. Critchfield

Extract from Meeting with @Dessau on February 24, 1967

7. In referring to the future of General Wessel, he said that there are three possibilities open to him when he (Wessel) leaves Washington next September. He identified these possibilities as 1) assignment to a troop command, 2) continuation in his same role in Brussels, with the 3) third possibility being that of replacing General Gehlen as Chief of the BND. @DESSAU indicated that he favored the third possibility above any other.

8. This led to a discussion to a successor to Gehlen with @DESSAU stressing Wessel as his own personal favorite but noting that there have been two other names from completely outside the intelligence world which have been mentioned. He did not mention these names. He said that Wentdland was certainly still in the running if the choice falls to someone within the BND. He said that while Wentdland would not be as good a choice as Wessel, he did think that Wentdland would be quite good in the job. He said that Wentdland's biggest weakness was the lack of any operational or tactical experience and he pointed to Wentdland's career which has been almost entirely in the administrative field. @DESSAU then said that the best solution to the BND successor problem is Wessel and he indicated that it might be advantageous to have [] use any influence he might have to bring about such a solution. He said that he had told the "Doktor" of his opinion many times and he indicated that he planned to re-emphasize this to the "Doktor" when he visits Washington. He added that the "Doktor" would be staying at his house. I asked whether he had any recent word about the "Doktor's" visit and he said that the last which he had heard was April but, he continued, whereas the "Doktor" had not been able to come earlier because of problems in Germany, he now could not appropriately come too close on the heels of CIA's current difficulties.

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Extract from Memorandum For The
Record
Dated 10 March 1967

12. During our morning discussion, he made reference to a cable which he had just received from the Doktor and said that he would come back to that later. Due to the length of our earlier conversation, we did not get around to any further discussion of this subject and I recalled it to him at this point. He said that the cable had been very interesting, and had contained a statement of the messages which the Doktor had asked Ray to bring along to the DCI in his forthcoming visit. (When I indicated knowledge that Ray was arriving on the 26th, GDESSAU quickly corrected me saying that Ray would arrive on the 19th.) GDESSAU said that the Doktor had asked Ray to tell the DCI that while he (the Doktor) would not visit the U.S. right now, he nevertheless hoped to take up the Director's invitation in the months ahead and he promised to give us four weeks advance notice. GDESSAU indicated the tone of the Doktor's cable had been so positive that GDESSAU was overjoyed. He said that GDESSAU was completely happy with Ray and that they got along extremely well. GDESSAU then asked that I not reveal any of Ray's thunder by making this information known before Ray himself had a chance to discuss it with the DCI. I promised not to do so.

C/E/S/CE

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SECRET
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE				
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	
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PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>GFHLEN. REINHARDT</p> <p>SEX M DUB ?</p> <p>CIT ?</p> <p>DCC ?</p> <p>SINCE CONVICTION OF HEINZ FELFE ON CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE, SUBJ HAS BECOME SO MISTRUSTFUL THAT HE HAS SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH W. W. II FRIENDS AND RELATIVES, RESULTING IN DRUP IN MORALE OF BND.</p> </div> <div style="width: 45%; text-align: right;"> <p>32W-002-029/01</p> <p>EGN -03272</p> <p>15 MAR 67</p> <p>P1</p> </div> </div> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;"> <p>EGDEGGEGFEGM</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY</p> <p>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</p> <p>SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B</p> <p>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT</p> <p>DATE 2008</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;"> <p>FILE IN </p> </div>				
14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.				

SECRET. TELEPOUCH

TO- C/EUR INFO- COB/BERLIN, COB/HAMBURG, COB/FRANKFURT,
C/MOB, C/MLB, USAREUR, USAFE, USEUCOM

FROM- COS/GERMANY

EGN-3272

INTEL

SUPDATA- NO PROJECT. L 1 TO L 1 ON 15 MARCH. SEE
BONN 6103 OF 6 DECEMBER 1966 AND BONN 7712 OF 15
MARCH 1967. NO INDEX. NOT FOR LIAISON.

FILED- 1300Z 20 MARCH 1967

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1

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY- WEST GERMANY

DOI - 15 MARCH 1967

SUBJECT- DIFFICULTIES FACING THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE /BND/

ACQ - GERMANY, BONN /15 MARCH 1967/ FIELD NO. EGN-3272

SOURCE - A QUALIFIED AMERICAN OFFICIAL FROM A WEST GERMAN
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION.
THE WEST GERMAN OFFICIAL IS AWARE THAT HIS
STATEMENTS WILL REACH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
THE INFORMATION IS PROBABLY TRUE.

1. THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE /BND/ IS
ENCOUNTERING CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES--BOTH WITHIN ITS
ORGANIZATION AND FROM GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN BONN.

2. SOME YOUNG BND STAFF MEMBERS COMPLAIN THAT SINCE THE
CONVICTION OF HEINZ FELFE ON CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE, BND
PRESIDENT GEHLEN HAS BECOME SO MISTRUSTFUL THAT HE HAS
SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH OLD CRONIES FROM HIS "FREMDE HEERE OST"

1

GROUP OF WORLD WAR II AND CLOSE RELATIVES. SUCH NEPOTISM AND THE MISMANAGEMENT WHICH IS INHERENT IN IT HAVE PRECLUDED THE PROMOTION OF MANY DESERVING MIDDLE-LEVEL OFFICERS AND HAVE RESULTED IN A DECIDED DROP IN THEIR MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS.

3. OUT OF THEIR DISSATISFACTION, BND STAFF MEMBERS HAVE SOLICITED THE ASSISTANCE OF WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIANS. ONE OF THE POLITICAL FIGURES WHO RESPONDED STRONGLY IS STATE SECRETARY FRIEDRICH SCHAEFER OF THE BUNDESRAT MINISTRY, WHO COMPLAINED TO CHANCELLERY STATE SECRETARY WERNER KNIEPER ABOUT MISMANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY IN THE BND. AFTER A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, KNIEPER ADVISED CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ABOUT THE PROBLEMS. KIESINGER THEN SUMMONED GEHLEN TO BONN ON 14 MARCH TO DISCUSS THE MATTER.

4. FOR SOME TIME THE HEAD OF WEST GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, ADMIRAL GUNTHER POSER, HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE OVER ELEMENTS OF THE BND AND INCORPORATE THEM INTO AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION THAT WOULD BE PART OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

5. BOTH THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST GEHLEN AND THE EFFORTS OF POSER ARE BEING GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BY CHANCELLOR

1

KIESINGER, WHO IS GIVING THOUGHT TO CHANGING THE BND
MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURE. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH
KIESINGER FACES IS THE LACK OF A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR
GEHLEN.

6. WHILE GEHLEN'S TWO DEPUTIES, HORST WENDLAND AND ERICH
DETHLEFFSEN, ARE CONSIDERED VERY CAPABLE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
FIELDS, NEITHER HAS THE WELL-ROUNDED CAPABILITIES REQUIRED
BY GEHLEN'S POSITION. WENDLAND IS RESPECTED AS AN EFFECTIVE
MANAGER, BUT IS NOT SO HIGHLY THOUGHT OF IN THE FIELDS OF
SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. WHILE
DETHLEFFSEN'S STRENGTH APPARENTLY IS IN THE FIELD OF SUB-
STANTIVE INTELLIGENCE, HE DOES NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED MANAGERIAL
ABILITIES. ALSO, DETHLEFFSEN IS NEAR THE AGE OF RETIREMENT.
IN THE PAST, GENERAL GERHARD WESSEL WAS OFTEN CONSIDERED
AS A POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR TO GEHLEN, BUT SINCE WESSEL'S
ASSIGNMENT TO THE STANDING NATO GROUP IN WASHINGTON, HE HAS
BEEN COMPLETELY OUT OF THE PICTURE.

7. FIELD DISSEM- STATE, USAREUR, USAFE, USEUCOM.
REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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20. Maerz 1967

Sehr geehrter Herr General Gehlen!

Den Anlass Ihres 65. Geburtstages moechte ich nicht vorbei gehen lassen, ohne meine aufrichtigen Wuensche zu diesem Tage uebermittelt zu haben. Gute Gesundheit, fortdauernde Arbeitskraft und ein gutes Mass von Erfolg und innerer Zufriedenheit ueber das Erraeichte seien Ihnen noch auf viele Jahre beschieden. Dem fuege ich den Wunsch bei fuer einen wirklichen Festtag im Kreise der Ihren.

Mit dem Ausdruck meiner ganz besonderen Hochachtung und Verbundenheit

Ihr

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Gehler — Chef auf Zeit

Personalprobleme in den Spitzen der geheimen Dienste / Von Hans Dellev Becker

From : DIE ZEIT, #10, 14 March '67, page 3.

Daß der Vizepräsident des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, Dr. Ernst Brückner, mit 7 Jahren „aus gesundheitlichen Gründen“ in den Ruhestand versetzt und der vormalige Leiter der Abteilung III (Linksradikalismus) des Amtes, Dr. Günther Nollau, zum Vizepräsidenten ernannt worden sei, war dem Bulletin der Bundesregierung zu entnehmen — Resonanz in der Öffentlichkeit hat diese Meldung freilich nicht gefunden.

Dabei ist an der Verlautbarung nicht nur auffällig, daß Dr. Brückner noch vor zweieinhalb Jahren als Polizeivollzugsbeamter in exponierter Funktion, nämlich als Chef der Sicherungsgruppe des Bundeskriminalamtes, ohne Zweifel kerngesund gewesen sein muß. Auch die Unterschiede in der Herkunft des alten und des neuen Vizepräsidenten stechen ins Auge. Brückner kam, wie erwähnt, aus dem Polizeivollzugsdienst. Nollau, als ehemaliger Dresdener Rechtsanwalt, kommt vom „Untersuchungsausschuß Freiheitlicher Juristen“ — also als Nichtbeamter von der Ideologisch-politischen Seite her. Er trat neben seiner Arbeit im Verfassungsschutz als Buch- und Presse-Autor mit Beiträgen über Ideologie und Herrschaftssysteme des internationalen Kommunismus hervor.

Aus dem „Canaris-Laden“ — den Ausdruck prägte der ehemalige Abwehroffizier und frühere Abteilungsleiter im Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Richard Gerkens — aus dem „Canaris-Laden“ stammen beide nicht, aber von Dr. Brückner ist bekannt, daß er den Verfassungsschutz auch gar nicht als „geheimen Nachrichtendienst“, sondern als „Sicherheitsdienst“ verstanden wissen wollte. Dies vor allem dürfte der Grund für den Bruch mit dem Präsidenten Schröbers nach kaum zweijähriger Zusammenarbeit gewesen sein.

Doch wird es unter Nollau, dem nun sämtliche operativen Abteilungen des Verfassungsschutzes direkt unterstehen, nicht zu geheimdienstlichen Indianerspielen kommen können, wie sie in der Pätzsch-Affäre der Canaris-Mann Gerkens und die ehemaligen Gestapo-Beamten Strübing und Wenger zu verantworten hatten. Nollau kommissarischer Nachfolger in der Abteilung III, Oberregierungsrat Degenhardt, demonstrierte zusammen mit seinem Kollegen Dr. Meyer, der mittlerweile Gerkens Nachfolger in der Abteilung IV (Spionageabwehr) wurde, als Zeuge im Pätzsch-Prozess vor dem Bundesgerichtshof

überzeugend einen modernen, aufgeschlossenen und demokratischen Geheimdienstbeamtentyp.

Ist im Verfassungsschutz also durch einen Abgang in den Ruhestand personelle Integration und Kontinuität in der obersten Führung bewirkt worden, so gilt für den Bundesnachrichtendienst das gerade Gegenteil. Am 3. April wird der Generalmajor der Wehrmacht und heutige Behördenpräsident Gehlen 65 Jahre alt und wäre damit nach Paragraph 41 des Bundesbeamtengesetzes zum 30. April in den Ruhestand zu versetzen. Die Ausnahmebestimmung, daß die Dienstzeit verlängert werden kann, wenn „dienstliche Rücksichten der Verwaltung im Einzelfalle die Fortführung der Dienstgeschäfte durch einen bestimmten Beamten erfordern“, ist allgemeines Gesetz und klingt doch wie gemünzt auf den Fall Gehlen: Kaum jemals wird ein Beamter schwerer durch einen anderen Beamten zu ersetzen sein, als der alleinige Schöpfer des Bundesnachrichtendienstes.

Andererseits: Nur jeweils um ein Jahr kann die Amtstätigkeit verlängert werden, Bundesregierung und Bundespersonalausschuß müssen zustimmen, und mit dem 70. Lebensjahr endet auch die Verlängerungsmöglichkeit. Gehlens Amtszeit ist bereits um ein Jahr verlängert worden, aber er ist von nun an ein Präsident auf Abbruch. Die Beziehungen zwischen einer Behörde, die total Selbständigkeit benötigt, und der Regierung können nicht mehr unbefangenen sein, wenn die Regierung binnen Jahresfrist wieder über eine Dienstverlängerung zu entscheiden hat. Zwar kann der Präsident des BND als politischer Beamter jederzeit in den einstweiligen Ruhestand versetzt werden, doch ist es ein politischer und vor allem ein psychologischer Unterschied, ob ein Präsident durch Initiative der Regierung in den einstweiligen Ruhestand geschickt wird oder, ob die Bundesregierung lediglich die Zustimmung zur Dienstverlängerung nach einer Routinefrist verweigert.

Sich Vorgesetzte, Stellvertreter, Mitarbeiter und Untergebene nicht aussuchen zu können, ist Beamtenlos. Schwerlich aber ist eine Behörde denkbar, bei der es dennoch so sehr auf dienstinternes Vertrauen und personelle Geschlossenheit der Führung ankommt wie bei dem im Ausland operierenden Bundesnachrichtendienst. Gehlen ist nicht ersetzbar, das ist die eine Seite, die andere Seite aber ist, daß in der längstens fünf-

jährigen Oberleitungsfrist eine innere Erosion stattfinden kann, wenn jeder Mitarbeiter in sein eigenes dienstliches Kalkül einrechnen muß, daß der Chef vielleicht nur noch ein Jahr, längstens noch vier Jahre im Amt sein wird.

Gehlens Vizepräsident, Hans-Heinrich Woritzki, kommt aus Alters- wie aus Gesundheitsgründen für die Nachfolge schwerlich in Frage. Der Führungswechsel im BND wird zugleich ein Generationswechsel sein. Die von ehemaligen Offizieren der Abteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“ im Generalstab des Heeres geprägte Epoche geht zu Ende. Der neue Typ des Geheimdienstchefs von zivilem Herkommen, mutmaßlich ein Managertyp, ist auch Kennern der Zusammenhänge noch nicht präsentiert worden.

Um so bedenklicher erscheint die Bonner Indolenz gegenüber den personellen, organisatorischen, rechtlichen und operativen Problemen der Geheimdienste. Ruhm ist dabei nicht zu ernten, Mitverantwortung könnte drücken, also Hände weg — das ist die Einstellung. Nach Adenauer und Globke hat das Bonner Kanzleramt den Chefs dieser Behörden nicht mehr die Resonanz gegeben, deren sie angesichts ihrer sonstigen Isolierung bedürfen.

Vor einem Jahr wurden Pläne geschmiedet, Minister und Staatssekretär beauftragt und ein Ministeriumsgebäude hergerichtet mit dem Ziel, in der Dienststelle des Bundesministers für die Angelegenheiten des Bundesverteidigungsrates auch die Tätigkeit der Geheimdienste zu koordinieren. Nicht nur Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, sondern auch Staatssekretär Reinhold Mercker, der zuvor als Abteilungsleiter im Bundeskanzleramt unter anderem BND-Fragen bearbeitet hatte, verfügte über politische und persönliche Eignung für ein so schwieriges Unterfangen. Doch zunächst lenkte die Devisenausgleichs- und Nonproliferations-Diskussion den Minister. Krone von seinen neuen Aufgaben ab, dann legte die Erhard-Krise ihn und sein Ministerium fort noch ehe er auch nur ein einziges Mal die Präsidenten Gehlen und Schröbers und den MAD General Seeliger in seinem Amt versammelt gehabt hätte.

In dem mittlerweile zweckentfremdeten Sicherheitsministerium an der Erich-Ollenauer Straße in Bonn brütet heute Ministerialdirektor Hohnmann, Erhards schon fast vergessener Berater, über imaginären politischen Planvorhaben.

Die Geheimdienste aber koordiniert niemand.

SECRET

22 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT: Planned Visit of General Gehlen to
Washington

1. It is suggested that you reply to the Director of Naval Intelligence along the following lines:

General Gehlen was indeed invited by the Director to visit Washington late last year. Immediately thereafter the government crisis arose in Germany which led ultimately to the fall of the Erhard government and the formation of the CDU/SPD coalition under Chancellor Kiesinger. General Gehlen understandably indicated his inability to accept the invitation at that time but expressed interest in making such a visit sometime this year.

All discussion of this invitation has been held directly between General Gehlen and the CIA Station Chief in Germany. At their most recent meeting in mid-March, General Gehlen again expressed his regret that he found himself still unable to set a firm date. He promised, however, to provide four to six weeks' advance notice of a proposed time for the visit.

Since plans for General Gehlen's visit have been so tentative, we have not yet discussed with him his desires respecting the agenda. We had assumed from the outset that he would be interested in spending some time with DIA. In any case, we shall advise DIA as soon as the timing becomes firm.

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-2-

2. For your own information (it is suggested that this speculation be kept within the Agency for the present):

a. We are at the moment rather skeptical that General Gehlen will visit Washington at all this year. The situation can change overnight, of course, but General Gehlen is still showing extreme hesitancy about leaving Germany and one gets the impression he may be heavily engaged in protecting his flanks with the new government. We doubt that General Gehlen has confided fully in [] and accordingly recommend against any direct comment on []'s remarks.

b. We further recommend that no written comment be made regarding []'s relations with []. Rather it is suggested the observation be made orally at an appropriate occasion that this matter continues to be of extreme sensitivity, and that it would be most helpful if Commander [] could avoid further meetings with [].

[]
Chief, European Division

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1 - DDP
1 - C/EUR

SECRET

SECRET

23 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Visit by Admiral Guenter Poser

1. Attached please find a telephone contact report dated 21 March 1967 in which [] notes that Admiral Poser, whom you met in Bonn, will be arriving in Washington on 29 March for a ten-day visit.

2. Mr. Ray Cline in his current discussions with the Division has commented on the fact that General Gehlen appears to be in difficulties with the Kiesinger Government and that there is a definite possibility that Admiral Poser may be selected to replace Gehlen as Chief of the BND. According to Mr. Cline, General Gehlen's management of the BND has been under fire in various quarters in Bonn and simultaneously Admiral Poser has been agitating to strip the BND of some of its military intelligence responsibilities which he would like to see vested in a new German equivalent of DIA, presumably with himself as chief of the new organization. In these connections, it is being suggested that replacement of General Gehlen by Admiral Poser would satisfy both the BND's critics and the Admiral's ambitions.

3. With the above background in mind, it is recommended that we follow through on []'s suggestion that Admiral Poser be received during his visit to Washington by the DDCI. It is suggested further that the DCI might be interested in the above report of a possible change in BND leadership and might himself wish to meet Admiral Poser at this time.

4. Attached for your background information are brief biographic sketches on Admiral Poser, General Boie, the West German Defense Attache who will be Admiral Poser's host in Washington, and []

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2005

Attachments

Chief, European Division

SECRET

Gehlen 201

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, EUR	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, Munich Liaison Base		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK Meeting with UTILITY 9 March 1967.		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>1. [] advised UTILITY on the background of the [] case, emphasizing that []'s activities had confined themselves purely to the briefing of [] on the KGB and its activities against foreign diplomats in Moscow. Heavy emphasis was placed on the fact that this was only a defensive briefing which [] undertook as a friendly service to [] because of their friendship and close association, and that there was no intent to solicit [] cooperation in any substantive intelligence activity.</p> <p>2. UTILITY indicated that he was very concerned over recent Soviet activities against the Western world, primarily in the fields of political action, disinformation, and active penetration operations. UTILITY opined that the Soviets are making a major effort to sow dissension between the Western allies, and in this effort are playing all registers of the intelligence game, ranging from their efforts to establish controlled agents with influential positions in Western governments, penetration of political parties of the Right and Left in Western countries, and last but not least, aggravating natural, but not necessarily major, disagreements between Western nations by using all elements of their disinformation potential.</p> <p>3. [] indicated to UTILITY that there initially was some concern that there could be some embarrassing publicity concerning student operations in Germany; however, that a close review of our activities had shown that we were not engaging in any activities in this sector which could give cause for concern. UTILITY's reaction was rather relaxed and he indicated that the type of political action operation utilizing students, labor unions and other groups of this kind were a traditional and historical modus operandi in the conflict</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - Chief, EUR 2 - Chief, MLB</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</p> <p>GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO D 32W-2-23/1	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA-33950	DATE MAR 28 1967 23 March 1967	
D 32W-2-24/1	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 32-W-5-25/1 C	

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA-33950
<p>between East and West, and that any revelations that we were engaging in such activity would not cause him any great surprise or concern.</p> <p>4. UTILITY mentioned that the emergency legislation which was recently approved by the cabinet did include as an addendum a law on the monitoring of communications. He mentioned that the specifics of this law were still undergoing some changes; however, that he hoped to be able to make available to us a draft copy of the law in the not too distant future.</p> <p>5. [] mentioned the assignment to and forthcoming arrival in Munich of []. UTILITY's reaction to []'s assignment was very, very positive. While making appropriate noises about the excellent job that [] had been doing, UTILITY made it quite clear that he and his staff greatly appreciated []'s familiarity with German and Austrian affairs, and especially his excellent background on CATUSK and its relation with WOFACT. He also mentioned that []'s previous association with CATUSK had won him many friends who had not forgotten him and that this particular aspect should make it very easy for him to quickly get into the swim of things.</p> <p>6. Within the context of requesting [] to apologize to [] for UTILITY's frequent postponements of his visit to [], UTILITY mentioned that he hoped to be able to communicate a definite date in about four weeks but that problems he was encountering with some of his adversaries in the new government precluded him from committing himself to a specific date at present. He emphasized that the problems were such that he did not feel that he could leave Germany for any period of time prior to having taken care of them, or at least having localized them.</p> <p>7. UTILITY in commenting on the furor that the NPT negotiations had caused in Germany, made it clear that while he had not made any official comment on this matter, or actively participated in the formulation of German policy, his personal views on the NPT were negative. Not only did he believe that Germany's accession to the NPT would adversely affect its capability to exploit atomic energy for peaceful uses, but it would be a serious obstacle to the ultimate establishment of a European nuclear force which he considered essential for the security of Western Europe. In continuing his commentary, UTILITY said that he felt that the worldwide commitments of the United States, especially the considerable effort that it had to expend in Southeast Asia, would adversely affect U. S. capability to forcefully react to challenges on the European continent, and that this was causing him, and indeed many other thinking Germans, considerable concern.</p>		
FORM 53a G-60 1401	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	2.

MAB

S E C R E T

Chief/Munich Liaison Base

Chief Of Station/Germany

Chief/EUR

CATDEX

Birthday Greetings for UTILITY

Transmitted under separate cover is a letter from []
[] tendering birthday greetings to UTILITY.

Attachment: Under Separate Cover

Distribution:

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2 - COS/Germany w/o/att

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EGMS-7223

27 March 1967

S E C R E T

E/G/CE []

[]: baf

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Gehien 201

Executive Registry
67-1938/1

DD/P 2-12-15

27 March 1967

Dear Gene,

We are most grateful for your phone call and for the copy of the letter you sent over concerning General Gehlen's planned visit to Washington.

As things now stand Gehlen himself expressed his regret that he is still unable to set a firm date in response to our invitation for a visit. He promised however to provide us with 4 to 6 weeks' advance notice when and if he is able to accept.

We have as yet developed no agenda for his visit since it has remained so tentative. However, we had assumed from the outset that he would be interested in spending some time with DIA and propose to take that up with him as soon as the timing becomes firm, if it ever does.

For various reasons we would consider it helpful if Fleming could reduce or avoid further meetings with ☐ ☐ Of course, this may not be possible without creating unnecessary embarrassment so we leave that aspect to you and Don Seaman's capable hands.

Again many thanks for keeping us advised in this matter.

With warmest personal regards,

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Sincerely,

Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director

Rear Admiral E. B. Fluckey, USN
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

O & 1 -- Addressee
C/EUR via DDP
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ORIG: [] :BAF
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DATE: 30 MARCH 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

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TO: MUNICH
CATUSK

INFO BONIN

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PG	[]
ABSTRACT	[]
INDEX	[]

PLS EXTEND BIRTHDAY GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO
UTILITY ON HIS BIRTHDAY FROM: []

[] , AND []

END OF MESSAGE

DC/EUR []

C/EUR []

C/NE []

DC/EUR []

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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TO: MUNICH INFO BONN

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ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM L BAF FOR UTILITY:

" IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO EXTEND BIRTHDAY
GREETINGS TO YOU ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR 65TH BIRTHDAY.

I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE RECENT REPORTS
WHICH MR. RAY CLINE BROUGHT CONCERNING HIS TALKS WITH
YOU AND I ASSURE YOU THAT ALL OF US HERE FIND A GOOD
DEAL OF SATISFACTION IN KNOWING THAT YOUR LONG AND
UNIQUE EXPERIENCE WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE IN GUIDING
THE ACTIVITIES OF GERMAN INTELLIGENCE. I LOOK FORWARD TO
SEEING YOU HERE IN WASHINGTON IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE."

END OF MESSAGE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION	
		S E C R E T		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
TO	Chief, Munich Liaison Base			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
FROM	Chief, Europe			MICROFILM	
SUBJECT	CATUSEK Transmittal of Letter				
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>Under separate cover we are transmitting a letter to UTILITY from []</p>					
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>					
Attachment: Under Separate Cover					
Distribution:					
2 - C/MLB W/ATT A/S U.S.C.					
2 - COS/Germany W/O/ATT					
<p style="text-align: right;"><i>Dehler</i> 4 APR 1967</p>					
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		DATE	
		EGMS-7255		31 March 1967	
		CLASSIFICATION		HQS FILE NUMBER	
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		OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
		C/E/G/CE	31 MAR 67	[]	
FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66		(40)		DISPATCH	

March 31, 1967

Dear General Gehlen,

Ruth and I wish to extend our greetings and warmest wishes with regard to your 65th birthday. We hope that you will be able to enjoy it in good health and in the company of your family.

We find it difficult to realize that five years have passed since you celebrated your 60th anniversary which we continue to remember so fondly. Although I visited your home several times, that birthday celebration stands out so vividly in my memory.

Nothing has really changed for us here since my note to you at Christmas. We are all in good health and continuing to enjoy working and living in the U.S.A.

I have heard, of course, that [] will be going back to Munich and I know how happy he and his family must be. It's a shame that the house they used to live in on Forstweg is no longer available. I think that would make the assignment to Munich a real home-coming.

Again, we wish you, your wife and the children all of our best and look forward to seeing you in the United States whenever you come.

Most sincerely,

DB-0016638

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief, EUR				MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO. Chief of Station, Germany <i>ELF</i>		XXX		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM A/Chief, Munich Liaison Base				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT CATUSK: UTILITY Tenure and Succession				MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		MICROFILMED APR 19 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.			
<p>ACTION REQUIRED: F Y I</p> <p>REFERENCES : A. EGNA-33962 B. MUNICH-9047</p> <p>1. During his talk with CATUSK's @PETERSEN on 27 March 1967 <i>EL</i> also raised the question of UTILITY's tenure and eventual succession. PETERSEN as usual was not very complimentary about UTILITY.</p> <p>a. To our first question whether the current extension might be repeated a year from now he said first "I fear so" and then "I hope not". He said the current situation was absolutely untenable, he likened UTILITY to a "lame duck" President. He considered that a years extension had been necessary because the new Government had simply not had time to find a successor. Further extensions he said would be disastrous for the organization. As long as the senior officers expected UTILITY to retire he could not provide effective leadership. From his vantage point as a Base chief, he said, UTILITY appeared to be no longer in command, at least not operationally. PETERSEN said that there is so much infighting and jockeying for positions in CATUSK that by default the effective leadership such as it is has fallen to the Chief of Administration, @STEIN (presumably identical with <i>EL</i> whom we last carried as Chief of Finance). PETERSEN explained that in the absence of true operational leadership and as a result of the internecine warfare among the senior officers at CATUSK only the bureaucracy continues to function.</p> <p><u>ALL INTELL OFFICERS</u> <u>CIT W/EGNA-33962</u></p> <p>Distribution: 2-EUR 2-Germany</p> <p style="text-align: right;">GROUP EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</p> <p style="text-align: right;">7 APR 1967</p>					
CROSS REFERENCE TO <i>EL</i>		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMA-70218		DATE 4 April 1967	
		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		HQS FILE NUMBER <i>EL</i>	
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005		ORIGINATING OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST - EXT.			
		COORDINATING			
		OFFICER'S NAME			
		RELEASING OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S SIGNATURE			
FORM 8-63 53b OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (40)		HQ COPY		DISPATCH	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-70218
<p>b. To our next question on succession PETERSEN had no direct answer only opinions. When we dropped the name of General Wessel, he said that unfortunately Wessel was no longer a candidate. He said he would have loved to have Wessel get the job five years ago, to quote PETERSEN, "he would have really cleaned that pigsty thoroughly" For some reason PETERSEN completely discounted the possible candidacy of Wessel. He implied that Wessel was too old but actually Wessel is only fifty-four and would have at least five years active duty left if he were appointed next year. We then spoke of the type of man who might replace UTILITY. PETERSEN, as an Air Force Colonel on active duty, would of course prefer a military man. He was of the opinion, however, that the politicians in Bonn would want a civilian. His estimate was that WAGNER would be replaced by a military man but the top job would go to a political appointee. He elaborated by saying it would be best if the new chief came from without the organization since anyone now in the organization would either be too much encumbered by UTILITY's past policy or would create great enmity from his colleague by attempting to change the policies. Only an outsider PETERSEN thought would have a chance to establish his own policy. PETERSEN also brought up the matter of age in grade stating that a large number, he said, over ten percent, of the CATUSK senior officers who aspire to the top job are either already over age in grade or are within a few years of retirement age. To be effective the new man would have to have a prospective tenure of at least five years. Since military retire at sixty, civilian at sixty-five this would mean a military man under fifty-five or a civilian under sixty. In order to get that type of man from within the organization a fairly young man would have to be promoted over the heads of at least several dozen of his superiors. That in itself would be a great handicap for a new chief in PETERSEN's opinion.</p> <p>3. Asked whether these were just his own opinions he said the topic was most current at all levels of CATUSK and he thought he had given us a consensus of a great many officers who themselves do not consider themselves as likely candidates for the job.</p>		
<p>APPROVED: _____</p>		
<p>FORM 53c 5-60 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION</p>		
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PAGE NO. 2

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Chief of Station, Germany
Chief, European Division

Chief []

① Transmittal of Article re General Reinhard GELLEN

Attached herewith as of possible interest to the German Station and Desk is a copy of an article concerning General Gehlen from the 12 - 18 April 1967 edition of Le Nouvel Observateur.

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DATE 2005


Attachments:

Newspaper Article (h/w)

Distributions:

Orig. & 1 - COS, Germany (w/att.)

73 - Chief, EUR (w/att.)




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14 April 1967

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REINHARD GEHLEN
En 1944 il commandait les « armées étrangères de l'Est »

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

*Pourquoi la mise à la retraite
d'un général allemand de 66 ans
inquiète-t-elle tant les Américains ?
Parce que ce général s'appelle
Reinhard Gehlen et qu'il dirige
tout le réseau d'espionnage
germano-américain
en Europe de l'Est... et ailleurs.*

12-18 Avril 1967

L'espion

Quand un transformateur électrique explose à Berlin-Est, quand un acte de sabotage est commis dans la République démocratique allemande, on sait — on croit savoir — à quoi s'en tenir, et on dit automatiquement : « Ce sont les hommes de Gehlen qui ont fait le coup. » Est-ce vrai, est-ce faux ? On n'en a que très rarement la preuve. Mais ce qu'on peut affirmer avec certitude, c'est que non seulement dans la R.D.A., mais dans tous les pays communistes où il y a du « travail » à faire, on retrouve « les hommes de Gehlen ».

Tout récemment, on a pu lire dans la presse polonaise une information ainsi conçue : « Trois membres de l'organisation Gehlen ont été arrêtés sur le territoire de la République populaire de Pologne. Ils ont des aveux complets. » Pas un mot de plus : c'est qu'on n'étale pas publiquement ce genre d'affaires.

Le « docteur »

Le nom de Gehlen et le prénom Reinhard sont très courants en Allemagne, mais le Reinhard Gehlen en question est unique ; à 66 ans, il est général, ce qui n'est rien, mais il est aussi chef des services de renseignement de la République fédérale allemande, ce qui est énorme. On a pu le voir, la semaine dernière, dans des journaux ont cru pouvoir annoncer qu'il allait prendre sa retraite ; les ambassades de divers pays, et en particulier l'ambassade française, assaillirent les ministères de Bonn de coups de téléphone pour demander anxieusement si la nouvelle était exacte. On n'en sait encore rien aujourd'hui, mais on ne croit pas, à Bonn, que, si vraiment l'idée lui en est venue, Gehlen pourrait aller tranquillement cultiver son jardin, sans que cela cause de graves inconvénients.

C'est que Reinhard Gehlen — ses anciens collaborateurs l'appellent « le docteur », bien qu'il n'ait aucun

droit à ce titre — passe, à juste titre, en Allemagne pour « l'homme qui sait tout ». Pour cela, il dispose d'un budget d'au moins cent millions de marks par an (soit cent vingt millions de francs lourds) et d'un appareil extrêmement vaste et ramifié qui groupe près de trois mille personnes à salaire fixe, plus un nombre bien plus considérable de ce qu'on pourrait appeler des « contractuels », payés pour des opérations précises.

« Le docteur » est l'homme le plus haï et le plus redouté dans tous les pays communistes. Une de ses spécialités est d'y établir des « positions » à partir desquelles sont recueillies des informations portant sur deux points essentiels : d'abord savoir où en est l'adversaire quant aux armements et à la répartition stratégique de ses forces ; ensuite découvrir ce que cet adversaire connaît de la situation militaire de l'Allemagne fédérale.

Pour y arriver, Gehlen dispose d'hommes triés sur le volet qu'on appelle ses « V-men » (V pour *Vertrauen* : confiance en allemand).

S'introduire en Allemagne de l'Est est relativement facile pour les « V-men » : beaucoup d'entre eux y ont des parents et, avec un passeport en règle, il leur est alors très facile, malgré le « mur » de Berlin, de passer la frontière. Des centaines de collaborateurs du « docteur » ont des « contacts » en R.D.A. et y font « travailler » des hommes et des femmes.

Bien que la discrétion soit évidemment de règle en ce domaine, on est arrivé à se faire une idée assez exacte de la structure de l'organisation Gehlen et des tâches qu'elle confie à ses agents.

1) Les « V-men » se doivent d'accomplir un travail de « pénétration ». A Berlin-Est, par exemple, ils doivent entrer en rapport avec tel policier ou tel officier et le décider à travailler pour l'organisation. On obtient ainsi des renseignements précis sur les projets des « centres de décision de l'ennemi », en même temps qu'on démoralise ses collaborateurs.

2) Les « V-men », une fois passés

qui vient de

par Gérard Sandoz

dans le camp adverse, déménagent fréquemment. Quand ils sont chargés de ce qu'on appelle une « vérification », ils s'installent alors près d'un lieu stratégique qu'ils surveillent de façon permanente ;

3) Mission particulièrement délicate et dangereuse, un « V-man » est chargé de se faire engager par le Service de renseignement de l'adversaire pour transmettre des informations, bien sûr, mais aussi pour démasquer les membres de l'organisation Gehlen qui travailleraient avec l'ennemi, et enfin pour lui fournir des informations truquées qui gênent le fonctionnement du service.

En Allemagne de l'Est, les hommes de Gehlen pullulent et ils ont, nous l'avons dit, la tâche relativement facile. Mais « le docteur » dispose aussi d'un appareil remarquablement organisé et efficace dans plusieurs pays communistes et même en U.R.S.S. Allen Dulles, qui s'y connaissait en matière d'espionnage, le disait « irremplaçable » et c'est pourquoi les services secrets américains se sont tellement émus à la nouvelle qu'il allait prendre sa retraite.

L'Abwehr

Pourtant, à l'origine, aucune vocation particulière ne semblait devoir mener Reinhard Gehlen à devenir un maître espion. Fils d'un officier de l'ancienne armée impériale, tout de suite après avoir passé son baccalauréat il s'engage dans la « Reichswehr », l'armée de la jeune république de Weimar qui, aux termes du traité de Versailles, ne devait pas compter plus de cent mille hommes, mais où, déjà, on forme activement, sous le commandement du général von Seeckt, les futurs cadres de l'énorme « Wehrmacht » qui sera l'armée de Hitler.

Discipliné et intelligent, Reinhard Gehlen se fait remarquer par ses supérieurs. Assez rapidement il devient lieutenant dans la cavalerie, puis capitaine et commandant. Il est fina-

lement admis dans la « Truppenamt » (administration des troupes), sous laquelle, baptisé d'un autre nom, se camoufle l'état-major dissous par les Alliés à la fin de la première guerre mondiale.

En 1933, quand Hitler prend le pouvoir, Gehlen qui a, comme on dit dans l'armée allemande, « le coup d'œil », fait déjà partie des quelque cinquante officiers allemands « qui comptent ».

Vient la guerre. Gehlen, officier d'état-major d'une division, est d'abord envoyé en Pologne, mais il est très rapidement rappelé pour servir auprès du général Halder, un des généraux les plus fidèles à Hitler. Plus tard encore, les Allemands ayant envahi l'Union soviétique, Reinhard Gehlen apparaît au côté du général von Leeb, dans les régions de Byalistok et de Minsk.

C'est là, sur le territoire soviétique ravagé par la guerre, que commence sa future carrière. Les chefs de l'armée allemande constatent en effet que les services de l'état-major de l'amiral Canaris, chef de l'« Abwehr », c'est-à-dire de l'espionnage et du contre-espionnage, fonctionnent assez mal. De plus, il n'a rien ou presque rien préparé pour cette forme de guerre qui consiste, par des méthodes « psychologiques », à démoraliser l'adversaire.

Reinhard Gehlen suggère alors au haut commandement allemand de créer un service spécial qui aura comme nom : « Fremde Heere Ost » (« Armées étrangères à l'Est ») et dont la tâche principale est ainsi formulée à l'époque : « Obtenir, à tout prix, des renseignements de tous ordres sur l'adversaire. Pénétrer chez l'ennemi. Saboter. »

Pendant toute la durée de la guerre, Reinhard Gehlen, avec le soutien actif de l'état-major, de Himmler et de Schellenberg, chefs des SS, perfectionne cet instrument et, de plus en plus souvent, il est amené à présenter personnellement, des rapports à Hitler.

Dans son secteur, il interroge des prisonniers soviétiques, il envoie des « collaborateurs » soviétiques de

NOUVE époque

loin



ALLEN DULLES
Un connaisseur

rière les lignes ennemies, il organise un vaste réseau d'agents qui le renseignent sur ce qui se passe en U.R.S.S.

Dans une ferme

On dit aujourd'hui, en Allemagne, que Gehlen aurait eu les pires difficultés avec l'état-major parce qu'il s'opposait au régime hitlérien. Tout semble prouver le contraire. Le 9 janvier 1945, c'est-à-dire peu avant la fin de la guerre, le général Guderian, chef des troupes blindées, se base encore sur les rapports de Gehlen admirablement documentés sur les forces soviétiques, sur leur structure, sur l'identité des officiers et aussi sur la situation économique du pays, bref, sur toute l'organisation militaire, industrielle et humaine de l'U.R.S.S. dont Gehlen, grâce à ses milliers d'agents, a acquis une connaissance approfondie.

Bon hitlérien, mais intelligent, Gehlen sent venir la défaite de l'Allemagne. Comme il est également prudent, il fait tirer en trois exemplaires tous ses documents et les fait enterrer en trois endroits différents. On ne sait jamais : ils pourront peut-être resservir. Ils ont resservi.

Lorsque les troupes américaines, marchant sur Prague, traversent la Bavière, Gehlen se cache dans une ferme des Alpes bavaroises. Il y reste quelques semaines, puis, quand il estime le moment venu, il se « fait connaître » aux Américains et leur propose sa « marchandise ». D'abord sceptiques et même hostiles, ceux-ci l'internent dans un camp. Mais, un peu plus tard, un général américain de Wiesbaden, « spécialisé » dans le renseignement, interroge longuement Gehlen et en est ébloui. Ce que détent « le docteur » apparaît aux services secrets américains (et en particulier à Allen Dulles) comme le plus extraordinaire trésor de renseignements sur l'Union soviétique.

Pratiques, les Américains n'hésitent pas longtemps : en juillet, deux mois après la fin de la guerre, ils

embarquent Gehlen, son « trésor » et quelques-uns de ses collaborateurs dans un avion spécial. En étudiant de près les documents, ils constatent que, dans le domaine des affaires soviétiques, Gehlen en sait mille fois plus qu'eux. Du coup, ils opèrent immédiatement un renversement d'alliances qui, officiellement, ne sera effectué que quelques années plus tard.

Dès 1945, ils chargent Gehlen et ses collaborateurs allemands de former, sous contrôle américain, un service spécial qui aura pour mission de « traiter et exploiter tout ce qui sert à la connaissance de l'Union soviétique ». Cet organisme siège à Francfort et il est financé par les services secrets américains.

Gehlen, toujours prudent et soucieux de préserver l'avenir, a posé ses conditions.

1) « Son » service travaillera sous son autorité directe et sera purement allemand ;

2) Aucun de ses hommes ne fera quoi que ce soit qui serait « contraire aux intérêts allemands » ;

3) Jusqu'à la formation d'un gouvernement allemand, lui, Gehlen, se considérerait comme « gérant des intérêts allemands ».

Les Américains, vainqueurs et sûrs d'eux, acceptent. Peut-être pensent-ils : « On verra bien... » On a vu en effet : l'organisation Gehlen s'est, depuis la fin de la guerre, développée de façon assez extraordinaire. Petit à petit, à la faveur de l'évolution politique, les services de Gehlen sont devenus une organisation germano-américaine.

Les Américains, certes, y jouent un rôle prépondérant. Ils ont plus de moyens financiers et techniques et aussi, dans certains pays, plus de « relations » que les Allemands. Mais un « service spécial », indépendant des services secrets américains (dont plus encore du gouvernement de Washington que ceux-ci tiennent à l'écart), est chargé de « défendre les intérêts spécifiquement allemands ».

De là vient que les Américains

→ redoutent le départ de Gehlen, qui provoquerait une germanisation encore plus poussée du service. Cette évolution était d'ailleurs prévisible : à peine les Américains avaient-ils récupéré Gehlen que M. Adenauer le recevait personnellement à plusieurs reprises, pour obtenir des renseignements, bien sûr, mais aussi pour lui conseiller une certaine « prudence » à l'égard des Américains.

Klaus

Ce qui est remarquable dans l'organisation Gehlen, c'est qu'elle ne fait pas seulement du renseignement classique, comme en font tous les pays, c'est qu'elle comporte une section spéciale, la « Tiefenforschung » (exploration en profondeur). Une très nombreuse équipe d'économistes, de techniciens de toutes sortes et même de sociologues, étudie et prépare de façon scientifique le terrain sur lequel seront envoyés les « V-men ». En font partie presque tous les « spécialistes » qui, du temps de Hitler et de la guerre, avaient déjà pratiqué ce genre d'études. Bien sûr, les méthodes ont changé et, aux côtés de ces nazis, il semble même qu'on trouve aujourd'hui quelques participants à la révolte des généraux du 20 juillet 1944.

Malgré cela, la direction reste nazie de cœur et il est inquiétant de voir que l'organisation ne tient aucun compte de la « détente » souhaitée par le gouvernement avec les pays de l'Est et reste très agressive.

Il est possible que l'on exagère pour des raisons politiques l'importance de l'organisation Gehlen, mais les « spécialistes » américains confirment qu'elle est la plus « efficace » d'Europe. Exemple le plus récent : Gehlen avait réussi à faire passer en Allemagne de l'Est un de ses meilleurs agents qui avait pour mission de prendre « contact » avec des officiers de la mission soviétique militaire à Pankov. « Klaus », l'homme de Gehlen, a été finalement arrêté à Berlin-Est : mais avant d'être pris, il avait réussi à établir un état très précis des divisions soviétiques en Allemagne. Actuellement, les services secrets américains cherchent à négocier sa libération en échange de celle d'un agent soviétique réputé « accidenté » il y a quelques années...

Si, pour le renseignement dans les pays communistes, la collaboration entre l'organisation Gehlen et les services secrets américains est extrêmement étroite, il n'en est pas de même pour le « travail » dans d'autres pays. L'organisation Gehlen vole maintenant de ses propres ailes. Elle a réussi à prendre pied un peu partout dans le monde, et essentiellement dans les pays arabes. Ses meilleurs agents dans le Proche-Orient sont d'anciens nazis qui, pendant la guerre, y avaient pris des « contacts », pour prôner, au nom du Troisième Reich, la lutte contre l'impérialisme britannique.

GERARD SANDOZ



Fait divers

Le gang des « B.D. »

* A défaut de draguer les greniers, on peut aussi fracturer les portes des collectionneurs

C'est toujours autant de gain pour les serruriers, le printemps 1967 connaît ses « nouveaux » cambrioleurs. Une nouvelle mode vient d'être lancée parmi les petits truands : le vol de bandes dessinées. Première tentative, une prise forcée au pied-de-biche, et premier succès, l'après-midi du 31 mars : quelques hommes ont cambriolé Claude Beylle, l'un des fondateurs du club des Bandes dessinées et kidnappé quelques centaines de « Robinson », « Hurrah », « L'Aventureux », « Donald » et autres trésors, luxueusement reliés dans une douzaine d'albums. La prise était bonne, il y en avait là pour près de deux millions anciens.

Depuis, les amateurs tremblent et

se méfient. Noblesse oblige. Les bandes dessinées sont reconnues valeurs sûres. Leurs collections cotent parfois deux, cinq ou sept millions à l'Argus des B. D. Alors on fait doubler les serrures des appartements et renforcer la porte du Club, rue Gager-Cabillot, à la fois sanctuaire rempli de trésors imprimés et siège de cette association à l'appellation magnifiquement contrôlée : Cercle d'études des Littératures d'expression graphique (C.E.L.E.G.).

Perles fines

Les voleurs ont donc pris le pas sur quelques doux paranomaques. L'irruption de la cambriole dans ce

petit monde, où la nostalgie de l'enfance compte beaucoup, a provoqué de violentes colères. Le conseil d'administration du C.E.L.E.G. a prié ses 1 500 adhérents de s'opposer à la revente éventuelle des collections volées et à leur recel. Et son président, Jean Lacassin, a fort mal pris la chose : « Voici déjà un certain temps que je suis écœuré, dit-il, par le milieu de collectionneurs de bandes dessinées grâce auxquels les proportions d'imbéciles heureux, de complexes sexuels, de névrosés, de doux paranoïaques, d'avarés, d'algrés et d'intrigants a augmenté de 90 % dans mes relations. A cette liste d'épithètes, j'ajouterai désormais celle de voleurs. »

Car c'est bien d'une opération « bandes dessinées » qu'il s'agit. Les cambrioleurs de « Robinson », « Hurrah » et « Donald » ont négligé chez Claude Beylie un collier de perles fines qu'ils n'ont pas pu ne pas voir et un coffret à bijoux bien en évidence sur une cheminée. Ils ont simplement renversé une pile de linge et pris quelques milliers d'anciens francs pour donner le change.

La première victime de ce petit gang des bandes dessinées hésitait un peu à se rendre chez les policiers. Le club a beau compter un commissaire parmi ses adeptes, on ne savait encore si le vol des « Robinson » allait être pris au sérieux dans les brigades territoriales parisiennes. Aujourd'hui on le sait. Les inspecteurs de la P.J. ont soigneusement noté la liste des albums

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 17

ORIG : RICHARD HELMS
 UNIT : DIRECTOR
 EXT : 6461
 DATE : 19 APRIL 1967

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

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(CLASSIFICATION)

(DATE AND TIME FILED)

(REFERENCE NUMBER)

(PICA)

SECRET

19 20 47 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

94007

TO PRIORITY MUNICH INFO BONN

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR UTILITY FROM ☐ ☐

"PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES AT THE DEATH OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER,
 THAT TRULY GREAT LEADER WHOSE SERVICES TO FREEDOM IN ESTABLISHING A SOUND
 DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY WON THE RESPECT AND ADMIRATION OF THE WORLD."

(END OF MESSAGE)

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 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

GEHLEN 701

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER
 RICHARD HELMS, DCI

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SECRET 210826Z CITE C = (5541)
 DIRECTOR, BONN, MUNICH

21 APR 67 IN 50168

CATUSE

IN ADDITION TO ANY EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY BY COS GERMANY
 AND DIRECTOR^W WOULD APPRECIATE ☐ PASSING FOLLOWING MSG
 TO UTILITY:

"SINCERE^N CONDOLENCES ON THIS GREAT LOSS TO GERMANY
 AND THE FREE WORLD. C = ;"

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

21 apr 67

SECRET

25 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Contact with @DESSAU on 25 April 1967

1. @DESSAU called and said that when he was with the "Doktor" last Wednesday (19 April) for a two and one half hour discussion, the "Doktor" had asked him to go to the DCI and pass along certain messages. @DESSAU said that the "Doktor" had cast his messages in such personal terms that he (@DESSAU) felt obligated to approach the DCI directly. @DESSAU said that he did not want to do so, however, without first letting me know that he planned to do so. He said that of course he would fully inform me of the content of the messages at our luncheon on Thursday but he indicated his feeling that he should first pass the messages to the DCI. He said the messages concern the DCI's invitation to General Gehlen to visit the United States and also certain matters regarding the further development of the BND and its relationship to the Chancellor's office.

2. @DESSAU said that, in view of his own long personal relationship to the DCI, he planned to simply call him at home this evening and determine his desires as to how he (@DESSAU) might best pass the messages on.

3. We chatted briefly about the television coverage of Chancellor Adenauer's funeral and @DESSAU said that he had watched it until shortly after 10:00 when he had left to attend the services in St. Matthew's in honor of the dead Chancellor. @DESSAU noted that he had run across ☐ at the Church.

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DATE 2005

C/E/G/CE

4 After checking with C/EOI about the DCI's office, I advised @DESSAU to call the DCI's office on the morning of 26 April in order to arrange an appointment.

SECRET

Gehlen 201

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief of Station, Germany		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	✓ Chief, EUR		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief []		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Article on General Reinhard GEHLEN		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REF: OFPT-12950, 17 April 67 [] E/GIR CE/MAB			
<p>1. The French left-wing weekly <u>Le Nouvel Observateur</u> in its issue No. 126 of 12-18 April 1967 carried an article on General Reinhard GEHLEN entitled "L'Espion qui Vient de Loin". The article makes much of American support of General GEHLEN and of the fact that the management of his organization remains Nazi at heart.</p> <p>2. On 24 April [] a sensitive contact of [] stated that the author of this article, who signed himself Gerard Sandoz, was in reality a member of Agence France Presse on duty in Germany. [] did not want to provide the actual name but he wanted to make the point that he found it very odd that a member of a French government-supported news agency should be allowed to write against an organization with which the French Services maintain official liaison. (Comment: Although it is usually taken for granted that AFP is controlled by the French government, the situation is a little more complex than that. Dating from a statute of 1957, AFP is administered by a council on which sit representatives of the government, the newspapers, the journalistic organizations, and the French Office of Radio and Television — ORTF. However, it is generally estimated that two-thirds of the budget of AFP comes from the government.)</p>			
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>			
<p>Distribution: 3 - COS/Germany 3 - Chief/EUR</p>			
DISPATCH REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	OFPT-13006	26 April 1967	
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	S-E-C-R-E-T		

ORIG: L
UNIT: C/EUR
EXT: 5881
DATE: 28 April 1967

MESSAGE FORM
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CONF: EUR 8 ☐ RID COPY

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CSDO, CS/RP, CI, CILOPS FI, FLINT

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(date and time filed)

97393

(reference number)

(pic)

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CITE DIRECTOR

97393

TO MUNICH INFO BONN

CATUSK

CE/MAB

1. AFTERNOON 28 APRIL ALIAS DESSAU GAVE L

] REPORT ON HIS TRIP AND REFERRED FOLLOWING POINTS

AS SPECIFIC MESSAGES FROM UTILITY:

A. NEW GOVERNMENT MAKING GREATER DEMANDS

ON CATUSK THAN PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT DID.

B. CHANCELLOR HAS ASKED UTILITY REMAIN IN

OFFICE UNTIL 31 MAR. 68.

C. QUESTION OF SUCCESSION MUCH ON UTILITY'S

MIND BUT NO DECISION MADE AS YET WHETHER TO BRING

IN OUTSIDER OR SELECT FROM WITHIN. ALIAS HOLM AND

WESSEL REMAIN FAVORED INSIDERS.

D. WHILE CATUSK NOW REPORTING TO STATE

SECRETARY KNEIPER IN TRADITIONAL CHANNELS, THERE

IS POWER STRUGGLE GOING ON WITHIN CHANCELLOR'S

Schlen 201

(CONTINUED)

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPT FROM 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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(reference number)

(pica)

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CITE DIRECTOR

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TO: PAGE TWO

OFFICE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS FOR CONTROL OF CATUSK.

MAJOR PROTAGONISTS APPEAR TO BE BACHMANN ON THE

ONE SIDE AND BARON ZU GUTTENBERG WHO APPEARS TO

BE NOT FULLY OCCUPIED, ON THE OTHER.

E. VIEW ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES UTILITY ~~UNABLE~~ ^{WILLING}

TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON AT PRESENT TIME. HE STILL

DESIRES VERY MUCH MAKE TRIP HOWEVER AND WILL

ADVISE [] AS SOON AS SITUATION STABLE ENOUGH

TO ALLOW HIM DO SO.

F. UTILITY HAS ASKED DESSAU STAY ON IN

WASHINGTON AND EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT FACT THAT

IN TIME OF PERSONNEL CHANGES TWO KNOWLEDGEABLE

OLD-TIMERS LIKE [] AND DESSAU REPRESENT

RESPECTIVE SERVICES.

2. [] ASKED DESSAU CABLE HIS APPRECIATION TO UTILITY

(CONTINUED)

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(date and time filed)

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(picol)

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CITE DIRECTOR

97393

PAGE THREE

FOR THIS REPORT AND EXPRESS UNDERSTANDING HIS RELUCTANCE
TRAVEL AT JUST THIS TIME. [] ASKED THAT UTILITY BE ASSURED
TIMING OUR INVITATION FLEXIBLE AND WE MOST HAPPY SEE HIM HERE
WHENEVER HIS SCHEDULE BECOMES LESS DEMANDING ~~SO AS TO PERMIT~~

~~TRAVEL~~

END OF MESSAGE

ADDP

DCI

VC/EUR

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET 031541Z CITE MUNICH 9496

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

3 MAR 67 59074

ATTENTION: C

CATSK

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR C FROM UTILITY:

"I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR CONDOLENCES ON OCCASION OF THE DEATH OF OUR FIRST CHANCELLOR. SINCERELY YOURS."

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Guthrie 201

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SECRET 171606Z CITE MUNICH 9617 **E**
 BERLIN INFO BONN, DIRECTOR
 CATUSK

CE/MAR JW
22
MAR

AL I O N

17 MAY 1967 223

1. ON 17 MAY ALIAS REICHLIN SAID HE PLANNING REPLACE HIS
 BERLIN REPRESENTATIVE SUMMER 67. HE ASKED THAT ☐ ☐
 VISIT HIM MUNICH PREFERABLY WITH WIFE DURING MAY OR JUNE
 ORDER MEET NEW REP AND ESTABLISH SOLID RELATIONSHIP. REICHLIN
 HIMSELF PLANS VISIT BERLIN LATER THIS YEAR WHEN NEW REP ES-
 TABLISHED. REQUEST ☐ ☐ REACTION INCLUDING DATES WHEN
 MIGHT BE AVAILABLE COME MUNICH. REICHLIN SUGGESTED FRIDAY
 EVENING SOCIAL AFFAIR WITH WEDNESDAY SECOND CHOICE, AND HE IS
 OBVIOUSLY QUITE ANXIOUS THAT ☐ ☐ ACCEPT.

17 MAY 1967

2. REICHLIN CLAIMS NO INSIDE INFO ON UTILITY'S SUCCESSOR
 BUT THINKS WESSEL HAS BEST CHANCE OF KNOWN CANDIDATES WITH HOLM
 HAVE VERY POOR CHANCE. HOWEVER HE WOULD EXPECT A POLITICIAN TO FILL
 JOB IF ONE CAN BE FOUND.

3. REICHLIN SEES NO HOPE OF OUR GETTING BETTER SOURCING
 DESCRIPTIONS HIS AGENTS UNTIL UTILITY LEAVES, IF THEN. HE THEREFORE
 RESIGNED TO MORE OR LESS PRO FORMA OPERATIONAL LIAISON
 WITH US FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ACCORDING HIM, OUR

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 9617 SECRET

"EFFORTS GET BETTER SOURCING INFORMATION WILL BE OBSTRUCTED BY STONE WALL OF OLD-TIME OFFICERS WHO ARE HIGHLY SENSITIVE RE THEIR FORMER SUBSERVIENT ROLE WOFAC AND INSIST MAINTAIN NEW-FOUND INDEPENDENCE EVEN IF UNPRODUCTIVE.

4. HE IS CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE STORES VALUABLE INFORMATION ON SOVIET UNION AND EAST BLOC WHICH WE HOLD OUT FROM CATUSK AND WILL CONTINUE DO UNTIL BASIC RELATIONSHIP CHANGES FUNDAMENTALLY WHICH NOT ABOUT TO HAPPEN UNDER PRESENT CATUSK ADMINISTRATION. HE REGARDS CITY PLANS AND PHOTOS WE RECENTLY GAVE HIM ONLY POLITE CONCESSION TO KEEP UP APPEARANCES CLOSE LIAISON.

5. HE HOPES WE WILL SANCTION CLOSER CATUSK OPS TIES WITH U.S.A.F. ON SANDT CONFERENCES.

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S E C R E T TELF UCH

DISP NO - EGMW-~~15445~~

FILE NO - NON

DATE - 23 MAY 1967

TO - CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE

INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

FROM - CHIEF, EUR

SUBJ - CATUSK

UTILITY TENURE AND SUCCESSION

ACTION - NON

REFS - EGMA-70218

MUNICH 9617

1. REFERENCES CALL TO MIND NEED FOR CAUTION IN DISCUSSIONS UTILITY'S TENURE OR SUCCESSOR WITH MEMBERS OF CATUSK. ASIDE FROM FACT WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL ON THIS SUBJECT ABOUT WHICH WE ARE NOT ALREADY INFORMED VIA VARIOUS CHANNELS, WHICH REALLY MAKES INITIATION OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS POINTLESS, WE FEEL IT INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT IN TIME FOR MEMBERS OF MLB TO RAISE SUCH MATTER FROM STANDPOINT OF PROPRIETY. INDEED, MLB MEMBERS SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE DRAWN INTO PROTRACTED DISCUSSIONS THESE QUESTIONS LEST WE THEREBY GENERATE IMPRESSION WOFAC HAS AN OFFICIAL VIEW ON THIS QUESTION.

2. OBVIOUSLY, INFO VOLUNTEERED BY MEMBERS OF CATUSK WHICH SHEDS NEW LIGHT ON THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE REPORTED BUT DISCUSSIONS CITED REFS DO NOT ADD TO OUR KNOWLEDGE AND MAY WELL BE SUBJECT MISINTERPRETATION WITHIN CATUSK.

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S E C R E T EGMW-~~15445~~

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DATE 2005

SECRET

24 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Spiegel Article re Gehlen's Successor

1. In the course of a telephone conversation with [] [] this date, he revealed that the BND anticipates the current issue of the Spiegel due to appear 25 July will carry an article speculating on the possible successor to General Gehlen. [] [] evidently had received a message from his headquarters to this effect which further indicated that the BND had played no role in inspiring the article and had only learned about it at the last minute but was evidently able to influence the Spiegel to make some modifications of the article largely apparently in matters of fact (presumably regarding Gehlen's background or the history of the BND).

2. [] [] was also instructed to advise General Wessel of the impending article and ascertained that Wessel was also unaware that such an article was planned. [] [] feels it was certainly not inspired by Wessel; the implication, although unstated, is that the article lists Wessel as the likely successor.

[] []
DC/EUR

cy AC/E/G

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DIRECTOR INFO BONN

CATUSK ☐ ☐

REF: MUNICH 0107 (IN 11961)

IP
26 JUL 67 IN 19259

AN <i>11/11</i>	E/G/C
PS <i>11/11</i>	9099
ABSTRACT	INDEX

1. WISH CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO ARTICLE PAGE 26
"DER SPIEGEL" NO 31 DATED 24 JULY TENOR OF WHICH
ALMOST IDENTICAL WITH STATEMENTS BY ALIAS BERNHARDT
REPORTED REF, RE POSSIBILITY GEN WESSEL TAKING OVER BND.

2. IN CONTRAST TO TENOR OF FINALITY AS VOICED
BY BERNHARDT AND SPIEGEL ALIAS REICHLIN STATED TO
☐ 20 JULY THAT QUESTION OF SUCCESSION FAR FROM
DECIDED. STATED ALL REPORTS RE UTILITY SUCCESSION
SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM AT THIS STAGE.

MICROFILMED
AUG 8 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

BT

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

B E

26 July 67

2191- (ROD) RE MAE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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1. COUNTRY: WEST GERMANY 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 834 0178 67

2. SUBJECT: (U) The Gehlen Organization- Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) 9. DATE OF REPORT: 26 Jul 67

3. ISC NUMBER: 10. NO. OF PAGES: Two 11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6A IR 2 834 0250 63

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Jul 67

12. ORIGINATOR: DAU BND GERMANY

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Bonn, Jul 67

13. PREPARED BY: F.G. STEPHENSON, LTC, GS, ARMA

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: ROBERT W. SCHAFER COLONEL, GS DEFENSE ATTACHE

7. SOURCE: Der Spiegel, Press DAO Files

REC'D CD-3 7 AUG 1967

15. SUMMARY: (U) Report forwards summary of recent information concerning the successor to General Reinhard Gehlen (Ret), Chief of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) who is scheduled for retirement in April 1968.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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1. (U) General Reinhard Gehlen (Ret), Chief of the BND since its formation in 1956, was scheduled for retirement in April of this year (1967). However, due to various reasons resulting in inability to agree on his successor, he was extended on active service until April 1968. An article appearing in the 24 Jul 67 issue of Der Spiegel discusses his retirement and names Lt Gen Gerhard Wessel, currently serving as German Representative on the NATO Military Committee in Washington, as his most likely successor. The article discusses the relationship between Wessel and Gehlen during WWII and afterward points to Wessel's role during both periods as making him highly qualified for the job.

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O-643

operation was as a basis primarily Geisen's past refusal to allow SPD delegates to "look into" his organization and operation. The SPD reportedly is backing Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, German Ambassador for Disarmament and Arms Control, as Gehlen's replacement.

FIELD COORDINATION: None.

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 DIRECTOR INFO BONN

CATUSK

REF: A. MUNICH 0107 (2/1961)

B. MUNICH 0212 (2/19259)

28 JUL 67 IN 21092

1. AT FAREWELL GATHERING FOR L ON 28 JULY, ALIAS WENDT, FORMERLY ALIAS HOLM, SAID HE HAD ATTENDED A MEETING AT BUNDESKANZIERAMT ON 26 JULY DURING WHICH STATE SECRETARY KNIEPER STATED FLATLY THAT CHANCELLOR KIESINGER HAS NOT YET SELECTED SUCCESSOR TO GEN GEHLEN AS PRESIDENT BND, AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT DO SO UNTIL LATER IN FALL OR TOWRD END OF YEAR: HOWEVER, CHANGE NEXT YEAR IS DEFINITELY IN PROSPECT. WENDT SAID THAT OF COURSE GEN WESSEL WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT SOLUTION TO THE LEADERSHIP PROBLEM, BUT HAS AT LEAST NOT YET BEEN TABBED FOR JOB.

2. ACCORDING WENDT, RECENT RASH NEWSPAPER ARTICLES RE GEHLEN'S POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR BASED ON PURE SPECULATION. HE BEMOANED FACT THAT ISSUE BEING PUBLICLY DISCUSSED, AND REFERRED FONDLY TO BRITISH SYSTEM WHERE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF IS NOT KNOWN TO PUBLIC

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28 July 67

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3. NOTE THAT ABOVE ACCORDS WITH ALIAS REICHMAN'S STATEMENT
AUG 9 3 58 PM '57
REF B.

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4. IN ASSESSING ABOVE, INTERESTING NOTE THAT WENDT HIMSELF IS CANDIDATE FOR TOP JOB AND REICHLIN IS IN HIS CAMP. ON 20 JULY REICHLIN SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD MUCH PREFER WENDT OVER WESSEL FOR JOB BECAUSE WENDT VERY FAMILIAR CURRENT BND PROBLEMS WHILE WESSEL LONG SEPARATED FROM THEM. REICHLIN CONCEDED, HOWEVER, THAT WESSEL EXTREMELY GOOD MAN WHO WOULD PROBABLY LEARN FAST. HE PRESUMES WENDT'S CHANCES ARE SLIMMER THAN WESSEL'S BECAUSE OF BONN'S DESIRE TO SWEEP WITH AT LEAST RELATIVELY NEW BROOM IF BRAND NEW BROOM CANNOT BE FOUND.

S E C R E T

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SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - EGMA-69933
FILE NO - 32W-002-041/1
DATE - 4 AUGUST 1967
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FILM - NONE
TO - CHIEF, EUR CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH
SUBJECT - CATUSK
REPORT OF MEETING WITH UTILITY
ACTION - NONE
REFS - NONE

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1. ON THE MORNING OF 1 AUGUST 1967, []
HAD HIS FIRST MEETING WITH UTILITY IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE.
ALIAS WENDT /FORMERLY ALIAS HOLM/ AND ALIAS ROENDORF WERE
ALSO PRESENT. UTILITY HAD COME IN FROM HIS VACATION TO MAKE
THE MEETING, AND EXTENDED A MOST HEARTY WELCOME ON THE
REASSIGNMENT OF THE WRITER TO MUNICH AND TO LIAISON WITH
HIS OFFICE. UTILITY DECLARED THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE
FOR CONSULTATION AT ALL TIMES, EITHER IN HIS OFFICE OR AT
HIS HOME ON LAKE STARNBERG.

2. [] PRESENTED GREETINGS FROM []
WHO ONCE AGAIN EXTENDED A CORDIAL INVITATION FOR A UTILITY
VISIT TO HEADQUARTERS WHENEVER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.
IT WAS POINTED OUT TO UTILITY THAT [] FULLY UNDERSTOOD
THE DIFFICULTY INVOLVED FOR UTILITY TO MAKE SUCH A VISIT.
THIS STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING WAS WELL RECEIVED BY UTILITY,
WHO DECLARED THAT NOW THE ONLY OBSTACLE STANDING IN THE WAY
WAS THE QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION TO HIS POSITION. AS SOON
AS IT WILL HAVE BEEN SETTLED BY THE BONN GOVERNMENT, HE HOPES

SECRET EGMA-69933 PAGE 1

1 ATT.

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DATE 2005

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TO BE ABLE TO PACK HIS BAGS AND TAKE OFF TO WASHINGTON.

3. UTILITY WAS PRESENTED WITH A GIFT FROM VIET NAM WHICH CONSISTED OF THREE FRAMED MAPS OF THAT AREA, PLUS AN INDOCHINA MAP FOLIO PUBLISHED BY WOROMP. AS AN EX-G2, IN ADDITION TO HIS CURRENT POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF CATUSK, IT WAS EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD BE APPRECIATIVE OF SUCH A TOKEN GIFT FROM THE FAR EAST. HE WAS. ON THIS SCORE, HE EXPRESSED A HOPE THAT THE WRITER COULD GIVE HIM AN INFORMAL BRIEFING ON THAT AREA BASED UPON THE WRITER'S RECENT TOURS OF DUTY THERE. [] ALLOWED HE WAS WILLING TO DO SO, BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE FAST-MOVING EVENTS IN THAT AREA MAKE HIS KNOWLEDGE ALREADY SOMEWHAT OBSOLETE, NEVERTHELESS, HE AGREED TO DO SO. THIS LED UTILITY TO DECLARE THAT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM LEAVE IN SEPTEMBER HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A TOUR D' HORIZON WITH THE WRITER. IN MAKING THIS REQUEST UTILITY STATED THAT HE FELT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN GUILTY OF SOME MISTAKES RECENTLY IN THE HANDLING OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

[] OFFERED NO COMMENT.

4. UTILITY BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF SUCCESSION DURING WHICH HE SIGNIFICANTLY AND FORCEFULLY STATED THAT HIS CANDIDATE, AND THE ONE MAN IN GERMANY MOST SUITED TO SUCCEED HIM, WAS IDENTITY A. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT ALIAS WENDT, WHO WAS PRESENT, WAS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE AND ONE WHO UTILITY FELT WAS ACCEPTABLE, BUT ONLY IF IDENTITY A WAS NOT AVAILABLE OR WAS FOR SOME REASON UNACCEPTABLE TO THE BONN GOVERNMENT. ALIAS WENDT NODDED HIS HEAD IN ACQUIESCENCE WITH NO APPARENT SHOW OF DISAPPOINTMENT. UTILITY POINTED OUT THAT THE RECENT ARTICLE IN IDENTITY B, IN HIS OPINION, WAS DONE TO DENIGRATE IDENTITY A BY TARRING HIM WITH THE SAME MILITARY BRUSH THAT IDENTITY B HAS SO OFTEN WIELDED ON UTILITY HIMSELF AND CATUSK

AS A WHOLE. AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS SO-CALLED IDENTITY B SLANT, HE ALLUDED TO THE STATEMENT IN THE ARTICLE WHICH PICTURED IDENTITY A AS A STRONG ROMAN CATHOLIC WHEN IN FACT HE IS A STAUCH MEMBER OF THE EVANGELISCHE CHURCH. IN UTILITY'S JAUNDICED VIEW OF IDENTITY B AND ITS WRITINGS ON CATUSK, THE RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION CHARGE WAS MEANT TO STIR UP OPPOSITION TO IDENTITY A AMONG CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE IDENTITY C. UTILITY DECLARED THAT, LIKE WOFAC, HE STRONGLY BELIEVED IN THE FRONT OFFICE MAKEUP ON THE SAME TERMS, WHEREBY THE TOP TWO IN THE ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE EITHER TWO CIVILIANS, OR ONE CIVILIAN AND ONE MILITARY, BUT NEVER TWO MILITARY. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT IN HISTORY, HE FELT STRONGLY THAT, ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIRST SUCCESSION TO THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF CATUSK, CANDIDATES FROM CATUSK ITSELF SHOULD NOT IN FACT BE REGARDED AS MILITARY CANDIDATES PER SE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF ALIAS WENDT, ALTHOUGH HE CARRIES THE RANK OF MAJOR GENERAL HE IS IN FACT THE EQUIVALENT OF A CAREER CIVILIAN STAFF EMPLOYEE OF CATUSK. AS A MATTER OF FACT, UTILITY POINTED OUT, ALL OF THE OLD-TIMERS, INCLUDING HIMSELF, REGARDLESS OF WHAT MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE RANK THEY MAY HOLD, SHOULD IN FACT BE REGARDED AS CIVILIANS BY VIRTUE OF THEIR CATUSK SERVICE, BOTH OFFICIALLY AND UNOFFICIALLY, FROM 1946 TO 1967. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME, THEY HAVE BEEN LIVING AND WORKING AS CIVILIANS MUCH LONGER THAN AS PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS, UP TO AND INCLUDING THEIR WARTIME ACTIVITIES. IN OTHER WORDS WERE IDENTITY A /WHO CAN BE CONSIDERED A PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER MORE THAN AN INTELLIGENCE CIVILIAN/ APPROVED AS PRESIDENT, THEN ALIAS WENDT, DESPITE CARRYING THE RANK OF MAJOR GENERAL, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ELIGIBLE FOR THE POSITION OF VICE PRESIDENT. UTILITY STATED THAT THIS LINE OF REASONING HAS BEEN ACCEPTED

BY CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED PERSONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. HE FOLLOWED THIS BY STATING THAT HE MIGHT REQUEST WOFAC TO SOLICIT SUPPORT FOR THIS VIEW WITH THE OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR BY OUR AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE. HE WAS NOT ASKING THAT THIS ACTUALLY BE DONE AT THIS TIME, BUT THAT POSSIBLY IN THE COURSE OF COMING EVENTS SUCH A REQUEST MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING. [] POINTED OUT THAT HE COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENTS ON THIS AT THIS TIME, BUT THAT THE GERMAN STATION WOULD HANDLE SUCH A REQUEST IN WHATEVER MANNER MIGHT BE ADVISABLE IN THE FUTURE. UTILITY UNDERSTOOD.

5. UTILITY TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REFER TO THE RECENT REQUEST FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON GENERAL ALBERT SCHNEZ [] ALIAS WENDT MADE REFERENCE TO THE ALLEGED NAZI PARTY AFFILIATION OF SCHNEZ AND WENT ON THE RECORD AS KNOWING SCHNEZ AS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND FOR THIRTY YEARS WHO HAD NO CLOSE TIES WITH THE NAZI MOVEMENT AND WHO CERTAINLY WAS NOT THE RECIPIENT⁰ OF ANY SPECIAL DECORATION BY THE NAZI PARTY. UTILITY HEARTILY ENDORSED ALIAS WENDT'S RECOMMENDATION OF SCHNEZ AND ADDED THAT CATUSK HAD A PERSONAL INTEREST IN SEEING SCHNEZ'S CONTEMPLATED APPOINTMENT GO THROUGH AS LEADER OF NATO CENTRAL FORCES. IF APPROVED, THIS APPOINTMENT WOULD THEREBY ELIMINATE ONE OF THE POSSIBLE HINDRANCES TO THE SELECTION OF IDENTITY A FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF CATUSK. IN OTHER WORDS, IF SCHNEZ WERE DENIED THE NATO SLOT, IDENTITY A MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO IT AND THEREFORE BE UNAVAILABLE FOR THE HEAD OF CATUSK.

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6. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, UTILITY ONCE AGAIN REITERATED THE OPEN DOOR POLICY FOR THE HEAD OF WOFAC LIAISON GROUP IN MUNICH AND EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO HAVE FREQUENT MEETINGS ON A PERSONAL BASIS AS WELL AS THE RESUMPTION, IN HIS WORDS, OF FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF HIS STAFF AND THOSE OF MUNICH BASE AND THE GERMAN STATION.

ATTACHMENT IDENTITY LIST/USC/INP VIA 'TP'
DIST VIA 'TP'

2 - EUROPE W/ATT USC/INP

2 - GERMANY W/ATT USC/INP

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IDENTITY LIST

IDENTITY A	-	GENERAL GERHARD WESSEL
IDENTITY B	-	DER SPIEGEL MAGAZINE
IDENTITY C	-	SPD

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SECRET 091151Z CITE BONN 0135
 DIRECTOR, MUNICH INFO BERLIN, FRANKFURT, HAMBURG
 CATUSK

IP IN 9 AUG 67 28440

AM/17/12	E/G/CE
4094	INDEX
ABSTRACT	

IN CONVERSATION WITH ☐ ON 2 AUG ADMIRAL POSER COMMENTED ON UTILITY SUCCESSION. SAID HE WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED BUT CONSIDERED HE HAD NO CHANCE AT SUCCESSION HIMSELF BECAUSE OF HIS KNOWN CONVICTION THAT CATUSK NEEDED REORGANIZATION AND TIGHTER CONTROL. AS OF NOW CHANCELLOR PLANS TO SELECT GENERAL WESSEL FOR POSITION NEXT SPRING BUT DECISION NOT FINAL AND THERE MUCH AGITATION AMONG POLITICAL GROUPS, ESPECIALLY SPD, FAVORING CIVILIAN CANDIDATE. AT PRESENT NO SUITABLE CIVILIAN CANDIDATE AVAILABLE. AMB. SCHNIPPEN-KOETTER IS STRONGEST CIVILIAN CANDIDATE MENTIONED AND MANY PEOPLE INCLUDING POSER THINK HE WILL BE DISASTER. THEREFORE UNLESS SOMEONE STILL COMES UP WITH BETTER POSSIBILITY, WESSEL ALMOST CERTAIN TO GET APPOINTMENT.

9 Aug 15
 Recklinghausen
 W.Ger. Amb. to Disarm.
 Council

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9 Aug 67

9 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Gerhardt Wessel

1. This memorandum is for your information.

2. A fortnight ago the Spiegel broke the story that Wessel would probably replace Gehlen as Chief of the BND. More recently both Wessel and Herre have indicated that the assignment of Wessel may be closer to a decision than reflected in the Spiegel story. On 7 August 1967, I met with Herre to give him a routine briefing on the Middle East situation; because he brought Wessel with him, I changed the briefing into a broader introduction to the intelligence problems of the area and the importance of the Middle East and the growing Soviet threat to European interests in the Middle East. At the end of the briefing Wessel discussed his own future. Chancellor Kiesinger has sent word that he desires to meet with Wessel during his visit here next week. Wessel appears reasonably certain that the Chancellor wants to talk about the BND assignment. Before the Chancellor arrives Wessel would like to formulate his own thoughts on the role of the head of the BND, the relationship with the Chancellor and other elements of the Bonn Government. He posed questions about the following:

Position of the President of the BND

To whom is the DCI responsible? Who appoints him? Is it a Presidential appointment? Is it subject to legislative confirmation? By the Senate or a smaller group?

Funding

How is CIA funded? Is the budget public? How is the budget presented to Congress? Does any outside agency review the allocation and expenditure of funds? Are operational expenditures concealed? How are funds transferred?

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DATE 2005

Hiring and Firing

Does the DCI have a clear authority to take on new employees and to separate those that he believes are no longer useful? Does the DCI have authority in the personnel field that is provided by law? Are his actions in personnel matters subject to an outside review? By whom?

The Function of the DCI as an Intelligence Advisor to the President

How does CIA report intelligence to the President, the principal Cabinet officers, Departments and Agencies? Does the DCI submit identifiable CIA items directly to the President? How is this handled procedurally? Does the DCI have representation in the White House?

Relationships with the Political Parties

Does the DCI make an effort to maintain contact with the leadership of the opposition party as well as the party in power? How is this done? Is intelligence made available to the opposition party?

3. It must be remembered that Wessel has not been active within the BND Headquarters for fifteen years and has been separated from the Federal Republic Defense Ministry intelligence activities for more than five. On the other hand, his experience in Paris in the early 'fifties, his experience in Bonn, command duty and the exposure to the larger world of the NATO Standing Group in Washington have given him a perspective that will probably serve him better than prolonged duty within the BND Headquarters in Munich. Wessel has not made an effort to stay abreast of BND bureaucratic arrangements with the Federal Republic. Therefore, we cannot assume that he has thus far been a beneficiary of the exposure in some depth that CIA has been giving to senior officials who have remained in the BND or to that given Dr. Hertl, the President of the Bundesrechnungshof (the closest thing to a Bureau of the Budget that the Federal Republic has) at the time that the official relationship of the BND with Bonn was worked out.

4. I suggested to Wessel that a few minutes of conversation with you would provide the most useful answers to the questions he raised. I proposed that he consider holding such a conversation with you. (Dinner at Wessel's on 11 August 1967 might provide an occasion.)

5. I touched briefly on the basic legislation (copies of which the END has in both English and German), the special committees in Congress which provide the legislative relationship, the absence of any structured arrangement with the "out party" that was in any way comparable to Gehlen's liaison with the SPD dating back to September 1950, the practice of the President offering intelligence briefings to the opposition nominee during Presidential election campaigns, the general pattern of the DCI's position in providing intelligence directly to the President and White House staff, the evolutionary character of all but the legislated basis of the DCI position etc.

6. Beyond this, it was agreed that if and when a firm decision was reached on his appointment as Gehlen's successor, the Clandestine Services would set up a series of briefings in some depth on matters of interest to him.

7. [] , Deputy Chief of the European Division, was present at the briefing and this conversation; I am preparing this memorandum at his suggestion since the exchange was primarily between Wessel and me; [] made the appropriate offer to Wessel regarding future briefings and assistance.

8. Earlier Herre had suggested that Chancellor Kiesinger might take soundings in Washington on Wessel's standing in the USG. As I recall, Secretary McNamara spotted Wessel as an unusually bright troop commander during a visit to Germany four or five years ago; I assume this reputation has endured through Wessel's tour in Washington. I am not aware that Wessel is well known at levels of the State Department and the White House which may be in contact with Chancellor Kiesinger. It seems unlikely that Kiesinger would, at this early date, broach this subject with any American official.

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD
Chief, Near East and
South Asia Division

cc: DDCI
DD/P
Chief, EUR

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
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DATE 2005

10 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: UTILITY's Comments re Possible American Intercession regarding his Successor

1. Heinz Herre saw me this date in the absence of C/EUR to convey the response he had received from UTILITY to the question posed by C/EUR to Herre during their lunch on 8 August whether COS/Germany might usefully indicate to the German government and political contacts that the Agency favored a professional (i.e., a person with previous intelligence experience) rather than a political appointee as UTILITY's successor. [] was himself struck by the speed with which UTILITY replied and had with him the original cable from which he read large portions.

2. UTILITY stated: he would welcome our saying something if appropriate opportunity presents itself. He suggests that the impending visit of Chancellor Kiesinger might present such an opportunity (although of course this is only one possible, not the exclusive, opportunity). His reason for endorsing the suggested action by us is to take all possible steps to ensure continuation of the existing good relations between the BND and the NATO services, in particular the U.S. service. He requests, however, that no names be mentioned but rather that our statement be limited to expressing our strong preference for a "professional" rather than a "non-professional". He requests that specific emphasis be placed on the importance of appointing as his successor a person who has had long experience in the foreign intelligence field (i.e., his successor should not come from the BfV). He further suggested that an opening wedge for initiating such a discussion might well be the recent Spiegel article speculating on the possibility that General Wessel would be appointed his successor.

3. Heinz insisted that I read back to him the notes I had taken and specifically endorsed the above paragraph as embodying the exact terms of the Doctor's message. He claimed to be impressed by the level UTILITY was suggesting for our intercession, and speculated, stressing that it was his personal opinion, that this implicitly authorized and requested us to have COS/Germany take action if and as we saw fit.

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To my direct query whether he had any persons particularly in mind whom we might approach, he stated that he personally felt principal weight should be given to top levels of the SPD, but that he felt COS/Germany would be a better judge of the appropriate people to approach in Bonn.

DC/EUR

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BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENST

General Reinhard Gehlen kann noch bis April 1972 in seinem Amt bleiben

Die Auswahl eines Nachfolgers stellt viele Probleme

Eigenbericht der WELT

H. W. D. Bonn, 14. August

Wer soll der neue Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) werden? Diese Frage wird zurzeit von Berufenen und Unberufenen öffentlich diskutiert. Namen werden genannt, Kandidaten hochgespielt.

Den Anlaß bietet der Umstand, daß der jetzige Präsident des BND, Reinhard Gehlen, in der früheren Wehrmacht Generalleutnant und Leiter der Abteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“ im Generalstab des Heeres, am 3. April dieses Jahres die normale Altersgrenze von 65 Jahren erreicht hat.

Die Amtszeit Gehlens ist einstweilen bis zum 30. April 1968 verlängert worden. Nach den geltenden beamtenrechtlichen Vorschriften kann sie jeweils nur um ein Jahr, höchstens jedoch noch viermal, ausgedehnt werden. Es ist also durchaus denkbar, daß Gehlen den BND noch bis 1972 leitet.

Irgendwann, frühestens im April nächsten Jahres, spätestens in fünf Jahren, muß ein Nachfolger für den Chef des Nachrichtendienstes gefunden sein. Wer käme dafür in Frage? Es kann nicht Sache von Organen der öffentlichen Meinung sein, personalpolitische Vorschläge für seine Nachfolge auszubringen. Indessen lassen sich die Qualifikationen beschreiben, die ein Nachfolger haben müßte.

In Bonn ist es ein offenes Geheimnis, daß ein Mitarbeiter eines früheren Bundeskanzlers, der noch kein ihm zusagendes Betätigungsfeld gefunden hat, sich mit dem Wunsche trägt, die Nachfolge zu übernehmen. Indessen kann der bloße Umstand einer nicht befriedigenden Tätigkeit keinesfalls zu einer Nachfolge Gehlens qualifizieren.

Ein Nachrichtendienst von hohem Niveau ist ein außerordentlich empfindliches Instrument, das an seine Leitung die höchsten Anforderungen stellt. Von der Qualität der Meldungen, die er beschafft, von ihrer Auswertung und Beurteilung können politische Entscheidungen von größter Bedeutung abhängen.

Sollte die Wahl, was grundsätzlich durchaus zu vertreten wäre, auf einen Nichtfachmann fallen, dann müßte ihm ein hochqualifizierter Fachmann als Stellvertreter beigegeben werden, damit sich die „Lehrzeit“ des neuen Chefs nicht negativ auswirkt. Dieser wäre dann freilich für längere Zeit in hohem Maße von seinem Stellvertreter abhängig, ein Nachteil, der nur dadurch ausgeglichen werden könnte, daß zwischen beiden von vornherein ein besonders enges Vertrauensverhältnis bestünde. Dies ist zwar in jedem Falle notwendig, aber sein Fehlen würde noch bedenklicher sein, wenn der Chef ein Laie und sein Stellvertreter ein Fachmann wäre. Daher wäre die Lösung, einen Nachfolger zu wählen, der in der Lage ist, die Leitung des BND zu übernehmen, ein Nachteil.

ständige Gremium noch schwieriger, als sie ohnehin ist.

Die Frage, ob der Nachfolger wieder ein Offizier ist oder nicht, ist unerheblich. Es kommt auf die Chefqualitäten an.

Außerdem muß der Nachfolger in der Lage sein, Spitzenverbindungen im In- und Ausland anzuknüpfen und zu pflegen. Auf den entsprechenden Ebenen wird aber nicht jeder beliebige nur deswegen als Gesprächspartner akzeptiert, weil er Präsident des BND ist.

Vor allem muß die Leitung des BND auf strikte innenpolitische Neutralität bedacht sein. Nur sie garantiert die Loyalität gegenüber jeder Bundesregierung, wie auch immer diese sich jeweils zusammensetzt. Eine Bundesregierung muß mindestens alle vier Jahre mit ihrer Ablösung rechnen. Würde über die Leitung des BND parteimäßig entschieden werden, dann würde entweder ihre Loyalität gegenüber einer neuen Bundesregierung in Versuchung geführt werden oder sie müßte ihrerseits auch abgelöst werden.

Das eine wäre so fragwürdig wie das andere. Weder darf die Loyalität problematisch werden noch verträgt es die Sache, wenn der Leitung eines Nachrichtendienstes alle paar Jahre eine Ablösung droht, was in das Instrument ein Element hochgradiger und lähmender Unsicherheit hineinbringen würde.

Die neue Leitung darf daher unter parteipolitischen Gesichtspunkten weder umstritten sein noch eine Handhabe dazu bieten. Kaum ein anderes Staatsorgan muß so bedingungslos aus Parteilichungen herausgehalten werden wie ein Nachrichtendienst.


Das bedeutet nicht, daß die neue Leitung keiner Partei angehören dürfte. Es bedeutet nur, daß sie sich keinem anderen Interesse als dem des Staates verpflichtet zu fühlen hat. Weder die Zugehörigkeit noch die Nichtzugehörigkeit zu einer Partei darf bei der Ernennung eines BND-Chefs und seines Stellvertreters eine Rolle spielen. Indessen ist es wichtig, daß die Leitung des BND das Vertrauen aller Parteien genießt.

Das liegt einmal in der Hand derer, die sie bestellen. Zum anderen liegt es bei denen, die ernannt werden, das allseitige Vertrauen zu pflegen und zu rechtfertigen. Wie in der Armee und in der Polizei muß in jedem Nachrichtendienst die Einheit des Staates ihren lebendigen und glaubhaften Ausdruck finden. Ein Nachrichtendienst, der nicht die Einheit des Staates zu vertritt, ist ein Instrument, das nicht nur in der Lage ist, die Leitung des BND zu übernehmen, sondern auch, die Leitung des BND zu übernehmen.

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DATE 2001 2009

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - EGMA-70519
FILE NO - NONE
DATE - 17 AUGUST 1967
INDEXING - NONE
MICROFILM - NO
TO - CHIEF, EUR
INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY - CHIEF OF BASE,
FRANKFURT - CHIEF OF BASE, BERLIN - WUCAUK
FROM - CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH
SUBJECT - 0 POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO UTILITY
ACTION - NONE
REF - NONE



1. COMMENTING ON CURRENT SPATE OF WEST GERMAN PRESS
ARTICLES IN REGARD UTILITY'S POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR, ON 16 AUGUST
ALIAS KUEHNE MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS -

A. NO FIRM DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE -

B. WORD ON TOP AUSWERTUNG LEVEL IS THAT CHANCELLOR
KIESINGER, PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE TO WASHINGTON, LET IT BE
KNOWN THAT NO DECISION LIKELY BE MADE BEFORE 4-6
WEEKS -

C. KIESINGER PLANS USE CURRENT TRIP TO TALK TO
GENERAL WESSEL IN WASHINGTON REGARDING POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT -

D. AMBASSADOR SCHNIPPENKOETTER APPEARS TO BE THE
TOP CIVILIAN IN THE RUNNING -

E. REGARDING POSSIBILITY THAT ^{Swidbert} (ADMIRAL) POSER TAKE
OVER NUMBER ONE ^{UTILITY'S} SLOT / THIS CARRIED IN FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE,
16 AUGUST / @KUEHNE SNORTED DISPARAGINGLY AND SAID "YOU CAN
BE ASSURED HE WILL NEVER GET IT" >

F. WHILE OUTSIDERS CLEARLY HAVE BEST CHANCE, IN-
SIDE MAN ALIAS ^{FOR UTILITY'S POSITION} ENDT STILL IN THE RUNNING AND IN "SOME

SECRET DISPATCH EGMA-70519 PAGE 1

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B []
D 32W-2-38/1

CS/COPY



WAYS' ' BEST MAN FOR THE JOB, ALTHOUGH ' 'HANDICAPPED' ' BY

LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE DEPTH AND EXPERIENCE, ACCORDING TO @ KUEHN600>

2. [] COMMENT. KUEHNE SEEMED RATHER RELAXED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL WESSEL TAKING COMMAND, BUT EXPRESSED LOW KEY UNCERTAINTY IF AMBASSADOR SCHNIPPENKOETTER WOULD BE THE PROPER MAN. THIS CONNECTION, HIS VIEWS ON MATTER NO DOUBT SHARPLY COLORED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF HIS OWN FUTURE. ALIASDEGENHARDT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RETIRE BY SUMMER OF 1969 - NOT LONG AFTER PROBABLE REPLACEMENT OF UTILITY - AND KUEHNE ASPIRES TO TAKE OVER FULL COMMAND OF AUSWERTUNG. THIS CONNECTION, AND GIVEN CLOSE PERXNAL TIES BETWEEN KUEHNE AND WENDT, CLEAR KUEHNE BE MOST COMFORTABLE IF WENDT TOOK OVER. CONVERSELY, AND GIVEN BACKGROUND OF SOME PERSONAL AND PROFEUONAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN KUEHNE AND POSER, A POSER ASSIGNMENT WOULD FACE KUEHNE WITH REAL PROBLEMS.

APPROVED - []

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SECRET DISPATCH EGMA-70519 PAGE 2

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

PROGRESS OF ACTION

TO: Chief of Station, Germany

INFO: Chief, EUR

FROM: Chief of Base, Munich

SUBJECT: CATUSK ☐ ☐
Possible Successor to UTILITY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCED

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated, Paragraph 1 below.

REFERENCES : A. BONN-0135, August 1967
B. EGMA-70519, 17 August 1967

1. Prior to requesting traces, Munich will appreciate Bonn's providing us with any available identifying biographic details on Ambassador SCHNIPPENKOETTER, reported in References as the strongest civilian candidate to replace UTILITY.

2. Information possibly pertaining to Ambassador SCHNIPPENKOETTER appears on page 11 of the 1967 edition of Taschenbuch des Oeffentlichen Lebens, which lists Presseref. ORR. Heribert SCHNIPPENKOETTER as on the staff of Dr. Bruno HECK, Der Bundesminister fuer Familie und Jugend, 5320 Bad Godesberg, Kennedyallee 105-107. During a conversation with ☐ on 9 August 1967, @CASTROP described SCHNIPPENKOETTER as a "disarmament man".

APPROVED: ☐ ☐

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

☐ ☐

EGMA-70706

0-1 SEP 1967

31 August 1967

S E C R E T

32W-2-41/1

Washington Post
5 September 1967

W. German Master Spy to Retire

By Geoffrey Issott
Reuters

BONN, West Germany—Reinhard Gehlen, known as the man without a face, will retire in April from his post as head of the West German counter-espionage organization, which he has led since shortly after World War II.

Most people know little of him other than his name and age for Gehlen has ruled his network of cloak-and-dagger men from behind a veil of anonymity at his headquarters surrounded by barbed wire near Munich. As far as is known, no photograph has been taken of him in the past 23 years.

The last one, taken in 1944, shows him as a balding, slightly built 40-year-old in the uniform of a Wehrmacht colonel.

About 19 years later, the East German security service put a big price on this balding head—a testimonial to the effectiveness with which his post-war apparatus was already working.

Born at Erfurt (now in East Germany) April 3, 1902, the son of a publishing house director, Gehlen joined the army in 1920. By 1935 he was an officer on the general staff, after receiving training in se-

cret-service work in the first years of Nazi power.

Promoted to colonel in 1942, he took over the department called Foreign Armies East in the army general staff, where his duties were to collect and analyze information about the enemy on and behind the eastern front.

When admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the German counter-espionage service, fell into disfavor in the same year, Gehlen set up his own counter-espionage network.

Gehlen, who managed to save his massive secret service files in the chaos of the final weeks of war, quickly awakened the interest of the Americans when he was captured in Bavaria.

After careful interrogation in Washington, he was sent

back to Germany and given his own department to gather information from Eastern Europe.

His work there proved invaluable to the Americans and he was given a free hand to expand his network from a base near Munich.

After that, the veil of secrecy again fell over his activities.

His organization was officially recognized in 1950 and called the Federal Information Service, directly responsible to the Chancellor.

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FBIS 80

U.S. 'INTERVENTION' IN GERMAN INTELLIGENCE

EAST BERLIN ADV DOMESTIC SERVICE IN GERMAN 1655 GMT 5 SEP 67 L

(TEXT) BONN--IT HAS NOW BEEN LEARNED THAT THE CIA HAS INTERFERED DIRECTLY IN THE SELECTION OF A SUCCESSOR TO THE POST OF HEAD OF THE WEST GERMAN SECRET SERVICE. THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE STATED ITS WISDOMS "IN A SUITABLE FORM--FIRMLY AND EMPHATICALLY" ON THE OCCASION OF THE LAST VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY CHANCELLOR KIESINGER AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, BRANDT.

THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE PRESENT SECRET SERVICE CHIEF IN KIESINGER'S OFFICE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL GENLEN, WHO IS 66, IS DUE FOR RETIREMENT AS "MINISTERIALDIREKTOR" IN THE SPRING OF 1968 AT THE LATEST. CIA DIRECTOR RICHARD M. HELMS IS SAID TO HAVE MADE IT KNOWN TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER THAT THE CIA WANTED LT. GEN. GERHARD WESSEL OF THE FEDERAL ARMED FORCES TO BE GENLEN'S SUCCESSOR.

IN THE FASCIST SUPREME ARMY COMMAND, WESSEL WAS GENLEN'S DEPUTY AND WAS IN CHARGE OF THE ANTI-SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND DIVERSIONIST DEPARTMENT "FRENDE HEERE OST." FROM 1947 TO 1955 HE HELD A LEADING POST IN THE CIA-DIRECTED AND -FINANCED "GENLEN ORGANIZATION." TODAY GENERAL WESSEL IS THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL ARMED FORCES ON THE WASHINGTON MILITARY COMMITTEE AND COOPERATES CLOSELY WITH THE CIA.

05 SEP 2200Z JD/CT

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DATE 2005

GEHLEN (SITUATIONER) ER--41

BY GEOFFREY ISSOTT

BONN, WEST GERMANY (REUTERS)--REINHARD GEHLEN, KNOWN AS THE MAN WITHOUT A FACE, WILL RETIRE IN APRIL FROM HIS POST AS HEAD OF THE WEST GERMAN COUNTER-ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION, WHICH HE HAS LEAD SINCE SHORTLY AFTER WORLD WAR II.

MOST PEOPLE KNOW LITTLE OF HIM OTHER THAN HIS NAME AND AGE. FOR GEHLEN HAS RULED HIS NETWORK OF CLOAK-AND-DAGGER MEN FROM BEHIND A VEIL OF ANONYMITY AT HIS HEADQUARTERS SURROUNDED BY BARBED WIRE NEAR MUNICH. AS FAR AS IS KNOWN, NO PHOTOGRAPH HAS BEEN TAKEN OF HIM IN THE PAST 23 YEARS.

THE LAST ONE, TAKEN IN 1944, SHOWS HIM AS A BALDING SLIGHTLY-BUILT 40-YEAR-OLD IN THE UNIFORM OF A WEHRMACHT COLONEL.

SOME 19 YEARS LATER, THE EAST GERMAN SECURITY SERVICE PUT A BIG PRICE ON THIS BALDING HEAD--A TESTIMONIAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS WITH WHICH HIS POST-WAR APPARATUS WAS ALREADY WORKING.

BORN AT ERFURT (NOW IN EAST GERMANY) APRIL 3, 1902, THE SON OF A PUBLISHING HOUSE DIRECTOR, GEHLEN JOINED THE ARMY IN 1920. BY 1935 HE WAS AN OFFICER ON THE GENERAL STAFF, AFTER RECEIVING TRAINING IN SECRET-SERVICE WORK IN THE FIRST YEARS OF NAZI POWER.

(MORE) RP 10:12P

*Article
Appeared
in Post
5 Sept 67*

ADD BONN GEHLEN (SITUATIONER) X X X POWER.

PROMOTED TO COLONEL IN 1942, HE TOOK OVER THE DEPARTMENT CALLED FOREIGN ARMIES EAST IN THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF, WHERE HIS DUTIES WERE TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMY ON AND BEHIND THE EASTERN FRONT.

WHEN ADMIRAL WILHELM CANARIS, HEAD OF THE GERMAN COUNTER-ESPIONAGE SERVICE, FELL INTO DISFAVOR IN THE SAME YEAR, GEHLEN SET UP HIS OWN COUNTER-ESPIONAGE NETWORK.

GEHLEN, WHO MANAGED TO SAVE HIS MASSIVE SECRET SERVICE FILES IN THE CHAOS OF THE FINAL WEEKS OF WAR, QUICKLY AWAKENED THE INTEREST OF THE AMERICANS WHEN HE WAS CAPTURED IN BAVARIA.

AFTER CAREFUL INTERROGATION IN WASHINGTON, HE WAS SENT BACK TO GERMANY AND GIVEN HIS OWN DEPARTMENT TO ANALYZE INFORMATION FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

HIS WORK THERE PROVED INVALUABLE TO THE AMERICANS AND HE WAS GIVEN A FREE HAND TO EXPAND HIS NETWORK FROM A BASE NEAR MUNICH.

AFTER THAT, THE VEIL OF SECRECY FELL OVER HIS ACTIVITIES AGAIN.

IN 1956, HIS ORGANIZATION WAS OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AND CALLED THE FEDERAL INFORMATION SERVICE, DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE CHANCELLOR.

(MORE) RP 10:15P

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SECOND ADD BONN GEHLEN (SITUATIONER) X X X CHANCELLOR.

SINCE THEN, GEHLEN'S ORGANIZATION HAS RECEIVED AN ESTIMATED SUM OF MORE THAN 100,000,000 MARKS (NEARLY \$28,000,000) A YEAR FROM THE FEDERAL BUDGET.

HOW MANY PEOPLE WORK FOR THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS A CAREFULLY KEPT SECRET. REPORTS SEVERAL YEARS AGO PUT IT AT 4,000 INCLUDING 500 OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

GEHLEN WAS DUE TO RETIRE LAST APRIL 3, WHEN HE WAS 65, BUT HIS TENURE OF OFFICE WAS EXTENDED FOR A YEAR BY THE BONN GOVERNMENT UNTIL A SUCCESSOR WAS FOUND.

STRONGLY TIPPED IN THE SUMMER OF 1967 FOR THE ROLE WAS 53-YEAR-OLD LT. GEN. GERHARD WESSEL, WHO WORKED FOR GEHLEN DURING WORLD WAR II.

HE WAS AT THAT TIME WEST GERMANY'S REPRESENTATIVE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION'S MILITARY COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON.

SECRET

5 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Statement by Heinz HERRE on BND Succession


1. Heinz HERRE left for a two-week vacation on the last day of Chancellor Kiesinger's visit, and we had no chance to discuss with him any possible conversations which might have taken place between the Chancellor and General WESSEL concerning an offer to WESSEL to become the new President of the BND. HERRE passed through Washington this past week-end on his way to Canada; and I had lunch with him on Saturday, 2 September 1967. A full contact report is being prepared; but the purpose of this paper is to present his statements on the BND succession, which were made during the luncheon and in two subsequent telephone conversations.

2. HERRE said that the Chancellor had raised the question of the BND succession with WESSEL at a dinner at the German Embassy on 16 August. The Chancellor did not offer the job to WESSEL but indicated a desire to have WESSEL visit him in the near future in Germany where they could discuss the succession problem in great detail in a more quiet and relaxed atmosphere. According to HERRE, WESSEL has advanced his previously scheduled departure date so that he will be in Bonn at the Chancellor's convenience around the 18th or 19th of September. WESSEL actually leaves Washington on 8 September but must first handle some NATO business before arriving in Bonn.

3. HERRE stated that it is now more important than ever that we spread the word in Bonn through Ray Cline, and perhaps through the Ambassador, that the appointment of an outsider to the BND Presidency is simply not acceptable to us. HERRE went ahead to note that since GEHLEN is the dean of all intelligence chiefs and since we are Germany's most important ally, we are surely entitled to make our influence felt in such an important appointment. HERRE said that because he had departed so quickly on leave and because he was in town only for the week-end, he has not communicated with GEHLEN since the Chancellor's visit; but he assumes there has been no change in the situation.

4. In another connection, HERRE mentioned Baron von GUTTENBERG as being perhaps the most influential of the

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-2-

Chancellor's advisors; and he said that the Baron, as a staunch friend of the BND, was sure to strongly recommend WESSEL as the successor to GEHLEN.

5. On the same evening, HERRE called me at home and said that he had forgotten to tell me something quite important at lunch. The "important" matter will be covered in the full contact report; but I suspect that the true reason for his call was to inform me that the WESSEL's would be paying a farewell call at his home on the next afternoon, Sunday, 3 September. He promised to call me if anything new came up during this visit, otherwise I could assume that the situation remained unchanged from that which he had sketched out at lunch.

6. HERRE did call late the next afternoon and stated that the WESSEL's had just left after a long and intimate visit. HERRE said that he and WESSEL had discussed the BND Presidency and that WESSEL had indicated that he would like to have the job. HERRE said they had discussed a number of ideas about the way in which WESSEL should handle the job if he received the appointment. HERRE then repeated his remarks of the previous day about our role in securing the appointment for WESSEL and stressed that we should not actually mention any names but should rather attempt to talk the people in Bonn out of appointing anyone from outside the BND. He noted that the greatest danger to an eventual appointment of WESSEL comes from Helmut SCHMIDT; and he recalled a conversation which he had with SCHMIDT at the time of the Atlantik Bruecke meetings in which SCHMIDT had said, in regard to the succession problem, that there were possibilities other than the appointment of WESSEL. HERRE told me that he and WESSEL had discussed this possible opposition and that they were agreed that, should the opposition prove overly strong at this particular moment, there is no reason why GEHLEN cannot be asked to stay on for another year and WESSEL can continue his NATO assignment in Brussels until the situation appears more favorable.

7. HERRE noted that the WESSEL's were having dinner at the Critchfields' later that evening and that WESSEL would have an opportunity to see the DCI prior to his departure for Europe. According to HERRE, WESSEL is to see the German Ambassador sometime this week; and Mr. Helms will also be present. As noted above, WESSEL actually departs on 8 September; and his wife will follow three days later.

SECRET

John D.

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH

DISP NO- EGNW-6610

FILE NO- 32W-2-28/1

DATE - 12 SEPTEMBER 1967

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY ATTN - []
CHIEF, MUNICH BASE ATTN - []

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, EUR

SUBJ - CATUSK

UTILITY SUCCESSION

ACTION - SEE PARA 5

REFS - EGMA-69933

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1. DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, ALIAS DESSAU HAS ASSIDUOUSLY LOBBIED FOR SOME TYPE OF WOFAC INTERVENTION WITH MHBRUSH WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF SUPPORTING THE CANDIDACY OF IDENTITY ONE FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF CATUSK. HIS GENERAL LINE HAS BEEN THAT WE SHOULD NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION IDENTITY ONE BUT THAT WE SHOULD AVAIL OURSELVES OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXTOL THE VIRTUES OF THE PROFESSIONAL OVER THE NONPROFESSIONAL. DESSAU HAS ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE APPOINTMENT OF IDENTITY ONE IS IDENTITY TWO AND HE HAS INTIMATED THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN AREA WHERE OUR INFLUENCE COULD BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HE HAS URGED US TO DIRECT YOU, AND IF POSSIBLE [] TO MAKE YOUR INFLUENCE FELT WITH MHBRUSH AND AMONG APPROPRIATE POLITICAL FIGURES IN BONN.

2. WE HAVE GENERALLY RESPONDED BY MAKING REFERENCE TO OUR OWN FORTUNATE POSITION IN THIS REGARD AND BY NOTING THAT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION, WE FULLY SUBSCRIBE TO THE POSITION THAT A PROFESSIONAL IS MUCH TO BE PREFERRED OVER A NON-

S E C R E T EGNW-6610 /PAGE 1/

PROFESSIONAL. WE HAVE ALSO GENERALLY EXPRESSED OUR ADMIRATION FOR IDENTITY ONE AND THEN NORMALLY LET THE MATTER DROP. ON ONE OCCASION, SHORTLY AFTER WE HAD RECEIVED REFERENCE, WE INDICATED TO DESSAU THAT WHILE THE APPOINTMENT OF A PROFESSIONAL WAS CLEARLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR VIEW, WE DOUBTED THE PROPRIETY OF MAKING OUR VIEWS KNOWN AND STATED THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT DO SO WITHOUT A SPECIFIC REQUEST FROM UTILITY. THE VERY NEXT DAY, DESSAU FACED US WITH A CABLE FROM UTILITY IN WHICH UTILITY ALLEGEDLY WROTE THAT HE WOULD WELCOME OUR SAYING SOMETHING SHOULD THE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY ARISE. UTILITY SUGGESTED THAT ONE SUCH OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE PRESENTED BY THE THEN IMPENDING VISIT OF IDENTITY THREE. UTILITY TOOK THE LINE THAT WE SHOULD NOT MENTION SPECIFIC NAMES AND GAVE AS HIS REASON FOR ENDORSING THIS ACTION HIS OWN DESIRE TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO ENSURE CONTINUATION OF THE EXISTING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN CATUSK AND THE NATO SERVICES AND, IN PARTICULAR, WOFAC.

3. THUS, IDENTITY FOUR DOES ACCURATELY REFLECT AN ACTION WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED TO US BUT IT IS A PROPOSAL WHICH WAS NOT ACTED UPON AT ANY LEVEL. WE HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN ANY ACTION HERE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTIONS MADE BY DESSAU AND ENDORSED BY UTILITY. NEITHER DO WE HAVE ANY PLANS TO DO SO SINCE WE WISH AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID FINDING OURSELVES IN THE MIDDLE OF AN ESSENTIALLY MHBRUSH QUESTION.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND WE DO NOT WISH ENTIRELY TO PRECLUDE SOME ACTION IN A SITUATION WHERE WE MIGHT MAKE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION WHICH COULD AT THE SAME TIME BE IN OUR OWN INTEREST. THUS, SHOULD THIS MATTER BE RAISED BY SOMEONE ON THE BONN SCENE WHO IN YOUR OPINION IS DOING SO FOR CONSTRUCTIVE REASONS, YOU MIGHT RESPOND ALONG THE SAME LINES WE HAVE TAKEN WITH DESSAU. IN NO CASE, HOWEVER, DO WE FEEL THAT WE SHOULD FAVOR A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL

OVER ANY OTHER.

5. WE WOULD APPRECIATE A REPORT FROM YOU ON ANY DISCUSSIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE ALONG THESE LINES AND WE, OF COURSE, WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED IF WE HAVE OCCASION TO FURTHER DISCUSS THIS QUESTION HERE.

6. YOU MAY ALREADY BE AWARE THAT DURING HIS VISIT IDENTITY THREE DID DISCUSS THE SUCCESSION WITH IDENTITY ONE BUT THAT HE DID NOT MAKE A SPECIFIC OFFER. RATHER HE SUGGESTED THAT THEY AGREE TO GET TOGETHER AT A LATER DATE IN BONN WHERE THEY COULD PURSUE THE MATTER AT SOME LENGTH WITHOUT THE TIME PRESSURES TO WHICH THEY WERE SUBJECTED HERE. IDENTITY ONE LEFT HERE ON 8 SEPTEMBER AND EXPECTS TO BE IN BONN AND AVAILABLE TO IDENTITY THREE AROUND SEPTEMBER 18 OR 19.

ATTACHMENT - IDENTITIES /4/ UNDER SEPARATE COVER VIA 'TP'

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S E C R E T TELEPOUCH SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO EGNW-6610

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY ATTN - []

CHIEF, MUNICH BASE ATTN - []

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, EUR

IDENTITY ONE - LT. GEN. GERHARD WESSEL

IDENTITY TWO - SPD

IDENTITY THREE - CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

IDENTITY FOUR - ADN RELEASE OF 5 SEPTEMBER

[

]

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO EGNW-6610

SECRET

DISPATCH

TO: Chief of Base, Munich

INFO COS, Germany; Chief, NE; Chief, EUR; [] no indexing

FROM Chief []

SUBJ CATUSK/UTILITY's Tenure

For Munich: File attachment in []

In response to a recent letter,
1. [] has received an answer from []
alias Victor, CATUSK Chief of Station, Madrid. A copy of the letter is being forwarded
to Munich for the 201 file.

2. The only comment of possible general interest has to do with UTILITY, about
whom [] wrote as follows:

"Concerning the forthcoming changes in our old mutual stable you have read in the
papers: whether "he" really will depart in the spring of 1968. I certainly do not
consider a sure thing because, as is to be expected in Germany, the tug of war
about his successor will not be so quickly decided in Bonn. I would personally be
most happy if my classmate W. (i.e., Wendtland D.A.M.) were to become his
successor, but in any event, in my own case any assistance comes too late and
I do not plan now to change my schedule; namely, to go ashore on 31 March 69--the
earliest possible moment that I can become pensioned..."

3. [] further commented that because of the above, which
concerns a scrap between himself and the head of CATUSK, he is not going to strain
himself too hard while in Madrid.

Attachment

Ltr 5/9/67, thermofax copy

Distribution

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2 - Germany w/o att
1 - NE w/o att
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NBDA-13050

13 September 1967

201-

C2 w/att, as noted

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 PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY BONN
 CATUSK

AM/PT/EX	E/G/CE
PS/D	DEBT
ABSTRACT	INDEX

18 SEP 67 154062

1. UPI/STARS AND STRIPES ITEM 18 SEPT STATING THAT ON 17 SEPT CHANCELLOR HAD SELECTED GENERAL WESSEL TO SUCCEED TO PRESIDENCY OF BND DESCRIBED AS INTERESTING, BUT UNTRUE, DEVELOPMENT BY UTILITY AND LEADING MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF. FOLLOWING FIRST NOTIFICATION TO THEM OF THIS REPORT BY MUNICH BASE, ALIAS WENDT INFORMED US THAT AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT DENIAL HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE LATER ON 17 SEPT.

2. RECENTLY UTILITY HAS STATED THAT IT IS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN HE WILL RETIRE WITH THE COMPLETION OF HIS 65TH YEAR, THIS BEING INFLUENCED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL DELAY IN SELECTION OF HIS SUCCESSOR, BY WHICH EACH DAY OF POSTPONEMENT IS SUBTRACTED FROM A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF OVERLAP. AT THE SAME TIME, SINCE THIS POSITION WAS STATED IN PRESENCE OF SUBORDINATES, HE MAY HAVE BEEN SAYING THIS DELIBERATELY MORE OR LESS TO KEEP HIS TROOPS TIGHTER IN LINE.

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 SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

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 SEP 30 1967
 DOC. MICRO. SER.

SEC
 18 SEP 67

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - EGNA-35113
FILE NO - []
DATE - 20 SEPTEMBER 1967
INDEXING - NONE
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TO - CHIEF, EUR - ATTENTION- []
INFO - CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH - ATTENTION- []
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY
SUBJECT - CATUSK UTILITY SUCCESSION
ACTION - NONE
REFS - A. EGNW-6610
B. MUNICH 0645

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1. SINCE THE RECEIPT OF REF A THERE HAS BEEN A SUCCESSION OF CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS ABOUT THE SUCCESSION TO UTILITY.

2. I WISH TO STATE AT THE OUTSET THAT I AGREE WITH YOUR REF A PARAGRAPH 2, I.E. IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT SENSITIVE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF WE MADE ANY PREFERENCE KNOWN. ACTUALLY I BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT EVEN BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. SINCE IDEN 3 OF REF A SEEMS TO BE ALMOST AS ~~TOUCHY~~ *TOUCHY* IN THIS RESPECT AS []

3. NOW AS TO THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS- ON 14 SEPTEMBER THE CHIEF OF THE LOCAL UPI BUREAU CALLED [] TO ASK WHETHER UTILITY SPOKE ENGLISH SINCE HE WAS GOING TO WRITE AN ARTICLE ABOUT CATUSK. [] ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND ASKED WHAT THE OCCASION OF THE ARTICLE WAS. WELLINGTON LONG, THE UPI CHIEF, SAID THAT THEY HAD JUST BEEN INFORMED BY SOMEONE IN THE CHANCELLORY THAT IDEN 1 OF REF A HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY APPOINTED AS THE SUCCESSOR TO UTILITY. [] EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE AND ASKED WHETHER LONG WOULD BE WILLING TO TELL HER WHO EXACTLY HIS SOURCE WAS. THIS RESULTED IN HEMMING

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1

AND HAWING AND LONG FINALLY PROMISED TO ASK SOMEONE IN HIS OFFICE WHO THE SOURCE HAD BEEN SINCE HE CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE HAD THE CONVERSATION PERSONALLY. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT TRUE BUT THERE WAS NO WAY OF FORCING THE ISSUE.

4. ON SEPTEMBER 18 BOTH THE STARS AND STRIPES AND DIE WELT HAD UPI DISPATCHES STATING EXACTLY WHAT LONG HAD TOLD [REDACTED], NAMELY THAT IDEN 1 HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY APPOINTED. ALSO ON 18 SEPTEMBER IN THE GENERAL ANZEIGER OF BONN THERE WAS A DPA DISPATCH WHICH SAID THAT "NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE AS TO WHO THE SUCCESSOR TO UTILITY WILL BE. A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN MADE THIS STATEMENT WITH REFERENCE TO CERTAIN ANNOUNCEMENTS ACCORDING TO WHICH IDEN3 HAD ALREADY MADE A DECISION IN FAVOR OF IDEN 1." AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS [REDACTED] WAS FINALLY ABLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH LONG AND POINTED OUT THE VARIOUS CONFLICTING VERSIONS OF HIS STORY, NONE OF WHICH HE HAD YET SEEN. IN ANSWER TO THE REPEATED QUESTION AS TO WHO HIS SOURCE HAD BEEN HE FINALLY CAME THROUGH AND SAID IT HAD BEEN DR. HORST OSTERHELD WHO IS THE HEAD OF ABTEILUNG I OF THE CHANCELLORY. LONG THEN CONTINUED TO SAY THAT HE WAS SURE THAT HIS VERSION WAS CORRECT. HE SUPPORTED THIS BY TELLING [REDACTED] OF A LUNCHEON HE AND SEVERAL OTHER AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS HAD HAD WITH STATE SECRETARY CARSTENS ON 14 SEPTEMBER /AFTER HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED]// DURING WHICH, IN ORDER TO GET A DEFINITE ANSWER HE HAD ASKED CARSTENS WHETHER IDEN 1 WOULD HAVE TO GO ON INACTIVE DUTY WHEN HE TOOK OVER FROM UTILITY. ACCORDING TO LONG CARSTENS DID NOT WINK AN EYE AND REPLIED THAT WHEN IDEN 1

1

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TOOK OVER HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE THE SERVICE AND COME
A CIVIL SERVANT SINCE THERE WAS NO OTHER SLOT ON THE
T/O FOR THE MAN HOLDING UTILITY'S JOB. LONG CONCLUDES
FROM THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL SOURCE WAS OSTERHELD
AND THAT CARSTENS WAS NOT AT ALL SURPRISED WHEN HE ASKED
HIS QUESTION THAT THE DENIAL WAS ISSUED EITHER BY A
SUBORDINATE WHO WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED OR THAT THE DENIAL
WAS ISSUED BECUASE IDEN 3 WAS ANNOYED THAT THE CAT HAD
PREMATURELY BEEN LET OUT OF THE BAG.

5. IN THIS LAST TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LONG ALSO
SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED CARSTENS WHETHER AND WHEN HE WAS
GOING TO MOVE OVER TO THE CHANCELLORY AS STATE SECRETARY
/THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS TO THIS EFFECT RECENTLY/. CARSTENS
REPLIED THAT THIS MOVE WAS NOT YET DEFINITE BUT IF IT DID
TAKE PLACE IT WOULD NOT BE BEFORE THE FIRST OF NOVEMBER,
THE DATE ON WHICH IT IS ASSUMED NOW THAT MINISTER SCHROEDER
WILL BE BACK ON THE JOB. CARSTENS ADDED THAT THE BIG
DEFENSE DEBATE IN THE BUNDESTAG WAS ALSO GOING TO BE
POSTPONED UNTIL SCHROEDER RETURNED. IF THAT RETURN
SHOULD BE DELAYED BEYOND THE FIRST OF NOVEMBER IT WILL
NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DEFER THE DEBATE ANY LONGER.

6. AT LUNCH WITH C 1 ON 19 SEPTEMBER UTILITY
TOLD C 1 THAT DECISION STILL NOT FINAL ALTHOUGH HE
BELIEVED IT WOULD BE MADE REASONABLY SOON AS INDICATED
BY UPI DISPATCH. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE PRESS STORIES
ON HIS SUCCESSOR, ESPECIALLY A RECENT SPIEGEL STORY,
WERE HOSTILE IN INTENT AND MEANT TO TORPEDO HIS FAVORITE
AS SUCCESSOR. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE DECISION HAD NOW
BEEN DELAYED LONG ENOUGH THAT HE BELIEVED THERE WOULD
BE INADEQUATE OVERLAP TIME BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT SPRING.

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HENCE HE SAID HE WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE ON ACTIVE
DUTY /PROBABLY AS AN ADVISOR/ FOR ONE YEAR OR EVEN TWO
AFTER NEXT SPRING. HE HAD MENTIONED HIS STAYING ON A
YEAR OR TWO IN A TALK A FEW DAYS EARLIER WITH HQS OFFICER
[BUT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT HIS JOB WOULD
NEVERTHELESS BE PASSED ON.

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DATE 2006

28 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Weekly Briefing of @DESSAU on 28 September 1967

1. The briefing was on the election in Vietnam and the Congo. In accordance with the DDI directive that a senior official attend all briefings on Vietnam, [] attended and did the briefing on the Congo. The briefing on Vietnam was handled by []. @DESSAU was well prepared for the briefing on Vietnam, and he pushed quite hard to get our views on whether there will be real political opposition when the new government is formed in Vietnam. At the conclusion of the briefing, @DESSAU invited both Molly and Waldo to cocktails at his home on 24 October.
2. After the briefing @DESSAU said that he had just learned that he would not be able to move into his new house until sometime in January after his return from Australia. It seems that, except for bedroom furniture, all the furniture for the new house is being purchased in Germany and will have to be transported here by ship. @DESSAU said that the reason for this was the desire on the part of his Headquarters to allow their representative to present an authentic German atmosphere when he entertained.
3. @DESSAU said that he had received a lengthy cable from the "doktor" on 27 September which had a most happy tone. He said that there has been no decision reached on a successor to the "doktor". He said he did not think that General Wessel has as yet had his talk with the Chancellor. Wessel found it necessary to make a NATO trip to Norway which brought about the necessity for a postponement. @DESSAU said that Wessel should have returned to Bonn by now, and he expects the postponed talk to take place momentarily. He noted that the "doktor" had ended his cable with a line expressing how pleased everyone there was with the presence of [].
4. On the way out of the briefing area, we ran across [] and [] in the hallway. We chatted briefly, and [] referred to the recent ADN press release which, as [] put it, "said

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downgrading and
declassification

Group 1 Excluded
Walden R. R.

SECRET

that Dick Helms is attempting to name the successor to General Gehlen." Later, when we were alone, @DESSAU referred to the ADN release and expressed the uneasiness he had felt upon first reading the release. He said that he, Rolf, Bill, and I were the only ones who knew of the proposal to have the Director speak with Kiesinger. I suggested to him that there might have been several people in Munich who were aware of the proposal, but he expressed a degree of certainty that the "doktor" had not discussed the proposal with anyone. He said that he had handled the matter so securely that he himself had cut the tape for the cable to the "doktor". I suggested the possibility that the "doktor" had broached the matter with the Chancellor's office and that some of the journalists surrounding the Chancellor might have learned of it. However, @DESSAU felt that the "doktor" had not done this, and he gave as his own view the likelihood that the East Germans had simply made a lucky guess.

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INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

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FROM 15

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SECRET 040922Z CITE BONN 1017

DIRECTOR INFO MUNICH, FRANKFURT, BERLIN

CATUSK

1. ACCORDING TO LOCAL USAREUR LIAISON REP WHO IN DAILY CONTACT WITH OFFICERS OF FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE J-2 INTELLIGENCE STAFF, LT GEN GERHARD WESSEL HAD LENGTHY CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ON 27 SEPT DURING WHICH KIESINGER CONFIRMED TO WESSEL THAT LATTER IS HIS PERSONAL CHOICE AS NEXT CHIEF OF BND. ACCORDING TO ABOVE J-2 SOURCE, FOREIGN MINISTER BRANDT AND ALL-GERMAN MINISTER WEHNER STILL WANT A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE AND HAVE NOMINATED CURRENT MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HANS-JUERGEN WISCHNEWSKI AS GEHLEN'S REPLACEMENT. KIESINGER TOLD WESSEL THAT HIS NAME WOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR CABINET APPROVAL IN NEAR FUTURE AND ANTICIPATED HE WOULD ASSUME BND PRESIDENCY IN APRIL 1968.

2. AS RESULT ABOVE, ACCORDING TO J-2 SOURCES OF USAREUR REP, A NUMBER OF CLOSE FRIENDS OF GEN WESSEL WHO CURRENTLY IN MOD ARE ALREADY JOCKEYING FOR POSITIONS WITH BND WHEN WESSEL MOVES TO MUNICH. WESSEL IS BEING ADVISED

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ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

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OCT 18 1967
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4 OCT 67

PAGE 2 BOWN 1017 S E C R E T

DURING CURRENT DISCUSSIONS BY FORMER GENERAL HANS SPEIDEL.

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, J-2 SOURCES REPORT
THAT COL. HANS PILSTER UNTIL RECENTLY DEPUTY TO REAR
ADMIRAL GUENTHER POSER, J-2 CHIEF, HAS BEEN PROMOTED
TO BRIG. GENERAL EFFECTIVE 2 OCT 67 AND IS BEING
TRANSFERRED TO THE BND TO BECOME CHIEF OF MILITARY
EVALUATION. HE LEAVES FOR MUNICH ON 4 OCT.

4. COL. PILSTER IS BEING REPLACED AS DEPUTY
CHIEF J-2 BY COL. FRITZ ROSENHAUER WHO UNTIL PRESENT
HAS BEEN CHIEF OF SECURITY AND CLEARANCES UNDER
ADMIRAL POSER.

5. BRIG. GENERAL ARMIN ECK, A FORMER
BND'ER AND RECENTLY APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE ASBW, IS
DISSATISFIED WITH HIS DEPUTY, COL. HASSO VON ZINGLER,
AND THE LATTER WAS OFFERED ROSENHAUER'S JOB IN THE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. HE HAS TURNED DOWN THIS JOB
AND WILL BE REASSIGNED ELSEWHERE.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
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1. COUNTRY: FED REP OF GERMANY (FRG). Personnel	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 210 0546 67	RECD CO-3 6 OCT 1967
2. SUBJECT: Intelligence Changes and Problems - MOD, ASBW, and BND.	9. DATE OF REPORT: 4 Oct 67	
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 3	
	11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6A2a,c; 6C; 6F.	
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Sept/Oct 1967 Koeln, Sep 67	12. ORIGINATOR: ODCSI USAREUR REP, OCA, BONN	
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Bonn, Oct 67	13. PREPARED BY: H.F. Windmoeller	
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: E.G. Gernand ODCSI USAREUR Rep/OCA	
7. SOURCE: J2 Staff, Ministry of Defense/FRG. FRG Armed Forces Security Agency (Amt fuer Sicherheit der Bundeswehr - ASBW).		
15. SUMMARY: (C-NOFORN) The following information, in synoptic form, concerning personnel changes and problems in the German military intelligence hierarchy was obtained during recent conversations with reliable contacts, Bundeswehr officers currently assigned to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Bonn, and the ASBW, Cologne. a. Brigadier General Heinrich Seeliger, former Commander of the ASBW, retired in May 1967. He was succeeded by Brigadier General Armin Eck, former Commandant of the Bundeswehr Intelligence School in Bad Ems. Colonel Hasso von Zingler, Deputy Commander of the ASBW, retained his position. Under the regime of Seeliger who always displayed exemplary social decorum but no particular interests or ability in security/intelligence matters, von Zingler occupied a dominant position in Headquarters, ASBW. With the advent of Eck, a strong leader and a capable intelligence officer, this situation changed rapidly, and von Zingler soon lost his influential status; furthermore, the two officers have diametrically opposed personalities, and their wives are not compatible either. Consequently, the relations between the Commander and Deputy Commander became strained and now appear to have reached a point requiring remedial action. During September 1967, von Zingler was offered a transfer to the J2 Staff, MOD, in Bonn, as Branch Chief of Fue S II 6, Military Security and Clearances, a position occupied until recently by Colonel Fritz Rosenhauer. Von Zingler declined this position and evidently anticipates a more promising offer. Although the true reasons for this refusal are not known, it is speculated that von Zingler does not desire to serve on the staff of Rear Admiral Guenther Poser (Fue S II), the current J2, MOD/FRG. In the meantime, in late September 1967, von Zingler went on an extended 'Kur', a recuperative leave, allegedly on account of a kidney ailment not necessarily attributable to a volatile atmosphere in the office. He is expected to return to duty during late November or early December.		(Leave Blank)
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OCA, BONN

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1967. The estimated date for his anticipated transfer to an as yet unknown assignment, is spring 1968. A prospective replacement has not been mentioned.

b. Colonel Rosenhauer's vacancy was created by the promotion of Colonel Hans Pilster, Chief of Section Fue S II 2, and Deputy J2 under Admiral Poser. Pilster's promotion, although expected for a long time, became effective 2 October 1967. On or about 4 October he is scheduled to depart for a new assignment at the Federal Intelligence Agency (BND - Gehlen Organization) in Munich. One contact referred to Pilster as a weak commander but a strong intelligence staff officer who demanded maximum efforts from his subordinates (facetiously diagnosed as the cause for heart attacks suffered recently by several J2 staff officers); an avid reader, proficient writer and elegant public speaker, Pilster ingratiated himself with Poser and other high ranking and Bundeswehr and governmental officials. Another contact summarized in a humorous vein, Pilster's major attributes for promotion to brigadier general and transfer to BND as follows: "He is a capable intelligence staff officer, a gentleman and a magician also called egg-beater (Schaumschlaeger). He could analyze a flimsy piece of information evaluated F-6, subject this information to his famous 'egg-beating process', resulting in a fine intelligence product evaluated A-1. He is fully qualified to become a general with BND". Rosenhauer, highly regarded by all concerned, is replacing Pilster at the MOD.

c. Rosenhauer's former position is being filled by a Lieutenant Colonel (fnu) Ruhe. Further background information is not available except that he is an Air Force officer who served at one time on the J2 staff of MOD/FRG. Ruhe was described by one contact as a very fine commander and a capable intelligence staff officer who would undoubtedly be promoted in the near future in spite of the unfortunate fact that he had been married twice and both wives committed suicide. This, the contact pointed out facetiously, is not a requirement for promotion in the Bundeswehr.

d. The main topic of discussion and speculation was and still is, of course, the likely replacement for Reinhard Gehlen, Major General (Ret) and current President of the BND, upon his projected retirement in March/April 1968. A UPI press release dated Bonn, 18 September 1967, announcing in positive terms that Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger had nominated Lieutenant General Gerhard Wessel to succeed Gehlen, cannot be regarded as a final decision. Influential functionaries of the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partei Deutschland - SPD) propose to have a prominent SPD member become BND president or at least, vice-president. A similar and successful effort was made in 1966 when Dr. Guenther Nollau (SPD) was eventually installed as Vice President of the BfV, as reported previously. Furthermore, the SPD prefers to have a qualified civilian rather than a military man, even though retired, assume the BND presidency. The only SPD candidate mentioned so far having an intelligence background is Dr. Guenter Redding, Chief of the LfV/Hamburg. Others are being considered and several have been openly listed in the press. The 1 October 1967 issue of 'STERN', a weekly publication, contains an article on the same topic, including background information on Wessel, Gehlen (his organization), and other persons. A copy of the STERN article entitled: "Wer wird der neue Spionagechef?" (Who will be the new espionage chief?) is enclosed hereto. One other possible candidate, not mentioned before, is Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, currently the Minister for Aid and Economic Cooperation. Wischnewski is reportedly the favorite of two leading SPD officials, Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister, and Herbert Wehner, Minister for All-German Affairs. Wischnewski, born 24 July 1922 in Allenstein, East Prussia, joined the SPD in 1946, was active in trade and labor unions, became a member of parliament in 1957, and a minister when the current coalition government was formed

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in December 1966. He made numerous trips to Africa, participated in several conferences pertaining to that continent, and is considered an expert on African affairs. He has no experience in intelligence.

Wessel, on the other hand, is a highly competent and experienced intelligence officer. Until recently he was Germany's Charge d'Affaires at the Standing NATO Military Committee in Washington. He is currently on leave in the Bonn area until he assumes his new duties at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. During the week 18-23 September 1967, Wessel had arranged for appointments with Kiesinger for two different dates; each time Kiesinger was unable to keep the appointment due to other pressing commitments. At this time it was speculated that Kiesinger did not want to commit himself, hoping to retain Gehlen for an extended period. However, on 27 September 1967, Wessel finally met with Kiesinger at the Chancellery in Bonn and the two had a lengthy conversation. At the conclusion of the conference, Kiesinger assured Wessel that he would be nominated Gehlen's successor. Kiesinger anticipated eventual approval by the SPD element of the coalition cabinet. After this meeting, Wessel visited Dr. Hans Speidel (Bundeswehr General Ret) who resides in the Honnef/Bonn area. The purpose of this visit is not known. However, Speidel and Wessel are close friends and the former is frequently consulted. Wessel indicated that should he become the next BND president in 1968, he would have to clean house by removing some of the 'dead wood'. Wessel also expressed his intention to transfer several intelligence staff officers from MOD to BND/Munich; thus, more personnel changes are pending.

e. In response to a query concerning Poser's status and future career, one contact replied: "No Comment", and another snorted: "Der bleibt wo er ist. Keiner will ihn haben" (He stays where he is, nobody wants him).

COMMENTS: Many ASBW officers and possibly enlisted and civilian personnel too, may be aware of the strained relations between the Commander and his Deputy. This situation, however, is not considered of sufficient magnitude to exert adverse effects on the operational efficiency and the overall security of that organization.

Although no official statement or press release is available announcing the retirement of Gehlen and his possible successor in 1968, it is felt that should such personnel action materialize, the most-qualified and likely aspirant for the BND presidency currently under consideration is Wessel. The impact of such a projected change and the effects of the reported changes in MOD intelligence personnel, cannot be fully assessed at this time but appear to be promising developments.

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<p>14.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; margin: 10px 0;"><p>GEHLEN, REINHARD SEX M DOR ? CIT ? DCC ? PROJECTED RETIREMENT SET FOR MAR/APR 68.</p><p style="text-align: right;">32W-005-012/01 EGNA-35188A01 11 OCT 67</p></div> <p>EGMEGFEGG</p> <p style="text-align: right;">R 6711083583</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.					

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SECRET 121274 CIE MUNICH

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

CATUSK ☐ ☐

ALIAS WILDEN TOLD ☐ 1 ON 8 OCT 67:

A. UTILITY HAD RECEIVED OFFICIAL NOTICE HIS
TENURE COULD NOT BE EXTENDED BEYOND MARCH 1968.

B. EXPECTS EXODUS OLD TIMERS DURING CURRENT YEAR
IN ANTICIPATION UTILITY RETIREMENT. BUT THINKS BROTHER
"GIOVANNI" ☐ ENJOYS SPECIAL STATUS IN CURRENT
LOCATION AND MIGHT REMAIN AS SONDERANGESTELLTER REPEAT
SONDERANGESTELLTER BEYOND NEXT MARCH.

C. ALTHOUGH FIRMLY CONVINCED REPLACEMENT WILL BE
SUBJECT ☐ ^{WESSEL} ALIAS WILDEN EXPECTS NAMING OF
CIVILIAN POLITICIAN AS OFFICIAL VICE PRESIDENT WITH ALIAS
WENDT CONTINUING AS CHIEF OF STAFF.

SECRET

SECRET

MICROFILMED

OCT 27 1967

DOC. MICRO. SER.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

12 OCT 67

~~SECRET~~/RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - EGMA-70903

FILE NO - C J

DATE - 16 OCTOBER 1967

TO - CHIEF, EUROPEAN DIVISION

- CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

FROM - CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH

SUBJECT - RYBAT/CATUSK

UTILITY AND SUCCESSION

ACTION - FYI

REF - MUNICH 0927

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

for weekly note 7
YR. **1**

1. IN A CONVERSATION 13 OCTOBER 1967, UTILITY TOLD L J THAT HE DEFINITELY EXPECTS TO BE AROUND UNTIL SPRING OF 1969. WHEN ASKED IF THIS WOULD BE IN A CONSULTANT CAPACITY, UTILITY EMPHATICALLY RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE AS THE PRESIDENT OF CATUSK. HIS SUCCESSOR, WHOEVER HE MAY BE, WILL NOT BE NAMED UNTIL DECEMBER OF THIS YEAR, OR POSSIBLY JANUARY 1968. UTILITY STILL IS OF THE OPINION THAT GENERAL WESSEL WILL SUCCEED HIM. HE ADDED THAT, NO MATTER WHO THE SUCCESSOR IS, AT LEAST A YEAR'S OVERLAP WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE NEW MAN TO ACCUMULATE A SUFFICIENT STORE OF KNOWLEDGE OF CATUSK BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCES WHICH HAVE BEEN BUILT UP IN THE PAST TWENTY YEARS. OTHERWISE, UTILITY STATES, HIS SUCCESSOR WOULD FIND TOO GREAT A KNOWLEDGEABILITY GAP BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE TOP DOZEN CATUSK STAFFERS ON WHOM HE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSTANTLY DEPENDENT.

2. WHEN ASKED WHOSE WOULD BE THE INITIATIVE TO BRING ABOUT HIS STAYING ON UNTIL THE SPRING OF 1969, UTILITY REPLIED IT WOULD BE THE CHANCELLOR'S ALONE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE WOULD NEVER DIRECTLY MAKE THE REQUEST TO BE RETAINED BEYOND HIS LEGAL RETIREMENT AGE, BUT THAT HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT THE CHANCELLOR HIMSELF WOULD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH AN OVERLAP WOULD BE VITAL. IN THIS REGARD, UTILITY FEELS THAT HIS STRESSING TO THE CHANCELLOR THE

~~SECRET~~/RYBAT EGMA-70903 PAGE 1 **CS COPY**

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NECESSITY FOR ABOUT TEN YEARS OF EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND DIRECTION EXPERIENCE, TOGETHER WITH A LIKELY PROSPECT OF TEN YEARS' AVAILABILITY PRIOR TO RETIREMENT, IS UNDERSTOOD AND CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY THE CHANCELLOR. THE CHANCELLOR FURTHERMORE HAS PROMISED UTILITY THAT THE MATTER OF SUCCESSION WILL NOT BE INVOLVED WITH ANY POLITICAL "HORSE TRADING."

3. WITH REGARD TO THE SPD'S POSITION IN THE MATTER, UTILITY IS OF THE OPINION, BASED UPON TALKS WITH HERBERT R. WEHNER [

] THAT THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE CHANCELLOR TOWARDS CHOOSING A CIVILIAN OUTSIDER FOR AT LEAST ONE OF THE TOP TWO POSITIONS, BUT NOT TO THE POINT OF DRAGGING THE ISSUE OUT OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. IN THIS VEIN, HE STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH WEHNER THE QUALIFICATIONS OF DR. GUENTER REDDING [], THE HEAD OF THE LFV IN HAMBURG, WHOM WEHNER CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE SPD CANDIDATE. UTILITY TOLD WEHNER THAT EXPERIENCE GAINED WITH THE LFV IN HAMBURG OR WITH ANY LFV, OR WITH THE BFV, DOES NOT SATISFY THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CATSK POSITION. IN OTHER WORDS, CANDIDATES WITH ONLY INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND WOULD NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY EXPERIENCE IN HANDLING EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ASSOCIATED DUTIES AND PROBLEMS. UTILITY STATED THAT WEHNER ACKNOWLEDGED THE VALIDITY OF THIS VIEWPOINT AND, IN REDDING'S CASE, ADMITTED THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT FIT THE BILL.

4. IF, DESPITE THE ASSURANCES MENTIONED ABOVE, A "HORSE TRADING" ACTION OCCURS RESULTING IN AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESSOR BEING NAMED, UTILITY WOULD BE FORCED TO ENTER THE POLITICAL FIELD HIMSELF. IN DOING SO, HIS PURPOSE WOULD BE TO CHAMPION THE CAUSE OF RETAINING A NON-POLITICAL GERMAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE STAFFED WITH OFFICERS SELECTED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR EXPERIENCE AND QUALITY RATHER THAN THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS.

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PAGE 3

SECRET
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PAGE 3

Life of Hiding

End of a Top Spy

By Peter Wilms
Toronto Star

LEAD

"FACELESS" former Nazi general who has led the West's spy network in Europe for 20 years retires next year to a life of hiding. The general, Reinhard Gehlen, will have a double guard day and night for the rest of his life.

Gehlen is a man with a price on his head. East Germany, alone, has offered \$250,000 for him dead or alive. Gehlen made his home in the United States near the end of the war. He traded his own safety for Russian secrets.

He became the man without a face — the chief of a vast West German spy network with headquarters behind a high electrified fence in Munich's Pullach Forest. He was last photographed just after the war and was a man whom virtually nobody knew.

★ ★ ★

GEHLEN JOINED the West in an astonishing way. The door of an American patrol's chalet opened to reveal a gaunt, scruffy German with large, protruding ears.

He held under his arm a large bundle of papers. "I am General Reinhard Gehlen," he told the patrol leader.

But the American was not interested. With the war in Europe all but over, generals were not worth a pinch of salt. The allies were after the bigger fish — Himmler's security men and S.S. Black Guards.

Still, Gehlen insisted on his right to be heard. He said, he said, documents in which the Americans would be very interested. Finally, he was deposited with an intelligence officer.

★ ★ ★

HE SHOWED the officer the documents, and the American gasped, for they contained a run down on Russian strength — plans and weapons it would have taken the United States years to compile.

Gehlen was rushed to Washington, where he made a deal which ensured his own personal salvation from war prosecution and at the same time struck fear and hatred into the Communist bloc.

Now, after more than 20 years as the anchor-man for American intelligence in Europe, he is retiring. But he cannot be forgotten. During the war he ran a highly secret department known as Foreign Armies-East.

He was a trusted confidant of Hitler, until he told Hitler that it would be futile to attack Russia, whose strength he had accurately assessed from his agents in the area.

HITLER, with pompous disregard for the realities of the situation, declared: "This is the biggest bluff pulled since the days of Genghis Khan. Who is responsible for this appalling rubbish?"

It was Gehlen who was responsible, and Gehlen was right. At least it might have protracted Hitler's war and given him a chance to recoup his massive losses on other fronts.

But the Fuehrer went his way and General Gehlen went his — straight to the Americans. Having handed over his documents and revealed the position as it was, Gehlen made three demands:

- The staff of his unit should be directly under his orders; they should work as a purely German organization on a fixed budget financed by the Americans.

- Until Germany regained her sovereignty and formed a government of her own, he, Gehlen, should be regarded as a trustee of



GEHLEN IN NAZI UNIFORM

Last photograph of mysterious general

German interests in intelligence matters. And he should be free to pass his organization over to the German government after Germany had regained sovereignty.

★ ★ ★

THE AMERICANS accepted the lot. They could not afford to let this prize slip. The last of his conditions was achieved in 1955, when the network fell under the jurisdiction of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer was a friend and defended Gehlen through many crises.

The United States provided the master spy with a fixed budget of more than \$2.8 million a year and provided for him, his staff and their families a special compound from which they could operate in secret.

Now he was able not only to provide the Americans with the information they wanted, but to make them feel it was essential to recreate the German army to help in the defense of Europe against the Russians. His information convinced the United States that Germany should be re-armed, and, significantly, on Gehlen's recommendation his old chief, Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger, was appointed first Inspector General of the new West German army.

★ ★ ★

DURING his period as chief European spy for the West, Gehlen has been criticized often for making too much use of Himmler's S.S. men. He countered in an interview in 1963 with the Munich weekly, *Review* — the first he had given since taking his post — by saying that the Americans liked to have S.S. men.

Be that as it may, Gehlen succeeded in developing a spy network, said to employ more than 5000 agents, which is the envy of the West and the target of the East.

With a bit of luck he should die peacefully, unlike many of his contemporaries. But there will still be no photographs.

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BONN, DIRECTOR

RYBAT CATUSK

REF: EGMA 70903

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ABSTRACT	INDEX

1. ACCORDING TO WENDLAND, GEN GERHARD WESSEL AND GEN GEHLEN HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED BY THE CHANCELLOR THAT WESSEL WILL BE NOMINATED FOR POSITION OF PRESIDENT BND. IN ADDITION, WENDLAND WAS INFORMED BY CHANCELLOR THAT HE (WENDLAND) WOULD BE HIS NOMINEE FOR VICE PRESIDENT. NEXT STEP IS TO GET CONCURRENCE OF VICE CHANCELLOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER WILLY BRANDT. IF BRANDT AND SOCIALIST PARTY DO NOT CONCUR IN KIESINGER'S PLAN, CHANCELLOR TOLD ALL THREE CONCERNED, ACCORDING WENDLAND, THAT HE WILL DEFER NAMING SUCCESSOR AND WILL ASK GEHLEN TO STAY ON FOR ANOTHER YEAR.

2. CHANCELLOR HAS PROMISED NOT TO ENGAGE IN HORSE TRADING (NOTE: WENDLAND STATES THAT REFERENCE TO HORSE TRADING WAS MADE DIRECTLY BY CHANCELLOR), WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH GEHLEN'S OWN DESCRIPTION, REPORTED IN REF, OF TALKS HE HAS HAD WITH CHANCELLOR ON THIS SUBJECT.

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S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	West Germany	REPORT NO.	CS -311/11730-67
SUBJECT	Chancellor Kiesinger's Nominations for President and Vice-President of the German Intelligence Service	DATE DISTR.	15 November 1967
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO. October 1967

PLACE &
DATE ACQ. Germany, Munich (24 October 1967) FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Qualified American official from Horst Wendland (Paragraphs 1 and 2) and General Reinhard Gehlen (Paragraphs 2 and 3).

1. According to Chief of Staff and Acting Vice-President of the West German Intelligence Service (BND) Horst Wendland. General Gerhard Wessel and General Reinhard Gehlen have been notified by Chancellor Kiesinger that General Wessel will be nominated for the position of President of the BND. In addition, Wendland was told by the Chancellor that he (Wendland) would be the Chancellor's nominee for the Vice-Presidency of the BND. The Chancellor indicated that the next step would be to obtain the concurrence of Vice-Chancellor Willy Brandt. If Brandt and the Socialist Party (SPD) do not concur in Kiesinger's choice, the Chancellor told all three BND officials concerned that he will defer naming a successor and will ask Gehlen to stay on for another year.
2. Wendland noted that the Chancellor specifically promised that the matter of BND succession would not be a subject for political horse trading. This same promise was made by the Chancellor to General Gehlen during an earlier discussion about BND succession. However, General Gehlen expressed his feeling that the SPD view that one of the two top BND officers should be an outside civilian may result in some form of 'horse trading' within the coalition. Gehlen noted that if such action occurs and results in an unqualified successor being named, he would "be forced to enter the political field" himself. In doing so, his stated purpose would be to champion the cause of retaining a "non-political German national intelligence service staffed by officers selected on the basis of their experience and qualifications rather than their political affiliations".

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3. Gehlan expects that a successor will not be named before December of this year or possibly in January 1968 and that the Chancellor will find it necessary to extend General Gehlan's tenure to provide for a year's overlap with his successor in order that the new President would have sufficient time to become familiar with the position.

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FILE NO- [] X-REF TO []

DATE - 20 NOVEMBER 1967

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

INFO - CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH


FROM - CHIEF, EUR

SUBJ - CATUSK

UTILITY SUCCESSION

ACTION - NONE

REFS - NONE



1. IN BRIEF SESSION FOLLOWING WEEKLY WOROMP BRIEFING, 16 NOVEMBER, ALIAS DESSAU INFORMED UNDERSIGNED HE RECENTLY RECEIVED LETTER FROM SUBJECT []. LATTER HAD BEEN INVITED TO LONG AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION WITH CHANCELLOR WHICH LEFT IMPRESSION CHANCELLOR STILL INTENDS APPOINT SUBJ [] TO SUCCEED UTILITY EVENTUALLY, BUT THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS HE INTENDS POSTPONE THIS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

2. SUBJECT [] ALSO SAID HE BEING CONSIDERED FOR APPOINTMENT TO PROMINENT ARMY JOB AND WOULD ACCEPT WHATEVER ASSIGNMENT HE GIVEN. HE ENJOYING CURRENT DUTIES.

3. ALIAS DESSAU COMMENTED THAT IT HIS OPINION ANY ONE OF SEVERAL MEN COULD HANDLE ARMY JOB BUT THAT [] ONLY INDIVIDUAL CAPABLE OF SUCCEEDING UTILITY. DESSAU DID NOT INDICATE ANY GREAT SATISFACTION THAT UTILITY MIGHT REMAIN ON JOB.

[]

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Still Without Face

BONN (Reuters). — Reinhard Gehlen, known as the man without a face, is retiring as head of the West German counterespionage organization which he has led since shortly after World War II.

Most people know little of him other than his name and age. For Mr. Gehlen has ruled his network of cloak-and-dagger men from behind a veil of anonymity at his headquarters surrounded by barbed wire near Munich. As far as is known, no photograph has been taken of him in the last 23 years.

The last one, taken in 1944, shows him as a balding, slightly built 40-year-old in the uniform of a Wehrmacht colonel.

Nineteen years later, the East German security service put a big price on his head—a testimonial to the effectiveness with which his post-war apparatus was already working.

after he had received training in secret service work in the first years of Nazi rule.

Linked With Eastern Front

Promoted to colonel in 1942, he took over the department called Foreign Armies East, in the army general staff, where his duties were to collect and analyze information about the enemy on and behind the Eastern Front.

When Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of the German counterespionage service, fell in disfavor in the same year, Mr. Gehlen set up his own counterespionage network.

Mr. Gehlen, who managed to save his massive Secret Service files in the chaos of the final weeks of a war, quickly awakened the interest of the Americans when he was captured in Bavaria.

After careful interrogation in Washington, he was sent back to Germany and given his own department to analyze information from Eastern Europe.

His work there proved invaluable to the Americans, and he was given a free hand to expand his network from a base near Munich.

After that, the veil of secrecy

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S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	West Germany	REPORT NO.	CS-311/12308-67
SUBJECT	Delay in Appointment of Successor to General Gehlen	DATE DISTR.	1 December 1967
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO. Mid-November 1967
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Germany
(15 November 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A senior official of the West German Federal Intelligence Service who is in frequent contact with American intelligence officers in a liaison capacity. He obtained the information informally from General Wessel.

1. Lieutenant General Gerhard Wessel, German Military Representative to NATO in Brussels said he had just recently had a long and friendly discussion with Chancellor Kiesinger during which Kiesinger indicated that he had not changed his mind about eventually appointing General Wessel to succeed General Gehlen as president of the BND.¹ Kiesinger said, however, that for "political reasons" he intended to postpone the appointment as long as possible.
2. General Wessel commented that he was also being considered for appointment to a prominent army position (not further specified) and said he would accept whichever assignment he was given. He expressed satisfaction with his present duties in Brussels and said he had no anxiety about the future.

¹Headquarters Comment: Chancellor Kiesinger's choices for the positions of President and Vice-President of the BND were reported in CS-311/11730-67.

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5 DEC 67 IN 06267

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DIRECTOR, MUNICH, BONN

CATIDE

1. FYI: UTILITY'S BROTHER MENTIONED THAT GENERAL OFFICER TENTATIVELY SELECTED REPLACE UTILITY WAS "CONNIE", FORMER CATIDE REP WASHINGTON.


2. BECAUSE OF POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS APPROVING NEW CHIEF, HOWEVER, UTILITY'S BROTHER BELIEVES THAT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD UTILITY WILL BE EXTENDED FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD.

3. UTILITY'S BROTHER HIMSELF WILL RETIRE AS "BEAMTER", BUT WILL CONTINUE ON INDEFINITELY IN PRESENT CAPACITY AS "ANGESTELLTER".

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DIRECTOR, MUNICH INFO BERLIN, HAMBURG

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ABSTRACT X	INDEX

7 DEC 67 110753Z
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1. JUSTICE MINISTRY STATE SECRETARY EHMKE TOLD
5 DECEMBER THAT SPD HAD DECIDED TO SUPPORT CANDIDACY OF
GENERAL WESSEL AS REPLACEMENT FOR GEHLEN SINCE THIS, IN
THEIR OPINION, BEST OF CHOICES OFFERED. EHMKE SAID THAT
CDU/CSU HAD ALSO SUGGESTED AMB. SCHNIPPENKOEITER, BUT THIS
UNACCEPTABLE TO SPD.

2. AS QUID PRO QUO FOR SUPPORTING WESSEL, SPD WANTS
TO HAVE RIGHT TO NOMINATE BND'S NUMBER TWO MAN. PRESENT
TWO SPD CANDIDATES ARE DR. NOLLAU, BFV VICE PRESIDENT AND
DR. REDDING, CHIEF LFW, HAMBURG. NOLLAU IN STRONGER
POSITION BECAUSE HE HAS SUPPORT OF HERBERT WEHNER WHILE
THERE IS SOME OPPOSITION WITHIN SPD TO REDDING. SPD WILL
MAKE NOMINATION FOR THE NUMBER TWO POSITION SHORTLY.

3. ☐ TOLD ☐ 6 DECEMBER THAT CHANCELLOR
HAD NOT MADE A DECISION ABOUT BND VICE PRESIDENT. BOTH
☐ AND CHANCELLOR ARE INCLINED APPOINT GENERAL
WENDLAND TO POSITION. AT THIS POINT THEY DO NOT THINK

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DEC 21 1967
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PAGE 2 BONN 2115 SECRET

THEY WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL APPOINTEE NOMINATED
BY SPD. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN THEIR MINDS ON PRESIDENT,
THEY ARE READY APPOINT WESSEL.

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE				
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
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		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. VIENNA 4251 IN 12630		14 Dec 67
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>14.</div> <div> <p>ALIAS FLEMING TOLD [] IN VIENNA ON 13 DECEMBER</p> <p>THAT CATUSK IN SAD STATE AFFAIRS WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO FACT</p> <p>UTILITY STILL HANGING ON DESPITE FACT HE TIRED AND HAS LOST HIS TOUCH.</p> <p>@ FLEMING THINKS UTILITY MAY RESIGN EARLY 1968 IF HE CAN GET GENERAL</p> <p>WESSEL CONFIRMED AS HIS SUCCESSOR.</p> </div> </div>				
<div style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;"> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY</p> <p>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</p> <p>SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B</p> <p>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT</p> <p>DATE 2005</p> </div>				
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; flex-grow: 1; text-align: center;"> <i>Gehlen 201</i> </div> </div>		

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SECRET 151541Z CITE BONN 2273

DIRECTOR, MUNICH

RYBAT CATUSK CAVATA

REF: MUNICH 1645 (408895)

15 DEC 67 11 33 14

ACT 100

1. 14 DEC 67 CAVATA 11 INFORMED ☐ OF CONDITIONS

HE WILL SUBMIT IN WRITING TO CHANCELLERY IF AND WHEN HE IS OFFICIALLY OFFERED VICE PRESIDENCY OF CATUSK. CAVATA 11 SAID THAT ☐ IS THE ONLY OTHER PERSON WITH WHOM HE HAS DISCUSSED THESE CONDITIONS. THE CONDITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A) STRICT DELINEATION OF DUTIES BETWEEN CHIEF CATUSK AND CAVATA 11 WITH UNDERSTANDING THE CHIEF HAS FINAL AUTHORITY ON ALL MATTERS.
 B) ASSIGNMENT TO C-11 OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL.

C) FREE HAND IN REORGANIZING CATUSK, CHANGE ITS PERSONNEL HIRING HABITS AND METHODS TO INCLUDE TRANSFERRING OR FIRING PRESENT EMPLOYEES (CAVATA 11 STATED, BUT HE WILL NOT INCLUDE IN HIS WRITTEN NOTE, THAT HIS MAIN TARGETS HERE ARE SOME OF THE MILITARY, NOT FURTHER SPECIFIED, AND THE NEPOTISTIC RETINUE OF UTILITY.)

D) AUTHORITY TO SELECT COMPETENT EMPLOYEES FROM OTHER MINISTRIES WHOM THE CHANCELLERY WILL THEN ASK TO TRANSFER TO CATUSK

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DB 16702

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PAGE 2 BONN 2273 S E C R E T

RATHER THAN CATUSK HAVING TO RELY SOLELY ON ITS OWN JOB OFFERS TO THESE EMPLOYEES.

E) NEW SLATE OF OFFICERS (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) TO BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR CATUSK MATTERS IN THE CHANCELLERY. (CAVATA 11 SAID HE WILL NOT PUT UP WITH THESE INCUMBENTS WHOM HE CALLS "UTILITY'S LACKEYS").

F) BOTH THE NEW CHIEF AND ~~THE~~ DEPUTY CHIEF MUST BE APPOINTED AND ASSUME NEW POST SIMULTANEOUSLY.

G) ABOVE CONDITIONS MUST BE AGREED TO IN WRITING BY THE CHANCELLERY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CHANCELLOR HIMSELF.

2. ~~C~~ ³ POINTED OUT, AND CAVATA 11 AGREED, THAT PARA 1 E ABOVE IS THE MOST DIFFICULT CONDITION BUT CAVATA 11 APPEARED ADAMANT IN HIS DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT NOMINATION UNLESS ALL REPEAT ALL THE ABOVE CONDITIONS ARE MET. CAVATA ADMITTED THAT THE CHANCES OF THESE CONDITIONS BEING FULFILLED ARE INDEED VERY ~~W~~^SILIM BUT HE SAID HE HAS SOME HOPE BECAUSE VERY WELL PLACED AND RELIABLE SOURCES OF HIS HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THE CHANCELLOR IS TOTALLY DISENCHANTED WITH CATUSK'S PERSONNEL AND THEIR PRODUCT. IN THIS RESPECT, PLEASE NOTE THAT CHIEF CASTIRRUP, WHO ACCOMPANIED THE CHANCELLOR DURING HIS ASIAN TRIP, TOLD ~~C~~ ³ THAT THE CHANCELLOR AND HIS PARTY WERE APPALLED BY THE POOR

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PAGE 3 BONN 2273 S E C R E T

PERFORMANCE OF THE VARIOUS CATUSK REPRESENTATIVES THEY MET DURING THIS TRIP.

3. CAVATA 11 SAID THAT PROFESSIONALLY SPEAKING THE SWITCH TO CATUSK WOULD NOT BE A PROMOTION FOR HIM AND, THEREFORE, HE WOULD NOT BE UPSET IF HE DID NOT GET THE JOB. FROM A PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE TO MUNICH, WHERE TWO OF HIS DAUGHTERS RESIDE AND WHICH IS SO CLOSE TO THE SKI SLOPES.

4. STATION HAS ONLY ONE COMMENT, NAMELY WE ARE CONVINCED CAVATA/11 IS DEAD SERIOUS ABOUT THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED ABOVE - THERE WAS NO TONGUE IN CHEEK ATTITUDE.

S E C R E T

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Nonsense
L.C. para 4
is!

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SECRET 081525Z CITE MUNICH 1645
PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO BONN (EYES ONLY)
SECTION 1 OF 2
RYBAT CATUSK CAVATA

FILE	INDEX
ABSTRACT	INDEX

08 DEC 1978 895

REF ID: A70903
ON 11 DECEMBER ALIAS BERNHARDT OF CATUSK TOLD
IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE ALLEGEDLY UNBEKNOWNST TO

UTILITY) THAT HERBERT WEHNER *C* WAS DEMANDING
Guenter NOLLAU.
APPOINTMENT OF CAVATA/II FOR THE SECOND SPOT IN CATUSK
AS CONDITION FOR SPD AGREEMENT TO THE CHANCELLOR'S
SELECTION FOR THE NUMBER ONE POSITION. BERNHARDT GAVE
GREDENCE TO THE REPORT BECAUSE, HE SAID, IT WAS WEHNER
WHO HAD INSISTED THAT CAVATA/II BE KEPT ON AT CAVATA WHEN
THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR WANTED TO RELIEVE HIM OF ALL
DUTIES AFTER THE RECENT PUBLICATION AFFAIR. WEHNER PRESUMABLY
SAID THAT ALTHOUGH CAVATA/II WAS NO PARTY MEMBER HE HAD DONE
A GREAT DEAL FOR THE PARTY. BERNHARDT FEARED THAT THE
APPOINTMENT OF BOTH PRINCIPAL OFFICERS WOULD BE DECIDED AS A
PACKAGE DEAL.

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2. HIS REASON FOR INFORMING WOFIRM AT THIS STAGE WAS

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THAT UNDER CURRENT SECURITY REGULATIONS BOTH AT NATO AND AT CATUSK BERNHARDT COULD NOT GRANT CAVATA/11 EITHER COSMIC, SIGINT OR COMINT CLEARANCES, ALL OF WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE AS NUMBER TWO MAN AT CATUSK. BERNHARDT SAID THAT IF CAVATA/11 WERE TO BE APPOINTED HE (BERNHARDT) WOULD BE FORCED TO GRANT HIM CLEARANCES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES. HE THEN CITED A NUMBER OF OLD ITEMS IN THE CAVATA/11 FILE, HIS EARLY POSTWAR YEARS IN THE SOVZONE, THE ALLEGATIONS OF SOME PUNISHABLE ACTIVITY THERE, HIS ALLEGED DEPARTURE FROM THE SOVZONE UNDER DUBIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, AND A FEW OTHER ITEMS, NONE OF WHICH HE SAID HAD EVER BEEN CLEARED UP TO THE POINT WHERE CAVATA/11 COULD BE HIRED BY CATUSK SHOULD HE BE CONSIDERED FOR ORDINARY EMPLOYMENT. BERNHARDT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WOFIRM COULD COME UP WITH DEROGATORY INFORMATION WHICH COULD BE USED TO FORESTALL FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF CAVATA/11 FOR THE JOB. THE SUGGESTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE HEARD IN THE PAST CONCERNING THE APPOINTMENTS AND INDEED WE COULD FORESEE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE PRIME CATUSK-SPONSORED CANDIDATE FOR THE NUMBER ONE POSITION MIGHT EVEN FLATLY

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REFUSE TO SERVE IF HE WERE FORCED TO ACCEPT CAVATA/11 AS HIS DEPUTY.

3. BONN COMMENTS THAT:

A. THE SPD SPONSORSHIP OF CAVATA/11 FOR CATUSK VICE PRESIDENCY GAINS CREDENCE IN VIEW OF INFORMATION FROM SEVERAL BONN SOURCES WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL MANEUVERING SURROUNDING RETIREMENT OF UTILITY. PER PREVIOUS REPORTING SPD INITIALLY WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO NOMINATE THEIR OWN CANDIDATE TO REPLACE UTILITY, CONSIDERING AT ONE TIME EVEN AID MINISTER WISCHNEWSKI. ACCORDING TO CALLIAS, SPD HAS NOW FINALLY AGREED TO ACCEPT WESSEL AND CABINET IS SET TO APPROVE HIS APPOINTMENT MOMENTARILY. WITH THEIR FAILURE TO ATTAIN TOP POSITION SPD CAN BE EXPECTED TO INSIST THAT NUMBER TWO SLOT GO TO MAN OF THEIR CHOOSING.

B. WITH RESPECT TO WEHNER'S SUPPORT OF CAVATA/11, THIS IS ESSENTIALLY HOW HE GOT THE CAVATA VICE PRESIDENCY. AFTER THE RETIREMENT OF THE PREVIOUS VICE PRESIDENT, MINISTER LUECKE OFFERED TO THE SPD THE OPPORTUNITY TO NOMINATE AN SPD MAN. IT WAS A POLITICAL MOVE TO PLACATE THE

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SPD WHO HAD ATTACKED CAVATA DURING THE TELEPHONE AFFAIR. AFTER CONSIDERING NUMEROUS SPD PARTY MEMBERS, WEHNER FINALLY INFORMED LUECKE THAT THE SPD'S CANDIDATE WAS CAVATA/11 AND HE WAS PROMPTLY APPOINTED. AFTER CAVATA/11 WROTE HIS UNTIMELY ARTICLE ON DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE STERN MAGAZINE, LUECKE WAS ABOUT TO FIRE C/11 FOR MEDDLING IN POLITICS, BUT WEHNER CAME TO C/11'S DEFENSE AND CONVINCED LUECKE THAT C/11 HAD NOT WRITTEN THE ARTICLE AT SPD REQUEST. WEHNER AGAIN UNDOUBTEDLY CONSIDERS C/11 THE MOST QUALIFIED MAN AVAILABLE TO THE SPD FOR THE JOB.

4. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH BONN, STATION POSITION IS THAT, WE CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT COMMENT TO CATUSK OR TO ANYONE ELSE OFFICIALLY ON THE QUALIFICATIONS OR LACK THEREOF OF ANY CANDIDATE. THE DECISION IS STRICTLY AN INTERNAL GERMAN DECISION AND WE CANNOT PERMIT OURSELVES TO BE PLACED IN A POSITION OF BEING ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE THE APPOINTMENT. MUNICH THEREFORE TELLING BERNHARDT THAT WE HAVE NO COMMENT NOR CAN WE ADD ANY INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO C/11'S SECURITY FILE, EXCEPT THAT IT OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT INTERIOR MINISTRY AND CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED C/11 YEARS

~~SECRET~~

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AGO WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

5. FYI: BONN HAS REVIEWED THEIR EXTENSIVE C/11 FILE, WHICH CONTAINS DETAILS ON NUMEROUS RUMORS AND ACCUSATIONS AGAINST C/11, WHICH INVESTIGATED AT HIS REQUEST, BUT NEVER WERE CONFIRMED. FILE INDICATES THAT UTILITY PERSONALLY AND NUMEROUS OTHER CATUSK SOURCES REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED THEIR DOUBTS AGAINST C/11, BUT NOTHING WAS EVER PROVEN. BONN REVIEWED C/11'S SECURITY FILE PRIOR TO HIS LAST VISIT TO WOLADY WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

6. GIVEN THE MUTUALLY KNOWN DISLIKE OF CAVATA/11 FOR CATUSK AND THE EQUALLY WELL KNOWN ANTIPATHY OF NUMEROUS SENIOR CATUSKERS TOWARD CAVATA/11 MUNICH BELIEVES THAT THE ACTUAL APPOINTMENT OF CAVATA/11 TO NUMBER TWO SPOT WOULD CREATE SITUATION WELL NIGH UNTENABLE FOR BOTH SIDES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY HARMFUL TO WOFIRM/CATUSK RELATIONSHIP. CAVATA/11 COULD BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT INFLUENCE UPON CATUSK PERSONNEL POLICY ESPECIALLY CONCERNING SENIOR POSITIONS. MANY SENIOR CATUSKERS COULD BE EXPECTED TO MEET HIM WITH DISTRUST AND RESENTMENT WHILE OTHERS MIGHT WELL

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

S E C R E T 081525Z CITE MUNICH 1645

8 DEC 67 110888Z

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO BONN (EYES ONLY) □ □

FINAL SECTION OF 2

CONSIDER SEPARATION FROM THEIR SERVICE. C/11 WOULD BE CONSIDERED A PARTY POLITICAL SPD PENETRATION OF CATUSK IF NOTHING WORSE. WOFIRM COULD EXPECT HIM TO MAKE HYPERCRITICAL REPORT TO THE SPD OF OUR CURRENT AND PAST LIAISON ACTIVITIES INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL ASPECTS THEREOF. AS PART OF CHAIN REACTION AND IN SELF DEFENSE CATUSK WOULD BE MORE OR LESS FORCED TO REDUCE THESE ACTIVITIES MATERIALLY WITH CONCOMMITTANT DISADVANTAGES FOR BOTH ORGANIZATIONS.

7. MUNICH CONSIDERS IT QUITE POSSIBLE, IF NOT PROBABLE, THAT THE NOMINATION OF CAVATA/11, MAY BE DESCRIBED AS A PLOY WHEREBY, AFTER CAVATA/11'S NAME WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, THE SPD WOULD THEN COME UP WITH OTHER CANDIDATES WHO IN CONTRAST TO CAVATA/11 MIGHT BECOME ACCEPTABLE.

8. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ABOVE ASPECT, ALIAS WENDT STATED THAT MOST RECENT CABINET MEETING

SECRET

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CONCERNED ONLY WITH MORE IMMEDIATE MATTERS AND
ADJOURNED SOONER THAN SCHEDULED DUE TO A "COLD"
AFFLICTING THE CHANCELLOR. ACCORDING TO WENDT,
UTILITY FEELS CHANCELLOR STILL COMMITTED TO CATUSK
PACKAGE, WESSEL AND WENDT.

S E C R E T

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DATE: 8 December 1967

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CITE DIRECTOR 58415

BONN INFO MUNICH

RYBAT CATUSK CAVATA

REF: MUNICH 1645 (IN 08895)

QUITE AGREE STATION POSITION PARA 4 REF AND AS SEEN FROM
HERE INCLINED A SHARE UTILITY'S VIEW LAST SENTENCE PARA 2.
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DATE 2005

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COUNTRY West Germany REPORT NO. CS-311/12918-67
SUBJECT SPD Views on Succession to Presidency and Vice Presidency of the BND DATE DISTR. 20 December 1967
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 5 December 1967

PLACE & Germany, Bonn

DATE ACQ. (5 December 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Qualified American observer from State Secretary Horst Ehmke of the West German Ministry of Justice.

1. On 5 December State Secretary Horst Ehmke stated that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had decided to support the candidacy of Lieutenant General Gerhard Wessel as the successor to General Reinhard Gehlen as President of the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Ehmke indicated that the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) had also suggested Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter for this position but the SPD found his candidacy unacceptable.

2. As a quid pro quo for supporting General Wessel, the SPD wants to have the right to nominate the Vice President of the BND. The candidates under current consideration by the SPD are Dr. Guenther Nollau, Vice President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), and Dr. Guenther Redding, President of the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in Hamburg. According to Ehmke, Nollau is in a stronger position since he has the support of Deputy SPD party chief Herbert Wehner while there is some opposition within the SPD to Redding. Ehmke predicted that the SPD would make their nomination for the BND Vice Presidency rather soon.

Headquarters Comment: For General Wessel's remarks about his candidacy and Chancellor Kiesinger's comments to him, see CS-311/12308-67.

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DATE 2005

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E/G/R	2	E/BOON	1	NO PROJECT
E/G/R/W	1	FI/D/E	1	
E/G/CE	1	CI/INT	1	
TOTALS				
IE 2, CI 4, FI 4, EUR 7 (2), DO 1.				

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CE/RB
MAK

SECRET 291410Z DEC 67 CITE EUCA 1856

DIRECTOR

LCLODE CATUSK

REF DIRECTOR 0512
EUCA

MUNICH ADVISES EQUIPMENT WAS TO BE GIFT TO CHIEF,
CATUSK WITH NO CATUSK KNOWLEDGE. THEY DO NOT DESIRE OBTAIN
TECHNICAL DATA AT THIS TIME AND HAVE REQUESTED REQUIREMENT
BE CANCELLED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

SECRET

SECRET

EUCA 0512 2 Nov 67

Munich base requested info on VHF paging system, 4 person, 7-10 mile
range, answer back capability, including prices.

OC/ED answered 20 Nov 67 via dispatch would need know more prior recommending
specific system.

This is Munich's answer.

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EUCA 1856

STA & NR

02 JAN 68

DATE

20985A

IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PLEASE CORRECT REF LINE TO READ "REF: EUCA 0512"

CE/MAB

slug line is

LCODE CATUSK

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DATE 2005

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SECRET 101714Z JAN 68 CITE MUNICH 1956

DIRECTOR, BONN

RYBAT CATUSK

PS	SECRET
ABSTRACT	INDEX

10 JAN 68 27482

1. UTILITY FULLY BELIEVES HE WILL BE ASKED BY CHANCELLOR TO STAY ON ANOTHER YEAR BECAUSE OF IMPASSE INVOLVING THE NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT TEAM DESIGNATION. HE ALSO FEELS CONFIDENT THAT NOLLAU WILL BE DROPPED AS A CANDIDATE BECAUSE OF A GREAT DEAL OF OPPOSITION TOWARDS HIM BOTH IN AND OUT OF CATUSK. AT THE SAME TIME, HE FEELS THAT SPD WILL STILL TRY TO NAME THE NUMBER TWO MAN EVEN IF IT IS NOT TO BE NOLLAU, WHICH WOULD PRESENT UTILITY WITH SOMETHING OF A PROBLEM REGARDING STATUS OF ALIAS WENDT, WHO HAS BEEN ACTING VICE PRESIDENT MOST OF 1967. THIS ASSUMES, OF COURSE, THAT ANY SPD NOMINEE FOR THE JOB IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHANCELLOR, TO THE NEW PRESIDENT, AND ALSO TO UTILITY AND CATUSK.

10 JAN 1968

2. FOR HIS PART, WENDT STATES THAT IF HE IS PASSED OVER FOR SOMEONE ELSE, PARTICULARLY AN OUTSIDER, AS VICE PRESIDENT, HE WOULD PROBABLY RESIGN, STATING THAT AFTER THIRTY YEARS OF SERVICE TO HIS COUNTRY HE DOES NOT HAVE TO TAKE ANY DOWNGRADING. HE HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOVERNMENT, BUT EVEN MORE OUTSIDE OF

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 1956 S E C R E T

GOVERNMENT WITH WHOM HE COULD ASSOCIATE HIMSELF IN A POST-RETIREMENT CAREER.

3. IN EXPRESSING HIS EXPECTANCY TO BE ASKED TO STAY ANOTHER YEAR, UTILITY BELIEVES THAT DURING SUCH AN EXTENSION PERIOD THE CHANCELLOR MAY FIND AN AD HOC SITUATION WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO NAME UTILITY'S SUCCESSOR AND A VICE PRESIDENT SUITABLE ALL AROUND AND, IF SUCH APPOINTMENTS WERE NOT OBNOXIOUS TO UTILITY, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONCUR AND STEP DOWN TO ASSUME THE ADVISORY ROLE WHICH HE EXPECTS TO TAKE IN ANY EVENT, WHETHER THE SUCCESSION COMES EARLY OR LATE.

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET

CITE TDCS DB-315/00150-68

DIST 12 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY WEST GERMANY

DOI 10 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT APPOINTMENT OF NEW PRESIDENT OF THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE

1412 23 0752

ACQ GERMANY, MUNICH (12 JANUARY 1968)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE AMERICAN OFFICIAL WHO CONDUCTS FORMAL LIAISON WITH THE WEST
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (BND) FROM REINHARD GEHLEN,
PRESIDENT OF THE BND. GEHLEN ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION
SHOULD BE CLOSELY HELD UNTIL IT IS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY.

1. AT A CABINET MEETING ON 10 JANUARY 1968, CHANCELLOR
KIESINGER ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
GERHARD WESSEL TO SUCCEED REINHARD GEHLEN AS PRESIDENT OF THE
WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (BND) AS OF 1 MAY 1968. VICE
CHANCELLOR BRANDT HAD AGREED TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE CABINET
APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT UNANIMOUSLY.

2. THE DATE FOR THE APPOINTMENT TO BECOME EFFECTIVE WAS
CHOSEN IN PART BECAUSE IT PERMITS SUFFICIENT TIME TO SELECT

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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SUCCESSOR TO WESSEL AT NATO, AN APPOINTMENT FOR WHICH THE CONCURRENCE OF NATO PARTNERS IS REQUIRED. GENERAL FELBER IS THE LEADING CANDIDATE FOR THIS POSITION. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PRESUMABLY MAJ. GEN. ERNST FERBER.)

3. A NEW VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BND HAS NOT YET BEEN APPOINTED. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE SPD HAD NOMINATED GUENTHER NOLLAU, WHO IS NOW VICE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (BFV).) ON THE BASIS OF GEHLEN'S REPORT TO KIESINGER THAT NOLLAU COULD NOT BE GRANTED THE BND SECURITY CLEARANCES NECESSARY FOR HIS APPOINTMENT AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BND, KIESINGER DROPPED NOLLAU'S NAME FROM CONSIDERATION. THE ONLY QUALIFIED PERSONS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR THIS APPOINTMENT ARE FROM WITHIN THE BND, AND GEHLEN IS CONFIDENT THAT THE BND'S ACTING VICE PRESIDENT, MAJOR GENERAL HORST WENDLAND, WILL BE CHOSEN.

4. FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE.

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12 JAN 68 29176

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR (ATTN L

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RYBAT CATUSK

1. UTILITY REQUESTS ADDRESSEES BE NOTIFIED FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	E/G/CE
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

A. AT CABINET MEETING 10 JANUARY 68, AFTER PRIOR COORDINATION AND AGREEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER BRANDT, CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ANNOUNCED FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF WESSEL TO SUCCEED UTILITY EFFECTIVE 1 MAY 68. CABINET APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY.

B. ON BASIS UTILITY REPORT TO KIESINGER THAT NOLLAU COULD NOT BE GRANTED CATUSK SECURITY CLEARANCES NECESSARY FOR APPOINTMENT AS VICE PRESIDENT, KIESINGER AGREED AND DROPPED NOLLAU'S NAME FROM CONSIDERATION. IN KEEPING WITH WESSEL'S POSITION, KNOWN TO THE CHANCELLOR, THAT VICE PRESIDENT MUST BE PERSON HAVING APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF CATUSK AND CONFORM TO STANDARDS ESTABLISHED FOR THIS POSITION, UTILITY IS CONFIDENT THAT ALIAS WENDT WILL BE NAMED NUMBER TWO MAN. UTILITY ADDED THERE NO OTHER QUALIFIED NAMES IN THE HOPPER OUTSIDE OF CATUSK

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 1990 S E C R E T

FOR THIS POSITION.

C. UTILITY BELIEVES STORY MAY HIT PRESS OVER THE WEEK END. WESSEL HAS BEEN INFORMED. UTILITY HAS BEEN SO BUSY THE PAST TWO DAYS HIS OWN WIFE DOES NOT YET KNOW OF THIS CHANGE.

D. ALTHOUGH NOT YET ESTABLISHED, UTILITY WILL BE AVAILABLE AND EXPECTS TO BE DESIGNATED TO PLAY ADVISORY ROLE TO SUCCESSOR FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD.

E. APPOINTMENT MADE AT THIS TIME DUE TO KIESINGER'S FINGERSPITZENGEFUEHL THAT WEDNESDAY, 10 MARCH OFFERED AN IDEAL POLITICAL MOMENT TO RECEIVE FULL CABINET APPROVAL WHICH MIGHT NOT ARISE AGAIN FOR SOME TIME. EFFECTIVE DATE CHOSEN, AMONG OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, BECAUSE IT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT TIME TO SELECT SUCCESSOR TO WESSEL AT NATO, WHICH APPOINTMENT HAS TO BE CONCURRED IN BY VARIOUS NATO PARTNERS. UTILITY STATES THAT GENERAL FELBER THE LEADING CANDIDATE.

2. FOR HIS PART, UTILITY HAS NO INTENTION OF RETIRING ALTOGETHER FROM THE SCENE. HE HAS LAID ASIDE POSSIBLE PLANS FOR ASSUMING A POLITICAL ROLE UNDER CSU BANNER ON THE BASIS THAT CATUSK HAS ENOUGH PROBLEMS WITHOUT HIS SADDLING CATUSK WITH THOSE WHICH COULD ARISE IF HE, WHOSE NAME IS ENTERTWINED

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PAGE 3 MUNICH 1990 S E C R E T

WITH THE HISTORY AND DESIGNATION OF CATUSK FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS, BECAME A POLITICAL FIGURE.

3. UTILITY CANNOT MAKE LONG DELAYED TRIP TO WOFIRM HEADQUARTERS UNTIL AFTER 1 MAY 68 DUE TO FLOOD OF BUSINESS WHICH WILL FOLLOW ANNOUNCEMENT. WOULD STILL LIKE TO MAKE VISIT SOME TIME IN MAY TO FORMALLY SEVER HIS OFFICIAL TIES WITH WOFIRM AND LNHARP INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. [] ASSURED HIM THE WELCOME MAT WILL STILL BE OUT WHENEVER VISIT CAN BE SCHEDULED.

4. FOR FIRST TIME SINCE SUMMER 67, UTILITY DISPLAYED EMOTIONAL STRAIN AND APPEARED IN STATE OF SEMI-SHOCK IN IMPARTING THIS NEWS. HE LOOKED HAGGARD, *WORN*, ~~AND~~ AND DEPRESSED DESPITE FACT SUCCESSION TAKING SHAPE AS HE HAD HOPED IT WOULD. IT UNDERSTANDABLE THAT IMPACT OF HIS OFFICIAL SEVERANCE FROM LEADERSHIP OF CATUSK--SPANNING BOTH THE CONCEPTION AND EXECUTION WARTIME PLANS, THROUGH OCCUPATION PERIOD, AND LEGALIZATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF HIS GROUP AS OFFICIAL MHBRUSH SERVICE THESE PAST 12 YEARS--BOUND TO CAUSE SOME KIND OF SHOCK REACTION. [] MADE APPROPRIATE REMARKS CONCERNING MIXED EMOTIONS OF REGRET IN LOSING UTILITY AS A PARTNER AND SATISFACTION AT WESSEL'S QUALIFICATIONS AND

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PAGE 4 MUNICH 1990 S E C R E T

WOLADY-ORIENTED ATTITUDE. UTILITY WAS GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT
WOFIRM MOST DEFINITELY WANTS TO BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION
WITH UTILITY REGARDING HIS POST-SERVICE ACTIVITIES.

5. UTILITY REQUESTS HOLD DOWN THIS INFO UNTIL PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENT.

S E C R E T

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RYBAT CATUSK

REF MUNICH 1990 (W29176)

PLEASE CORRECT 10 MARCH IN PARA 1E REF TO READ 10 JANUARY.
 GENERAL FELBER CITED PARA 1E NOW IDENTIFIED AS MAJ GEN ERNST
 FERBER, CHIEF OF NATO STANDING GROUP.

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NEW YORK TIMES
16 January 1968

Gehlen Is Retiring as German Intelligence Chief

Wessel Will Succeed Him
in Bonn Post Next May 1

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Jan. 15—The West German Government announced today that it had picked a seasoned military intelligence officer, Lieut. Gen. Gerhard Wessel, to succeed Reinhard Gehlen as head of the Government's Intelligence Service.

General Wessel, 54, has been the West German representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Military Committee, first in Washington and later in Brussels, and has had experience in artillery and armored warfare. But his principal assignments have been in intelligence.

He will take over May 1, a month after General Gehlen's 66th birthday and compulsory retirement. General Wessel is a protégé of his predecessor.

During World War II, General Gehlen commanded the I-C section of Hitler's Supreme Army Command, which kept watch on the Red Army and all that went on behind the front lines. In 1945 he defected to the American Army, bringing most of his staff and files to the Office of Strategic Services, a predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Since then full-face photographs of General Gehlen have not been publicly available and he has worked closely with United States intelligence agencies, which gave him a new lease on life.

An artillery captain in 1941, the 27-year-old Wessel went straight from a course in the War Academy to General Gehlen's section.

The young intelligence officer was reputed to have such a keen analytical mind that he

was able to forecast a major Soviet offensive in January, 1945, four days before it occurred. Hitler dismissed the analysis as "completely idiotic" and recommended that the officer, by this time a lieutenant colonel, be sent to a mental asylum. On Jan. 12, 1945, Soviet troops cracked the German lines as predicted, and Colonel Wessel stayed on with General Gehlen.

In 1952 General Gehlen detached Colonel Wessel from their work for the Americans and sent him from their tightly guarded compound in the Mu-

neo Head Has Long Served
on NATO Committee

nich suburb of Pullach to Bonn to help organize intelligence services for the new West German Army.

General Wessel, appointed full colonel in 1955, and brigadier general in 1958, is regarded as the founder of the West German Army's counter-

intelligence service, which he headed for seven years. In 1962 he took command of the Second Armored Infantry Brigade at Braunschweig.

Like his mentor General Wessel has stayed in the background as much as possible. He is not listed in West German directories. An East German listing of Nazis published in 1965 lists him as "confidential agent of Nazi General Gehlen."

General Wessel, a dark-haired man, is tall enough to be called "der grosse Gerhard" by his comrades. He is married and has two children. He was born Dec. 24, 1913, in the Holstein city of Neumünster, the son of a pastor. He joined the German Army in 1932, directly after graduation from high school.

General Wessel takes over an organization whose reputation for omniscience has suffered seriously in recent years. The "Gehlen Organization" has been the butt of mockery by Western spy novelists, and occasionally by Communist espionage authorities. Many of its agents have been captured in East Germany and several have been exposed in the Soviet Union.

The West German Intelligence Service no longer has the high-level entrée it had under the late Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Last summer, a government spokesman, Conrad Ahlers, said his Public Information Office was quicker with news about the Arab-Israeli conflict than the intelligence service. Its annual budget is said to be more than \$25-million.

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Reds Infiltrated Agency**Reds Within Plagued German Spymaster**

BONN (UPI)—The spymaster who has been Germany's eyes and ears in Eastern Europe for a quarter century is retiring this year with his veil of mystery still unturned.

Only a couple of pictures of Reinhard Gehlen, none recent, most of them with his features hidden behind dark glasses and in the shadow of a wide-brimmed hat, have ever been published.

His personality is as little known as his face.

Like all men who surround themselves with an air of mystery, he is thought by the general public to be a figure of glamor and a near genius directing a corps of the world's best spies and top analysts, always one jump ahead of the permanent enemy, the Communists.

THE TRUTH is less sensational.

For one thing, Gehlen apparently leads a prosaic, almost dull life, sticking close to his home in a restricted area in Pullach, on the banks of the Isar River south of Munich.

For another, his outfit isn't as sharp as he or the taxpayers would like.

He was unable to predict, discover or thwart the Communist decision to build a wall through Berlin, sealing the last gap in the Iron Curtain dividing Communist from Western Germany.

The Federal Intelligence Agency (FIA) that Gehlen created and directed was infiltrated with Soviet agents as early as 1950. The Russian technique was simple. Moscow recruited several former Gestapo officers who found it easy to get on to Gehlen's staff because his personnel office considered the Nazi bully boys probably were the world's leading experts on communism.

FOR 11 YEARS, Heinz Felte and other Gestapo men turned Communist spies riddled Gehlen's outfit. In 1960, the group celebrated a double anniversary—the unsuspecting Gehlen presented the spies with certificates in recognition of 10 years of faithful service, while the Russians gave the boys a \$500 bonus, for the same reason.

Only in 1961, did Gehlen finally discover the enemy within.

Perhaps because of the revelations of Communist infiltration and the failure to detect Communist preparations for the Berlin Wall, Gehlen's stock fell, and the government came to rely less on his office.

Gehlen did show an unusual talent for survival. As chief of

Foreign Armies East, a wartime intelligence section, he survived Hitler's wrath and held his job until the capitulation, when he turned himself and his files over to the Americans, who kept him on their payroll until he was transferred back to German control in 1956.

Gehlen's successor, Lt. Gen. Gerhard Wessel, is an officer Hitler considered an idiot, be-

ing Wessel, got to Munich, and there delivered themselves to the Americans. Within months of the end of the war, they were back at work, this time for Washington.

GEHLEN'S only stipulation was that his outfit revert to German control whenever Germany regained its sovereignty.

In 1956, the Americans transferred control to Bonn, which gave Gehlen an annual budget said to total about \$25 million.

Wessel already had left Gehlen to set up the new Defense Ministry's military counterintelligence service. He directed that operation until December 1962 when he was assigned to command an armored brigade. A year later, he moved on, to become the German representative on NATO's military committee in Washington. By 1965, he was a lieutenant general, at 42 years of age, the youngest in the Bundeswehr.

Gehlen, meanwhile, was approaching retirement age. He wanted Wessel to be his successor. The Bundeswehr wanted to make sure the military continued to head the FIA, even though technically the director had to lay aside his army rank in favor of a civil service title.

BUT WEST Germany has too few general officers to go around. Wessel couldn't be spared. Last year, Gehlen reached retirement age of 65, but Bonn agreed to his extension for one more year.

During that year, the Social Democrats attempted to convince Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and his Christian Democrats that the FIA job ought to go to a civilian.

But Kiesinger finally picked Wessel, on the grounds he was the only expert available.



Reinhard Gehlen

... veil still unturned

cause Wessel predicted a Soviet attack in 1945.

Wessel may also succeed to the title of Russia's public enemy No. 1 in Germany, since his main task will be to ferret out Russian political and military intentions, and anyone who has that kind of job draws Moscow's ire.

THE NEW CHIEF of the FIA is no novice in the intelligence game. He was one of the original team Gehlen gathered around him during the war in his general staff group. Wessel's particular assignment was the Soviet army.

On Jan. 9, 1945, Gehlen passed up to Hitler an analysis by Wessel, predicting a massive Soviet attack within the week.

"Absolutely idiotic," Hitler cried. "The fellow who did this ought to be put away in an insane asylum."

Three days later the Russians began an attack that smashed through the German front and carried them through to Berlin.

With the front crumbling, Gehlen began to think beyond the end of the war. Copying the most important of his files, he and key members of his staff, includ-

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Wessel like. per 1 MAY 1968

2506 Fort Scott Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202
January 19, 1968

[
Deputy Director, Plans
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Tom:

Enclosed is a letter which I believe would be in order
for me to send to General Gehlen.

If it is satisfactory to you, please seal and forward.

Best regards,

Sincerely,



C. P. Cabell
General, U.S.A.F. (Ret.)

Enclosure

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2506 Fort Scott Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202
January 19, 1968

General Reinhard Gehlen

Dear General Gehlen:

As you near the time of your retirement, I should like to express my appreciation for your great contribution to Free World Intelligence. It has been my personal pleasure to have been associated with you in this endeavor for a period of twenty years. I therefore know that your role has been a major one.

Perhaps you will have occasion to come to the U.S.A. in the future. If you do, I hope that we can meet. You may recall my Brother, Mayor Earle Cabell of Dallas, Texas, who presented you with a Texas hat. He is also in Washington now, representing Dallas in the U.S. House of Representatives.

With every good wish for the future, I am

Sincerely yours,



C. P. Cabell
General, U.S.A.F. (Ret.)

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2. ¹UTILITY STATED ALSO THAT SPD STILL FIGHTING
IT HAS NO~~E~~ ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE FOR JOB OF VICE PRESIDENT.
THEY STILL TRYING TO FOSTER NOLLAU, BUT UTILITY REITER-
ED THAT KIESINGER HAS DROPPED NOLLAU FROM ALL CON-
SIDERATION.

3. FINALLY, CONFIRMING ALIAS WENDT'S DECLARATION
(IN 27482)
(MUNICH 1956), UTILITY CONVEYED WENDT'S INTENTION
OF RESIGNING SHOULD HE BE PASSED OVER FOR THE VICE
PRESIDENCY IN FAVOR OF AN OUTSIDER. INFORMED KIESINGER THAT
UTILITY AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TOP BRASS IN CATUSK WOULD DEPLORE

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DATE 2005

19 Jan 68

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 2061: S E C R E T

LOSS OF WENDT AT A CRUCIAL PERIOD WHEN HE PROBABLY COULD BE OF
HIS GREATEST USE TO CATSK. UTILITY HAS REITERATED
WESSEL'S ENDORSEMENT OF WENDT AS HIS DEPUTY. IN ANY
EVENT, WESSEL SET A CONDITION TO HIS APPOINTMENT
REQUIRING HIS FULL CONCURRENCE IN THE SELECTION OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT.

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CS COMMENT: *Reports that Chancellor Kiesinger has appointed Wessel to
succeed UTILITY (1) effective 1 May 1968.

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RYBAT CATUSK

REF MUNICH 1990 (IN 29176)*

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ABSTRACT	INDEX
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1. UTILITY STATED 18 JANUARY THAT IN MEETINGS JUST HELD WITH WESSEL AND CARSTENS ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR WESSEL TO REPORT FOR OVERLAP PERIOD 1-30 APRIL. UTILITY WILL OFFICIALLY RETIRE AS OF CLOSE OF BUSINESS 30 APRIL AND WESSEL'S ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND WILL TAKE PLACE ON 1 MAY.

2. UTILITY STATED ALSO THAT SPD STILL FIGHTING BUT HAS NO ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE FOR JOB OF VICE PRESIDENT. THEY STILL TRYING TO FOSTER NOLLAU, BUT UTILITY REITERATED THAT KIESINGER HAS DROPPED NOLLAU FROM ALL CONSIDERATION.

3. FINALLY, CONFIRMING ALIAS WENDT'S DECLARATION (MUNICH 1956), UTILITY CONVEYED WENDT'S INTENTION OF RESIGNING SHOULD HE BE PASSED OVER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN FAVOR OF AN OUTSIDER. INFORMED KIESINGER THAT UTILITY AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TOP BRASS IN CATUSK WOULD DEPLORE

19 JAN 1968

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

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19 Jan 68

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 2061 S E C R E T

LOSS OF WENDT AT A CRUCIAL PERIOD WHEN HE PROBABLY COULD BE OF
HIS GREATEST USE TO CATSK. UTILITY HAS REITERATED
WESSEL'S ENDORSEMENT OF WENDT AS HIS DEPUTY. IN ANY
EVENT, WESSEL SET A CONDITION TO HIS APPOINTMENT
REQUIRING HIS FULL CONCURRENCE IN THE SELECTION OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT.

S E C R E T

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CS COMMENT: *Reports that Chancellor Kiesinger has appointed Wessel to
succeed UTILITY (1) effective 1 May 1968.

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SECRET EGNT-5317 PAGE 2

POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL WENDLANDT BECOMING VICE PRESIDENT, BACHMANN REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS A CATASTROPHE SINCE HE FELT IT WAS UNTENABLE TO HAVE MILITARY OFFICERS AS THE NUMBER ONE AND TWO MEN OF THE BND. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION AS TO HOW THE RANK AND FILE OF THE BND WOULD REACT TO AN APPOINTMENT OF NOLLAU, HE SAID THAT SOME WOULD CERTAINLY BE VIOLENTLY OPPOSED TO IT WHEREAS OTHERS WOULD WELCOME IT. HE ALSO BRIEFLY BROUGHT UP THE ALLEGATION MADE IN CERTAIN QUARTERS THAT NOLLAU WAS A MEMBER OF THE SPD AND SAID NOLLAU HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD NEVER JOINED THE PARTY. BACHMANN HIMSELF, I FOUND OUT YESTERDAY, IS A STAUNCH CDU ADHERENT, AND MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF ONE OF THE KREIS ORGANIZATIONS NEAR BONN (HE LIVES IN IPPENDORF, A SUBURB OF BONN). THIS GROUP, INCIDENTALLY, HAS MONTHLY EVENING MEETINGS. HE ASKED WHETHER THE EMBASSY COULD PROVIDE A SPEAKER FOR THE FEBRUARY MEETING WHO WOULD PRESENT THE VIETNAM PROBLEM IN A POSITIVE LIGHT SINCE ALL ONE HEARD AND READ OTHERWISE WAS COMPLETELY NEGATIVE. I HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE BEST QUALIFIED SPEAKER ON THIS SUBJECT IN USIA TO MAKE THE PRESENTATION.

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C/EUR

COB, MUNICH

SECRET EGNT-5317 PAGE 2

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The Sunday Times, 21 Jan 68

Exit the man without a shadow

By Antony Terry
Bonn, Saturday

THE LEGENDARY "man without a shadow"—it is said that no photograph exists of him which is less than 20 years old—is retiring. General Reinhard Gehlen, at 65, is leaving the post of chief of BND, West Germany's equivalent of MI 6, reputedly the largest and technically the best-equipped spy organisation outside the CIA and Russia's KGB.

Hitler's former expert on the Red Army has been under a temporary cloud which has not been completely lifted even by his discovery of the date of the outbreak of the Israeli-Egypt war five days before it happened.

The cloud descended when it was discovered that his massive £8 million-a-year service numbered top-level Russian agents among its 3,000 employees, spies, informers and officials. It has also never recovered from the slur of failing to report in advance the building of the

on the grounds that the Russians had offered £100,000 to any Communist agent who killed or captured him. A number of attempts on his life have been made and the Russians also attempted to lure him from duty through attractive girls. He has agents throughout the world; his main British bureaux, according to a map some years ago, were in London and Hull.

Gehlen was chief of Hitler's military espionage in Russia as the war ended. He and his friend and successor, 54-year-old Lieutenant-General Gerhard Wessel, were by then planning the switchover which was to put them at the head of their country's intelligence network once Hitler was gone.

Gehlen hid with his group near Lake Schlier in Bavaria until the Americans arrived, and then calmly handed them the plans of Germany's entire military and spy network in Eastern Europe.

He accepted the Americans' offer of a job, with a budget of \$3.5 million a year, on three conditions: that his espionage organisation should never be used against Germany, that it should employ only Germans, and that it should work for the Americans only until West Germany again became independent. The Americans agreed.

Later, he set up hundreds of phoney commercial firms wherever he needed an espionage bureau. But even by the 1950s the Russians were worming their informers into the network.

When the Americans handed back Gehlen and his spies to the West Germans he kept close ties with the CIA and the Pentagon. But his reputation with the present West German Chancellor suffers under Dr Kiesinger's general scepticism against anything he is told by the "spooks" until it is confirmed, and the Socialists now in the Government resent Gehlen's refusal to put them on his secret mailing list when they were in opposition.

Gehlen's recent intelligence information presents a resolutely gloomy picture of Soviet intentions.

The dapper General Wessel, who during his four-year stay in Washington, learnt how important the public image of a national intelligence organisation can be in gaining the ear of the government, may be able to handle Bonn officials more easily than his rather self-righteous predecessor.

WEST GERMANY'S
BEST MAN

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with @ DESSAU on 23 January 1968

Time: 1215 to 1415

Place: Tino's Restaurant, Wisconsin Avenue

1. Meeting Arrangements. @ DESSAU called me on 19 January to say he was now back on duty having returned from his Australian trip and having supervised the move into his new house. For the record his new address is

□

□

(I am sending a brief dispatch to Munich on this.)

2. Introduction of □ □ I brought □ with me and introduced him to @ DESSAU as □ successor and explained that he would henceforth assist me in our liaison relationship. The luncheon conversation was pretty well monopolized by @ DESSAU's detailed account of his voyage to Australia (by way of Tahiti, Fiji, Auckland, New Zealand, Sydney and Adelaide) and his return by way of Honolulu. At each step of the way he was given VIP treatment either by representatives of the Australian or New Zealand services or by his own organization.

3. Possibility of UTILITY Visit. While @ DESSAU was expressing his great satisfaction with the appointment of General Wessel as now BND Chief, I asked whether he thought UTILITY would visit the United States before giving up control of the BND. @ DESSAU was sure that UTILITY would remain in Munich until after the transfer of power but he thought that UTILITY would probably visit the United States (and other countries) after Wessel had assumed full charge. (We are preparing a special UTILITY

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- 2 -

visit file for just such an eventuality. We are also reviewing UTILITY's 201 file now to be sure we record in the visit file all the names of his many friends and contacts in the United States - people he is likely to desire visiting and people whom protocol would indicate a visit should be made.)

4. Forthcoming Visit of BND Reps. @DESSAU asked if the schedule for the BND visitors, arriving 27 January, had been put together yet. I promised to give him a copy of at least our tentative schedule on Thursday, 25 January, when @DESSAU comes for his weekly briefing.

5. @DESSAU paid for the lunch.

[C/E/G]

SECRET

WEST GERMANY

In from the Cold

The most wanted man in West Germany for the past 20 years has been Reinhard Gehlen, the shadowy chief of West German intelligence, whom the Communists honored with a standing offer of \$250,000 to anyone who could kill him. An assassin almost collected in 1953, but the bullet-resistant glass in Gehlen's Mercedes deflected the revolver slugs. That was the closest the Communists came, for Gehlen was a furtive quarry. He allowed no pictures to be taken (the only postwar photograph of him was a sneak shot taken in 1957), traveled under aliases, continually switched the license plates on his cars, and was known by sight only to a handful of top Western officials. Last week the West German government announced that its master spy will retire in April, when he reaches 66.

Hitler's Wrath. Gehlen was a colonel on the General Staff in Russia in 1942 when the Wehrmacht suddenly ran into unexpected Soviet resistance. Gehlen was given the mission—until then largely ignored by the overconfident Germans—of assessing the capabilities of the Red Army. As chief of intelligence on the Eastern front, he quickly won a reputation for precise forecasting of Russian moves, but his predictions of Soviet victories so angered Hitler that he ordered Gehlen sent to an insane asylum.

Instead, Gehlen fled with the retreating Wehrmacht into the Bavarian Alps,

where he cached away 50 steel cases of intelligence data on the Red Army. Reckoning that the wartime alliance of the U.S. and Soviets would soon crumble, he greeted the victorious invading Americans with a proposal: his secrets in return for U.S. financial backing. The U.S. accepted and installed Gehlen and his wartime staff in a heavily guarded compound near Munich that had formerly served as headquarters of Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess. There, behind double rows of concrete walls and steel fences, Gehlen plotted some of the crucial undercover moves of the cold war. He recruited agents throughout Eastern Europe, even had a minister in the East German government in his employ, smashed a Czech-run spy ring in West Germany and provided the West with a realistic assessment of Soviet power that helped the U.S. to call Soviet bluffs over Berlin. The Central Intelligence Agency regarded Gehlen as one of its best investments.

Soviet Agents. In 1956, after West Germany had gained sovereignty, Gehlen's organization ended its dependence on the CIA. Gehlen, who was known in the trade as Herr Doktor, enjoyed Konrad Adenauer's close confidence. When Adenauer stepped aside in favor of Ludwig Erhard, Gehlen's standing declined in Bonn, partly because Erhard mistrusted espionage, and partly because of disclosures that two of Gehlen's aides had been double agents in Soviet employ. But Gehlen recovered a measure of his former influence under the Grand Coalition, even though he warned Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt that their diplomatic initiatives toward Eastern Europe might provoke the Soviets into some kind of serious political retaliation.

Gehlen turns over to his hand-picked successor, Lieut. General Gerhard Wessel, 54, an organization of 3,500 full-time employees that ranks after the CIA and Britain's MI-6 as the free world's most ubiquitous intelligence service. Though he will slip into retirement as furtively as he conducted his operations, Gehlen can take some pride in the fact that his reputation for omniscience has entered the German language. In response to an unanswerable question, a West German is likely to reply, "Das weiss nur der Gehlen" (Only Gehlen knows that).



GEHLEN IN HANNOVER, WEST GERMANY (1957)
Only Herr Doktor knew.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION	
		S E C R E T			
TO	Chief of Base, Munich			MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief, EUR			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	CATUSK Letter for UTILITY			MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>Transmitted under separate cover is a letter to UTILITY from William F. ORDWAY. Please deliver.</p>					
<p>Attachment: USC as stated above</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - COB/M w/att USC 2 - COS/G</p>					
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>					
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		DATE	
		EGMS-7777		8 February 1968	
		CLASSIFICATION GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		HQ'S FILE NUMBER	
		S E C R E T			
Hqs Distribution: 2 - E/G/CE 1 - E/G/IS 1 - RID 1 - E/REG		ORIGINATING OFFICE E/G/CE OFFICER [] TYPIST [] :gd EXT. 6028			
		COORDINATING			
		OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
		RELEASING OFFICE SYMBOL C/E/G DATE 8 Feb 68 OF [] []			
FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66		(40) DISPATCH			

Memorandum for the File
Subject: Meeting with Alias DESSAU
Date: 27 Feb 68
Time: 1900-2300
Place: Alias DESSAU's House (Cocktail Party/Housewarming)

b. Recommendation about Gehlen Retirement. @ DESSAU offered me his "personal" advice and hoped we would understand the sincerity of his intentions. He suggested that CIA send a delegation to Munich to participate in the retirement ceremonies for General Gehlen. He specifically suggested that at a minimum we should send Mr. Critchfield, [] and []. In addition Mr. Cline from Bonn and of course [] from Munich Base would attend. (I would like also to suggest here that [] come down from Berlin since he served earlier at the Munich Liaison Base.) I thanked @ DESSAU for his suggestions and told him we had been discussing appropriate action in anticipation of this event. I suspect he would like some idea of our intentions re the above before he returns to Germany on 10 March.

File: UTILITY

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

28 February 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Chief, EUR

VIA : Assistant Chief, EUR/Central Region

SUBJECT : Birthday Gift for General Gehlen

1. We have examined several possibilities in considering a suitable birthday remembrance for General Gehlen - this in response to a suggestion from Deputy Chief, EUR.

2. Attached is a memorandum from the CE/Liaison Section. I do not believe we should get involved in presenting Gehlen with any electronic gadgets. He will have little or no need for them in retirement. (The gadget involved would also cost an estimated \$1,000.)

3. I believe we should consider two separate gifts: a medal to be presented to Gehlen at his retirement ceremony and a medallion of the Agency Seal, cast in gold, to be given him as a birthday present at a private German-American ceremony on or immediately before his birthday. *↑ As DeSimone gave Mr. Dulles a gold medal on his retirement. AC/E/C*


4. [] I was consulted about awards and medals. Attached are Agency regulations concerning awards and the forms for requesting them. That few have been given to foreign dignitaries should not necessarily deter us from presenting a medal, probably The Distinguished Intelligence Medal, The Intelligence Medal of Merit, or The National Security Medal to Gehlen. He is (we are constantly reminded of this by Alias DESSAU) the "dean" of the intelligence chiefs of the Western world. Some special form of tribute in recognition of this is, I think, warranted.

5. Before we proceed with the necessary paperwork we would like your views and your recommendations as to which medal we should request.

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28 February 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, E/G

SUBJECT : Birthday Present and Recognition
of General Gehlen's Retirement

1. E/G/CE is currently exploring the possibilities of appropriate recognition of General GEHLEN's retirement on 1 May 1968 as first and only chief of the BND, plus attempting to determine what might be a suitable gift on the occasion of his sixty-sixth birthday on 3 April 1968. It has been Agency custom to cable appropriate greetings from senior officials on each birthday, and the Munich Base chief usually presents a small gift. In 1962, when Gehlen became 60, the Agency presented him with an American eagle plaque for wall display in his office. He has received other tokens at various times from various officers with whom he has been in close contact. He is particularly interested in electronic gadgetry. In late 1967, Munich Base requested EUCA in Frankfurt to determine prices on a VHF paging system, but later cancelled the request. E/G/CE has asked the Office of Communications at Headquarters what might be available along the line of a glorified walkie-talkie, or a similar device. In the meantime, Munich Base should be asked to contribute their thinking.

2. Presentation of an Agency medal in recognition of the close cooperation between the services has also been suggested. It has been determined that the Agency awards medals in various degrees, all of which are Agency attributable, and that approving authorities are reluctant to award these medals to foreign, or other non-Agency affiliated personnel. There is a regulation and form designed to request consideration for an Agency award, which E/G/CE is attempting to procure to see what steps are necessary. It should be added that the BND has for award to various worthy individuals a non-attributable medal, depicting St. George slaying the dragon on one side and the date of BND legalization

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on the other. Agency personnel have received the bronze edition of the BND award, and a gold edition was presented to Mr. Dulles. [] indicated that the Agency has on a few occasions presented a miniature Agency seal to foreign liaison representatives, but indicated it is not a usual practice.

3. The following sequence is suggested:

- a. present General Gehlen with electronic gadget for his birthday
 - b. present General Gehlen with whatever medal or insignia the Agency will allow on his retirement date (in Munich)
 - c. provide ceremonial rite should he come for farewell trip to Washington
- []

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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INDEX <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TOTAL COPIES 14
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> SECRET </div>	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
REF TO FILE NO.		1
FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/>		2
DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.		3
FROM 8	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	4
ACTION	ADVANCE COPY	UNIT
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FILE	YR, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/CI 2, C/CSPS	

SECRET 051649Z MAR 68 CITE MUNICH 2571

DIRECTOR INFO BONN (ATTN ☐ J/C ☐ J)

RYBAT KEYWAY

5 MAR 68 IN 64144
②

FROM ☐ J. HEADQUARTERS PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING ITEMS
TO ☐ J ON HIS ARRIVAL.

1. SUGGEST YOU LOOK INTO AVAILABILITY ☐ J

☐ WHO UNDERSTAND HAS HAD BOTH STAFF D TYPE AND
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE. HE SPEAKS EXCELLENT GERMAN AND IS
ABOUT THE AGE OF MAN STATION AND BASE SEEK TO FULFILL
COMBINED DCOB/GENERAL AND SIGINT RESPONSIBILITIES IN MUNICH.

☐ J HAS BEEN HIGHLY RECOMMENDED BY THOSE HERE WHO
KNOW OF HIS PREVIOUS GERMAN STATION EXPERIENCE AND HIS
PERFORMANCE IN VIET NAM WHILE COB WAS STATIONED THERE.

2. UTILITY HAS PROPOSED DATE OF 17 APRIL FOR PLANNED
AIS COMMUNITY FAREWELL ¹⁹BLACK-TIE HERRENABEND AT COB RESIDENCE
MUNICH, WITH ☐ J HOSTING. AVAILABILITY OF U.S. MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS IN GERMANY CURRENTLY BEING EXPLORED.
PER UTILITY'S OWN REQUEST, HIS SUCCESSOR ALIAS WIELAND WILL
ALSO BE INVITED. FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS BEING WORKED OUT
WITH ☐ J HAVE SUGGESTED TO ACOS AND BASE CHIEFS TO HOLD

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 2571 S E C R E T

DATES FREE AND THAT YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE OPPORTUNITY THIS
CONVOCATION FOR BASE CHEIFS MEETING PRIOR TO OR AFTER
HERRENEBEND.

3. UTILITY HAS ALSO ACCEPTED INVITATION SMALL INTIMATE
DINNER WITH WIVES FOR WOFIRM FAMILY FAREWELL ON 2 APRIL,
NIGHT BEFORE UTILITY BIRTHDAY. HOPE YOU AND MRS []
CAN ATTEND.

S E C R E T

SECRET



Executive Registry
68-1384

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13 March 1968

Dear Admiral Taylor:

As you may have read recently, General Gehlen is going to retire as head of the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) on the 30th of April, 1968. I am sure you will agree that he has had a career in intelligence which is unique in the Western World. His departure will mark the end of an era here in Germany.

It is my understanding that the appreciation of the US Intelligence Community will be conveyed to General Gehlen in a variety of ways and on a number of occasions. However, it occurred to me that it would be appropriate if you would be so kind as to write to General Gehlen expressing your appreciation for the assistance he and his organization provided to ONI during your tenure as DNI.

I have also written to Admirals Frost, Espe, Fluckey, and Lowrance making a similar request.

Thank you Admiral, for your cooperation. I know that the letters from the Directors of Naval Intelligence will be deeply appreciated by the General and will become valued mementoes of his association with the United States Navy. If you would send your letter to me, I shall insure that it is -- along with the others -- securely and appropriately presented to General Gehlen.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]
CDR U.S. Publitz, USN
CINCPACNAVEUR Rep., Munich
US Consulate General
APO New York 09108

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET [REDACTED]	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, EUR (Attn: [REDACTED])		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany (EYES ONLY [REDACTED])		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Base, Munich [REDACTED]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	[REDACTED]/KMBALL Transmittal of Letter from UTILITY		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REFERENCE: BONN 3005			
<p>Forwarded under separate cover is a letter to from UTILITY, expressing thanks for arrangements made for four recent CATUSK visitors to Headquarters.</p> <p>[REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p>			
<p>Attachment: (USC) Letter for [REDACTED]</p>			
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>			
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	EGMT 16447	14 March 1968	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [REDACTED]	HQ'S FILE NUMBER	

MESSAGE FORM
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UNIT: E/G
EXT: 19256
DATE: 14 MARCH 1968

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BY: 26 PER: #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO: ☐ STANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CE FILE NO.

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ASRS, CI, CI/OPS, F, F/INT 2

(classification)

(date and time filed)

(reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO: MUNICH

INFO: BONN 1800Z

02670

REF: MUNICH 2571 (IN 64144)

1. DATE OF 17 APRIL SOUNDS GOOD FOR UTILITY
FAREWELL AND L WILL PLAN TO BE THERE. AGREE
WE SHOULD TRY TO HAVE BASE CHIEFS MEETING CONCURRENTLY
AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED PROVIDING L CAN COORDINATE
TO CONVENIENCE OF EVERYONE.
2. GETTING TO MUNICH BY 2 APRIL AFTER L
RETURN WILL BE DIFFICULT. WILL TRY BUT DO NOT DEFINITELY
COMMIT US ON L ATTENDANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2D
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DATE 2005

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO	Chief of Base, Munich		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief, EUR		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	CATUSK Birthday Greeting to UTILITY		MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
<p>Transmitted under separate cover, true name pouch, is a personal letter to UTILITY from [] Please deliver to UTILITY.</p>				
Attachment: USC via tnp				
Distribution: 2 - COS/H 2 - COS/G				
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE/METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005				
19 MAR 1968				
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ECMS-7843	DATE 18 March 1968		
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	HQS FILE NUMBER Echelon 201	
Hqs Distribution: 2 - E/G/CE 1 - E/G/IS 1 - RID 1 - E/REG	OFFICE E/G/CE []	ORIGINATING TYPIST :gd	EXT 5871	
	COORDINATING			
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
	RELEASING			
	OFFICE SYMBOL C/E/G/CE	DATE 18 Mar		
FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66		DISPATCH		



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

20 March 1968

Dear Bob,

I have considered your note of 13 March with regard to the suggestion that I write a note to General Gehlen thanking him for the assistance he and his associates provided to ONI during my tenure as DNI.


I don't feel it would be appropriate for me to do this in my present position, or, if I did, that it would be appropriate to send it through you. To do the latter would run considerable risk of creating some misunderstanding on the part of the BND as to the relation of your position in the Intelligence Community.

As to the substance of the matter, I am really quite unaware of any great assistance rendered by General Gehlen or his organization to ONI during my time there either as DNI or in any other capacity. As a matter of fact, it was my impression that what we were trying to do was develop a direct intelligence liaison with the German Navy and that this entailed some degree of delicacy because of BND controls over German naval intelligence.

In view of all these considerations I am not planning to take any personal notice of General Gehlen's departure.

With warmest personal regards,
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Sincerely,


Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Commander R. E. Publitz, USN
CINCUSNAVEUR Rep., Munich
c/o U.S. Consulate General
APO New York 09108

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO 2/9/00

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 40 PER
ACTION

☒ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE.

VR.

DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF,

SECRET 260825Z MAR 68 CITE MUNICH 2788

26 MAR 68 77960

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

RYBAT CATUSK

1. GENERAL WESSEL WILL REPORT FOR DETACHED SERVICE FOR PURPOSES OF READING IN, RECEIVING BRIEFINGS, AND ACTING AS ALTER EGO WITH DESK NEXT TO UTILITY, ON 1 APRIL. WESSEL, ALONG WITH OTHERS, AND AT SUGGESTION OF UTILITY, WILL BE INVITED TO ATTEND OFFICIAL FAREWELL BANQUET HOSTED BY ☐ 2 ☐ AT ☐ 3 RESIDENCE ON 17 APRIL. WESSEL WILL TAKE OVER AS PRESIDENT OF CATUSK ON 1 MAY. HOPEFULLY THE SWEARING IN CEREMONY, WHICH AS PLANNED WILL TAKE PLACE IN MUNICH, WILL BE HELD ON 1 MAY, BUT COULD BE DELAYED UNTIL 2 OR 3 MAY DEPENDENT UPON AVAILABILITY OF CHANCELLOR. WESSEL NOT EXPECTED TO BRING ANY AIDES OR ADVISORS WITH HIM, EXCEPT FOR HIS SECRETARY FROM NATO. HE WILL PROBABLY BE BILLETED AT A VILLA IN SOELN, ALTHOUGH THIS NOT FIRM AS YET.

2. ON DATE HE IS SWORN IN, WESSEL WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY GO INTO THE MILITARY RESERVE, AND MOST LIKELY RECEIVE ANOTHER STAR TO MAKE HIM A RESERVE LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHILE SERVING AS CIVILIAN PRESIDENT OF CATUSK. ALIAS

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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CS COPY in ☐

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INIT: C/E/G
XT: 4262
ATE: 29 MAR 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

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INFO:

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DIR
CITE DIRECTOR

87289

MUNICH INFO BONN

CATUSK

PLS PASS FOLLOWING TO UTILITY FROM C

BEST WISHES ON YOUR BIRTHDAY. EVEN THOUGH YOU WILL SOON
FORMALLY RETIRE, I KNOW YOU WILL CONTINUE FOR MANY YEARS TO COME
TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAUSES YOU HAVE SERVED SO LONG AND SO WELL.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN WASHINGTON.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B END OF MESSAGE
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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ABSTRACT	A	INDEX

DOP C

27 Mar 68

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CHIEF, EUROPEAN DIVISION

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DISP NO- EGMW-1577
 FILE NO- ☒ ☐
 DATE - 29 MARCH 1968
 INDEX - NONE
 FILM - NONE
 TO - CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH
 INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY
 FROM - CHIEF, EUR
 SUBJ - 0 UTILITY
 ACTION - PER PARA 2
 REFS - MUNICH 2788 PARA 3

RESTRICTED COPY

1. DEFER TO STATION AND MUNICH TO PRESENT UTILITY WITH APPROPRIATE GIFT FOR BIRTHDAY IN NAME OF HIS MANY FRIENDS IN WOFIRM.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY NOTICE UTILITY PLANS VISIT WASHINGTON, PLUS YOUR ADVICE RE LENGTH INTENDED STAY, PREFERRED ITINERARY, SPECIAL WISHES RE SEEING OLD FRIENDS, ETC. FYI - LATE MAY WOULD BE INCONVENIENT.

3. ALIAS DESSAU PLANS HAVE UTILITY STAY AT HIS HOME AND IF UTILITY DECIDES VISIT WASHINGTON IN JUNE, ASSUME DESSAU WILL CUT SHORT HOME LEAVE.

4. FYI ONLY - PLANNING PRESENT UTILITY GOLD MEDALLION AT HQS CEREMONY.

☒ ☐
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 BY TELEPOUCH

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 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

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☒ C/EUR/OPS
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SECRET EGMW-15779

6/8/68

11/1/68	11/1/68	E/G	11/1/68
11/1/68	11/1/68	11/1/68	11/1/68

29 March 1968

Dear General Gehlen,

Ruth joins me in wishing you a most happy birthday anniversary. We hope you will be able to enjoy it in good health and with most of your family present.

The years fly by and I find it difficult to realize that you will be retiring from your august position as President. It just does not seem possible that an era is coming to an end. Your complete and total identification with your Service ever since you founded it has, of course, been recognized but it has been such that one sort of expects you to always be associated with the Service.

It must be personally gratifying to note that no other intelligence service chief has occupied such a position for so long a period as you. I am certain that despite the fact that your choice of a successor actually came to pass, there must have been many heavy hearts within your organization when it was announced that you would be leaving. Having been closely associated with so many of your employees, particularly during my five years in Germany, I think I can sense the feeling of loss that must have pervaded your organization.

I am sure that your contacts with your Service will not cease and that your valuable experience will still be available.

Ruth and I hope that you will be truly happy in whatever pursuits you now decide to follow. And I certainly trust that you will be able to spend much more time in your favorite sport -- sailing.

Again, all best wishes to you and your family.

Most sincerely,

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1 April 1968


Dear Tom,

The enclosed letter is self-explanatory. Peg and I had asked Christa and Heinz to visit us last summer. They could not do so because of the move, so that the plan to visit this coming summer along with the Géhleins more or less naturally grew during my last conversation with Heinz. I realize that it sounds a little hairy; however if the old boy is ever going to relax, his post-retirement visit to the United States would be a good time to begin. We have a comfortable old cottage at the lake, plus a small guest house. They will have just about all the privacy they could possibly need.

Suggest you pass my invitation along (if it seems feasible and the right thing to do) about the time Heinz returns from his kur.

Best to all. I understand that you are having a perfectly splendid time and doing a swell job.

Cordially,


Gordon M. Stewart

P.S. Heinz knows that our place is at Dwight on the Lake of Bays. Certainly the Royal Canadian Mounted Police will be able to tell him how to get to Dwight. Once there, he should ask at the general store how best to get to my cottage. This little map may be of some help.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

April 1, 1968

Dear General Gehlen,

The day before he left, Heinz told me that you and Mrs. Gehlen may be visiting the United States early next fall. If you do, I would like very much to introduce you to part of the lake district of the Province of Ontario. I talked with Heinz about this plan and he endorses it.

The plan entails your flying to Ottawa, meeting Heinz there, paying a few calls and then driving up through the Algonquin Provincial Park to the Lake of Bays. You would be my guest at the lake, and then could drive on to Washington by way of Toronto, Hamilton, Niagara Falls, and a beautiful stretch of the Adirondacks which you cross coming through Pennsylvania. Heinz can tell you more about the plan since we have discussed it off and on for more than a year.

We would be particularly pleased to have you arrive before the end of August during our own vacation stay at the lake. If this is not possible, I can assure you that September is brilliant in Canada and that you might even be able to go swimming if you arrive before the middle of the month.

My wife joins me in kindest greetings to Mrs. Gehlen.

Sincerely,

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

28. 2012.15

<h1 style="margin: 0;">DISPATCH</h1>		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION		
				MARKED FOR INDEXING		
TO	Chief of Base, Munich			NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
FROM	Chief, EUR			MICROFILM		
SUBJECT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CATUSEK Letter for UTILITY					
<p style="text-align: center;">ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Transmitted under separate cover (TNP) is a letter for UTILITY from [] Please seal before delivery to UTILITY.</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 100px;">[]</div>						
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>						
<p>Attachment: USC</p> <p>Distribution:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">2 - COM/M w/att USC via TNP</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">2 - COM/G w/o att</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">33 COPY</p> <p style="text-align: right;">2 APR 1968</p>						
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER KCMW-15777		DATE 2 April 1968		
		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		HQ'S FILE NUMBER		
<p>Hqs Distribution:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">2 - E/G/CE</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">1 - E/G/IS</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">1 - RID</p>		ORIGINATING				
		OFFICE E/G/		OFFICER :gd		EXT. 5871
		COORDINATING				
		OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME		
		RELEASING				
		OFFICE SYMBOL C/E/G/CE		DATE		
FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66		(40)		<h1 style="margin: 0;">DISPATCH</h1>		

AN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	E/G
SE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DEST <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	4044
ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	INDEX <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

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SECRET 021610Z APR 68 CITE MUNICH 2879

2 APR 68 IN 83342

BONN, BERLIN, FRANKFURT, VIENNA, ☐ ☐ ☐ INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT CATUSK

1. ON THE OCCASION OF HIS RETIREMENT, UTILITY PLANS HOST FAREWELL
HERRENABEND TO BID ADIEU TO GERMAN STATION, MUNICH BASE, AND WOFIRM
INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH CATUSK ON UPPER LEVEL IN
DAYS GONE BY. THOSE INVITED ARE:

MR RAY CLINE

MR ☐ ☐

MR ☐ ☐

MR ☐ ☐

MR ☐ ☐

MR ☐ ☐

MR ☐ ☐

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

2. AFFAIR SCHEDULED FOR 1900 HOURS, 24 APRIL 1968, IN CATUSK
COMPOUND; DRESS: DARK SUIT. INVITEES WILL BE BILLETED IN MUNICH HOTEL
AS GUESTS OF CATUSK.

3. FOR ☐ ☐ PRESUME ☐ ☐ CAN CONTACT MR ☐

☐ WHO, EVEN THOUGH RETIRED, HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY INVITED
BY UTILITY.

8 - APR 1968

SECRET

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ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RID COPY				5	10
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PAGE 2 MUNICH 2879 S E C R E T

4. [] HOPES THAT ALL THOSE INVITED WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND AND WITNESS THE PASSING OF AN ERA WITH THE RETIREMENT OF THE DEAN OF WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

5. PLEASE CABLE ACCEPTANCE OR REGRETS SOONEST TO INCLUDE TRAVEL PLANS.

S E C R E T

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			5: _____ 10: _____		
		DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG. _____			

SECRET 030843Z APR 68 CITE MUNICH 2883

3 APR 68 11 83739

VIENNA INFO BONN, DIRECTOR

RYBAT [CATUSK]

REF MUNICH 2879 (IN 83342)

ACTION

MR. [] SHOULD HAVE BEEN NAMED AS INVITEE

IN REF. REGRET OMISSION.

SECRET

BT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief of Base, Munich				MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO. Chief of Station, Germany				NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief, EUR				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT 0 CATUSE UTILITY Trip Letter for []				MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>Transmitted under separate cover (TNP) is a letter for [] from [] which transmits in turn a letter to UTILITY. We would appreciate being advised of UTILITY's reaction.</p> <p>[]</p>					
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>					
<p>Attachment: USC a/s above via TNP</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - COB/M w/att USC via TNP 2 - COS/G</p>					
5 APR 1968					
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		DATE	
[]		ECMW-15784		3 April 1968	
		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		HQ'S FILE NUMBER []	
		GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification			
Hqs Distribution: 2 - E/G/CE 1 - E/G/IS 1 - RID		OFFICE E/G/		PIST gd	
		COORDINATING		EXT 5871	
		OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE	
		C/E/G/CE			
		RELEASING			
		OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE	
		C/E/G/CE			
<p>FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-64</p>		<p>1401</p> <p>DISPATCH</p>			

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ACTION <u>CLEAR</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY		CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____		4	9
		X-REF TO FILE NO. _____		5	10
		FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO _____	BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/>	DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.	
		INFO: _____	FILE, VR. <u>CLC1, CLF12, CLF1INT2</u>		
DDP, ADDP, CSDO					

SECRET 041509Z APR 68 CITE [] 4117

MUNICH INFO DIRECTOR, BONN

RYBAT [CATUSK]

REF: MUNICH 2879 (483342)

1. WITH HQS APPROVAL, [] GLAD ACCEP
2. WILL ADVISE [] , NOW AWAY, NEXT WEEK.

ASSUME WE WILL BOTH TRAVEL AS FOLLOWS: ARRIVE MUNICH
1350 HOURS 24 APRIL VIA LH FLIGHT 340. DEPART MUNICH
1130 HOURS 25 APRIL VIA BEA 643.

SECRET

BT

6 - APR 1968

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DATE 2005

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		INFO: _____			
		FILE: _____ VR. 4/65 3/65 PS 7/0P			

SECRET 041533Z APR 68 CITE [] 43
MUNICH INFO BONN, DIRECTOR
RYBAT [CATUSK]
REF MUNICH 2879 (FW 83342) 1/32w-2-28/
[] APPRECIATES REF INVITATION. TENTATIVELY
PLANS ARRIVE 24 APRIL BY POV.

ACTION
184865
d/

SECRET
BT

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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CE

ADDY, A, A/PT, FL, FL/INT 2

MARS

SECRET 050956Z APR 68 CITE VIENNA 132

MUNICH INFO DIRECTOR, BONN

REFS: A. MUNICH 2879 (IN 83342)

B. MUNICH 2883 (IN 83739)

[] AND [] PLEASED ACCEPT INVITATION TO

HERRENABEND. WILL ADVISE LATER RE TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

SECRET

BT

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 3

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ORIG: C/EUR
UNIT: SS81
EXT: 5 APRIL 1968
DATE:

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INFO: FILE NO. C/EUR 000 0000

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6 18 09 Z
(date and time filed)

CITE DIRECTOR 89420
(reference number)

TO: BONN BERLIN FRANKFURT VIENNA [] [] INFO MUNICH
RYBAT [CATUSK]
REF: MUNICH 2879 (IN 83342)
FROM: []

WHILE AGREE IT APPROPRIATE INVITEES REF ATTEND, ALL
SHOULD APPRECIATE NEED FOR METICULOUS ATTENTION SECURITY
INHERENT GATHERING TOGETHER SENIOR [WO] FIRMERS FROM SEVERAL
STATIONS PARTICULARLY WHEN BILLETED IN LOCAL HOTEL AS GUESTS
[CATUSK]

END OF MESSAGE

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DATE 2005

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS COORDINATING OFFICERS
RELEASING OFFICER

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SECRET 081425Z APR 68 CITE

MUNICH INFO DIRECTOR, BONN

RYBAT [CATUSK]

REF: [] 1117 (1184952)

[] ALSO GLAD ACCEPT. WE WILL TRAVEL TOGETHER

PER REF.

SECRET

BT

ACTION

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SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

8 APR 1968

SECRET

COMMONS TO ASSN.
COMMON'S ASSN.
**Calls For Prompt
Interracial Action**

"Responsible action with our fellow men across racial and cultural lines" was called for Wednesday in an emergency meeting of the board of directors of Chicago Commons Assn.

"We know there is a danger of retreat into repressive action and the hardening of resistance to progress," a board statement said, referring to last week's disturbances.

The association president, Robert H. McCormick, said the board resolved to press for speedy approval of the civil rights bill just enacted by Congress; called for support and expansion of poverty war programs, especially summer Head Start, Neighborhood Youth Corps, and summer employment programs, and urged that the programs be extended year round.

Kerner Report Hailed

The board also demanded "early action" on implementation of the recommendations of the National Commission on Civil Disorders. Board members were given copies of the commission's report, McCormick said.

Recognizing that "substantial means" will be needed to further the programs the association proposed, the board urged "an earnest re-evaluation of national priorities."

'Need For Communication'

One of the largest social agencies in the city, operating six settlement houses in the city and three camps outside the city, Chicago Commons said there was a need for "more effective channels of communication with the Negro community and other minority groups."

The board pledged to help agencies improve their relationships with neighborhoods, and called on board members to "create greater understanding of the problem of the Negro and to reduce ingrained prejudice" in their own "residential communities."

Of one area served by the association's Olivet Community Center, 1411 N. Cleveland, McCormick said there was communication between neighborhood agencies and the people, and therefore, "unlike the West Side, there were no fires or windows broken."

11 Apr 68

Seen
Twice

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EYES ONLY															

SECRET 121358Z CITE MUNICH 2993

121358Z 90419

DIRECTOR, BONN (EYES ONLY ☐ ☐)

RYBAT (KMBALL (CATUSK))

REF: EGMW-15779

1. AT BIRTHDAY PARTY IN COB'S HOME, UTILITY WAS PRESENTED WITH MATCHED BLACK LEATHER PAIR OF SUITCASES, AND LEATHER DESK SET FOR HIS RETIREMENT DEN, FROM ☐ ☐ ☐ AND UTILITY'S MANY FRIENDS IN WOFIRM. HE WAS VERY PLEASED.

2. PRESS OF BUSINESS ON ☐ ☐ AFTER ASSUMING COMMAND WILL BE SO HEAVY AS TO REQUIRE CLOSE PROXIMITY AND FREQUENT CONSULTATION WITH UTILITY DURING MAY AND INTO SUMMER. UTILITY THEREFORE PREFERS, WITH OUR CONCURRENCE, TO MAKE HIS FAREVELL VISIT TO HEADQUARTERS IN SEPTEMBER. HIS STAY IN WASHINGTON WILL ENCOMPASS SEVERAL DAYS DURING WHICH HE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO SEE AND THANK THE MANY WOFIRM AND OTHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN LIAISON WITH HIM AND HIS ORGANIZATION. HE INTENDS TO UTILIZE DESSAU'S HOME TO HOST A SOCIAL EVENING WITH AS MANY OLD FRIENDS AS POSSIBLE, IF NOT ALL IN ONE EVENING, IN TWO OR MORE IF NECESSARY. HIS EXACT ITINERARY WILL BE WORKED OUT IN THE ENSUING MONTHS.

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 2993 SECRET

3. UTILITY HAS REQUESTED ² [] TO ESCORT HIM, AS WAS DONE IN THE PAST. UTILITY RECALLED THE TILL-STARRED OCEAN VOYAGE IN 1956 WHEN THE SUEZ CRISIS AND HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION CAUGHT HIM IN MID-OCEAN AND NECESSITATED HIS IMMEDIATE RETURN AFTER LANDING IN NEW YORK. HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GO BY FASTEST SEA ROUTE (PROBABLY SS UNITED STATES) AND TRY TO RECAPTURE THE RELAXING LEISURE USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH AN OCEAN SAIL. [] ³ STATED HE COULD NOT PROMISE ESCORT DUE TO BUDGETARY REASONS AND THAT DECISION ON THIS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING LATER, BUT [] ² OPINED PROPOSAL OF SURFACE TRAVEL FOR AN EXCORT MIGHT BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE. UTILITY SAID IF THIS WERE THE CASE, HE WOULD FOREGO SHIP TRAVEL IN FAVOR OF AIR. OUT OF FEAR OF BEING INTERCEPTED BY THE PRESS, UTILITY WILL PROBABLY TRAVEL IN ALIAS, AS HE HAS ALWAYS DONE PREVIOUSLY.

4. UTILITY DOES PLAN TO STAY AT [DESSAU'S] HOME, BY WHICH TIME [DESSAU] WILL PROBABLY HAVE HAD HIS ALLOTMENT OF "KURS" TDY, AND ANNUAL LEAVE BEHIND HIM.

5. [] ³ RECALLS THAT AT SOME TIME IN THE PAST THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESENTING UTILITY WITH LEGION OF MERIT, UNDER

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PAGE 5 MUNICH 2993 **SECRET**
JOINT ⁵VOFIRM-LNSHOE SPONSORSHIP, WAS MENTIONED. OUR AGGRESSIVE
LOCAL ⁶LTUUCK REPRESENTATIVE RECENTLY RAISED SUGGESTION THAT
CHIEF OF ⁶LTUUCK INTELLIGENCE MIGHT BE AMENABLE TO PRESENTING
UTILITY WITH APPROPRIATE MEDAL ON THE OCCASION OF HIS
RETIREMENT. ⁶LTUUCK REP WAS ADVISED TO ESCHUE ANY PROMOTION
OF THIS SORT SINCE THIS WAS A MATTER FOR ⁵VOFIRM TO WORK OUT
WITH LNSHOE IF DEEMED DESIRABLE ON BEHALF OF THE WHOLE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. MUNICH BASE ASSUMES THAT GOLD
MEDALLION WOULD BE PRESENTED IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER MEDAL.

²ALL IN ALL, UTILITY SEEMS TO HAVE FULLY RECONCILED
HIMSELF TO FACT AND TIMETABLE OF HIS RETIREMENT, AND APPEARS
WELL ADJUSTED AND LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS NEW STATUS AS A
GUIDE AND ADVISOR TO HIS SUCCESSOR. ²UTILITY BELIEVES HE WILL
BE ABLE TO SEE MANY ISSUES MORE CLEARLY AND MORE PHILOSOPHICALLY
IN THE FUTURE WITHOUT RESTRICTION OF SPEAKING IN THE NAME
OF ⁷CATUSK, SUCH AS: QUESTIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE AFFECTING
HIS COUNTRY AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. IN A BIRTHDAY-DINNER
TOAST, ²UTILITY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. AND GERMAN
GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE STRONG PARTNERS AND ALLIES
IN THE CAUSE OF ALL THAT THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HOLDS DEAR--

SECRET

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BASE
2993

13463

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SEARCH ☐

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FILE

PAGE 4 MURICH 2593 S E C R E T

FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE, AND RECOGNITION OF AN OPPOSITION TO THE DANGERS STILL PRESENTED BY THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. HE REPEATED MANY TIMES IN TETE-A-TETE CONVERSATION THAT HE PERSONALLY CAN ALWAYS BE COUNTED UPON AS SYMPATHETIC TO AND A PROponent OF U.S. POLICIES IN EUROPE AND GERMANY.

7. UTILITY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO COUNT ON CONTACT WITH WOFIRM VIA COS GERMANY AND

OF COURSE WITH THE BLESSING OF 4

ALREADY CONCURRED. HE WAS ASSURED THAT

WELCOME

SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT SINCE HIS VIEWS ON CONCERN BETWEEN QU TWO COUNTRIES WOULD OF VALUE. HE WAS ASSURED THAT COB MUNIC TIME FOR KEEPING THE CONTACT ALIVE. RE PAST, HE WOULD BE READY TO SEE US WHENEV HE TURNED TO THE GAESTBUCH, WROTE A PLEA. SHOOK HANDS, ROUNDED UP HIS GIFTS, BUNDL FOR HIS HOME IN BERG BEI STARNBERG.

8. COMMENT: DEFER TO HQS. ON DISSEMIN INTERESTED PERSONS OUTSIDE DIVISION SUCH

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C/NES, C/CI, C/FI

C/FI/INT2

SECRET 161239Z APR 68 CITE MUNICH 3015

PRIORITY [] (ATTN)

RYBAT [CATUSK]

ACTION

AS YOU KNOW, GENERAL WESSEL IS TAKING OVER FROM UTILITY
ON 1 MAY 68. OFFICIAL FAREWELL DINNER FOR UTILITY GIVEN BY
AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN GERMANY WILL BE HELD ON NIGHT OF
17 APRIL IN MUNICH. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE NICE GESTURE IF
CABLE FROM YOU COULD BE READ ON THIS OCCASION.

SECRET

BT

16 APR 1968

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

ORIG: JAMES CRITCHFIELD
UNIT: C/NE
EXT: 7903
DATE: 17 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER #

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DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP.

ESDU, CS/REF, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

(classification)

(date and time filed)

(ref) 1978

(pk)

SECRET

17 15 11 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

91978

TO IMMEDIATE
MUNICH (PRIORITY) INFO BONN (ROUTINE)

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING TO UTILITY FROM [] AT 17 APRIL DINNER:

"AS YOUR AMERICAN FRIENDS GATHER THIS EVENING TO OFFICIALLY BID YOU FAREWELL FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, I AM SURE THAT MUCH WILL BE SAID BY MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUES ABOUT YOUR CONTRIBUTION IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD. I WOULD JOIN THEM IN THIS EXPRESSION BUT WOULD NOTE THAT IN THE UNCERTAIN YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II THE CONTRIBUTIONS YOU PERSONALLY AND INSTITUTIONALLY MADE TO LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS ON WHICH COOPERATION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE WESTERN NATIONS, PARTICULARLY AMERICA, WERE BUILT MAY BE JUDGED IN HISTORY AS YOUR GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN SECURITY AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE. TO HAVE BEEN AN OBSERVER AND PARTICIPANT IN THAT EFFORT WAS FOR ME A UNIQUE AND PRIVILEGED EXPERIENCE."

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001-2005

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

DC/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

JAMES CRITCHFIELD

C/NE

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

GROUP 1
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		INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		2	7
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		X-REF TO FILE NO. _____		4	9
		FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO		5	10
BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.		INFO: _____ FILE. _____ VP. _____			

PAGE 2 [] 2467 S E C R E T

HEIMAT URLAUBSREISE SIE UND IHRE LIEBE FRAU GEMAHLIN
 BESUCHEN. MEINE ZUVERLAESSIGE QUELLEN BEHAUPTEN IN DER
 NAECHSTE ZUKUNFT SIE HAETTEN DIE ABSICHT IHRE LIEBLING-
 STAETIGKEIT ALS GENERALINSPEKTEUR DES SEGELSCHIFFWESENS
 BAYERNS ZU UNTERNEHMEN. VOM GENERALLEUTNANT ZUM
 ADMIRAL IN EINEM TAG. SO EIN LAUFBAHNWECHSEL! VON SO
 EINE POSITION BEIM ANKUNFT VON HAARSTAUEBENDE MELDUNGEN
 BRAUCHTEN SIE NUR WEITER ZU SEGELN UND LEISE SAGEN,
 "DASS KANN DOCH EINEN SEEMANN NICHT ERSCHUETTERN..."

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

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1	6
2	7
3	8
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5	

SECRET 180824Z APR 68 CITE VIENNA 5063

MUNICH INFO BONN, DIRECTOR

REF VIENNA 4982 (in 85566) att (FYI)

18 APR 68 IN S3263

1. [] PLANS TRAVEL MUNICH WITH WIFE 23 APRIL AND
THEREFORE WILL MAKE OWN HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS OR STAY BILLET ON
POST IF AVAILABLE. ADVISE.

2. [] PLANS ARRIVE BY POV CIRCA NOON 24 APRIL.

SECRET

BT

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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BY: _____ AT: _____ Z		INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		3	7
DISSEM BY: <u>46</u> PER <u>*</u>		CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____		4	8
ACTION <u>clues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY		X-REF TO FILE NO. _____		5	9
		FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO _____			10
		BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG. _____			
		INFO: _____			
		FILE. _____ VR. _____			

SECRET 191743Z APR 68 CITE MUNICH 3049

PRIORITY [] (ATTN [] INFO DIRECTOR, BONN 20 APR 68 IN 94864

RYBAT [CATUSK]

REF [] 2467 (IN 93526) (att (FYD) return IS/JAF something for future ref.

1. JUST RECEIVED INVITATION FOR YOU FROM [CATUSK] TO ATTEND WHAT HAS BEEN SCHEDULED AS A FAREWELL HERRENABEND BY UTILITY ON EVENING 24 APRIL TO THOSE [W] FIRM STAFFERS STATIONED IN EUROPE WHO DEALT ON HIGH LEVEL WITH [CATUSK] SUCH AS [] AND [] FROM [] MR [] FROM [BERLIN], [] FROM VIENNA, AND [] FROM []

2. HAVE INFORMED [CATUSK] THAT GREATER DISTANCE YOU WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL PLUS THIS SHORT NOTICE MIGHT PRECLUDE YOUR ATTENDING. SHORT NOTICE EXPLAINED BY FACT [CATUSK] WAS UNAWARE YOU STILL IN [] UNTIL RECEIPT OF REF.

3. ~~HVEM~~ GUESTS WILL BE BILLETED BY [BND] AT HOTEL WETTERSTEIN IN MUNICH WHICH, YOU WILL REMEMBER, IS CLOSE TO [MUNICH BASE.]

PLEASE ADVISE, WITH TRAVEL INFO IF YOU WILL BE ABLE

ATTEND. [CATUSK] MEETING AIRCRAFT OF VISITORS.

SECRET

BT

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

Der Haupteingang zur Spionagezentrale befindet sich in der Heilmannstrasse, in Richtung München zur rechten Hand, und ist von bewaffneten Posten bewacht. Auch gegenüber dem Eingang sind Wachposten untergebracht. Bleibt man in diesem Teil der Heilmannstrasse auch nur ein paar Minuten stehen, kommt sofort ein bewaffneter Posten oder ein Landpolizist per Auto auf einen zu, um zu fragen, ob man auf jemanden warte und was man überhaupt hier suche.

Linker Hand der Strasse ist die zur Spionagezentrale gehörende Wohnstadt, in der jene leben - sie sind gleichzeitig von der Umwelt weitgehend isoliert - die in Gehlens Reich beschäftigt sind.

Es ist wohl selbstverständlich, daß kein gewöhnlicher Sterblicher in die Pullacher Geheimdomäne Zutritt hat. Selbst für die meisten Gehlen-Agenten gilt hier „Eintritt verboten“. Man muß über einen Sonderausweis verfügen, Arbeiter, die im Sperrgebiet zu tun haben, sind mit einem täglich in der Farbe wechselnden Spezialausweis mit Photo ausgestattet, der sichtbar getragen werden muß. Photographieren ist sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb des Gehlens-Reiches streng verboten. „Scheuwerter abschalten“, lautet die Aufschrift auf dem Tor. Mit denselben Maßnahmen, mit denen sonst nur Atomgeheimnisse bewahrt werden, wird das Spionagezentrum Pullach abgesichert.

WER IST REINHARD GEHLEN?

Der Herr, der in diesem Reich weitgehend autark regiert, hat eine ebenso wechselvolle wie skrupellose Vergangenheit. Die Karriere des Reinhard Gehlen begann unter Admiral Canaris, dem Spionagechef beim Oberkommando der Hitler-Wehrmacht. Bereits 1942 leitete Gehlen die Abteilung „Fremde Heere“.

Ost. Nach dem Attentat auf Hitler am 20. Juli 1944 wurde er der als absolut zuverlässig geltende, der von seinem ehemaligen Chef in den Rücken gefallen war, mit noch größerer Wichtigkeit eingesetzt. Knapp vor Torschluss des „dritten Reiches“ turnte er auf die höchste Sprosse seiner Karriere hinauf. Reinhard Gehlen wurde von Hitler persönlich zum Generalleutnant befördert.

Bald nach Ende des „dritten Reiches“ setzte der treue Diener Hitlers auf den amerikanischen Geheimdienst um. Gehlen wurde dollarbezahlter US-Intelligence (Geheimagent). Bis Anfang 1950 spionierte er mit seiner von ihm neu aufgebauten Organisation, deren Männer sich zum größten Teil aus der nazistischen Militärspionage rekrutierten, ausschließlich für die US-Armee, beziehungsweise für die 1949 gegründete CIA. In den darauffolgenden Jahren 1950 bis 1955/56 fungierte er als Doppelagent: Er arbeitete sowohl für die CIA wie für den Bonner Staat. Finanziert wurde sein Apparat weiterhin von den Amerikanern.

Seit Mitte 1956 ist die Gehlen-Spionage unter der Bezeichnung „Bundesnachrichtendienst“ eine offizielle Institution des westdeutschen Staates, untersteht unmittelbar dem Bundeskanzleramt und wird jährlich mit mehreren Dutzend Millionen DM von Bonn finanziert. Der „Bundesnachrichtendienst“ nimmt in den vielfältigen Geheimdiensten Westdeutschlands die zentrale Stelle ein. Sein riesiger Apparat umfaßt etwa 5000 Agenten, die in der ganzen Welt eingesetzt sind. Das Hauptquartier befindet sich in Pullach. Hier liegen unter strengem Verschluss auch die Agentenkartellen, die Organisationspläne und die Generalstabskarten samt Spionageergebnissen.

ERWEITERT UND AUSGEBAUT

Die Geschichte der Pullacher Geheimzentrale selbst ist nicht weniger wechselvoll wie die ihres Chefs. Die Rudolf-Heß-Siedlung wurde 1942 mit einer weitverzweigten Bunkeranlage für Hitler und einem ausgedehnten unterirdischen Nachrichtennetz versehen. 1945 von der US-Besatzungsmacht beschlagnahmt, wurde sie bald Gehlen und seiner Organisation übergeben. Und in dem selten lindenbemannten Doppelposten treffen, Auch der Revierförster hat so einen ganz anderen Beruf aus. Die unterirdischen Anlagen und Bunker wurden erweitert und Doppelposten nicht genug Veratombombensicher gemacht, die Nachrichten hat, wird Gehlens Reich noch mittels einer raffiniert konstruierter Alarmanlage abgesichert.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY


Mit drei Meter hohen Mauern ist Gehlens Hauptquartier in Pullach abgesichert.

Hans Wolker

Geheimdienstchef geht in

Pension — Spionagezentrale

an der Isar bleibt



Das ist das ganze Sperrgebiet in Pullach. Rechts das eigentliche Spionagezentrum mit den atomisierenden Bunkern, den riesigen Radar-, Peil- und Funkanlagen.

Pullach an der Isar, wenige Kilometer südlich von München, ist ein kleiner, ländliches Städtchen. Mit seinen Wäldern, der romantischen Burg Schwanegg und den schönen Ausblicken auf das Isartal scheint diese Landschaft für besinnliche Spaziergänge geschaffen. Hier hat Reinhard Gehlen, der oberste Chef des westdeutschen Bundesnachrichtendienstes, sein Hauptquartier aufgeschlagen.

Die frühere Rudolf-Heß-Siedlung - aus dem „tausendjährigen Reich“ - wurde zur Domäne Gehlens ausgebaut. Heute umfaßt sie ein etwa 200.000 Quadratmeter großes von der Außenwelt völlig isoliertes Terrain. Drei Meter hohe, meist neu errichtete Mauern, oder Drahtverhaue und Stacheldrahtzäune, dahinter Binsengelächte und Rohrmatten sorgen dafür, daß man nicht hineinkommt. Wer den Charlottenweg oder den Burgweg entlangspaziert, wird nicht selten lindenbemannte Doppelposten treffen. Auch der Revierförster hat so einen ganz anderen Beruf aus. Die unterirdischen Anlagen und Bunker wurden erweitert und Doppelposten nicht genug Veratombombensicher gemacht, die Nachrichten hat, wird Gehlens Reich noch mittels einer raffiniert konstruierter Alarmanlage abgesichert.

(Fortsetzung von vorhergehender Seite)

...und verleiht dem Vorgesetzten absolute Macht.

Der hauptamtliche Agentenkreis des Gehlen-Apparats setzt sich teils aus Offizieren, Beamten und Angestellten, teils aus V-Männern und freien Mitarbeitern zusammen. Dazu kommt noch eine Anzahl von fallweise bezahlten V-Männern, die der Agent kennt und seine Kollegen, die er kennen muß, oft auch nur seinen unmittelbaren Vorgesetzten. Viele arbeiten unter Decknamen. Besonders abgedeckt ist natürlich Gehlen selbst und sein engster Mitarbeiterstab. Eine Zeilang führte Gehlen den Decknamen Dr. Schneider und das Ziffernpseudonym 30. Sowohl Deckname wie Ziffernpseudonym werden immer wieder gewechselt, Filialen werden neu gegründet, andere wieder abgeschaltet, die Meldewege ständig verändert.

Der „Bundesnachrichtendienst“ gliedert sich in drei Abteilungen: Abteilung I umfaßt die Spionage (militärisch, politisch, wirtschaftlich-technisch), Abteilung II die sogenannten E-Fälle (Diversion, Sabotage und psychologische Kriegführung), Abteilung III die Spitzeltätigkeit, die sich insbesondere auf politische Parteien, Militärmissionen usw. konzentriert. Es gibt auch spezielle Länderabteilungen, in denen das gesamte Spionagematerial über das betreffende Land gesammelt und ausgewertet wird.

Unter „SO-R“ läuft die Spionageabteilung, die auf die Sowjetunion spezialisiert ist, unter „SO-S“ die gegen Polen. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt natürlich Westberlin, wo vor allem der gegen die DDR gerichtete Apparat konzentriert ist. Die Spione werden mit amerikanischen Militärmaschinen nach Westberlin geflogen.

Das Hauptquartier des „Bundesnachrichtendienstes“, die Generaldirektion, befindet sich in München-Pullach. Gleich einer Spinne umspannt sie von hier das ganze Land mit einem Netz von Generalvertretungen (in den größeren Städten), Bezirksvertretungen, Unterververtretungen und Filialen (Außenstellen). Die Untergliederungen sind ähnlich organisiert wie die Generaldirektion.

GENERALVERTRETUNG „SOD“

Die Gehlen-Spionage beschränkt sich keineswegs nur auf Westdeutschland. Sie ist offensiv und hat ihre Agenturen auch in anderen Ländern – auch im neutralen Österreich. Ihre Generalvertretung „Süd“ residiert in Wien mit Unterververtretungen in Graz, Linz, Salzburg

einander nicht zusammenhängen. Vielleicht ist da irgendwo eine Südfürchtenhandlung, die im Vorderhaus tatsächlich Orangen-Import betreibt, aber in einem kleinen Büro an der Hintertür des Hauses werden Nachrichten importiert. Mancher hat sich vielleicht auch schon beim „Bundesnachrichtendienst“ einen Küchenherd gekauft, ohne zu ahnen, daß die wirkliche Arbeit des Geschäftsinhabers erst nach Ladenschluß beginnt und daß er die Bestückung eines tschechischen Panzers besser kennt als Propagandabrenner.

neriner Gehlen-Filiale 1302, Major Werner Haase, daß der Kurierverkehr nach den sozialistischen Staaten vor allem über Österreich aufrechterhalten wird, wobei sich Gehlen sowohl seines eigenen Agentennetzes wie auch österreichischer Stellen bedient. Während des konterrevolutionären Putsches in Ungarn 1956 organisierte die Gehlen-Spionage von Österreich aus die Zusammenkunft des US-Geheimdienstspezialisten Donovan mit dem faschistischen ungarischen Generalmajor Bela Kiraly in Budapest.


PANNEN UND NIEDERLAGEN

Gehlen und sein Spionageapparat erlitten in den vergangenen Jahren nicht wenige Pannen und Niederlagen. Wichtige Mitarbeiter sind „hochgezogen“, „abgesprungen“ oder „übergelaufen“. Vielfach hatte sich Gehlen verspekuliert und verspielt und wurde von geschichtlichen Ereignissen überrollt. So wurde Gehlen vom Bau der Berliner Mauer vollkommen überrascht, was für seinen Spionageapparat schwerwiegende Folgen hatte.

Es wäre verhängnisvoll, würde man die Wirksamkeit des „Bundesnachrichtendienstes“ unterschätzen, dessen Tätigkeit gegen den Frieden und die Sicherheit der Völker – nicht zuletzt gegen Österreich – gerichtet ist. Im kommenden Sommer zieht der Chef in Pension. Doch der Gehlen-Apparat wird weiterbestehen und weiterespionieren. Sein Hauptquartier hinter der hohen Mauer, den dichten Drahtverhauen und den riesigen Bunkeranlagen im lichten Pullach an der Isar wird weiter ein neutralistischer Punkt auf der Landkarte Europas sein.

Gehlen

Nur unter „Geheimer Bundesache“ ist die eigenhändige Unterschrift Gehlens zu finden. Sonst versteckt er sich hinter Tarnnamen und Ziffernpseudonymen.



Ungemein photoscheu ist der Chef des westdeutschen Spionagedienstes. Einer der wenigen existierenden Photos noch aus der Zeit, als Reinhard Gehlen (ganz links) für die Hitler-Wehrmacht spionierte.

Q U E S T I O N S	ORIGI	MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES: 1 <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">S E C R E T</div>	RECORDING INITIALS - SEEN BY	
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	EXT: 6207		2	
	DATE: 20 APRIL 1968		3	
			4	
		5		
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C	CONF: <u>SECRET</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> RID COPY	INFO: FILE, VR	

(classification) **S E C R E T**

(date and time filed) 20 17 34 Z

(reference number) 9321

CITE DIRECTOR

TO: [PRIORITY]

INFO MUNICH BONN

RYBAT CATUSK

REF MUNICH 3049 IN 94864

DESPITE TRIBUTE TO [] WHICH REF INVITATION REPRESENTS SUGGEST

[] DECLINE ON GROUNDS DISTANCE AND TIME MAKE HIS ATTENDANCE IMPOSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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C/F12, C/F/INT.2

SECRET 220949Z APR 68 CITE []

2493
~~SECRET~~

MUNICH INFO DIRECTOR, BONN

RYBAT [CATUSK]

22 APR 68 IN 95391

REF: A. DIRECTOR 93218

B. MUNICH 3049 (IN 94864)

1. UTILITY'S FRIENDLY INVITATION FOR EXPENSIVE AIR TRIP TENDS TO MAKE ONE FEEL THAT AT LEAST [CATUSK] HAS NOT PENETRATED [WOFIRM] AND READ THE TREASURER'S REPORT.

2. MUNICH MAY WISH TO PASS TO UTILITY OR READ AT HERRENABEND FOLLOWING FROM [] TO UTILITY:

"DA ICH MICH IMMER SEHR WOHL UNTER NACHRICHTENDIENST-VERBINDUNGSKANNONEN GEFUEHL HABE, BEDAUERE ICH ALSO SEHR ES SEI UNMOEGLICH IHRE FREUNDLICH EINLADUNG ZUM 24. -TEN APRIL FOLGEN ZU KOENNEN. DIE GRUENDE SIND DREI: ZEITKNAPPHEIT, ENTFERNUNG UND, DA POLO SAISON IN [] ZU ENDE IST, ICH BIN LEIDERGOTTES WIEDER SEHR TUECHTIG AN DER ARBEIT. ICH BLEIBE HIER AM SCHRIBTISCH UND UNTER BANYANBAUM GEHEIMTREFFPUNKT OHNE ZU WEINEN NUR IN DER GEWISSHEIT DASS IM PLANQUADRAT STARNBERGERSEE-AMMERSEE DIE EHRENEINGEBORENE SEIEN NICHT UNFREUDLICH UND ZU JEDERZEIT IN DER ZUKUNFT ZU BESUCHEN SEIEN."

SECRET

BT

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DATE 2005

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief of Base, Munich		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, EUR		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Vienna <i>WUP</i>		ONLY QUALIFIED DISK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	GRDOVY CATUSK Forwarding of Newspaper Article		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>Forwarded for your information is an article which appeared in the Communist daily "VOLKSSTIMME" on 20 April.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>807</i> <i>807</i> <i>872</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">[<i>110</i>]</p>			
<p>Attachment: A/S h/w</p> <p>Distribution: 1/2 - Munich w/att h/w 1 - C/EUR w/o att</p>			
<p>GROUP I EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION APR 26 1968</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <i>(EAVT-8106)</i>	DATE 26 April 1968	
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER	

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*Deutschlands oberster Geheimnisträger räumt nach 22 Jahren seinen
Posten an der Spitze des Bundesnachrichtendienstes*

Der Mann ohne Gesicht

General Reinhard Gehlen blickt zurück

Von Marion Gräfin Dönhoff



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DATE 2001 2005

Reinhard Gehlen als Generalmajor bei Kriegsende. Hinter seinem Schreibtisch ein Spruch von Goethe: „Wenn du durch Nichtstun weckst, so gibt es nichts, was du nicht beherrschen könntest.“

Geheimwaffe der Griechen

Papandreou will die Militär-Junta isolieren

Von Werner Höfer

„Wenn aber nun die vierfache Isolierschicht, zusammengesetzt aus politischen, militärischen, wirtschaftlichen und moralischen Aktivitäten, nicht zustande kommt oder die erwartete Wirkung verfehlt: was dann?“

Für diesen Fall schließt Andreas Papandreou gewisse Aktionen im Lande, bei denen Gewaltanwendung einzukalkulieren sei, nicht aus. Freilich würde es nicht zu einem Bürgerkrieg kommen dürfen und kommen müssen, weil die Erinnerungen an den letzten Bruderkampf die Griechen als schmerzliches Trauma begleiten, und weil die Armee sich nicht schützend vor das Regime stellen werde.

„Aber warum ist dann der Gegenputsch des Königs gescheitert?“

„Weil diese Aktion schlecht vorbereitet war und vermutlich frühzeitig verraten worden ist, nachdem der König die eine oder andere ausländische Botschaft über seine Pläne ins Vertrauen gezogen hat.“

„Welchen Stellenwert nimmt der König in Ihren Planungen und Erwartungen ein?“

„Ich glaube, die Krone hat das Volk enttäuscht. Und wenn das Volk wieder einmal aufgerufen wird, über sein Schicksal frei zu entscheiden, wird bei der Wahl der künftigen Regierungsform auch die Frage der Monarchie entschieden werden müssen.“

„In seinem kleinen Reisegepäck trägt Andreas Papandreou so etwas wie ein Grundsatzprogramm für ein neues Griechenland mit sich. Danach soll das Land, wenn die Diktatur abgewirtschaftet hat, jene demokratische Souveränität und Integrität erreichen, die das Land in der Frühzeit seiner Geschichte einmal genossen hatte, und die ihm die übrige Welt, Griechenland gern im verklärenden Licht seiner Frühgeschichte sehend, aufs neue wünschen möchte.“

„Wenn Sie das Staatsstreichjubiläum und das orthodoxe Osterfest in dem Lande verbringen, dessen Söhne Ihr Land schon immer mit der Seele suchten, so kann das Zufall, so kann das Absicht sein.“

„Es war meine Absicht, an diesem Tag in Deutschland zu sein, wo die größte freiheitlich gesinnte Gemeinschaft meiner Landsleute außerhalb Griechenlands lebt.“

ORIG: []
UNIT: DC/EUR
EXT: 5882
DATE: 29 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 6

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(reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

95256

TO: MUNICH INFO BONN
RYBAT KMBALL
FROM: []

MAB
to file
up.

SECRET

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO UTILITY IN MY NAME:

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR THE
COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE YOU HAVE PROVIDED FOR SO MANY YEARS.
YOURS HAS BEEN A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF THE
WEST, FOSTERING COOPERATION OF THE WESTERN NATIONS IN THEIR COMMON
INTEREST. PLEASE ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES FOR LONG YEARS OF CONTINUING
PARTICIPATION ON YOUR PART IN THOSE CAUSES YOU HAVE SERVED SO WELL.

END OF MESSAGE

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PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO UTILITY FROM

YOUR CAREER HAS BEEN A MODEL OF UNSELFISH DEVOTION TO DUTY, LOYAL SERVICE TO YOUR COUNTRY AND TO THE FREE WORLD, AND STAUNCH ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE. YOU HAVE WON THE RESPECT OF US ALL WHO HAVE BEEN PRIVILEGED TO ASSOCIATE WITH YOU DURING THE PAST TWO DECADES.

YOUR VISION AND EFFORTS HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT THE CREATION OF AN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS MADE, AND I AM SURE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE, IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAUSE OF THE WESTERN WORLD.

I HOPE YOU WILL FIND IN RETIREMENT THE TIME AND LEISURE TO PURSUE THE MANY INTERESTS YOU HAVE HAD TO PUT ASIDE IN THE NAME OF DUTY, BUT I HOPE YOU WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO AFFORD US YOUR UNIQUE EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM FOR MANY YEARS TO COME.

I LOOK FORWARD TO GREETING YOU PERSONALLY ONCE AGAIN THIS FALL.

WARMEST GOOD WISHES.

(END OF MESSAGE)

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1225: GEHLEN (SCHEDULED):

BY BERND DEBUSMANN

MUNICH, WEST GERMANY, APRIL 30 (REUTERS)-GEN. REINHARD GEHLEN, KNOWN AS THE MAN WITHOUT A FACE, RETIRED TODAY AS HEAD OF THE GERMAN SECRET SERVICE HE LED FOR 22 YEARS.

HE HANDED OVER THE KEYS TO HIS FILES TO HIS SUCCESSOR, LT. GEN. GERHARD WESSEL, 54, IN A BRIEF CEREMONY AT HIS BARBED-WIRE-SURROUNDED HEADQUARTERS IN THE MUNICH SUBURB OF PULLACH BEFORE LEAVING ON VACATION.

A SPOKESMAN FOR THE 66-YEAR-OLD GERMAN MASTER SPY SAID ONLY A FEW HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS WERE PRESENT AS GEHLEN ENDED A SECRET SERVICE CAREER THAT BEGAN IN 1942.

FEW GERMANS HAVE BEEN AS SURROUNDED BY MYSTERY AS GEHLEN, WHOSE CLOAK-AND-DAGGER NETWORK IS ESTIMATED TO COMPRISE SOME 5,000 AGENTS.

NNNN

ZCZC EPE 130

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1228: 1ST ADD MUNICH GEHLEN:

X X X AGENTS.

THE EAST GERMAN SECRET SERVICE ONCE PUT A PRICE OF ONE MILLION MARKS (250,000 DOLLARS) ON GEHLEN'S HEAD.

HE BECAME KNOWN AS THE MAN WITHOUT A FACE BECAUSE ONLY THREE PHOTOGRAPHS OF HIM EXIST.

TWO, TAKEN IN 1944 AND 1945, SHOW HIM AS A BALDING, SLIGHTLY BUILT 40-YEAR-OLD IN THE UNIFORM OF A WEHRMACHT OFFICER. THE THIRD, A BADLY OUT-OF-FOCUS SNAPSHOT TAKEN 11 YEARS AGO, SHOWS A SINISTER-LOOKING MAN WEARING LARGE DARK GLASSES WITH HIS TRILEY HAT PULLED LOW OVER HIS FOREHEAD.

IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE WEEKLY NEWSPAPER DIE ZEIT THIS WEEK GEHLEN TOLD HOW HE ONCE TRAVELLED IN A TRAIN COMPARTMENT WHERE TWO NEWSPAPERMEN DISCUSSED WAYS OF MEETING THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF. A THIRD MAN WAS LISTENING.

"I PREFERRED TO MOVE INTO ANOTHER COMPARTMENT AT THE NEXT STATION. TWO DAYS LATER . . . A REPORT CAME ACROSS MY DESK DESCRIBING THE ENCOUNTER IN MINUTE DETAIL," HE SAID.

THE THIRD MAN HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF THE GEHLEN ORG NIZ IION WHO, LIKE ALMOST ALL HIS COLLEAGUES, DID NOT KNOW HIS BOSS.

:: (MORE) DMX

NNNN

ZCZC EPE 181

66,94

1233: 2ND ADD MUNICH GEHLEN :

X X X BOSS

GEHLEN SAID THERE WERE SOME SECRETS ONLY HE AND ONE OTHER PERSON IN WEST GERMANY KNEW.

BORN IN ERFURT, NOW IN EAST GERMANY, THE SON OF A PUBLISHING HOUSE DIRECTOR, GEHLEN JOINED THE ARMY IN 1920.

BY 1935 HE WAS AN OFFICER ON THE GENERAL STAFF AND SEVEN YEARS LATER HE TOOK OVER THE DEPARTMENT OF "FOREIGN ARMIES EAST" WHERE HIS DUTIES WERE TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMY ON, AND BEHIND, THE EASTERN FRONT.

GEHLEN MANAGED TO SAVE HIS MASSIVE INTELLIGENCE FILES IN THE CHAOS OF THE FINAL WEEKS OF WAR, AND MADE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE AMERICANS WHEN HE WAS CAPTURED IN BAVARIA.

AFTER CAREFUL GRILLING IN WASHINGTON GEHLEN WAS SENT BACK TO GERMANY AND GIVEN HIS OWN DEPARTMENT TO ANALYZE INFORMATION FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

:: REUTERS DM/DMX

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1968

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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1. COUNTRY: FED REP OF GERMANY (FRG).	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2210-0457-68
2. SUBJECT: Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) (Federal Intelligence Service)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 24 May 1968
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
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7. SOURCE: DAD/OCA; FRG MOD 'J' Staff.	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: C. S. GRAVES, Lt Col ODCSI ULO, Bonn

15. SUMMARY: (C-NOFORN)

a. The BND, or Federal German Intelligence Service, is directly responsible to the Federal Chancellor's Office. The direct supervisor of the President of the BND is the Chief of the Chancellor's office, State Secretary Carstens. Within the Chancellor's office and directly responsible to the State Secretary is a special section whose sole activity is a review of activities of the BND on behalf of the State Secretary. The head of this section is Ministerialdirigent Von Koester. His staff is relatively small. Once every two weeks, the President of the BND, General Wessel, comes to Bonn to brief the Federal Chancellor. He is usually accompanied by his chief evaluator, General Dettleffsen. Present at these briefings are usually the two State secretaries in the Chancellor's office, Carstens and Baron von Gutenberg.

b. The BND maintains a liaison office in the Bonn area for the purpose of conducting close relations with the Federal ministries and to pass intelligence reports to the appropriate consumer agencies within the Federal government. This office is headed by Colonel Klaus Eschenburg. Within Colonel Eschenburg's office are several BND staffers who maintain regular liaison with the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Office for the purpose of providing daily and periodic intelligence reports and summaries. Furthermore, the BND Bonn liaison office has a full-time liaison officer, Dr. Heinz Rafoth, whose responsibility is to maintain close relations with the Federal security and police agencies as well as foreign embassies.

c. It is believed that government ministries and offices which have a specific need for information that could possibly be obtained and/or furnished by the BND can levy requirements upon that organization. The mechanics involved are probably two-fold, depending upon the nature of the requirement:

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ORIGINATOR WDCSI DLO, Bonn

a. Requirements of a more routine nature are handled through one of the above named liaison offices and the requirement is presented directly to the appropriate BND department.

b. Special requirements of a sensitive nature that might concern information on other countries must be presented to the Foreign Office (perhaps by the Minister himself) which relays the request to the BND after proper processing.

d. In addition to the normal liaison activities on the part of the BND through its Bonn office for the purpose of providing intelligence to the various government agencies, a special arrangement exists with the J-2 staff of the Ministry of Defense. This arrangement has been worked out within the last eighteen months by the Chief of the J-2 Staff, Admiral Poser, as a result of continual conflict between the J-2 military experts and the Military Evaluation Staff of the BND. Admiral Poser obtained BND agreement to assign a senior J-2 staff officer to the position of Chief, BND Evaluation Staff. On the basis of this agreement, Admiral Poser's former deputy, Colonel [redacted], has been assigned to this position in the BND. He has since been promoted to Brigadier General. This arrangement has greatly improved the coordination between Ministry of Defense and BND evaluators, who are responsible for preparing the German position papers for various NATO conferences and exercises.

e. Since the new president of the BND, General Wessel, has had extensive experience in senior MOD positions and NATO positions, it is anticipated that coordination between the BND and the MOD on military intelligence matters will be much improved.

COMMENT: a. The above cited arrangement in the Chancellor's office, has according to another source, not been firmed up as yet. Whether State Secretary Carstens will be the responsible Chancellery man, or perhaps von Gutenberg is still in question.

b. The number 2 position in the BND, as well as other personnel changes, is being held in abeyance. General Wessel is faced with the dilemma of getting rid of incompetent personnel who are protected by their long tenure with the BND and he has not been in office sufficiently long to resolve this problem. The contenders for the deputy position have increased their number by an additional candidate: Brigadier General Armin Eck, Chief of the ASBW, who formerly served with the BND, is now another likely prospect. Dr. Guenther Nollau, Vice-President of the BfV, has very recently again spoken with Herbert Wehner, SPD Minister for All-German Affairs, and has been assured that the SPD still endorses him for the position. The decision, when made, will be a consolidated one in which the Chancellery, the BND President, the political elements, and perhaps the Security Committee of the Bundestag, come to an agreement.

c. General Gohlon, the recent BND president, has allegedly incurred the displeasure of the Bundestag Security Committee by taking his secretary and his driver at the BND, into "retirement" with him. He intends to employ this personnel as assistants in writing his memoirs.

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Richard J. Hall
Unit Director
Neighborhood Resource Center
3052 S. Cratten
Chicago, Ill. 60608
U.S.A.

May 23, 1968

Capt. Hellmuth Lang
c/o Ministry of Defense
Bonn, Germany

Dear Capt. Lang,

The students of our center have been making a study of German military personnel during the period of 1939 to 1945 in an effort to obtain a correct and unbiased knowledge of their accomplishments in military history. To date we have corresponded with Generals Manteuffel, Schack, Busse and Admirals Donitz and Raue.

In our studies we have discovered that you served as aide to Field Marshal Rommel for period of time.

We would like to know the following if you find you are able to answer this request; did you have any personal reaction when you achieved appointment as aide to General Rommel and what do you feel was his greatest accomplishment during the period you served with him?

Although the students realize you are busy they would appreciate any cooperation your kindness might allow you to make. If possible we would also like to obtain an autographed picture of you in your uniform to add dimension to our study. Thank you for your cooperation and concern.

Sincerely,

Richard J. Hall
Richard J. Hall
Unit Director

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U.S.A.

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CAPT. HELLMUTH LANGE

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FLA. HALL, P. 4. 57

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Achtzehn Jahre lang blieb er der große Unbekannte: Besuch bei dem pensionierten Geheimdienstchef General a. D. Reinhard Gehlen

Nachbarn spielten für ihn Leibwache

Von unserem Mitarbeiter Jochen Willke

München, Ende Juni

Zwischen den verstreuten Hügeln der Gemeinde Berg zieht sich eine unscheinbare Waldstraße zum Ostufer des Starnberger Sees hinunter. Der Mann, der hier draußen wohnt, ist 18 Jahre lang jeden Morgen, an dem er nicht verreist oder krank war, über diese schmale grüne Straße in sein geheimnisvolles Hauptquartier gefahren, nach Pullach bei München. Sein Name wurde zu einer Legende, und oft saßen Photographen im Laub der Bäume oder hinter dem Buschwerk, um das in der ganzen Welt begehrte Bild von ihm zu schließen. Es gelang ihnen nicht. — So schildert unser Mitarbeiter Jochen Willke (VOLUNTAS) seinen Besuch bei General a. D. Reinhard Gehlen, dem am 1. Mai pensionierten Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND). Willke berichtete über seinen Besuch in der neuen Ausgabe der Illustrierten „Neue Revue“. Wir entnehmen der Schil-

derung folgende Passagen: „Ich werde Ihnen jetzt das Haus zeigen“, sagt der General, „wenn es Sie interessiert“. Wir treten auf eine kleine Wiese, um den Rundgang zu beginnen, und da erscheint Jochen Gehlen vor mir, wie man ihn von den alten Photos kennt: der Mann mit der dunklen Sonnenbrille, die ich zum erstenmal an ihm sehe. Den langen Strahlen der Abendsonne über dem See verdanke ich diesen Anblick. Würde er jetzt noch den Kragen hochschlagen, dann glähe er haargenau den Schilderungen, die ich früher über ihn gelesen habe.

Heimliche Zeichen als Warnung

Glauben Sie mir: Es ist kaum zu verstehen, daß der Chef des BND, obwohl Dutzende erfahrener Photographen Jagd auf ihn machten, in all den Jahren nie von Angesicht zu Angesicht erwischt worden ist. Und doch ist es so. Dabei bewegte er sich oft ganz zwanglos im Inland wie im Ausland. Er reiste viel herum. Im Sommerurlaub machte er sogar Campingtouren, allerdings nicht zu öffentlichen Plätzen, aber ausgerüstet mit Funktelefon und Bewachung. Aus solchen Tagen gibt es einige Photos von ihm, freilich aus Entfernungen, die sein Gesicht nicht erkennen lassen. In Berg besuchte er nicht selten den Sonntagsgottesdienst der evangelischen Kirche, er ging in die Läden einkaufen, er nahm

an den Elternberatungen der Schule teil. Er verkehrte regelmäßig mit seinen Nachbarn, wie es auf dem Land üblich ist. Sie wußten seinen richtigen Namen. Und kein Photograph kam an ihn ran?

Gehlen hat eine sehr sympathische Erklärung dafür zur Hand. Er ist davon überzeugt, daß seine Mitbürger sich einen Sport daraus machten, ihn gegen Fremde abzusichern. Sie spielten freiwillig das James-Bond-Spiel mit und gaben ihm versteckte Zeichen, wenn bei einem Einkauf Unbekannte im Laden waren.

„Einmal wurde ich ziemlich aufgeregt aus der Apotheke angerufen. Man habe einen verdächtigen Wagen beobachtet. Es sei nach mir gefragt worden, und daher wolle man mich warnen. Der General verständigte daraufhin die Polizei. Sie stellte fest: Reporter von BBC London waren nach Berg gekommen, um das Haus des BND-Chefs ausfindig zu machen. Sie fanden es nicht.

Übrigens: Noch kürzlich veröffentlichte die Zeitung, hinter der laut Eigenwerbung immer ein kluger Kopf steckt, ein Porträtfoto mit dem Namen „Gehlen“, auf dem ein völlig anderer General zu sehen war, nämlich Ritter von Niedermeyer.

Wir sitzen im Wohnzimmer um den Teetisch. Frau Herta Gehlen, geborene von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, der Präsident a. D., ein Freund von ihm, der ihn mit seinem alten Decknamen „Dr. Schneider“ an der zum See hin abfällt, viel Sonne, an der Wand-Bücher und ein auffallend schöner Stich des alten Moltke, immer noch Vorbild jedes deutschen Generalstabsoffiziers. Kein Dienstmädchen erscheint, Frau Gehlen serviert selbst, das ganze Haus zeugt von einer Bescheidenheit, wie sie selten wurde bei der Repräsentanz unseres Staates.

Es ist etwas anderes, einem 67jährigen Gentleman namens Gehlen in der freundlichen Atmosphäre einer Teestunde gegenüberzusitzen, als ihm auf den Dschungelpfad der Geheimdienste zu begegnen. Wer auf Vermutungen, Verdächtigungen und Gerüchte angewiesen ist, muß vor diesem Mann und seinen unvergleichlichen Intrigen erschauern. Er muß ihn für eine intellektuelle Ausgabe des „Batman“ halten, eiskalt und ver schlagen, zu jeder Schandtat bereit. Nimbus kann auch schädlich sein, denn man traut diesem Gehlen einfach alles zu, sogar daß es ihn gar nicht gibt, daß er ein Phantom ist.

Der Mann, der als Weltstar der Spionage gilt, ergreift das Wort: „Und dabei müssen Sie bedenken, daß ich mich als junger Offizier freiwillig zum Studium meldete, vor allem, damit ich nie zum Geheimdienst kommandiert werden konnte.“ Das bekannte Sprichwort lügt: Hier krümmte sich erst spät, was ein Dr. Schneider werden sollte.

Von Memoiren ist plötzlich die Rede. Wird Reinhard Gehlen zur Feder greifen? Ein Thema, das Verleger und Illustrierten zu gewaltigen Auflagen denkwürdig. Doch vorerst scheint dies wenig für ihn nicht aktuell zu sein. Denn er ist sich als Fachmann der Fesseln bewußt, die er sich beim Schreiben seiner Erinnerungen selbst auferlegen mußte. Das Amtsgeheimnis bindet ihn mehr als jeden anderen. So wird seine schriftstellerische Tätigkeit unter Umständen auf einen Erklärungsbericht für die Regierung beschränkt bleiben und sich damit in jenem Kreis bewegen, wie er für ehemalige Geheimdienstchefs üblich ist.

Außerdem wartet sein altes Hobby auf ihn, das er in diesem Sommer voll auskosten will: der Wassersport. Durch Zufall, weil ihn 1949 die Wohnungsnot in München dazu trieb, ein altes Haus am Starnberger See, hier auf diesem Grundstück, zu erwerben, wurde der General zu einem begeisterten Segler. Unten am Ufer liegt sein neues Boot. Auf einer Ausstellung in Essen hatte er es gesehen und dann telefonisch gekauft, preiswert, für wenige tausend Mark. („Mit Aufleger natürlich, damit ich es transportieren kann.“)

Reisen? Ohne Auftrag, der Amtspflichten ledig? Und freier als vorher, wie ein normaler Tourist? Ein langes Ja aus dem Munde des Präsidenten a. D. — doch da meldet sich die zweite Stimme, die Stimme des „Dr. Schneider“. Wahrscheinlich, sagt sie, werde ich aber vorher noch einiges zu erledigen haben. Und von der Freizeit wird bereits ein Stück abgestrichen.

„Ich werde Ihnen jetzt das Haus zeigen“, sagt der General, „wenn es Sie interessiert“. Wir treten auf eine kleine Wiese, um den Rundgang zu beginnen, und da erscheint Jochen Gehlen vor mir, wie man ihn von den alten Photos kennt: der Mann mit der dunklen Sonnenbrille, die ich zum erstenmal an ihm sehe. Den langen Strahlen der Abendsonne über dem See verdanke ich diesen Anblick. Würde er jetzt noch den Kragen hochschlagen, dann glähe er haargenau den Schilderungen, die ich früher über ihn gelesen habe.

Eigenheim aus dem Versandgeschäft

Das Haus ähnelt einem Bungalow und stammt aus einem Versandgeschäft. Ein paar Finessen vom Hausherrn selbst enthalten, wirken Wunder und lassen die Konfektion vergessen. So die Unterkellerung, so das eingebaute Doppelzimmer mit Schreibtisch, Gartenplatz und Wäand voller Bücher. So die kleine, voll automatische Küche. Ein Haus für ein Ehepaar, in dem auch noch ein Gast übernachten kann.

Das alte, das erste Haus, 50 Meter oberhalb gelegen, ein Holzhaus im Stil der Landschaft, hat den Sohn und dessen Familie aufgenommen. Christoph Gehlen ist Physiker in München. Kommen die beiden Töchter zu Besuch, dann können sie sich aussuchen, ob sie bei den Eltern oder beim Bruder wohnen wollen: Die Häuser liegen auf dem gleichen Grundstück.

Fortsetzung auf Seite 5



Er ist ein begeisterter Segler: Gehlen mit einer seiner beiden Töchter
Photo: Neue Revue

Nachbarn spielten für ihn Leibwache

Fortsetzung von Seite 3

Als der General mich durch das Haus führt, erinnert er sich an seine Besuche in Amerika. Besuchte er drüben ein Haus oder eine Wohnung, wurden ihm freimütig sämtliche Räume gezeigt. Er hält es genauso und läßt auch das Schlafzimmer nicht aus, obwohl die Hausfrau leisen Protest anmeldet, den Protest aller Hausfrauen zivilisierter Länder: Es ist doch nicht aufgeräumt! Und daß ich's nicht vergesse: Bei diesem Rundgang entdeckte ich schließlich doch noch etwas, das wenigstens entfernt an den aufregenden Beruf des Hausbesitzers erinnert. Ich meine den Batteriesatz für die Alarmanlage bei Gefahr.

Seltenerweise fand ich nirgends einen Fernsehapparat. Keine einzige der TV-Spionage- oder Geheimdienstserien hat General Gehlen je angeschaut. Sie sind alle sehr abenteuerlich, sage ich. Ja, antwortet der Fachmann, sicher auch romantisch, und dabei ist der moderne Nachrichtendienst mit seiner Elektronik und Computertechnik zum großen Teil Statistik, Aktenkram und Fleißarbeit.

Was läßt sich über die Person des Generals sagen? Daß er mittelgroß ist und einen grauen Anzug trägt, wissen Sie bereits. In einem ausländischen Pressebericht stand zu lesen, er sei kein Mensch, er sei ein Supermensch, habe kein Herz, sondern nur Gehirn. Ich kenne General Gehlen — ich muß betonen: als Außenstehender, als Journalist — seit vielen Jahren persönlich, und ich

halte diese Charakteristik für falsch. Er hat Herz und bringt für seine Umgebung Verständnis auf, er ist ein fürsorglicher Mensch. Ein Geheimdienst verlangt von



Lange Zeit gab es nur dieses Photo von ihm: Gehlen als Wehrmachts-offizier

seinem Chef zuweilen ernste Entscheidungen. Darin gipfelt die Problematik solcher Institutionen. Doch es gibt kein Zeugnis dafür, daß Gehlen je Humanität und menschliches Maß verleugnet hätte. Wäre er nicht Offizier geworden, dann hätte er sich wahrscheinlich der Medizin zugewandt. Psychologie und Psychiatrie interessieren ihn brennend. Seine Vertrauten behaupten, ein „Seelenarzt“ sei an ihm verloren-

gegangen. Seine Prägung erhielt er — Sohn eines Verlagsdirektors in Breslau — durch Reichswehr und Generalstab. Und da er sich in seiner Reichswehrzeit dagegen sträubte, zur „Abwehr“ versetzt zu werden, nennt er sich selbst einen Geheimdienstchef wider Willen.

In einem neuen französischen Buch („Le général gris“) findet sich über die äußere Erscheinung Reinhard Gehlens folgende Zusammenstellung aus verschiedenen Veröffentlichungen:

● Eine Mischung aus Intellektuellem, Tatmenschen und Diplomaten. Ähnelt einem britischen Kolonialobersten in Zivil. Trägt Hut mit verbeultem Rand und hochgestellten Mantelfragen. Sieht aus wie ein leitender Bankangestellter.

Nach der gleichen Quelle hat das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in Ostberlin folgendes Signalement bereit:

● Größe: 1,72 Meter. Figur: schlank. Haare: wenig, schütter, fast kahlköpfig. Gesicht: blaß. Nase: spitz. Grauer Schnurrbart wie Hitler. Gleicht einem Bankkaufmann. Trägt im allgemeinen Tirolerhut mit grüner Kordel, die abgetragen wirkt. Sportmantel in Trenchcoatform.

Ich hoffe, die Sicherheitsbestimmungen des BND nicht zu verletzen, wenn ich feststelle, daß der Vergleich mit Hitlers Bart wohl nur polemisch gemeint sein kann. Der von Gehlen ist eleganter.

Copyright: Jochen Wilke und „Neue Revue“